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Escalation of Commitment (EoC) behaviour occurs when a Decision Making Unit 
(DMU), such as an individual or group, continues with a course of action despite 
receiving negative feedback about it. Much research exists, within multiple disciplines, 
which attempts to explain why DMUs continue with failing courses of action. To date 
however, there has been very little critical inquiry of such research. Using a historical 
research approach, this thesis reviews and critically assesses all existing EoC behaviour 
research and concludes that a number of serious issues exist. These include the use of 
multiple labels by authors to describe the phenomenon; the considerable uncertainty that 
exists regarding which DMUs are subject to EoC behaviour; the existence of multiple, 
concurrent definitions for each ‘theory label’ and important EoC behaviour concepts, 
such as escalation, DMU, resource, success, failure and commitment, not being 
adequately defined. It is contended that these and other issues exist primarily because of 
the scope of the phenomenon and the resultant high quantity and complexity of research; 
all of which impair research technique. However, independent, pre-existing research 
technique issues are also proposed as reasons. Ultimately, it is argued that the state of 
EoC behaviour research is poor. It is considered that the mere recognition of the issues 
raised in this thesis will assist in the improvement of the research. Yet this aspect in 
isolation is deemed inadequate. In response, a prescriptive technique is developed which 
is bifurcated between resolutely defining the important concepts related to EoC behaviour 
research and creating an ‘integrated framework’ which includes all existing EoC 
behaviour determinants from all research disciplines. The proposed framework also 
identifies a number of new potential determinants of EoC behaviour, including the 
Autoepistemic Sunk Cost Effect (ASCE), the age of the DMU and anthropomorphic 
revenge motives. It is suggested that these two prescriptive responses will also promote 
focussed future EoC behaviour research, designated in the thesis as research direction. 
This thesis contributes to existing knowledge by not only recognising research issues that 
have not previously been acknowledged but also by prescribing for these issues through a 
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1.1 Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis concerns Escalation of Commitment (EoC) behaviour. Fundamentally, 
EoC behaviour occurs when a Decision Making Unit (DMU) – an individual or a group, 
for example – continues to invest in an ongoing project/situation, despite it receiving 
negative feedback and there being uncertainty concerning the likelihood of ultimate 
success. Specific EoC behaviour research is widely recognised to have originated with a 
paper1 by Professor Barry Staw in 1976. Here, Staw argues that an individual is more 
likely to reinvest in a failing situation if he made the original investment decision,2 
because he does not want to admit to himself that he made a mistake regarding the initial 
investment.3 Staw contrasts this self-justification approach against traditional cognitive 
dissonance theory;4 the difference being that in Staw’s experiments the actor has a 
possibility to make good on his investment and thus reduce dissonance, whereas an actor 
forced to argue against his own opinion on abortion, for example, with no obvious 
reward, has no further means to reconcile his dissonant feelings. In the latter situation, 
Staw argues that the individual may change his opinion, to reduce dissonance.5
The list of determinants that explain EoC behaviour has expanded dramatically 
since the 1970s. In 1997
 
6
                                               
1 B. M. Staw, ‘Knee Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of 
Action’, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1976, pp. 27-44 




6 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update and Appraisal’, in Z. Shapira (Ed.), 
Organizational Decision Making, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 191-215 
 Staw produced his most recognised framework, which 
integrates other EoC behaviour researchers’ findings and includes numerous 
psychological, economic and organisational determinants, including a need to save face, 
consideration of sunk costs and detrimental organisational culture. Many researchers 
investigate EoC behaviour, predominantly within the field of social science. This field 
however covers multiple disciplines; including economic theory, organisational theory, 
international relations (IR) theory, decision making theory, argumentation theory and 
 2 
philosophy. EoC behaviour is even recognised in the ‘hard’ sciences of biology/ecology. 
The Concorde Fallacy, founded by Professor Richard Dawkins and T. R. Carlisle,7 details 
the apparent irrational EoC behaviour of animals and insects. For example, the fallacy is 
argued to occur when animals apparently protect their young from predators in proportion 
to how much energy they have expended upon their young up to the time of an attack. 
Thus, relatively less developed offspring are more likely to be abandoned. Similarly, 
digger wasps8 are argued to commit the Concorde Fallacy when two of them fight for 
dominance over a nest which, up to the point at which they meet, they unknowingly 
share. The wasps apparently fight with effort proportional to the amount of dead 
caterpillars each has contributed to the nest, not the total amount of prey stored. Thus, 
wasps which have contributed the least generally quit before their opponents, losers 
dictate the fight length and the major contributor is more likely to gain control of the nest, 
not necessarily the fittest wasp. The Concorde Fallacy is disputed however; such dispute 
based upon animal intelligence/reasoning research gaps9
Aside from Staw, the three most prominent EoC behaviour authors are Arkes, 
Brockner and Teger.
 and environmental variables. 
While not as pertinent to this thesis as the social science based research, Dawkins and 
Carlisle’s theory is applied to IR examples by authors. Importantly, Dawkins and 
Carlisle’s subject emphasises how relevant EoC behaviour is to all aspects of human and 
animal behaviour. 
10
                                               
7 R. Dawkins and T. R. Carlisle, ‘Parental Investment, Mate Desertion and a Fallacy’, Nature, Vol. 262, 
No. 5564, 1976, pp. 131-133 
8 R. Dawkins and H. J. Brockman, ‘Do Digger Wasps Commit the Concorde Fallacy?’, Animal Behaviour, 
Vol. 28, No. 3, 1980, pp. 892-896 
9 Animal reasoning has strong philosophical, not just biological, foundations. The most interesting 
philosophical investigations include Chrysippus’ Dog and, pejoratively, Burridan’s Ass. 
10 For example, H. R. Arkes and C. Blumer, ‘The Psychology of Sunk Cost’, Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1985, pp. 124-140, J. Brockner and J. Z. Rubin, Entrapment 
in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis, (New York, USA: Springer-Perlag, 1985) and 
A. I. Teger, Too Much Invested to Quit, (New York, USA: Pergamon, 1980). 
 All three authors investigate EoC behaviour, but from within 
different social science disciplines; adopting different foci and utilising different rubrics 
from Staw and each other. Brockner and Teger investigate EoC behaviour predominantly 
in the discipline of IR, under Entrapment and Too Much Invested To Quit (TMITQ) 
respectively. Arkes examines EoC behaviour primarily in the arena of economics, under 
The Sunk Cost Effect (SCE). 
 3 
There is however extremely little research that deals with the historiography of EoC 
behaviour research: how EoC behaviour has been researched, how such research has been 
integrated into the academic domain and what state the research is considered to be in. 
Given that specific EoC behaviour research is now over thirty years old, this is a gap that 
must be closed. This thesis therefore critically examines EoC behaviour research. 
This thesis demonstrates that many complex issues exist within EoC behaviour 
research and, although some of these issues are not dissimilar to those recognised in other 
research areas, the problems present within EoC behaviour research are shown to be more 
ingrained, more unique and more serious than those suffered by other fields.11 There is a 
slipperiness and precariousness12
The thesis in its current form originated from the perceived absence of an IR model 
of the Concorde Fallacy, which at the time of preliminary reading was thought to exist 
solely in the biological context and to constitute the entire research/literature of EoC 
behaviour. Only after further reading was it discovered that EoC behaviour is studied 
under many rubrics, in many disciplines – including IR – and to varying degrees of 
development. These discoveries were made through Concorde Fallacy texts referring to 
other EoC behaviour rubrics and texts, which were then studied. However, as the 
literature was studied further it appeared to betray pathological, exigent errors. Thus, as 
the former issues undermined the initial goal of creating a unique IR model of the 
Concorde Fallacy, the latter issues undermined the feasibility of the author undertaking 
any non-critical EoC behaviour research. Consequently, the thesis became more critically 
driven; concerning the quality of all EoC behaviour research; crafted out of inductive 
observations; rather than simply being – to adopt an analogy from John Dumbrell – “a 
hammer looking rather desperately for nails to strike.”
 regarding EoC behaviour research, leading this thesis 
to ultimately argue that the state of this research is extremely poor. 
13
In précis, one key issue is that there is a superfluity of labels used by EoC 
behaviour researchers to describe the phenomenon. Furthermore, many authors claim one 
 
                                               
11 For example, H. Wallace and W. Wallace, Policy-Making in the European Union (4th Ed.), (Oxford, UK: 
OUP, 2000), p. xx. 
12 J. Dumbrell, ‘Winston Churchill and American Foreign Relations: John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush’, 
Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2005, p. 35. Originally, this description relates to “the 
Churchillian anti-appeasement theme.” 
13 J. Dumbrell, ‘American Isolationism: A Response to David Hastings Dunn’, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, 2005, p. 700 
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EoC behaviour theory is synonymous with another despite others claiming that such 
theories are different (‘partial synonymy’). Such claims are argued to be highly 
questionable however given another issue: that each theory has a vast number of 
interpretations – differing in their complexity regarding determinants and applications of, 
and what ‘conditions’ are deemed necessary for, EoC behaviour – that are in concurrent 
circulation in the academic domain. One particularly significant and multifaceted 
definitional ambiguity regards the DMU. Immediately problematic is that ‘DMU’ is not 
defined by any EoC behaviour author; in terms of what a DMU’s function and nature is 
and what types of DMU exist. Furthermore, there is considerable ambiguity regarding 
which DMUs are subject to EoC behaviour. Currently, such information is merely 
‘inferred’ from the language used by EoC behaviour authors.14 However, this issue is 
more complex than implied here; and should be regarded in conjunction with chapter 
five. Some simpler and more general issues exist however, such as mass duplication of 
research,15 claims of novel discoveries or principles that turn out to be erroneous or 
unoriginal,16 some rubric definitions being internally conflicting,17 EoC behaviour 
authors misrepresenting one another’s views18
The reasons for which such issues exist are considered many and multipart and this 
précis cannot accommodate all the proposed complexities. Put simply however, a number 
of issues are believed to stem from another, previously undiscussed, issue: poor or 
inconsistent background reading techniques on the part of the researcher. Other possible 
reasons include a hypothetical construct of this thesis, labelled as semantic errors: subtle 
changes to a definition as it is transferred from one piece of research to another. Claims 
 and authors changing their preferred 
terminology mid-text. Furthermore, conceptual ambiguity is endemic in EoC behaviour 
research with concepts including escalation, commitment and rationality being either not 
discussed or having vastly different connotations to different authors. 
                                               
14 All EoC behaviour authors, including Staw, Brockner, Arkes and Teger, are implied in this argument. 
15 For example, A. Gerritt, ‘Entrapments in Risky Investments’, Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 24, No. 
3, 1995, pp. 447-462. 
16 For example, P. Ayton and H. Arkes, ‘Call it Quits’, New Scientist, Vol. 158, No. 2135, 1998, p. 41. 
17 For example, R. Paraye, ‘The Strategic Implications of Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Perspective’, Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1995, pp. 418-419. See section 6.11 of this thesis. 
18 For example, M. G. Bowen, ‘The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or Decision 
Errors?’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1987, pp. 52-66. See section 6.16 of this 
thesis. 
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of synonymy are also thought to contribute to some of the issues described above, by 
encouraging authors to transfer definitions or aspects of one EoC behaviour rubric to 
another and using these under the label of the second theory. It is believed that complex, 
interactive and possibly cyclical relationships exist between many of the issues discussed 
above, with some issues being immediately conducive to others. These ‘causative’ issues 
are termed here intermediate issues, in opposition to the ‘non-causative’ immediate 
issues. However, it is believed that ultimate responsibility for the issues under discussion 
lies with what are termed overriding issues. These issues include the scope of EoC 
behaviour and the resultant quantity of EoC behaviour research which, in conjunction 
with a hypothesised chronological process, limit adequate research. Some issues 
however, can only really be explained as the result of poor research practice by EoC 
behaviour authors. Some issues fall into both categories. Equally important, and a further 
component of this inadequate research approach, it is argued that the current troublesome 
situation has arisen and perpetuates because of the ignorance of EoC behaviour authors 
to the issues described above. Furthermore, in rare cases where issues are recognised, it 
is contended that the solutions devised to address them are counterproductive. 
It is argued in this thesis that the mere recognition of the issues under discussion 
will help combat the degradation of EoC behaviour research and, by association, EoC 
behaviour theory. However it is also contended that two further solutions are required to 
generate improvement of the research: a full exploration of the conditions and concepts 
that are argued to be ambiguous, with a summative interpretation of each proposed and a 
truly integrated framework of EoC behaviour determinants which includes all existing 
EoC behaviour determinants from all EoC behaviour labels and all EoC behaviour 
disciplines. This thesis effects these solutions. Importantly, ideas by the author of this 
thesis are also presented in the framework. These ideas involve (1) entirely new DMU 
and non-DMU specific determinants from the author, inspired by background reading of 
EoC behaviour and non-EoC behaviour literature, (2) existing determinants of non-EoC 
behaviour theories that may apply to EoC behaviour and (3) new DMU applications of 
existing EoC and, where applicable, non-EoC behaviour determinants. The new ideas, it 
is contended, not only provide a richer picture of EoC behaviour than would otherwise 
exist, but also provide inspiration and – crucially – direction for future EoC behaviour 
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research; something which is felt to be sorely lacking currently. Indeed, numerous facets 
of the proposed solutions serve this important purpose. 
 
1.2 The Hypotheses, Objectives and Research Question of the Thesis 
 
This thesis utilises two hypotheses, two objectives and one research question to 
arrive at its conclusions. The first hypothesis argues that EoC behaviour research suffers 
from a number of complex, problematic issues. Fulfilling the intuitive requirements of 
this hypothesis, the first objective is to describe these issues and the second is to suggest 
the causes and effects of these issues. Proceeding from this set of arguments, hypothesis 
two argues that the overall state of EoC behaviour research is extremely poor. Finally, 
the research question asks: “Based upon the findings of the hypotheses and objectives, 
how can the state of EoC behaviour research be improved?” 
 
1.3 The Structure of the Thesis 
 
The structure of the thesis reflects its historiographical foundation, in addition to 
the nature of its hypotheses, objectives and research question. The thesis adopts a 
‘traditional’ nine chapter approach. Chapter two addresses the methodology of the thesis 
and explains how the adoption of a historical approach best served its goals. Chapters 
three to five primarily serve a complete “ground clearing”19 literature review purpose. 
Chapter three describes in detail EoC behaviour and explains the origins of EoC 
behaviour research. Staw’s EoC research and the evolution of his framework are 
comprehensively examined20
                                               
19 J. Dumbrell, ‘Was there a Clinton Doctrine? President Clinton’s Foreign Policy Reconsidered’, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, p. 43 
20 Comprehensively examined because Staw is considered to be the founder of specific EoC behaviour 
research (under ‘Escalation of Commitment’). Furthermore, because a temporal, staged process is 
suggested in chapter seven to be in play for many of the issues encountered, a detailed, chronological 
description of the progression of Staw’s work is considered to be essential for the reader. 
 and a number of the posited issues are briefly examined 
apropos this research. Ancillary EoC behaviour research, from several social science 
disciplines, is then examined and more issues are introduced. Chapter four examines EoC 
behaviour research specifically in the social science discipline of IR. Brockner’s 
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Entrapment, Teger’s TMITQ and related, theories are examined here. Throughout this 
chapter, the issues outlined in chapter three are shown to exist in this literature too. New 
issues are also implied. Chapter five explores in detail the DMU issue and examines EoC 
behaviour literature that explicitly recognises the group as a DMU. In addition to 
implying the basic DMU points made in this introductory chapter, chapter five makes 
more detailed arguments, through a ‘classification scheme’ of author behaviour. A 
number of issues are then discussed relating to this scheme. The review chapters, then, 
also serve to introduce some of the issues posited in the proceeding analytical chapters, 
as well as removing the need for lengthy examples there; reducing sentence complexity 
and fog index21
                                               
21 The fog index is a measure of sentence readability. As longer syllable words are included in the sentence, 
and/or as the sentence becomes longer, the index increases, as argued by P. Dunleavy, Authoring a PhD, 
(London, UK: Palgrave, 2003), p. 108. 
 count. Chapter six ‘isolates’ and explores further all the issues that are 
highlighted in the previous three chapters and raises issues not previously discussed. 
Chapter seven suggests the causes and effects of the issues raised in chapter six. The 
chapter then delivers an informed judgement as to the overall state of EoC behaviour 
research. Proceeding from this judgement, chapter seven prescribes steps that, it is 
believed, will improve the state of EoC behaviour research. Chapter eight puts into 
practice these recommendations. Finally, chapter nine discusses the thesis’ core findings, 
evaluates the validity of the hypotheses, objectives and research question, reflects upon 
the methodology adopted and outlines the priorities for future EoC behaviour research. 
The thesis structure then, as well as reflecting the purpose of the thesis, mirrors the order 
of its hypotheses, objectives and research question; with chapter seven forming the 
theoretical ‘bridge’ between problem recognition and solution implementation. This 
concludes the introduction. The following chapter discusses the methodology used to 




This chapter addresses the methodology through which the hypotheses, objectives 
and research question were examined. Essentially, this study is a linear analytic1 thesis 
comprising of an exploratory2 historiographical critique of research that studies 
Escalation of Commitment (EoC) behaviour. There is no all-encompassing definition of 
historiography.3
The study of the way history has been and is written…the history 
of historical writing…. When you study ‘historiography’ you do 
not study the events of the past directly, but the changing 
interpretations of those events in the works of individual 
historians
 The term is broadly interpreted as the study of the academic discipline 
of history, principally history writing, its development and its changing methodological 
approaches, over time, including within different cultures and ‘ages’. It is another, 
complementary, interpretation of historiography, however, which is considered to be the 
most important in relation to this thesis’ methodology: that of the study of a specific body 
of historical writing, written at a specific time concerning a specific subject. Furay and 
Salevouris define historiography as: 
 
4
The designation of historiography to this thesis is justified in sections 2.1 and 2.2, 
since it is recognised that the specific methodology employed here is not a typical or 
‘strict’ application of the approach. However, consider immediately that the validity of 
EoC behaviour theory was not being tested in this thesis – though conclusions were 
inevitably arrived upon – nor were specific determinants or conditions of the behaviour 
purposefully isolated for validation. Rather, it was how EoC behaviour research is 
performed, how this research is treated by EoC behaviour researchers and the overall 
 
 
                                               
1 R. B. Burns, Introduction to Research Methods (4th Ed.), (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2000), p. 493. 
A linear analytic thesis is one which adopts the straightforward or ‘traditional’ thesis structure of 
introduction, statement of problems, methodology, literature review, research analysis and conclusions. 
2 G. Wisker, The Postgraduate Research Handbook, (London, UK: Palgrave, 2001), p. 120. According to 
Wisker, exploratory research is used “when new knowledge is sought…or when new events, actions or 
symptoms need discovering….” 
3 H. Ritter, Dictionary of Concepts in History, (Connecticut, USA: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 188-193 
4 C. Furay and M. J. Salevouris, The Methods and Skills of History: A Practical Guide (2nd Ed.), (New 
York, USA: Harlan Davidson, 1988), p. 223 
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state of EoC behaviour research that were the primary concerns here. Many authors adopt 
the historiographical approach; studying how events or people are recorded rather than 
critically analysing the subject matter itself.5 This thesis replicates this form of 
investigation, but as a critical historiography of a theory: EoC behaviour. It was 
considered that this atypical theoretical approach did not, however, require a vastly 
different methodological approach or “methodological sermonizing”6
This thesis adopts a historical approach
 than more 
‘traditional’ theses; historiographical or otherwise. 
 
2.1 A Historical Approach 
 
7 to address the hypotheses, objectives and 
research question. The reasons for which such an approach was adopted relate to the 
abandoned aim,8
                                               
5 For example, O. Daddow, ‘Rhetoric and Reality: The Historiography of British European Policy, 1945-
1973’, Ph.D Thesis, (Nottingham University, UK: 2000), O. Daddow, ‘The Construction of British 
Military Doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s’, Defence Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2003, pp. 103-113, E. H. Carr, 
What is History?, (New York, USA: Random House, 1961), M. Spongberg, Writing Womens’ History 
Since the Renaissance, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), M. R. Beard, Woman as a Force 
in History: A Study in Traditions and Realities, (London, UK: Macmillan, 1971) and B. G. Smith, The 
Gender of History: Men, Women and Historical Practice, (Massachusetts, USA: Harvard University 
Press, 2000). 
6 P. Grice, Aspects of Reason, (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 36 
7 The historical approach as discussed by authors including (historically) G. J. Garraghan, A Guide to 
Historical Method, (New York, USA: Fordham University Press, 1946), L. Gottschalk, Understanding 
History: A Primer of Historical Method, (New York, USA: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), R. J. Shafer, A 
Guide to Historical Method, (Illinois, USA: The Dorsey Press, 1974) and (contemporarily) C. B. 
McCullagh, Justifying Historical Descriptions, (New York, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1984), M. 
Howell and W. Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods, (Ithaca, New 
York, USA: Cornell University Press, 2001), E. A. Danto, Historical Research, (New York, USA: OUP, 
2008), D. A. Yerxa (Ed.), Recent Themes in Historical Thinking: Historians in Conversation, (South 
Carolina, USA: University of South Carolina Press, 2008) and others discussed in this chapter. 
8 See p.3 of this thesis. 
 which ultimately inspired the hypotheses, objectives and research 
question. The ‘exigent errors’ discovered during the initial study appeared to possess 
historical, chronological and cumulative elements, insofar as it appeared likely the errors 
were evolving and their causes and effects intuitively appeared to be explained by 
preceding and subsequent research respectively; relative to the piece of research where 
the error was being observed. The thesis required a historical approach therefore to test 
this observation; which was ultimately proven to be correct.  
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While the mechanics of the historical approach, applied specifically to this thesis, 
are discussed later in this chapter, several constituents of the approach, which were key to 
tackling this thesis’ aims, are discussed here – again, along with their specific application 
to this thesis – and thus serve to provide further evidence of the advantages to this thesis 
of adopting a historical approach. Discussing the cumulative development9 of EoC 
behaviour theory, through research, over time was an important consideration, for 
instance. As an example of this methodology in action, chapter three discusses 
comprehensively, and chronologically, Staw’s advancement of his EoC theory. Chapter 
four takes the same approach to Brockner’s, Rubin’s and Teger’s work and discusses too 
their (including Staw) interaction, commonalities and differences. Chapter six describes 
other authors’ work as ‘satellite literature’ to illustrate how they appear to both inspire 
and gain inspiration from the core authors’ research.10 Yet chapters six and seven argue 
that true cumulative development of EoC behaviour theory stalled early on in its lifespan 
and provide some explanation, using a chronological framework, as to why this is the 
case. The evolving academic context11 in which EoC behaviour research has been and is 
produced, and has developed was also deemed to be significant. Older theories – like 
forced compliance, in chapter three – are identified as the antecedents to contemporary 
EoC behaviour theory. Moreover, Groupthink12
                                               
9 The historical development approach to theories is taken by numerous historical accounts, covering a 
wide area of study, such as R. B. Myerson, ‘Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1999, pp. 1067-1082. An exploratory account of the 
history of theory is presented by Ian Hunter in I. Hunter, ‘The History of Theory’, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 
33, No. 1, 2006, pp. 78-112. 
10 There is a pseudo-prosopographical element active here, in terms of grouping the research activities of 
the core authors and observing their common/divergent behaviours. There is also an adversarial element, 
insofar as dividing authors into ‘core’ and ‘others’ categories. See: K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Ed.), 
Prosopography Approaches and Applications: A Handbook, (Oxford, UK: Prosopographica et 
Genealogica, 2007). 
11 The importance of context is described by authors such as Quentin Skinner and Preston King. 
Particularly relevant texts are P. King (Ed.), The History of Ideas, (New Jersey, USA: Barnes and Noble, 
1983) and Q. Skinner, ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory, Vol. 8, 
1969, pp. 3-53. 
12 I. L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (2nd Ed.), (Boston, 
Massachusetts, USA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982) 
 is used, in chapters five, six and seven, as 
a ‘contemporary comparison’ to illustrate how a theory which possesses a similar 
theoretical and chronological starting point as EoC behaviour theory and which suffers 
similar problematic research issues has nonetheless evolved, while EoC behaviour theory 
has remained largely static. Interaction between research on the two theories through time 
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is also shown. The evolution of recognised Decision Making Units (DMUs) is discussed 
too, as is the shift in the EoC behaviour research methodologies used. Identifying, 
historically, the ‘moment of crisis’13 in EoC behaviour research was also important, yet 
this proved difficult since, as argued in chapter seven, the growing crisis has been a 
gradual, cumulative process rather than a ‘sudden onset’. Moreover, whereas most 
paradigm and theory crises occur owing to new and conflicting discoveries,14
This final point, regarding the types of research issue, provides one of the reasons 
for which a historiographical methodology was adopted within the encompassing 
historical approach and justifies, to some extent, the use of the term here in the first 
place. A historiography relates broadly to the analysis of the discipline of history, 
historical writing, historical methodologies and the analysis of written history relating to 
a specific subject, over a specific time frame; all from an author-centric perspective. 
Taking this interpretation, one could immediately argue that this thesis does not actually 
constitute a historiography. Yet consider now of what this methodology does consist. Not 
only did the issues discovered during the abandoned study suggest historical, 
chronological and cumulative aspects to their existence, but also an important issue type 
was perceived to be related to author behaviour and author research technique. Thus, 
how authors behaved was a key facet of the subsequent examination of the research. Now 
consider the specific subject selected for this analysis: EoC behaviour theory, or, more 
correctly, its research. While not the traditional subject of historiographical analysis – 
people and events are the norm – and while not strictly ‘historical’, it is a subject 
nonetheless. Indeed, the historiography of a theory is not an isolated approach developed 
here, merely part of a minority of historiographies.
 the crisis of 
EoC behaviour is argued to be caused instead predominantly by research technique 
factors. Indeed, the lack of explicit recognition of a crisis by EoC behaviour authors is 
argued to be a causative factor of the crisis itself, in its current form. 
15
                                               
13 A number of diverse theories are observed to have suffered moments of crisis. Authors who discuss this 
include J. L. Comaroff, ‘Dialectical Systems, History and Anthropology: Units of Study and Questions of 
Theory’, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1982, pp. 143-172 and M. Edelson, 
Psychoanalysis: A Theory in Crisis, (London, UK: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).  
14 In intellectual history terms, T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago, USA: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1962), has particular relevance here. 
15 For instance, M. Blaug, ‘On the Historiography of Economic Thought’, Journal of the History of 
Economic Thought, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1990, pp. 27-37. 
 However, it is suggested here that 
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some studies which claim to be a historiography of a theory could be better interpreted as 
‘just’ a theory’s written history. Such a distinction however is a subjective one. The 
reasons for which this thesis is not simply a historical discussion of the evolution of a 
theory are subtle. The thesis (1) starts with a theory’s ‘problems’ and looks at their 
evolution, rather than the theory itself, (2) subsequently takes a highly critical perspective 
and (3) focuses greatly on author attitudes – and their impact on the research – within the 
research examination itself. Yet, one could argue that true historiographies analyse their 
subject’s literature within a specific timeframe. This thesis does not isolate the research in 
this way – all available research was used – but there are good reasons for this, notably 
that the thesis was of a purposefully critical nature, that EoC behaviour research had not 
been previously critiqued and that there was a presumption by the author at the beginning 
– from initial reading – that there existed an evolving cause and effect element to the 
issues. Thus we have the subject, the author-centricity and the historical nature. Yet, 
beyond the broad interpretation, the constituent parts of ‘historiography’ lend themselves 
well to this study too, and thus justify further its application of the term historiography as 
well. These constituents are discussed below, both in isolation and in terms of their 
application to this thesis’ methodology. 
 
2.2 A Critical Historiography 
 
Moving on from the standard definitions above, the questions historiographies 
traditionally address concern the reliability of both the methodologies adopted and the 
sources used in recorded history, in terms of authorship, author credibility, and the 
authenticity or corruption of the texts;16 the historiographical traditions or frameworks 
adopted;17 moral issues and guilt and praise assignment;18
                                               
16 That is to say higher, lower, external and internal criticism, as explained in N. A. Stahl and D. K. 
Hartman, ‘Doing Historical Research on Literacy’, in N. K. Duke and M. H. Mallette (Eds.), Literacy 
Research Methodologies, (New York, USA: The Guilford Press, 2004), pp. 170-196. 
17 For instance, big history, microhistory, cliometrics, Whig history, Marxism (after the Frankfurt School) 
and metahistory, explored by H. Whyte, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe, (Baltimore, Maryland, USA: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). 
18 M. Bentley (Ed.), Companion to Historiography, (London, UK: Routledge, 1997) and D. N. Robinson, 
Praise and Blame: Moral Realism and its Applications, (New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 
2002) 
 revisionist versus orthodox 
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interpretations19 and historical metanarratives.20 At a critical level, historiographies 
become more ‘theoretical’ – and esoteric21 – in nature. Questions concern what 
constitutes a historical ‘event’;22 the modes in which historians write and produce 
statements of ‘truth’ and ‘fact’,23 how the medium through which historical information 
is conveyed influences its meaning;24 the inherent epistemological problems archive-
based history possesses;25 how historians establish their own objectivity/come to terms 
with their own subjectivity;26 the relationship between historical theory and historical 
practice;27 establishing the ‘goal’ of history and exploring what history teaches us.28
Reliability is a major feature of this thesis; for instance, in terms of exploring how 
authors make erroneous claims, how they misrepresent other authors and how definitions 
become corrupted as they are transferred. Blame and praise assignment also feature, 
apropos observations from EoC behaviour authors as well as from this thesis’ author. 
 
                                               
19 The Cold War has orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist historical interpretations; see J. Nashel, 
‘Cold War (1945-91): Changing Interpretations’, in J. W. Chambers II (Ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
American Military History, (New York, USA: OUP, 1999), pp. 154-155 and J. L. Gaddis, We Now 
Know: Rethinking the Cold War, (New York, USA: OUP, 1997). This point is often related to praise and 
blame assignment. 
20 Metanarratives are discussed by J. Lyotard, La Condition Postmoderne: Rapport sur le Savoir, (Paris: 
Minuit, 1979). Blum’s work (cited below) also figures here. 
21 For example, some interpretations treat history writing as being a specalised form of historiography, 
instead of, traditionally, the reverse being the case. 
22 For instance, P. Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, (London, UK: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 
96-97, 112, 115. Various works by Mark. E. Blum also figure here. Three of his essays are contained in 
J. G. Backhaus (Ed.), Political Economy, Linguistics and Culture: Crossing Bridges, (New York, USA: 
Springer, 2008): M. E. Blum ‘Contrasting Historical-Logical Narrative Conventions in Germany and 
Austria and their Influence upon Inquiry and Explanation in the Arts and the Sciences: An Example from 
the Economic Inquiries of Gustav Schmoller, Max Weber, Carl Menger, and Ludwig von Mises’, pp. 59-
100, M. E. Blum ‘The European Metahistorical Narrative and its Changing “Metaparadigms” in the 
Modern Age (Part I)’, pp. 101-162 and M. E. Blum ‘The European Metahistorical Narrative and its 
Changing “Metaparadigms” in the Modern Age (Part II): Western Painting 1815-1914’, pp. 163-212. 
23 J. Topolski, ‘Conditions of Truth of Historical Narratives’, History and Theory, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1981, pp. 
47-60 
24 A. Briggs and P. Burke, A Social History of the Media, (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003) 
25 G. McCulloch, Documentary Research in Education, History and the Social Sciences, (London, UK: 
RoutledgeFalmer, 2004), pp. 51-73 and J. Tosh (Ed.), Historians on History: An Anthology, (Essex, UK: 
Pearson Education Limited, 2000). 
26 K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (London, UK: Routledge, 2002) 
27 M. Bunzl, Real History: Reflections on Historical Practice, (London, UK: Routledge, 1997), B. Croce, 
History: Its Theory and Practice, (Russell and Russell, 1960), L. Jordanova, History in Practice (2nd Ed.), 
(New York, USA: OUP, 2006), M. Bentley, Modern Historiography: An Introduction, (London, UK: 
Routledge, 1999) and A. Munslow, ‘Why Should Historians Write about the Nature of History (Rather 
than Just do it)?’, in Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2007, pp. 
613-625 
28 J. S. Blackie, What Does History Teach?, (Unknown: BiblioBazaar, LLC, 1886, 2008). The structure of 
this paragraph was informed partially by http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historiography, 2006-2009. 
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Metanarratives are examined in chapter seven when the – limited – explanations for the 
state of EoC behaviour research are studied. A metanarrative of sorts is also created here, 
to explain the reasons the proposed troublesome situation exists, from the author’s 
perspective. The word ‘critical’ is used in this thesis mainly to illustrate the approach 
taken when analysing the research, not to evoke academic definitions of ‘critical 
historiography’, although elements of these do feature here. For instance, the relative 
nature of truth is an important issue in this thesis, especially in chapter six, as are the 
issues of objectivity and subjectivity, significant in chapter eight. There is also an 
underlying discussion throughout the thesis of the schism between the ideals of historical 
theory and the realities of historical practice. Chapter seven, for example, discusses how 
literature reviews can be undermined by ‘literature overload’. Overall, it is agued here 
that, despite some aspects of the approach being marginally less relevant to the study, the 
hypotheses, objectives and research question are best served by a historiographical 
approach and moreover this thesis’ methodology is best described as such an approach. 
The historiographical approach is considered strong enough and elastic enough here to 
cope with this thesis’ unique aspects. 
Like many critiques, the research is heavily qualitative in nature. The qualitative 
features of the thesis are that the issues under analysis were only known roughly at the 
start of the thesis; the analysis was modified as the study unfolded; the author was the 
principal research gathering instrument; data was in the form of words;29
                                               
29 Although some numerical data was analysed in chapter eight (regarding the Vietnam War) the analysis of 
such data was qualitative. This is an important exception to the traditional qualitative/quantitative schism, 
as argued by D. Bouma and G. B. J. Atkinson, A Handbook of Social Science Research (2nd Ed.), 
(Oxford, UK: OUP, 1995), p. 206. They argue that “some of the data may be quantified, but the analysis 
is qualitative.” 
 the research 
was subjective, concerning both the author’s immersion in the study and the email 
respondents’ (discussed below); the data was rich in that it had many contextual features 
and the thesis was the first comprehensive critique of EoC behaviour research and thus 
the start of a new research path. The approach is also descriptive (in that the behaviour of 
EoC behaviour authors is being described) as well as correlational (in that correlational 
relationships between issues are hypothesised). Furthermore, the thesis uses both 
inductive and deductive approaches. The thesis is deductive in that it began with 
hypotheses, objectives and a research question which were then analysed against 
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observations made from the data. Importantly, from these observations the hypotheses 
were able to be confirmed or falsified. The thesis is inductive in that the hypotheses in 
particular were based upon observations made during preliminary reading of the 
literature, during the abandoned aim. These related approaches can be observed in figures 
2.1 and 2.2. Feasibly, these figures could be combined to illustrate one larger cyclical 
relationship. Overall, the research approach implemented here is one of lex 
parsimoniae;30 it adopts the most straightforward and obvious methodology to resolve 
the thesis’ aims. 
 
 
2.3 The Sources 
 
The thesis is predominantly literature based. Apart from a small number of books, 
the main research sources are papers that investigate EoC behaviour in terms of its 
determinants, applications and antecedent conditions. The research emerges from several 
disciplines, including economics, international relations (IR), organisational psychology 
and biology and investigates EoC behaviour under many rubrics, other than simply 
Escalation of Commitment, as Staw labels it. In addition to a critique of the existing 
                                               
30 This law is a shorthand version of ‘entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem’ (Ockham’s 
Razor), which dictates that the simplest and most straightforward approach to a problem is often the best. 
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literature, a complementary analysis of the responses of several key EoC behaviour 
authors to questions by email was undertaken.31
The method for recognising the relevant literature was a progressive, robust and 
bifurcated one that developed from the accidental discovery of other EoC behaviour 
literature during the abandoned study. Firstly, the bibliographies of preliminary research 
relevant to EoC behaviour were studied for further relevant research. These relevant 
papers and books were then gathered and their bibliographies too were studied. This 
process was repeated in a cyclical manner. However, not only were the bibliographies of 
these texts studied, but keywords in the text that stated other rubrics for EoC behaviour – 
like Entrapment, Sunk Cost Effect and Escalation of Commitment – were also noted. 
Once the bibliographies of all the gathered literature turned up no new research, the cycle 
 These questions regarded (1) authors’ 
understanding of key EoC behaviour concepts like commitment, escalation and sunk costs 
(2) their level of knowledge concerning the existence of other EoC behaviour research 
and other EoC behaviour rubrics and (3) their level of awareness of disagreements 
between EoC behaviour authors regarding the determinants, antecedent conditions and 
concepts of the behaviour. For the reasons given earlier, it was deemed that the entire 
collection of available research papers and books relevant to EoC behaviour should, as 
much as reasonably practicable, be included in the study. Simply, the critical aims of this 
thesis are not limited by timeframe, discipline or any other ringfencing measure common 
to historiographical methodologies of other theses. Both source types – literature and 
email communications – were considered primary sources, in that they give first hand 
accounts of the treatment and practice of EoC behaviour research. Given that EoC 
behaviour research itself is critiqued in this thesis, the typical application of a case study 
– to test a theory against a certain set of facts or within a historical environment – was 
deemed unsuitable. Instead, each piece of research and each email response was 
considered to be a case study, in that they each illustrate the state of EoC behaviour 
research, how such research is performed and how similar EoC behaviour research is 
treated by EoC behaviour researchers. One typical case study – the Vietnam Conflict – 
was undertaken in chapter eight, to illustrate the discussion of several vague concepts. 
                                               
31 J. Brockner, Personal Communication, (Email, 15/07/05), R. Dawkins, Personal Communication, (Email, 
02/11/04), I. McLean, Personal Communication, (Email, 21/10/04), B. M. Staw, Personal 
Communication, (Email, 23/07/05) and D. Walton, Personal Communication, (Email, 24/10/04) 
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of research gathering ended. The second phase of literature recognition then began. 
Keywords raised in the obtained research were inputted into the internet and library 
databases and used to find the details of relevant texts, which were then gathered. The 
bibliographies of these texts and material too were studied to find other research, which 
was then gathered and whose bibliographies were studied. New keywords were also 
noted in this literature so that when the cycle ran dry again, these keywords could be 
inputted into the internet and the cycle could begin again. The approach taken could be 
described as a form of snowball sampling, where new finds are recognised from existing 
ones, in a cyclical manner. The snowball method is a common and efficient qualitative 
approach for locating awkward/secretive social groups in a networking fashion;32
The actual gathering of the research was intermittent. A period of research 
gathering was followed by using the keywords gathered to find more research. This was a 
time consuming process, taking from September 2004 to August 2005, but was felt to be 
the most robust methodology for a comprehensive gathering of the relevant literature. In 
order to offset as much as possible the non-discovery of research released during the 
research gathering phase, all keywords were used in every keyword search, not just the 
newly discovered keywords. Importantly, issues that were emphasised during the 
 but it 
has hitherto not knowingly been applied where literature is the sample object. When 
inputting keywords into the internet, not only did they provide references for future 
literature gathering, they also provided ‘internet only’ articles, which did and did not 
have bibliographies. These articles were treated the same as the ‘hard’ research outlined 
above, apropos bibliographies and keywords. While the keywords generally related to the 
many names for EoC behaviour, some keywords related to subjects that are considered, 
here, to be closely related to EoC behaviour, but which are not discussed at length in EoC 
behaviour research. One such keyword was escalation, which generated much conflict 
theory literature. However, such literature was treated less exhaustively than the EoC 
behaviour literature insofar as the bibliographies of the texts were studied only for 
fundamental literature. This snowball methodology was repeated until it was considered 
that all relevant EoC behaviour research, as much as reasonably practicable, had been 
recognised and gathered. 
                                               
32 Burns, Introduction to Research…, p. 389 
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research gathering phase, such as the number of cycles needed, the quantity of literature 
gathered, the quantity of applicable keywords and the different interpretations of each 
rubric, reinforced the author’s initial opinion, generated when first looking at the 
Concorde Fallacy, that significant problems existed with EoC behaviour research; and so 
served to shape further – inductively – the ensuing critical analysis. 
Once the literature had been gathered, pre-existing issues and the issues and ideas 
generated while actually gathering the research were analysed from the perspective of 
each text. This was done to discover the frequency, seriousness and possible causes and 
effects of the issues and to provide specific examples of the issues within the thesis. 
While reading these texts in detail, to find specific instances of the issues thought to exist, 
new issues were also discovered, which were analysed, again from the perspective of 
each text. Together, these issues formed the critical analysis of EoC behaviour research. 
It is also the case that email contact was made with key EoC behaviour authors Barry 
Staw, Doug Walton, Iain McLean, Richard Dawkins and Joel Brockner. This contact was 
an ad hoc addition to the analysis methodology; made towards the end of the reading of 
the EoC behaviour literature; for several reasons. Firstly, it was considered that a form of 
triangulation33
                                               
33 W. L. Neuman, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (4th Ed.), (London, 
UK: Allyn and Bacon, 2000), p. 124. It is recognised here that triangulation is usually applied to three or 
more forms of analysis. 
 was needed in the analysis. In other words, two forms of investigation 
were considered better than just one. Furthermore, it was considered that the emails 
would provide authoritative supporting examples beyond the literature for some of the 
issues discussed (such as Staw, who agreed that there are problems with the definitions of 
many EoC behaviour rubrics). The emails also provided new issues for exploration (such 
as McLean and Walton being uncertain as to what other EoC behaviour research existed) 
and these issues provided possible explanations for some already recognised issues that 
were proving difficult to explicate. Similarly, the email issues appeared to provide 
consequences of other already recognised issues. Perhaps most importantly, it was felt 
that the existence, or at least the continued prevalence, of many of the issues discovered 
may have been dependent upon the extent of EoC behaviour authors’ knowledge of them. 
The emails served all these investigative angles. The selection of authors was subjective, 
but primarily based upon which authors were considered to be important. This 
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consideration was in turn based upon dating the EoC behaviour research to get some 
sense of who discovered what and when, and who are the founding authors of particular 
EoC behaviour rubrics and who are the ancillary authors. The authors’ email addresses 
were discovered from the abstract which accompanied most research papers, or from the 
internet. The email approach presented some minor ethical concerns. Although no 
purposeful deception34 was required, an academic incompetent35 element was deemed 
necessary to get honest responses. I did not tell the authors what issues I had already 
discovered in order to prevent them from reading further, which would have invalidated 
the principal role of the emails: to find out what they knew without prompting. I wanted 
to avoid as much as possible an experimental effect.36 For each email, I stated my name, 
title, institution and department; that the email was part of research taking a critical 
approach to EoC behaviour research and that the response would assist with this research. 
A response specifying no ‘conditions’ was deemed commensurate with having obtained 
Voluntary Informed Consent37
The research was actually obtained from many different sources, for efficiency and 
research availability reasons. Internet search engines and databases
 (VIC) for the author’s response to be used in the thesis. 
38 were preferred (to 
locate electronic/online versions of journals/research) followed by the Coventry 
University library database, other library databases39 and then the Coventry University 
Inter Library Loan40
                                               
34 Ibid., p. 95 
35 In other words, deception by playing down the level of my own knowledge, as described in Ibid., p. 349. 
36 P. McNeill, Research Methods (2nd Ed.), (New York, USA: Routledge, 1999), p. 55 
37 VIC is discussed in P. Oliver, Teach Yourself Research, (London, UK: Hodder and Stoughton, 2002), p. 
65. The Criteria selected to measure VIC in this thesis is found in P. M. Boynton, The Research 
Companion, (Hove, UK: Psychology Press, 2005), p. 91. 
38 Including http://www.web.ebscohost.com/ehost/selectdb?vid=1&hid=6&sid=957e232e-c769-4ade-9a3c-
88634ef1ca60%40sessionmgr9, 10/12/04, http://www.ingentaconnect.com/, 10/12/04, 
https://www.web.lexis-nexis.com/universe, 10/12/04 and http://www.sciencedirect.com/, 10/12/04. 
 (ILL) facility (delivering hard copies of research from real world 
interaction/visits). Rarely, and usually unsuccessfully, an email was sent to the author of 
a required research piece asking for a Portable Document Format (PDF) of it. However, 
when emailing authors regarding the issues concerning EoC behaviour, Staw provided 
39 In later cycles, the London-centric M25 Consortium of Academic Libraries Database (M25CALD) was 
predominantly used, http://www.m25lib.ac.uk/, 10/12/04. M25CALD searches multiple London libraries 
simultaneously. 
40 Here, a piece of research is ordered in from a library within the UK, by using the British Library location 
service. The ILL is a subsidised service from Coventry University, thus necessitating a cost-efficient 
search technique. 
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an unpublished/in progress chapter41 concerning EoC behaviour; handled identically to 
the other literature. The abstracts of any remaining missing research were then ‘internet 
searched’. The search was then abandoned and any remaining, missing research in the 
current cycle was struck from the bibliography. Although it is stated above that the 
significant literature gathering phase ceased in August 2005, research selection and 
collection – in a similar vein to the methodology already described – actually continued 
for the life of the research analysis phase and virtually up to the completion of the thesis, 
to ensure that newly released research, as much as reasonably practicable, was 
assimilated.42
A potential criticism of the thesis is that some elements of it could be considered 
hypothetical and ipse dixit. These descriptions however could only really apply to a very 
small number of what are termed the intermediate and overriding issues, but mainly to 
the causative relationships between all the issues – both discussed in chapter seven – and 
to the solutions, enacted in chapter eight. Thus, the thesis could be argued to be evidence 
based only in terms of the immediate and most of the intermediate and overriding issues, 
and much less so in terms of the relationships between them
 This was important, not least because of the thesis’ ‘completist/update’ 
credentials. The use of abstracts, missing research and the ongoing research gathering 
technique are all complex and somewhat interactive points; discussed further below. 
 
2.4 The Limitations of the Thesis and the Problems Encountered During the Study 
 
43
                                               
41 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: Steps Toward an Organizational Theory’, Working Paper, 
(California University, Haas School of Business, Berkeley, California, USA: 2004), pp. 1-36 
42 The need for constant searching is made by Boynton, The Research…, p. 61. 
43 Thus, potentially, the immediate, intermediate and overriding designations given may not be correct for 
some issues. 
 and the subsequent 
solutions. However, given that this thesis is the first substantial critical analysis of EoC 
behaviour research it was felt that attempting to prove definitively the ‘pathognomonic’, 
causative relationships between what were newly discovered and highly complex issues, 
although theoretically possible, was premature behaviour for what is effectively a driver 
of future – and, personally, post-doctoral – research. Specifically, it was deemed that 
attempting this extra investigation without the adequate method, motivation, scope or 
focus could lead to a post hoc ergo propter hoc situation. More practically, such was the 
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expected schism in methodologies between the current study and that which would have 
been needed (principally interviews but also content analysis, participant-observation, 
correlational and longitudinal research), that it was considered unreasonable to assume 
that both investigations could have occurred simultaneously. Furthermore, even if this 
super-mixed method approach had been adopted, the time and space limitations of a PhD 
would have infringed upon this dualist study. Thus, only the discovery and 
documentation of the majority of the issues themselves, coupled with suggested causative 
relationships between them and the suggested solutions to these issues, was considered 
the priority here. As an aside, it was deemed that even some of the complex hypothetical 
relationships between the issues (such as cyclical, direct, and indirect relationships) 
needed to be less detailed than they could have been, in order to keep focus on the issues 
themselves and to aid reader comprehension. Exploring the complete interactions of all 
issues, even hypothetically, was deemed counterproductive. The reasons the causative 
relationships were investigated at all were to facilitate future investigative research, to 
facilitate in determining the state of EoC behaviour research and to assist in developing 
the prescriptive measures; which too serve to facilitate future research. As a corollary to 
what has just been stated, it should also be noted that as well as the proposed solutions 
being hypothetical in their own right, they were logically, designed in light of the issues 
raised (of which some are hypothetical) as well as the hypothetical causative 
relationships between these issues. The crucial and unique point concerning the solutions 
is that unlike the other hypothetical elements, they could not be proved or disproved in 
the thesis, no matter what research approach was adopted. This is because the 
effectiveness of the solutions is reliant upon the observation of future EoC behaviour 
research after this thesis has been published; this thesis has to be in the public domain for 
it to be adopted and then ranked regarding its effectiveness at reducing the issues 
described. Significant longitudinal, interview, correlational and observation based 
research practices are considered here to be the key approaches required to establish the 
efficacy of the solutions. Positive longitudinal research – improvement of EoC behaviour 
research coupled with uptake of this thesis – could also theoretically bolster the validity 
of some of the other hypothetical issues described earlier, as well as delivering other 
conclusions; for instance, regarding the ‘wider message’ of the thesis made in chapter 
 22 
seven. Regarding the solutions themselves, certain elements of the solutions can only be 
validated by future research too; insofar as these elements merely constitute the opinions 
and ‘best guesses’ of this thesis’ author and require the future input and opinions, via 
discussions, papers/books and forums, of EoC behaviour researchers; owing to what 
could be termed significant ‘consensus’ gaps. In other words, the validity of these 
elements is conditional; based upon future analysis and comment by other EoC behaviour 
authors. This point is discussed further in chapters eight and nine. 
The more tangible problems encountered during the research are typical to PhD 
theses (time pressures, frequent and intense research gathering cycles, organisation 
problems associated with the large quantity of research and research gathering 
difficulties). Several interconnected issues in particular deserve further discussion here. 
First, approximately 10-15% of the desired EoC behaviour research – discovered in all 
periods of searching – was completely untraceable and thus struck from the 
bibliography.44
                                               
44 In bibliographic form, Arkes, H. R. and L. Hutzel, ‘The Role of Probability of Success Estimates in the 
Sunk Cost Effect’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2000, pp. 295-306, Arkes, H. 
R. and L. Hutzel, ‘Waste Heuristics: The Desire not to Waste Versus the Desire for New Things’, in M. 
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Potential Loss in the Influence of Affect on Risk-Taking Behavior’, Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1988, pp. 181-193, Awasthi, V. N. et al., ‘VIP Company: A Mini 
Case for Reinforcing Students’ Understanding of Sunk Costs, Ethics and the Role of Management 
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7, No. 2, 2004, pp. 3-5, Bazerman, M. H., ‘The Relevance of Kahneman and Tversky's Concept of 
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Bower, J. L. and C. G. Gilbert (Eds.), From Resource Allocation to Strategy, (New York, USA: OUP, 
2005), Brecher-Kellerman, E. G., ‘Good Feelings, Bad Decisions: Mood Induction and Escalation of 
Commitment’, Dissertation Abstracts International, Vol. 62, No. 5-B, 2001, p. 2524, Brockner, J. and B. 
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 This figure resulted despite searching again, periodically, for research 
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that was marked as ‘unobtainable’, in case circumstances had changed. This has 
numerous implications for the validity of the thesis. Importantly, the missing research 
may have caused problems already outlined in the thesis related to ‘research technique’, 
such as claims of originality and erroneous arguments, on my part. Furthermore, gaps in 
the historiography element were created, especially from an ‘author specific’ 
chronological viewpoint. Logically, not having a piece of research also meant that its 
bibliography could not be read and hitherto undiscovered keywords may not have been 
found, meaning other important research may also have been missed; though this is 
hypothetical. This point is linked to another regarding missing research. One could argue 
that despite a thorough search, hitherto ‘unknown’ research could still exist; that is to say 
research not discovered in any bibliographies or databases/internet or perhaps simply 
‘missed’ by the author. Indeed, one could carry the criticism further and argue that 
important analytical points in research were also missed. These arguments are 
hypothetical however, but would be likely to have the same consequences as those 
discussed above. In partial mitigation however, particularly in acknowledgement of 
similar criticisms levelled, by this thesis, at other EoC behaviour authors, (1) these issues 
have clearly been discussed above (indeed authors not doing this could be an ‘issue’ in 
itself) (2) similar criticisms of authors predominantly regard research that was found by 
this thesis’ author but not them (though it is possible that it was not available to them at 
that time, on some occasions) and (3) unobtainable research has been listed in the 
footnote above as a ‘stop-gap’ response to the argument that this thesis’ research is 
incomplete, in the hope that this research may be located by the reader or become 
available in the future. Moreover, in a small number of cases, abstracts only were 
studied. Although not a perfect solution – important aspects may have been missed – it 
                                                                                                                                            
16, No. 11, 1997, pp.1153-1161, Strube, M .J. and C. L. Lott, ‘Time Urgency and the Type A Behavior 
Pattern: Implications for Time Investment and Psychological Entrapment’, Journal of Research in 
Personality, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1984, pp. 395-409, Tan, H. T. and J. F. Yates, ‘Financial Budgets and 
Escalation Effects’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 87, No. 2, 2002, pp. 
300-322, Teger, A. I., ‘The Effect of Early Cooperation on the Escalation of Conflict’, Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1970, pp. 187-204, Wagner III, J. A. (Ed.), Advances in 
Qualitative Organization Research Volume One, (Greenwich, Connecticut, USA: JAI Press, 1998), 
Wang, J. and M. Keil, ‘A Meta-Analysis Comparing the Sunk Cost Effect for IT and Non-IT Projects’, 
Information Resources Management Journal, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2007, pp. 1-18, Wong, K. F. E., ‘The Role 
of Risk in Making Decisions under Escalation Situations’, Applied Psychology: An International 
Review, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2005, pp. 584-607. 
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was considered that this was a better approach than ignoring the abstracts and classifying 
such research as ‘unobtainable’. In mitigation, the use of abstracts was uncommon. A 
related issue here concerns the ongoing research selection and collection that occurred 
after August 2005. The first point to make here is that relatively more recent research 
appeared to present a higher proportion of ‘unobtainability’. This may have been because 
the research had not been ‘embedded’ sufficiently in databases, the internet and library 
collections. By extension of this argument, one could also argue that ‘unknown’ research 
would be more likely to be of a relatively newer nature too. One must also consider that 
although research selection and collection was deemed important, after August 2005 this 
process had to compete with the analytical and practical phases of the thesis. A balance 
had to be struck for this division of labour. Given the nature of research, it was 
acknowledged too that research was being released45
Data regarding the Vietnam Conflict (especially the dollar cost of the action per 
year) was extremely difficult to locate. The US Census Bureau, the US Department of 
Defence, veterans’ websites and other potential gatekeepers
 constantly. A minor issue related to 
this acknowledgement is that of the schism between research completion date and 
research publication date. Because of this, it is potentially debatable who actually made 
some particular discoveries/observations. Furthermore, ‘new findings’ may have been 
published in this interval. Both arguments here could explain some ‘conflict issues’ 
related to the research. Upon publication, this thesis is likely to be included in this debate. 
46 of this information did not 
have the data or did not reply to requests. There were also the “vagaries of document 
declassification”47 to contend with. This experience provided an ironic reply to Bulmer’s 
rhetorical question.48 The desired ‘economic cost’ Vietnam data was ultimately not 
retrieved. Economic cost data that was49
                                               
45 ‘Released’ here and above means (1) the release of ‘new’ research, (2) the release of older research 
whose existence was previously unknown or (3) the release of research whose existence was known but 
was previously unobtainable. 
46 Neuman, Social Research Methods…, p. 352 
47 J. Dumbrell and S. Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives 1966-1967: Marigolds, 
Sunflowers and ‘Kosygin Week’’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2003, p. 113 
48 M. Bulmer, ‘Why don’t Sociologists Make More Use of Official Statistics?’, Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 4, 
1980, pp. 505-523 
49 Dollar data was eventually retrieved from the Virtual Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University, 
Lubbock, Texas, (http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu, 22/09/07) in the form of congressional documents. 
 located related to groups of years (for instance, 
the war’s total cost), single years or incomplete single year ‘chains’ (for example, up to 
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1971). Moreover, there were multiple author interpretations of what this ‘dollar cost’ 
data consisted of anyway; meaning that this data could not be combined. Ultimately, this 
data was treated as indicative rather than definitive. Chapter eight discusses this subject 
further. Gatekeepers of another kind, librarians, in a number of London libraries refused 
the author access on the first visit, because they were unaware of the Society of College, 
National and University Libraries (SCONUL)50
                                               
50 SCONUL (http://www.sconul.ac.uk, 29/10/04) allows students from UK universities to enter and borrow 
research from the libraries of others. 
 scheme of which the author and their 
university are members. This delayed rather than prevented research gathering. This 
concludes the methodology chapter. Chapter three explores the meaning of EoC 
behaviour and instigates the examination of EoC behaviour research. 
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3.0 An Introduction to Escalation of Commitment Behaviour and to the Current State of 
Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
This chapter and the following two chapters have two main aims. The principal aim 
is to provide an introduction to the idea of Escalation of Commitment (EoC) behaviour, 
through the exploration of existing EoC behaviour research. Arising from this 
exploration, the second, more relevant aim, with regard to validating this thesis’ 
hypotheses, is to highlight elements of the research that give some suggestion as to its 
overall ‘state’. The introduction and investigation begins with a study of the founding and 
dominant theory in the entire EoC behaviour field: that of Professor Barry Staw and 
termed simply ‘Escalation of Commitment’. Following the exploration of Staw’s 
research, the potential issues that emerge from it are highlighted for later analysis. As 
well as some questions regarding Staw’s treatment of Decision Making Units (DMUs) 
and his level of inclusion of other EoC behaviour research in his framework, these 
problematic issues rudimentarily involve the absence of definitions for, and a lack of 
clear relationships between, important EoC behaviour ‘concepts’. The remainder of 
chapter three explores ancillary EoC behaviour in the realm of the non-international 
relations (IR) collective of literature, while chapter four investigates ancillary literature 
undertaken in the discipline of IR, since it is argued that EoC behaviour research is split 
between a large IR focussed body of work and a smaller body of work formed from a 
collective of related, non-IR disciplines. A number of new issues and as well as some 
similar to those discovered when analysing Staw’s research are discovered here. 
Continuing the overall examination of ancillary EoC behaviour research, chapter five 
investigates further the issue of the DMU, and EoC behaviour literature that recognises 
the group DMU. A number of important observations are made here that have 
significance for the rest of this thesis. It is contended that all the ancillary literature, 
despite the concerns raised, does contribute to Staw’s EoC theory and to the greater EoC 
behaviour concept. In the conclusion to this series of chapters, the many findings that 
have been discussed are summarised and the purpose of the ensuing chapter is set out. 
 
 29 
3.1 The Origins and Evolution of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research: Staw’s 
Escalation of Commitment Framework 
 
The term ‘Escalation of Commitment’ entered modern social science parlance 
through a psychology based paper, in 1976, by Barry Staw.1 Here, Staw argues that 
following negative feedback in an investment decision context,2 the decision maker 
would increase his total investment, to “self-justify”3 his original decision; he would 
continue with the course of action in the hope of ultimately proving his original decision 
was right, though at risk of incurring further negative feedback. This assumption was 
based upon Staw’s observations of cognitive dissonance/distortion literature which 
discusses events where negative feedback cannot easily be changed, particularly in so-
called forced compliance experiments.4 Here, one is forced to undertake an unpleasant 
task/series of tasks, such as discrediting one’s opinions or eating an unpleasant food. 
Negative consequences follow this counterattitudinal action and since no external 
reward/compensation is offered – to ‘permit’ internal justification – the actor will distort 
his opinions relating to the tasks, to reduce dissonance. In an unpublished chapter,5
                                               
1 B. M. Staw, ‘Knee Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of 
Action’, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1976, pp. 27-44 
2 Ibid., p. 28. Investment decision contexts are “situations in which resources are allocated to one decisional 
alternative over others, and in which the level of resources can be increased or decreased at the discretion 
of decision-makers.” 
3 Ibid., p. 29. According to http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn2.1, justification is generally 
taken to mean “a statement in explanation of some action or belief” or “something (such as a fact or 
circumstance) that shows an action to be reasonable or necessary.” Thus self-justification is justifying an 
action to oneself. 
4 L. Festinger and J. M. Carlsmith, ‘Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance’, Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, Vol. 58, 1959, pp. 203-210 
5 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: Steps Toward an Organizational Theory’, Working Paper, 
(California University, Haas School of Business, Berkeley, California, USA: 2004), pp. 4-5 
 given 
to this thesis’ author by Staw, Staw relates a real life ‘dissonance and attitude change’ 
experience, suffered by Vietnam Conflict draft dodgers who joined the Reserve Officers 
Training Corps (ROTC) to delay drafting yet subsequently received high draft ‘lottery’ 
numbers. Similarly, in a situation where more ‘tangible’ losses (for instance, money) 
cannot be refunded or recouped following a setback, an actor will tend to distort the 
feedback as less negative than it is and/or blame the situation on others and/or external 
events. 
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Staw argues however that investment decision contexts are one instance where an 
actor can “go beyond the distortion of negative consequences to rationalize a behavioral 
error…to take new and concrete actions to justify their behavior.”6 How the investor goes 
beyond distortion here is by “greatly enlarging the commitment of resources”7
The theory having begun in the milieu of forced compliance research, Staw 
critiques the two conditions ‘required’ for cognitive dissonance/forced compliance 
justification and then applies them to self-justification in an investment context scenario. 
In their original form, the conditions state: the actor must have “committed himself to 
behavioral consequences which are irrevocable or at least not easily changed” and the 
actor must “feel personally responsible for the negative consequences of his behavior…or 
at least receive a moderate degree of choice in his behavior.”
 to the 
failing task, to potentially rescue the situation and thus rationalise the initial decision. 
This, according to Staw, is the fundamental precept of EoC behaviour. A responsible 
actor continues his course of action despite (and because of) negative feedback, to self-
justify his initial decision. 
8 Staw modifies these 
qualifications, to distinguish between the occurrence of self-justification as a cause of 
investment context EoC behaviour and other behavioural phenomena were negative 
consequences may also increase one’s commitment to an investment decision; such as the 
Gambler’s Fallacy,9
Staw argues further that although the above conditions of responsibility and 
reconcilable consequences can occur as ‘separated’ factors in the above other 
 rationally maximising one’s outcomes or, in the case of prior 
responsibility, the need for consistent behaviour. Staw maintains that the personal 
responsibility condition for negative consequences is compatible with investment context 
EoC behaviour situations but he modifies the other which details ‘irrevocable’ negative 
consequences to discuss instead potentially reversible ones, (that is to say in terms of the 
action itself being an eventual success and/or in terms of costs that may still be sunk and 
non-refundable, but can be recouped in terms of eventual income or ‘face’). 
                                               
6 Staw, ‘Knee Deep…’, p. 28 
7 Ibid., p. 29 
8 Ibid., p. 28 
9 Ibid., p. 30. The gamblers fallacy, Staw argues, is the fallacious belief that “resources should always be 
placed upon the [currently] losing decisional alternative” since such continued failure would appear to 
signify an approaching success. 
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phenomena, only a self-justification explanation “would predict a [synergistic] interaction 
of personal responsibility and decision consequences such that increases in commitment 
would be even greater than the additive effects of these two separate factors.”10
Staw’s next paper, with Fox,
 What 
occurs however, as Staw’s EoC theory progresses, is that many more EoC behaviour 
drivers other than self-justification, including those dismissed above, are included. 
11 duplicates his previous paper’s fundamentals, in 
terms of the cause of EoC behaviour, yet includes the basis for his temporal model, 
discussed below. Staw and Fox suggest a ‘pathway’ of how EoC behaviour proceeds; 
initial escalation leads to a withdrawal followed by a period of reescalation.12 Yet, they 
also maintain that EoC behaviour generally is an “unstable phenomenon”13
It is Staw’s third paper, with Ross, however
 over time; 
EoC behaviour through self-justification does not have to occur in every situation where 
potentially redeemable negative consequences have been received by a responsible actor 
and, after a time of escalation, sooner or later, reinvestment will cease. This final 
argument however is dismissed in Staw’s later research. 
 
3.2 Moving Beyond Self-Justification 
 
14 that presents a fundamental shift from 
his previous research. Staw and Ross introduce new concepts, beyond the single self-
justification explanation, to elucidate the causes of EoC behaviour. Before they discuss 
these possible causes, they discuss further the incremental nature of EoC behaviour 
situations. Staw and Ross reaffirm that EoC behaviour situations are incremental in 
nature; “they are not,” as Staw says in a later text, “one-shot affairs.”15
                                               
10 Ibid., p. 30 
11 B. M. Staw and F. V. Fox, ‘Escalation: The Determinants of Commitment to a Chosen Course of 
Action’, Human Relations, Vol. 30, No. 5, 1977, pp. 431-450 
12 Ibid., p. 448 
13 Ibid., p. 447 
14 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Commitment to a Policy Decision: A Multi-Theoretical Perspective’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1978, pp. 40-64 
15 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update and Appraisal’, in Z. Shapira (Ed.), 
Organizational Decision Making, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 191 
 They posit that “it 
is extremely difficult for a policy maker to assess all the long range costs and benefits of 
a complex project and as a result many major resource allocation decisions are made a 
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step at a time.”16 Policy makers may sometimes become trapped in a particular course of 
action and rather than “accept an immediate loss and withdraw from a poor investment 
alternative, they may be prone to commit new and additional resources [to justify their 
actions and their costs]…a costly circle of escalation.”17 Thus, while ideally the 
incremental allocation of resources “should allow for feedback which in turn should 
enable organizations to avoid large expenditures on unsatisfactory or failing ventures,”18 
in reality it is possible for incremental resource allocation schemes to be “one of the most 
rather than least expensive forms of policy formation.”19
Alongside self-justification, Staw and Ross now discuss several other interacting 
factors that may affect the decision to escalate commitment following negative feedback. 
Complementing a model, (figure 3.1), they discuss first ‘reinforcement effects’. These are 
discussed on two levels
 
Staw and Ross follow this statement by clarifying the existing self-justification 
theory and establishing new EoC behaviour determinants. The clarification part of the 
paper simply elucidates an idea based on the non-recoupable/recoupable schism in Staw’s 
first paper: there are now two distinct self-justification forms. The first occurs when 
negative consequences are non-refundable (irreversible) and non-recoupable (no 
opportunity to turn the situation around) and there is personal responsibility. The second 
occurs when negative feedback is potentially recoverable; there is personal responsibility 
and the resultant self-justification need (in terms of the action and the initial costs) is met 
by reinvestment. The focus for EoC behaviour research is the latter form. 
20
                                               




20 Ibid., p. 41 
 and are considered to have an effect upon other subtheories 
examined in the same model. They argue first that after a loss/setback, an individual 
would always and immediately be disposed to cut investment in a course of action and 
invest in an alternative, because one’s rational actions are ‘reinforced’ by the setback. 
This does not appear to be immediately conducive to the fundamental tenet of EoC 
behaviour. However, more relevantly, they argue that commitment can be a function of 
one’s previous ‘reinforcement history’ (the history of failures and/or successes previous 
to the latest setback). Assuming, as the model does, that there is a possibility of ultimate 
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success and/or recouping costs, then when there has been success in the action prior to 
the current setback there is an opposing impulse: to reinvest; as the setback can be 
considered an anomaly. This can occur through ‘retrospective reasoning’ or ‘prospective 
reasoning’. Retrospective reasoning indicates an individual’s propensity to attempt to 
‘fix’ past mistakes over addressing future outcomes. 
Conversely, prospective reasoning describes an actor’s proclivity to tackle the 
future utility of his actions. Self-justification is considered extreme retrospective 
reasoning. Furthermore, if previous success in the reinforcement history is predominant, 
Staw and Ross argue the ‘Illusion of Invulnerability’,21 may occur; where the individual 
is so overconfident of his own skills that he ignores the setback completely. However, 
when regarding failure prior to the current setback, they state that retrospective reasoning 
would dictate a tendency to escalate commitment, while prospective reasoning and 
Expectancy Theory, discussed below, would dictate a reexamination of the utility of the 
alternatives. If previous reinforcement history is predominantly negative, the actor may 
fall to the ‘Learned Helplessness Effect’;22
                                               
21 Ibid., p. 45 
22 Ibid. 
 reinvesting because his actions and the 
resultant consequences are deemed unconnected. Staw and Ross argue further that if the 




The two new theories discussed under prospective reasoning23
 
 differ from the 
others in that they are considered by Staw and Ross as the ‘rational’ theories of 
psychological behaviour concerning commitment. Expectancy Theory, states that 
following a setback the individual will increase or cut commitment according to the 
course of action deemed to carry the greatest subjective expected utility or MF. 
 
The second theory, a modified ‘Reactance Effect’,24 argues that following a 
setback, “individuals may intensify their efforts to act rationally.”25
                                               
23 Ibid., pp. 43-45 
24 Ibid., p. 45 
25 Ibid. 
 These theories utilise 
a high level of prospective reasoning, while the former theories focus upon retrospective 
reasoning, or use no reasoning. Thus it is quite reasonable to suggest that if Expectancy 
or Reactance Effects are utilised during decision making, and are sufficiently powerful, 
then withdrawal may result. 
In summary, Expectancy Theory dictates that: 
 




MF = Motivational Force (in this case, to follow a particular action) 
 
Expectancy Probability = Effort/performance relationship (‘will extra effort 
[investment] generate improved performance?’) 
 
Instrumentality Probability = Performance/reward relationship (‘will better 
performance generate the reward?’) 
 
Valence = The value of the reward (outcome) 
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If focus is shifted to self-justification briefly, reinforcement history is argued by 
Staw and Ross to affect it in terms of strength. If the history is largely one of failure, then 
despite reinforcement history being less powerful, self-justification effects are strong and 
escalation (in terms of intensification) is likely. If the history has been successful, the 
need for justification is lower and commitment will tend to remain at a maintenance 
(continuance) level. It is also important to note that Staw now considers reinforcement 
history as an important effector of self-justification (between ‘setback with personal 
responsibility’ & ‘the possibility of recouping losses’ and ‘justification’ [figure 3.1]) and 
thus an important facet of EoC behaviour. 
Yet one should note that reinforcement history does not need to be included for 
self-justification to occur (since a history does not always exist). Here one could argue 
that self-justification strength would start low and increase with failure (owing to a 
growing, negative reinforcement history). Aside from reinforcement effects, Staw and 
Ross raise other possible modifiers of the EoC behaviour self-justification effect,26
Staw’s next EoC behaviour paper,
 
including: visible responsibility to salient others for a negative consequence; public 
advocacy for an action that results in negative consequences; political vulnerability and 
psychological differences between actors. 
 
3.3 The Trapped Administrator and External Justification 
 
27 examines EoC behaviour in the context of 
Campbell’s ‘experimenting society’.28 Fox and Staw argue against Campbell’s belief, 
that in such a society “we try out new programs designed to cure specific social 
problems, in which we learn whether or not these programs are effective and in which we 
retain, imitate, modify or discard them on the basis of apparent effectiveness.”29
                                               
26 Ibid., pp. 61-62 
27 F. V. Fox and B. M. Staw, ‘The Trapped Administrator: Effects of Job Insecurity and Policy Resistance 
upon Commitment to a Course of Action’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1979, pp. 
449-471 
28 D. T. Campbell, ‘Reforms as Experiments’, American Psychologist, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1969, pp. 409-429 
29 Ibid., p. 409 
 They 
posit that so-called ‘trapped administrators’ are likely instead to “become committed to a 
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course of action and refuse its failure”;30 something that Campbell concedes may occur.31 
Although new modifiers of self-justification are given here, such as the individual’s level 
of self-esteem (measured as one’s willingness to face failure),32 Fox and Staw extend the 
scope of EoC behaviour too. Given that the ‘trapped administrator’ is defined as “one 
who stands to lose politically if a particular program does not work and who has little 
choice but to remain fully committed to it,”33 it is not surprising that Fox and Staw now 
focus upon more ‘external’ EoC behaviour determinants, in an “extension of the 
justification framework.”34
The magnitude of negative feedback
 
35 and its corresponding level of subjective 
meaning for the actor are shown to be factors that can influence EoC behaviour. 
Implicating and exonerating factors for personal responsibility combine following a 
setback to cause the individual to either feel personal responsibility or not. Once personal 
responsibility has been established, it is likely to instigate self-justification and thus 
escalation. However, determinants such as job insecurity36 can also increase commitment 
to a failing action, since one may feel forced to continue for fear of losing one’s job 
otherwise; something fox and Staw argue carries some modicum of rationality for 
perseverance, past immediate economic prudence.37
Other reasons include others’ demands for competent behaviour
 
38 and the actor 
previously overcoming policy resistance to the failing project.39 Some of these factors 
were previously considered as effectors only of self-justification, yet they are adopted 
now as effectors of a new EoC behaviour determinant: ‘external justification’: an actor 
continues, to prove to others that his initial decision (and initial investment/costs) was 
correct.40
                                               
30 Fox and Staw, ‘The Trapped Administrator…’, p. 449 
31 Campbell, ‘Reforms as…’, p. 410. Campbell states “if the administrative system has committed itself in 
advance to the correctness and efficacy of its reforms, it cannot tolerate learning of failure…. 
[Commitment] blinds us to reality testing.” 
32 Fox and Staw, ‘The Trapped Administrator…’, p. 452 
33 Ibid., p. 453 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., p. 452 
36 Ibid., p. 464 
37 Ibid., p. 453 
38 Ibid., p. 452 
39 Ibid., p. 464 
40 Ibid., p. 453 
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Another external EoC behaviour determinant argued here is ‘clarity of feedback’. 
Beyond simply the scale of the negative feedback event, it is argued that the clearer the 
feedback is that reinvestment will/will not succeed, the more likely it is that the 
individual will act for maximum utility, or at least be less susceptible to self- and external 
justification. However, more ambiguous feedback will cause the converse effect. The 
causes – and their likely persistence – of the setback are an important consideration here. 
However, related to this determinant, it is common for subordinates of the actor (in a 
social setting) not to want to be the bearers of bad news. Thus they often distort feedback 
information before passing it up the chain, leading to reinvestment based upon skewed 
information. Social distortion can also occur accidentally and the decision maker himself 
may also internally distort feedback. Staw’s later research discusses this subject more. 
The crux of the second Fox and Staw text however is the self- and external justification 
separation and the inclusion of external EoC behaviour determinants. This is an important 
progression in Staw’s understanding of EoC behaviour and EoC behaviour research 






In 198141 Staw introduces yet more EoC behaviour determinants and produces a 
model of his understanding of the behaviour as it stands (Figure 3.3). Potential 
recoupability is now a ‘given’ of an EoC behaviour situation, as is the negative 
consequence itself, and justification is now a function of personal responsibility for 
negative consequences and both internal and external demands for rationality. Personal 
responsibility for the consequences is argued to be a function of the setback itself and 
previous choice, the foreseeabilty of the outcome and other exonerating & implicating 
factors. It is also argued42 that the ‘nature’ of the setback – in the overall milieu of 
calculating the future probability of success – is important to escalating or quitting a 
project. If the cause is argued to be ‘exogenous’, (outside factors, unlikely to persist), 
then reinvestment is more likely than if the setback is caused by ‘endogenous’ factors 
(factors central to the project and unremitting). Staw argues that the actor here 
predominantly uses prospective rather than retrospective reasoning to determine the 
utility of the project. However, Staw cautions that justification biases may encourage 
feedback information bias and – regarding setback type – the actor may filter endogenous 
reasons and generate exogenous reasons for failure, providing a rationale for 
reinvestment.43 Such distortion could also occur in the social ways discussed earlier. 
Finally, in addition to an Expectancy Theory determinant, Staw talks of the ‘norm for 
consistency’: a product of cultural and organisational norms. Here, one who continues a 
project despite negative feedback is considered by others to be a more effective 
administrator than one who adopts Campbell’s44 experimenting society approach.45
                                               
41 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action’, Academy of Management Review, 
Vol. 6, No. 4, 1981, pp. 577-587 
42 Ibid., p. 580 
43 Ibid. 
44 Campbell, ‘Reforms as…’ 
45 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment to a Course…’, p. 579 
 
Moreover, determination followed by ultimate success produces a greater effectiveness 
rating than the sum of the two facets acting alone (synergy). Thus, Staw is arguing that 
not only does the administrator in question also hold this cultural opinion but this opinion 
dictates his actions; the administrator continues, to avoid appearing ineffective but mainly 
to gain the cultural rewards for persistence, even if Campbell’s argument is the wiser 




Staw also revisits the inherent instability of EoC behaviour situations.46 In addition 
to stating that EoC behaviour is not guaranteed despite EoC conditions being present, 
Staw argues that in some situations of high responsibility and negative feedback over 
time, commitment gradually decreases, while in some low responsibility cases, 
commitment gradually increases or is maintained. Staw puts this down to actors “probing 
and learning from the system over time.”47
The gap between Staw’s old EoC behaviour research and what can be considered 
the ‘contemporary’ version of it is bridged in 1986 when, with Ross, he investigates Expo 
’86.
 However one could argue, in the low 
responsibility case at least, that actors gambled because they had less responsibility and 
thus less consequences if the situation flopped, yet possessed enough responsibility to 
claim accountability if the situation prospered. More simply, responsibility would surely 
grow with further investments. 
 
3.4 Approaching the Contemporary Model of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour 
 
48
                                               
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 J. Ross and B. M. Staw, ‘Expo 86: An Escalation Prototype’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, 
No. 2, 1986, pp. 274-297 
 The main shift that occurs here is that an early version of Staw’s ‘categorised 
determinant’ framework, is presented. The Expo paper separates the previous morass of 
EoC behaviour determinants into the headings of ‘Project Determinants’, ‘Psychological 
Determinants’, ‘Social Determinants’ and ‘Structural Determinants’ and adds many new 
determinants and suggestions to these headings. The headings also include some EoC 
behaviour determinants from other EoC behaviour researchers not just Staw’s own EoC 
findings. Furthermore, the paper trials a ‘three-phased’ prototype model of EoC 
behaviour. This is an important step, as it considers the temporal priority of particular 
EoC behaviour determinant categories. Like the framework, the phased prototype model 




In 1987, Staw and Ross49 replicate the framework, using the same headings but now 
with far greater detail and including more determinants, again including those from other 
EoC behaviour researchers. They introduce a generic cyclical model of EoC behaviour 
and apply this model to each determinant heading. They also create a ‘three-phased’ 
prototype model variant, now with four stages. Again, using +, – and 0, this four-phased 
model predicts the “dynamics of various forces over time”50
                                               
49 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents, Prototypes and Solutions’, 
Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 9, 1987, pp. 39-78 
50 Ibid., p. 65 
 and their impact upon the 




This paper is considered here the most detailed of Staw’s entire research and, 
though the list of determinants and the models in the paper are superseded in his final 
paper, the content concerning the determinants that are covered, as well as the heading 
specific models, are used extensively in this chapter’s summary of Staw’s framework, 
below. The next series of texts build slightly upon the Antecedents paper, apropos new 
determinants and model structure, but tend not to include all the previously discovered 
determinants and are not ‘intrinsic’ to Staw’s EoC behaviour research. Most importantly, 
in Knowing When to Pull the Plug,51 Staw and Ross experiment with changing the 
category headings of their previous works. Although this reorganisation does not stick, it 
encourages the permanent name change of one category from ‘Structural Determinants’ 
to ‘Organisational Determinants’ in future texts. Determinants that have already been 
explored in previous research are categorised under the new headings52 and further 
explanation for some of these are presented too.53 The following paper54 displays this 
‘Organisational Determinants’ heading and again presents a modified phased model. 
 
                                               
51 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Knowing when to Pull the Plug’, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 65, No. 2, 
1987, pp. 68-74 
52 Ibid., pp. 69-71 
53 Ibid., p. 70 
54 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Understanding Behavior in Escalation Situations’, Science, Vol. 246, No. 4927, 
1989, pp. 216-220 
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In 1992 Simonson and Staw55 discuss further the importance of information 
ambiguity in EoC behaviour situations. Then, Ross and Staw56 create a further phased 
temporal model and apply it to another case study: the Shoreham nuclear power plant. An 
important conclusion of this study is that it did not entirely fulfil the model, and questions 
are raised regarding whether it is feasible to create a model that can predict the order in 




Ross and Staw also discuss a new determinant framework heading: ‘Contextual 
Effects’ (those determinants present outside of an organisation). Another, unrelated, 
comment is that an individual or organisation that executes multiple and simultaneous 
                                               
55 I. Simonson and B. M. Staw, ‘De-Escalation Strategies: A Comparison of Techniques for Reducing 
Commitment to Losing Courses of Action’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1992, pp. 
419-426 
56 J. Ross and B. M. Staw, ‘Organizational Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power 
Plant’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1993, pp. 701-732 
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projects may keep an EoC behaviour situation going indefinitely by offsetting failure 
costs with overall profit margins.57 In 1995, Staw and Hoang58 apply an EoC behaviour 
determinant, the Sunk Cost Effect (SCE), discussed later, to another case study: player 
employability in the National Basketball Association (NBA) according to purchase price. 
This is followed, in 1997, by a further case study59 which finds that the extension of a 
bad loan ceases when the manager who initially approved the loan leaves the 
organisation. It is however another 1997 text60
Staw’s later EoC behaviour definitions unsurprisingly differ from those of his 
earlier research. Initially, justification motives formed the basis of EoC behaviour and 
thus the definitions were built around the individual; personal responsibility, negative 
consequences and potentially recoupable costs and/or situation. Yet as justification 
motives are now joined by many other factors, particularly non-psychological ones, the 
need to be personally responsible for the initial act seems to become less of a must for the 
definition as a whole, particularly when organisational EoC behaviour is under 
discussion. This need could be argued to be predominantly limited to justification and 
other psychological motives.
 which presents Staw’s current opinion as 
to the nature of EoC behaviour. More determinants are added here, as well as an entirely 
new model, beyond the temporal, phased kind. Below then is a summary of Staw’s 
contemporary interpretation of the behaviour, based upon the second 1997 text, with 
reinforcing information from his Antecedents and Understanding papers. 
 






                                               
57 Ibid., p. 725 
58 B. M. Staw and H. Hoang, ‘Sunk Costs in the NBA: Why Draft Order Affects Playing Time and Survival 
in Professional Basketball’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 3, 1995, pp. 474-495 
59 B. M. Staw et al., ‘Escalation at the Credit Window: A Longitudinal Study of Bank Executives’ 
Recognition and Write-Off of Problem Loans’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 82, No. 1, 1997, pp. 
130-142 
60 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update…’ 
61 B. M. Staw, Personal Communication, (Email, 23/07/05), “I originally used a dissonance/cognitive 
explanation of the phenomenon but later realized that the issue can be determined by many psychological 
and social processes.” 
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EoC behaviour situations are now defined by Staw as: 
 
Predicaments where costs are suffered in a course of action, 
where there is an opportunity to withdraw or persist and where 
the consequences of persistence and withdrawal are uncertain62
A decision pathology…where losses have resulted from an 
original course of action, but where there is the possibility of 
turning the situation around by investing further time, money or 
effort…. The central phenomenon of interest is the tendency of 






Predicaments in which things have not only gone wrong but in 
which corrective actions can actually deepen or compound the 
difficulty…a course of action is not working, multiple decisions 






In Staw’s latest interpretation of EoC behaviour then, the complete determinants of 
the behaviour are presented under the headings of: ‘Project Determinants’, 
 
 
Thus, according to Staw’s interpretation of EoC behaviour, EoC behaviour 
situations could be defined as: 
 
A course of action where negative feedback has been received, 
costs have been incurred, where one can withdraw or persist in 
the course of action; and where the consequences of both are 
uncertain 
 
And thus EoC behaviour itself could be defined as when: 
 
One persists with this course of action 
 
                                               
62 Staw and Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents…’, p. 40 
63 Staw and Ross, ‘Understanding Behavior…’, p. 216 
64 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update…’, p. 191 
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‘Psychological Determinants’, ‘Social Determinants’, ‘Organisational Determinants’ and 
‘Contextual Effects’. Staw further generates an entirely new model to explain the process 




Project determinants are the “objective features of the project.”65
Closing Costs and Salvage Value. These linked determinants concern cases where it 
is recognised that the project is more costly to continue than the perceived potential 
gains, but it is judged
 In cases of ‘for-
profit’ projects, project factors that affect the financial value of persistence or withdrawal 
are involved. In non-profit contexts, variables will include objective factors that affect the 
overall utility of abandoning or continuing a project. Already discussed factors in this 
heading are the closely related issues of: Clarity of Feedback, Whether the Setback is 
Judged to be Temporary or Permanent and Whether Further Investment is Judged Likely 
to be Efficacious. 
 
66
Timing of Rewards and Costs, Payoff Structures and the Nature of the Project. 
Some projects involve irregular concentrations of rewards and costs during their lifetime 
(especially building and defence projects, where costs come first followed later by the 
rewards). It is argued that a DMU will be more likely to continue a project when costs are 
expected anyway first, followed by benefits at some future date, rather than in projects 
where “economic benefits closely follow cost expenditures”;
 the costs of terminating the project will be greater than those of 
continuing. Similarly, projects that have large intangible costs (such as salaries) will have 
a lower salvage value than projects where costs are made in machinery where at least 
some refund can be made. Thus, low salvage value and high or positive net closing costs, 
Staw argues, encourage EoC behaviour. 
 
67
                                               
65 Staw and Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents…’, p. 44 
66 Ibid., p. 47 
67 Ibid. 
 since if the latter project 
type failed to deliver benefits soon after starting, the manager would be more likely to 
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perceive a problem. Parallel to this situation is the project structure. If the project is 
structured as an investment situation (a situation where one’s inputs are directly linked to 
the likelihood of the project succeeding), then negative outcomes are considered less 
alarming than if inputs are considered as expenses. Furthermore, if one does reexamine 
the project, then future success is more likely to be expected than if the project is set in a 
non-investment frame. Consider a person waiting for a bus.68 The longer one waits, the 
more likely one is to achieve the goal of catching the bus; the waiting is an investment. If 
however, one waits on hold on a call line, if the computer is not under a first come first 
served algorithm, then waiting is no longer an investment but a cost, since the investment 
is no longer linked directly to success. It is important to emphasise here that treating the 
project as an investment has little relation to the ‘investment context’ discussed 
previously. All escalation situations are investment contexts, but treating costs as 
investments does not always occur. This phenomenon however is “more of a cognitive 
label than an economically defensible fact.”69
                                               




Availability of Alternatives. If there is a choice of alternatives to pursue following 
negative feedback then EoC behaviour could be argued to be less likely to occur. 
However, if there is a lack of viable alternatives or if there has been too much investment 
for alternatives to now be afforded, then EoC behaviour is more likely to occur (compare 
this with ‘Sunk Cost Effect’ in the ‘Psychological Determinants’ heading). 
 
The Future Expenditure Required to Reach the Payoff. This is also linked to 
Expectancy Theory. If marginal benefits (benefits that are expected yet to appear) exceed 
marginal costs (costs that are expected to be incurred), then it is entirely rational to 
continue the project, Staw argues. This facet is explored further under ‘Sunk Cost Effect’, 
in ‘Psychological Determinants’. Furthermore, this factor can be contrasted with the 
‘closing costs’ argument, above. 
The figure below demonstrates how Staw believes project determinants can 






These are determinants that move beyond the objective nature of project 
determinants. Some of these factors can induce errors in calculations, while others can 
bind an individual to a course of action. Already discussed factors present here are: Self-
Justification, Expectancy Theory and Reactance Theory. 
 
Reinforcement Traps. Reinforcement history affects EoC behaviour in several 
ways. If there has been previous success in the project or a similar project, then failure, 
the actor is more likely to continue than if there has only been failure. An irregular 
deterioration pattern of success and failure will further promote EoC behaviour. Staw 
also discusses the ‘Invulnerability Trap’70
                                               
70 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update…’, p. 198 
 and ‘Learned Helplessness’. Furthermore, 
when benefits of a decision are able to be claimed by an individual yet costs are absorbed 
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by a larger organisation, persistence is more likely to occur; this is known as the 
“Tragedy of the Commons”.71
Self-Inference. Slightly different to self-justification, self-inference argues that an 
actor may escalate commitment because he cognitively views his own prior investment 
actions and then infers beliefs and values from them (“I obviously believe in the situation 
because I have previously invested in it!”). Thus, if an actor complies with a request to 
put a political party’s sticker in his window, he is more likely to then agree to put a 





Information Biasing. Decision makers have an “uncanny ability”
 that six factors, similar to those that encourage self-justification, encourage self-
inference: the act is explicit and unambiguous, the behaviour is irrevocable, the behaviour 
has been entered into freely, the act has importance for the actor, the act is visible to 
others and the act has been performed a number of times. 
 
74
Cognitive Scripting. This is very similar to Cultural Norms. However whereas the 
latter theory argues that the manager may continue so as not to appear weak and to gain 
the heroic status of a leader who continues through difficulty because of a prevailing 
 to bias feedback 
to fit their beliefs. The ways in which actors do this are multifaceted and includes: the 
invention of exogenous failures and the ignorance of endogenous ones, the interpretation 
of ambiguous data as positive, the narrowing of their information searches to only find 
reinforcing data and the selection of only positive data from a mixed report. Socially, 
information may also be biased by other actors when delivering information to the 
manager; sometimes accidentally, but usually through fear of attack for being the bearer 
of bad news and because managers often attempt to discredit the source of the 
information in order to question the validity of the information itself. 
 
                                               
71 Staw and Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents…’, p. 49 
72 Ibid., p. 52. When used aggressively, this phenomenon is known as the Foot-in-the-Door technique. 
Compare this with Low-Balling: when individuals are enticed into a false situation yet continue with the 
decision even when the truth is revealed. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid., p. 53 
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culture, the ‘turnaround script’75
The Sunk Cost Effect Discussed briefly in Staw’s earlier works, this factor concerns 
an actor’s failure to ignore costs that have previously been incurred and cannot be 
recovered (that is to say ‘refunded’, and directly linked to the original cost). All EoC 
behaviour situations involve sunk costs and rationally, it is argued, an actor should ignore 
sunk costs and only take on board marginal costs and gains when deciding a project’s 
viability. However it has been shown that an actor is more likely to continue a project if 
large amounts of sunk costs have been incurred. The predominant motive behind sunk 
cost effects, Staw argues, is the actor’s dislike of ‘waste’ (the actor continues in order to 
justify the sunk costs; not simply to justify the decision that was facilitated by the costs, 
as with psychological justification). However, the need to ‘recoup’ sunk costs no matter 
what (even if marginal costs exceed marginal benefits) and the mistaken association 
between the amount of sunk costs and the project’s completion level also figure. Framing 
effects are also argued to influence one’s accommodation of sunk costs, in terms of the 
situation emphasising losses. However, the SCE is more complex than Staw expresses. 
For example, the irrationality of considering sunk costs in every situation is disputed. 
Also, numerous variations of the SCE exist. Furthermore, the SCE is often deemed an 
 (that of believing ‘failing situations will turn around in 
the end’) can be so well learned by the actor that he may reinvest because the script 
makes him overly optimistic. This is related to the Invulnerability Trap, the difference 
being that the former involves the belief that fate will make ‘all good’, whereas the latter 
involves the actor believing his own skills are so good he will not fail. 
 
Framing Effects. This factor concerns how the information the actor receives is 
‘framed’ despite the usable information being identical. Staw argues that if a situation is 
perceived in terms of losses, the actor will be more willing to risk further investment. 
However if it is termed as a proportion of gains, the actor is more likely to avoid risking 
further investment. This is a quite basic view however since there is more to framing than 
how project information is phrased. Framing is a constituent of an important EoC 
behaviour hypothesis, discussed later under Prospect Theory. 
 
                                               
75 Ibid., p. 54 
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EoC behaviour theory on its own merits, against Staw’s opinion of it being just an 
explanation for EoC behaviour. These important factors are discussed later in this 
chapter. 
The figure below demonstrates how Staw believes psychological determinants can 





Whereas psychological determinants focus predominantly upon the actor and affect 
his view of the desirability and likelihood of success, social determinants recognise that 
many escalation situations are “multiparty events”.76
External Binding. As self-inference dictates that an individual may infer beliefs and 
ideas of who he his from an action he undertakes and use these beliefs when deciding to 
continue the action, it is possible that outsiders can also bind an actor to a course of 
 Determinants already discussed 
include: External Justification, Cultural Norms and Social Information Biasing. 
 
                                               
76 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update…’, p. 202 
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action. An actor’s abilities and beliefs from the view of outsiders can become tied to the 
project’s performance. Staw argues that an “administrator’s social identity can become 
linked to the fate of a particular course of action…observers infer capabilities and 
motives to actors after watching their behavior.”77 Staw argues further that the external 
binding can even adopt the name of the actor undertaking it78
Modelling. When a decision maker mimics the actions of others in a similar 
situation to himself, he is modelling. If the actor’s own situation is ambiguous and there 
is another situation similar enough, visible to the actor, then the actor may copy it as a 
function of “the desirability and similarity of the comparison other.”
 (Reaganomics, Blairism 
and Thatcherism). Thus, an actor may continue in order to show or protect his overall 
competence rather than externally justify his choosing of the current project. The division 
between these phenomena however is ambiguous. 
 
79
Competition. Staw recognises that EoC behaviour situations are not always 
structured as ‘the individual versus the inanimate project’; they can be “infused with 
interpersonal conflict.”
 This effect is 
further increased if the comparison expresses satisfaction rather than regret for his actions 
and is pleasant rather than obnoxious. If the comparison withdraws then the actor may 
also withdraw, thus EoC behaviour may not always occur with modelling. Staw does not 
comment as to whether the actor can model a similar situation that has already been 
completed, but it seems reasonable to assume that if the ‘stage’ the actor is currently ‘at’ 
is located within the history of the other event then the decision maker may model it. 
 
80
                                               
77 Ibid., p. 203 
78 Staw and Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents…’, p. 56 
79 Ibid., p. 58 
80 Ibid., p. 57 
 Staw argues that if competition is involved, continuance 
motives can include beating or even just punishing the opponent and this can be an 
evolutionary process (motives change in dominance over time), depending on the 
situation. Staw comments too that while it may seem irrational to continue some forms of 
competition-related behaviour, because economically the costs outweigh the benefits, 
such may be the emotional reward for beating the opponent that it may be rational for an 
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actor to continue. This factor is related to works by Allan Teger and Joel Brockner and is 
important to the debate regarding the relationship between EoC behaviour and what is 
termed conflict or traditional escalation (escalation related to duopolistic, military 
conflict); discussed following the exposition of Staw’s framework. 
The figure below demonstrates how Staw believes social determinants can 




Organisational or Structural Determinants 
 
While the other headings expand upon the causes of EoC behaviour, they still focus 
seemingly upon the individual either inside his own psychology or interacting with 
others, in a number of contexts; usually within the organisation. Yet decisions within the 
organisation, Staw argues, can involve context specific determinants. It is necessary thus 
to “consider macro level variables”81
Organisational Inertia. Just as there is an imperfect relationship between an actor’s 
beliefs and his behaviour, there is an even less perfect relationship between 
 when trying to understand EoC behaviour 
situations. 
 
                                               
81 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update…’, p. 204 
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organisational goals and actions. Organisations are less sensitive to changes in their 
environment than smaller unitary actors; they have “imperfect sensory systems.”82 Thus, 
when negative feedback occurs, a project may continue; the decision making personnel 
having not detected or been told of the feedback because of bureaucracy. However, even 
when the feedback is detected and orders issued to counteract the situation, the 
organisation is generally slow to respond because of “difficulties mobilizing…[and] the 
necessity to alter long standing policies, rules and procedures.”83
Policy Resistance. Just as stakeholders in the company can resist a policy being 
undertaken, they can also resist a policy being “dismantled;”
 This can cause further 




Institutionalisation. Just as an individual can become bound to a project and allow 
himself to be represented by its success/failure, an organisation can too. As Reagan was 
linked to Reaganomics, a company and its products or projects can become inseparable. 
Pan Am, Staw argues,
 especially if they are the 
project’s employees. These individuals can cause delay in terminating the project and 
promote the generation of ambiguous feedback. This behaviour can be intensified by 
outsiders doing the same (see ‘Contextual Effects’). 
 
85




85 Ibid., p. 205 
 was one such company; selling its profitable hotel/real estate 
portfolio instead of its airline because it could not reconcile the loss of its ‘name’. Thus, a 
company’s decision makers may refuse to abandon a losing product because they believe 
its demise will be linked to customers’ views of the organisation’s overall business 
prowess. 
The figure below demonstrates how Staw believes organisational determinants can 






Sometimes EoC behaviour can be triggered by “forces larger than the organization 
itself.”86
As well as the framework, Staw considers the various temporal models of EoC 
behaviour posited in his previous research.
 Such factors include pressure from local businesses to continue a project that 
will benefit them, or government support or pressure for the failing project. Other 
‘effects’ include side bets; a complex subject, meaning fundamentally, where other 
‘important factors’ depend upon a project’s outcome. Staw does not elaborate upon 
contextual effects. 
87
                                               
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., pp. 207-208 
 Ultimately, Staw concludes that there is not 
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much “empirical evidence”88 to support temporal modelling and it is therefore a “useful 
conceptual tool rather than an accurate representation of reality.”89 EoC behaviour 
situations are rarely as uniform as temporal modelling suggests and so temporal 
modelling “shows an idealized sequencing of events that most escalation events can be 
expected to depart from.”90
In its place, Staw generates the ‘aggregate model’ (figure 3.13). This model is 
similar to the Shoreham phased model but without the temporal aspect. The model is a 
non-temporal representation that shows aggregate effects of determinants rather than the 
separation of behavioural forces over time. Project determinants are juxtaposed against 
the other determinants, which also impact separately, to create a ‘biased perceived project 
economics’ element to the model. This, in conjunction with the separate effects, 
determines commitment to the course of action. The “crucial assumption”
 Ironically, as a case study (Expo) encouraged temporal 
modelling, another, (Shoreham) led to its eventual abandonment when such modelling 
proved inaccurate. 
91 is that the 
behavioural forces must “match or exceed the strength of any negative data,”92 to hold 
decision makers in a losing course of action. Staw argues that this model is the most 
representative of an EoC behaviour situation, since it can be “generalized”93
                                               
88 Ibid., p. 208 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 









3.6 Highlighting the Limitations of Staw’s Framework 
 
The above classification scheme summates Staw’s EoC behaviour research. It is 
considered that Staw’s complex research suffers from a multitude of problematic issues – 
primarily related to ambiguity and self-conflict – that would be served by further 
discussion. Definitional ambiguity is a particularly important issue. There are, for 
example, no definitions by Staw of recoupable costs and refundable costs, failure and 
success or rationality, which is a fundamental facet of EoC behaviour situations. It is 
considered too that Staw does not explore fully the concept of the resource, and 
numerous unanswered questions arise from this. For example, what exactly is a resource? 
What is the spectrum of resources available to invest in a situation; are money and time 
always the predominant resources in an EoC behaviour situation? What of concepts such 
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as face, effort and manpower? Do some resources interact? What is their relationship to 
‘costs’ and ‘rewards’? 
Connected to these observations and especially important to this thesis, it is deemed 
that Staw does not specify clearly enough what escalation, in the realm of EoC 
behaviour, is. It is contended that confusion and uncertainty are particularly prevalent 
regarding this topic. Problematically, Staw does not define escalation at all throughout 
his research yet employs it in a number of senses. The first sense appears to mean the 
overall continuance of a project or action (despite negative feedback) and, in this sense, 
the word is usually paired with ‘of Commitment’. The second way escalation is used is to 
describe a form of this continuance. From the separation of figure 3.1, Staw’s 
interpretation of EoC behaviour constitutes either a ‘tendency to maintain at same level’ 
or a ‘tendency to increase or escalate’ (both following negative feedback). This would 
seem to be a clear proposition. However, if looked at from a semantic viewpoint, several 
complex, tautological problems arise. For example, if EoC behaviour means continuance 
with a failing project, surely deescalation (some sort of deintensification behaviour) is as 
equally appropriate as escalation and maintenance? Deescalation, after all, still 
constitutes carrying on the project. 
If the deescalation issue is put aside for a moment however, more rudimentary 
problems can be argued to exist. Confusion arises when the form of escalation being 
implied in Staw’s statements is ambiguous. Statements like ‘he escalates his behaviour’ 
or ‘she escalates her commitment’ can prove a puzzle as to whether Staw is talking of the 
general and more vague behaviour of EoC (which can comprise maintenance or 
intensification) or the more specific escalation (intensification) form. Staw’s mention of 
maintenance EoC behaviour is no more efficient. Staw generally does not specify what 
form of the behaviour he is talking about.94
                                               
94 This general lack of detail can be observed in all of Staw’s work, including throughout Ibid. 
 Yet because Staw does not define escalation, 
even if it was made clearer what form he was discussing, there is no detail anyway 
concerning exactly how EoC behaviour in the intensification sense actually proceeds, 
how it is to be recognised or how it is different from maintenance; also not defined. 
Intuitively, escalation (in the second sense) appears to mean an intensification of a 
situation. It would seem then to involve an increase in the quantity of some existing value 
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in a situation, yet maintenance (and even deescalation) would also be expected to do the 
same, over time. Thus, over time, escalation would seem to be an increase over and 
above the expected increase, perhaps as a function of some kind of rate measurement 
(such as $/year, perhaps resulting in a percentage increase of investment). An obvious 
question here though, and moving beyond simply escalation to the wider issue of 
continuance, is ‘what value is actually considered when deciding what form of 
continuance is taking place?’ Moreover, how and why is this value chosen above others 
that may exist or, more significantly, is some kind of statistical amalgamation of values 
involved – with some intensifying values being negated by deintensifying values – to 
give a verdict on the overall form of continuance? 
Notwithstanding the numerous uncertainties above, a question remains regarding 
whether this numerical description is all escalation, in the second sense, can ever mean. 
Surely the nature of a situation too can be escalated, with the adoption of some new 
value/tactic/method rather than just the quantitative intensification of pre-existing values. 
Yet what exactly does nature denote and does such a quantity/nature schism even exist? 
Moreover, surely ‘nature change’ can work in the opposite way too (causing 
deintensification) as well as being potentially multifarious in character, not just 
‘singular’. The issue also arises regarding how ‘nature change’ could be incorporated into 
the sort of amalgamated statistical/numerical equation of continuance hypothesised, since 
a new nature value would have no previous value and some values may be difficult to 
quantify. An issue also emerges regarding the range of measures available for gauging 
continuance. Many measurements can be envisaged – not just ‘value/year’ leading to a 
percentage measure of escalation – but many others that could ‘meta-analyse’ other 
measurements/values to deliver other outcomes. Most basically though, how are values 
recognised, created and selected anyway, when investigating continuance type, and can 
all EoC behaviour situations be intensified/deintensified? Clearly, the subject of 
escalation, in all its forms, is highly complex; numerous questions remain unasked and 
unanswered and deserve further examination. The immediate argument however is that 
Staw does not discuss the numerous multifarious nuances of escalation and this is a cause 
of concern apropos EoC behaviour research. 
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A further salient question that arises from the above discussion, not discussed by 
Staw, is how escalation and deescalation (and perhaps even maintenance given the 
subjective understandings of all these terms) relate to the more general argument that 
EoC behaviour is the continuance of a course of action. This is fundamental to the entire 
understanding of EoC behaviour situations. An intuitive, recurring question, when 
puzzling over the ways in which one can continue with a course of action, is: 
 
Does changing the nature and/or rates of inputs of the investment 
mean that EoC behaviour does not occur because the previous 
effort has been abandoned and an alternative – nature and/or 
rates of inputs – course of action has been undertaken? 
 
Instead of being complementary, the assumptive ‘rate/nature change’ interpretation 
of escalation, deescalation and maintenance sits somewhat uncomfortably with the more 
general continuance interpretation. A possible lemma – a preliminary conclusion, to aid 
further work – of Staw’s work then is that a paradox exists regarding the relationship 
between continuance, escalation, deescalation, maintenance and the notion of change; 
where continuance appears to include methods that involve change. Owing to the 
subjectivity of many concepts important to the discussion however, this paradox may be a 
nonentity. 
Moreover, it seems sensible to suggest now that, although not defined by Staw, the 
various concepts utilised in his research are interrelated in that the chosen meaning of 
one concept indirectly infers/implies the meaning of others. This issue too requires 
deeper investigation. Another important and much broader issue to emerge from the 
above discussion, which also requires exploration, is the uncertain theoretical relationship 
between EoC behaviour situations and what could be termed traditional escalation 
situations, commonly taken to mean duopolistic, intensifying, conflict escalation between 
nations/subnational politicised bodies. 
Moving on from this complex semantic exploration, there is also an issue regarding 
Staw’s understanding of what is termed here as the DMU. Clearly ‘the individual’ is key 
to Staw’s work. Much of his early work is devoted to ‘everyday situations’ we, as 
individuals, may find ourselves in. Yet in later research and in his framework, Staw also 
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places importance upon ‘the organisation’. It can be seen from Staw’s work that project, 
psychological and social variables are applied to individuals in predominantly 
organisational contexts (even though the determinants are all applicable outside of an 
organisation too). Moreover, the ‘Organisational Determinants’ and ‘Contextual Effects’ 
framework headings are only applicable in an organisational setting, argues Staw. Yet 
serious clarity issues exist here. 
Most notably, in some of his work Staw does not talk of the specific individual 
DMU. In some of his organisational examples, he talks vaguely of ‘people’, ‘decision 
makers’ and ‘the organisation’ making a decision.95 Moreover, Staw argues that some 
organisational decisions cannot be pinned on one particular individual within the 
organisation.96 There appears to be general uncertainty here regarding what DMUs Staw 
believes exist. It is uncertain whether Staw considers the organisation as a DMU or as a 
context in which, presumably, the ‘individual’ DMU is applied, or both.97 Staw appears 
to apply the organisation in both modes.98
Ameliorative to this situation is that (1) the use of ‘organisation’, as a DMU, as a 
word and as an illustrative context, (2) the use of ‘people’ and ‘decision makers’ and (3) 
the ‘no ultimate individual responsibility’ argument in Staw’s work implies that DMUs 
other than the individual can figure in EoC behaviour situations. Intuitively, a group 
DMU could be placed here and would appear to be a suitable midpoint between Staw’s 
polarised ‘individual’ and ‘organisation’. Staw does not explicitly state however that he 
intends to imply a group DMU when he is vague regarding DMUs, or if a group is even a 
valid EoC behaviour DMU. Yet if this implication is extended, it appears rational to 
assume that the group DMU can be applied in multiple contexts and is subject to the 
same determinants as the individual DMU is argued to be. However, this argument does 
 Although these ideas may feel intuitively 
comfortable, this thesis’ author finds it difficult to accept that ‘an organisation’ can be 
responsible for a decision and that a decision can be made without some kind of ultimate 
individual human responsibility. 
                                               
95 Two particularly illustrative pieces of research are Ross and Staw, ‘Expo 86...’ and Ross and Staw, 
‘Organizational Escalation and Exit...’. 
96 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update…’, p. 204 
97 Again, see Ross and Staw, ‘Expo 86...’ and Ross and Staw, ‘Organizational Escalation and Exit...’. 
98 Ibid. 
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not clarify if Staw considers the organisation to be a ‘genuine’ DMU, or if this is even an 
acceptable argument. 
It can be argued that the complex issues cited immediately above originate because 
of Staw’s already demonstrated definitional apathie regarding his theory’s ‘basics’. The 
‘DMU’ is not defined by Staw, neither is ‘organisation’. Moreover, Staw’s argument that 
contextual effects are only applicable in organisational settings is questionable. It is 
contended that the DMU omission undermines in multiple ways Staw’s EoC framework, 
which is generally inclusive of other EoC behaviour research. Staw raises his own 
concerns for EoC behaviour research at the end of several of his texts. These issues and 
those highlighted above are discussed further, later in this thesis. 
 
3.7 Ancillary Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Literature 
 
Much research exists, beyond Staw’s, that relates to EoC behaviour. The majority 
of this research investigates possible new EoC behaviour determinants. This research is 
present almost completely in the multifaceted field of social science. Indeed, many 
findings of this ancillary literature inform Staw’s contemporary framework. However 
much of this ancillary research is performed under a wealth of rubrics other than Staw’s 
Escalation of Commitment. Moreover, authors in the same or different rubrics appear to 
disagree regarding what determinants cause EoC behaviour, how some determinants 
affect EoC behaviour, the various situations in which EoC behaviour could occur and 
what ‘conditions’ are deemed necessary for EoC behaviour to be declared. Also, authors 
misrepresent the findings and opinions of other researchers in their own and other 
theories. Staw’s opinions are often disagreed with or misrepresented by a number of 
ancillary authors. Despite, or perhaps because of, this level of external and internal 
disagreement regarding the rubrics, many authors find it acceptable to label some rubrics 
as synonymous with others. Furthermore, the ancillary literature also suffers from issues 
relating to conceptual accuracy and uniformity; particularly regarding escalation, change, 
continuance, intensification and DMUs. Predictably, there is too uncertainty concerning 
the relationship between EoC behaviour and what could be termed ‘traditional 
escalation’. Ancillary EoC behaviour literature from several similar non-IR social science 
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disciplines (predominantly business psychology, decision making and economics) is now 
examined. 
Conlon and Parks99 are two authors who adopt Staw’s EoC behaviour paradigm. 
Barton et al.100 too, agree with much of Staw’s EoC behaviour interpretation. Barton et 
al. though focus predominantly upon justification motives as EoC behaviour 
determinants, rather than wider organisational and contextual factors. They contend, 
vaguely, that escalation itself is “continued commitment.”101 They define commitment as 
“an individual’s adoption of a stance of belief in the appropriateness of a course of 
action.”102 Biyalagorsky et al., with reference to Staw’s statement that EoC behaviour 
situations are not one shot affairs, argue that EoC behaviour situations must have a 
minimum of two phases.103 Escalation here is considered “sticking with”104 the action. 
Northcraft and Wolf,105 like Staw, argue that the structure and expectation of feedback 
patterns can influence continuance of a project. Bobocel and Meyer focus upon 
justification motives, both internal and external.106 Bowen107 argues that while Staw’s 
work carries some weight, it is ambiguity of feedback (apropos the utility of continuance) 
that principally causes the Escalation of Commitment phenomenon. Yet Bowen argues 
simultaneously that such behaviour is not flawed;108
                                               
99 D. E. Conlon and J. M. Parks, ‘Information Requests in the Context of Escalation’, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1987, pp. 344-350 
100 S. L. Barton et al., ‘An Empirical Test of Staw and Ross’s Prescription for the Management of 
Escalation of Commitment Behavior in Organizations’, Decision Sciences, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1989, pp. 532-
544 
101 Ibid., p. 532 
102 Ibid. 
103 E. Biyalagorsky et al., ‘Stuck in the Past: Why Organizations Exhibit Escalation Bias’, Working Paper, 
(Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA: 2001), p. 3 
104 Ibid. 
105 G. B. Northcraft and G. Wolf, ‘Dollars, Sense and Sunk Costs: A Life Cycle Model of Resource 
Allocation Decisions’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1984, p. 231 
106 D. R. Bobocel and J. P. Meyer, ‘Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Separating the 
Roles of Choice and Justification’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 79, No. 3, 1994, pp. 360-363 
107 M. G. Bowen, ‘The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors?’, 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1987, pp. 52-66 
108 Bowen’s overall argument is that reinvestment in an ambiguous situation is performed to obtain more 
information on the likelihood of success of said situation. 
 and that EoC behaviour should only 
be labelled as such if there is continuance and unequivocal feedback that the action is 
failing and will continue to do so. Bowen’s argument however is academically 
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problematic; discussed later in this thesis. Brickman et al.109 argue that commitment to 
any project or action should only be considered commitment when the actor is faced with 
salient negative feedback. Davis and Bobko110 argue that low responsibility can also 
trigger justification motives. Drummond argues that in addition to ‘organisational 
inertia’, there is also ‘powerlessness’.111 She also disagrees with the order of Staw’s 
temporal models,112 yet since Staw ultimately dismisses this process, this doubt is of little 
significance here. Finally, Drummond proffers that EoC behaviour situations will behave 
differently depending on whether they are “established” or “ad hoc.”113 Drummond also 
applies Staw’s EoC theory to two case studies: A local city council study114 and the 
Taurus IT venture.115 Goltz116 argues that reinforcement history is the prime motivator of 
EoC behaviour. Kanodia et al.117 contend that external justification and cultural pressure 
are the major determinants; because the manager’s skills and the information he is 
presented with are both private and so the only way he is judged by others is through his 
actions. Thus even though he may acknowledge the correct decision is to quit a situation, 
he may continue, to save his reputation, even if he is doomed to fail. This is supported by 
Lydon and Zanna.118 Regarding ambiguity of information as a cause of EoC behaviour, 
Karlsson et al.119
                                               
109 P. Brickman et al., ‘The Development of Commitment’, in C. B. Wortman and R. Sorrentino (Eds.), 
Commitment, Conflict and Caring, (New Jersey, USA: Prentice Hall, 1987), P175. 
110 M. A. Davis and P. Bobko, ‘Contextual Effects on Escalation Processes in Public Sector Decision 
Making’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 37, 1986, pp. 121-138 
111 H. Drummond, ‘Too Little too Late: A Case Study of Escalation in Decision Making’, Organization 
Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1994, p. 604. Drummond states that powerlessness is “where the capacity to 
effect change is non-existent.” Drummond however fails to reconcile the theoretical juxtaposition of 
‘powerlessness’ with ‘coercion’ and how choice is considered a necessary tenet by some author’s for 
EoC behaviour to be considered ‘active’ (See Brockner’s work in the following chapter). 
112 Ibid., p. 605 
113 Ibid. 
114 H. Drummond and J. A. K. Hodgson, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: A Case Study of Escalation’, 
Management Decision, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1996, pp. 29-34 
115 H. Drummond, ‘Are We Any Closer to the End? Escalation and the Case of Taurus’, International 
Journal of Project Management, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1999, pp. 11-16 
116 S. M. Goltz, ‘A Sequential Analysis of Continued Investments of Organizational Resources in Non-
Performing Courses of Action’, Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1992, pp. 561-574 
 argue that even if complete information is presented, the individual may 
117 C. R. Kanodia et al., ‘Escalation Errors and the Sunk Cost Effect: An Explanation Based on Reputation 
and Information Asymmetries’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1989, pp. 59-78 
118 J .E. Lydon and M. P. Zanna, ‘Commitment in the Face of Adversity: A Value-Affirmation Approach’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 58, No. 6, 1990, p. 1040. Lydon and Zanna state that 
“people feel especially committed to those experiences that they see as diagnostic of their values.” 
119 N. Karlsson et al., ‘Escalation of Commitment with Transparent Future Outcomes’, Experimental 
Psychology, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2005, p. 67. Karlsson et al. state that “it is indicated that people may escalate 
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continue a failing action for purely psychological reasons (such as to psychologically 
postpone the effects of failure). This argument is represented differently from Bowen’s 
earlier statement however and is discussed later in this thesis. McFarlin et al.120 mirror 
Staw’s uncertainty regarding self-esteem and whether it causes or inhibits EoC 
behaviour. They argue that high self-esteem prolongs commitment to a task and this can 
sometimes produce eventual success. They argue further that past success actually raises 
one’s self-esteem; mirroring Staw’s reinforcement history argument. However the main 
argument is that individuals with high self-esteem, however generated, tend to persist 
beyond rationality. Whyte et al. support McFarlin et al.’s initial argument by stating that 
individuals with low self-efficacy121 perceptions escalate less after failure. Finally, Fox et 
al.122
Schoorman and Holahan develop a different take on EoC behaviour entirely.
 argue that individuals escalate more if the failing project is related to their academic 
background; thus not only is familiarity relevant here, but also the pride of an actor not to 
fail in ‘his area’. 
123 
They argue that only choice is required for EoC behaviour to occur,124 contrary to Staw’s 
choice, responsibility and negative consequences argument. They argue that in real life 
not all choices are implemented125 (the actor is overruled and an alternative choice may 
be selected). When this occurs, they argue, EoC behaviour occurs in a negative direction 
(the implemented action is viewed negatively by the actor). In other words, the individual 
is still as committed to his chosen course of action whether this action is selected or 
not.126
                                                                                                                                            
despite knowing that it will not make them economically better off. A more comprehensive 
understanding of escalation requires disentangling people’s non-economic reasons for escalation.” 
120 D. B. McFarlin et al., ‘On Knowing when to Quit: Task Failure, Self-Esteem, Advice and Non-
Productive Persistence’, Journal of Personality, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1984, pp. 138-156 
121 G. Whyte et al., ‘When Success Breeds Failure: The Role of Self-Efficacy in Escalating Commitment to 
a Losing Course of Action’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 18, No. 5, 1997, pp. 415-432 
122 S. Fox et al., ‘Escalation Behavior in Domains Related and Unrelated to Decision Makers’ Academic 
Background’, Journal of Psychology and Business, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1995, pp. 245-259 
123 F. D. Schoorman and P. J. Holahan, ‘Psychological Antecedents of Escalation Behavior: Effects of 
Choice, Responsibility and Decision Consequences’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 81, No. 6, 
1996, pp. 786-794 
124 Ibid., p. 786 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid., p. 787. They state that “participants whose original choices were not implemented were just as 
likely to be committed to the initial choice, often at the expense of the implemented alternative.” 
 This is often to the detriment of the selected choice. Schoorman and Holahan term 
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this phenomenon “negative escalation”127 (termed here ‘NEoC’) and juxtapose it to 
Staw’s “positive escalation”128 (‘PEoC’). They compare the two forms in figures 3.14 
and 3.15. 
 




Schoorman and Holahan do question the meaning of ‘feedback’ however. While 
stating that individuals whose choices are implemented and who receive either negative 
or positive feedback, escalate commitment in both cases,129 (attributed to Staw’s basic 
premise and to reinforcement theory respectively); regarding the ‘no responsibility’ 
variable (choice not implemented), they are less certain of the results. While one’s biased 
opinion of an implemented (but not preferred) action demonstrates NEoC, the 
introduction of external feedback concerning the implementation confuses matters. It is 
shown that having one’s choice rejected and then receiving positive feedback on the 
implemented action causes greater NEoC. Schoorman and Holahan note that while the 
preferred action does not deliver feedback of any kind, positive feedback relating to the 
implemented action may be considered as negative feedback by an individual, (as it 
demonstrates the actor made the wrong choice) and this generates NEoC for the 
implemented action. Similarly, when the implemented choice receives negative feedback, 
the individual regards himself more highly than if he was a participant in the division that 
receives positive feedback for the implemented action, again strengthening (here, 
rationally, because the alternative is failing), his dislike for the alternative (similar then to 
PEoC in the responsible/positive frame). Thus feedback should be considered in a more 
“relative sense”;130
CEST (Cognitive Experiential Self Theory) is an element of EoC behaviour not 
discussed by Staw. CEST is not actually an EoC behaviour determinant, rather a process 
through which EoC behaviour determinants act. CEST argues that decisions are made by 
two, sometimes opposing, forces within the actor: a rational (logical) system and an 
experiential (emotional) system. This ‘pre-conscious’ decision making system can lead to 
EoC behaviour. Although Staw does not explicitly discuss CEST, there is similarity 
between CEST and Staw’s contemporary framework, which shows that individuals do 
not rely solely upon project factors when making a decision. The main proponents of 
 evaluating feedback in terms of the level of dissonance with the 
decision maker’s original choice than simply ‘good’ or ‘bad’ results. 
                                               
129 Ibid., p. 792 
130 Ibid. 
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CEST are Denes-Raj131 and Epstein.132 Epstein presents a comparison of the rational and 




                                               
131 V. Denes-Raj and S. Epstein, ‘Conflict between Intuitive and Rational Processing: When People Behave 
Against their Better Judgment’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 66, No. 5, 1994, pp. 
819-829 
132 S. Epstein et al., ‘Irrational Reactions to Negative Outcomes: Evidence for Two Conceptual Systems’, 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 62, No. 2, 1992, pp. 328-339 
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3.8 Prospect Theory 
 
One EoC behaviour determinant, discussed briefly by Staw, which deserves further 
examination, is Prospect Theory. Prospect Theory was developed by Kahneman and 
Tversky133 to demonstrate actors’ attitudes to gains and losses. Here, an actor begins a 
situation at an anchor/reference point, representing the ‘status quo’ from which future 
events are judged in terms of gains and losses (figure 3.17). 
 
 
                                               
133 D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’, Econometrica, 
Vol. 47, No. 2, 1979, pp. 263-291 
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Prospect Theory has been discussed in detail by many authors, who present 
somewhat tailored and varied definitions.134
[With reference to figure 3.17] the value function yields the 
preference value assigned to outcomes, and is concave for gains, 
convex for losses, and steeper for losses than for gains. This 
functional form implies that decision makers are more sensitive 
to losses than to gains and exhibit diminishing marginal 
sensitivity to both
 But in a concise summary of Prospect 
Theory, Gonzalez et al. state: 
 
135
Thus an actor will prefer to gamble if he is in a loss domain relative to his anchor 
point, yet would limit his risky behaviour if he found himself in the relative gain domain; 
choosing a certain gain. Thus, how the situation is framed will also affect an actor’s 
behaviour, despite the objective information being identical (and arguably whether or not 
one is actually rather than perceived to be in the domain of gains or losses). An actor will 
tend to opt for “a sure alternative perceived as a gain rather than for a risky alternative of 




                                               
134 For an encyclopedic definition of Prospect Theory, see N. Nicholson, ‘Prospect Theory’, in N. 
Nicholson (Ed.), Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Organizational Behavior, (London, UK: 
Blackwell, 1995), pp. 453-456. 
135 C. Gonzalez et al., ‘The Framing Effect and Risky Decisions: Examining Cognitive Functions with 
FMRI’, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-20. Gonzalez also puts forward 
explanations for Prospect Theory type behaviour. These explanations are based upon the perceived effort 
required by the individual to analyse positive and negative domains, (effort is greater to analyse risky 
gain than certain gain and effort is the same to analyse risky loss and certain loss), combined with 
motivational models. 
136 Ibid., p. 3 
 Thus if a 
situation is framed in terms of losses, an actor will be more risky and if perceived in 
terms of gains, he will play it safe. Both these points have implications for EoC 
behaviour. EoC behaviour situations have an inherent failure element, (the setback) and 
the individual is practically always in the domain of losses, thus he becomes more risk 
prone. Furthermore, EoC behaviour situations commonly present the possibility of 
reprieve in the form of the potentially recoupable losses and/or possible eventual 
‘success’ but only through risky behaviour. Moreover, EoC behaviour situations are not 
just situated in a loss domain, they are often framed in terms of losses, making the 
situation sound direr than it perhaps is; increasing the pressure to persist more than a 
 73 
setback presented neutrally or positively would. For example, if the actor is told that he 
will ‘save 50% of the budget by quitting’ he will be more likely to quit than if he was told 
‘if you quit, you will lose 50% of the budget’. Prospect Theory, then, provides another 
explanation for EoC behaviour: in terms of the different impact losses have on the actor 
than that of gains and the subjective way in which both are perceived. Prospect Theory is 
often juxtaposed as a rival to the self-justification theory.137
The complexity and volume of the literature concerning Prospect Theory is 
exceeded by that concerning what is broadly known as the Sunk Cost Effect. This theory 
has already been discussed briefly in Staw’s framework. However, it is a much more 
complex, independent and diffuse subject than it first appears. Simply, the SCE is when 
an actor considers previously incurred, immutable costs when making a future decision 
yet even this simple definition is open to interpretation. One issue is that some authors 
only consider the irrevocable conscious investments made in a course of action to be sunk 
costs yet others consider overall irrevocable costs (conscious investments and other costs 
which may be incurred in a situation). More importantly, there is a multitude of SCE 
variations; and multiple definitions of these variations exist. Because of the latter point, it 
is suggested here, and later on, that not only is the SCE treated as an EoC behaviour 
determinant, in some cases it is also treated as an EoC behaviour theory in itself; 
containing other determinants. What most authors say however in relation to sunk costs is 
 However, it is not really 
necessary to do this, since both theories can be complementary. An actor may engage in 
EoC behaviour because of a negative domain/frame and because he feels personally 
responsible for the loss. Here, the theories would tend to be cumulative. Prospect Theory 
antecedents however could occur alone, since personal responsibility is not essential for 
continuance in this way, only the presentation of the negative frame and the capability to 
invest more. However, once the risk is taken, the individual is then responsible and so 
justification may take hold. Ultimately, both theories present reasons for which an actor 
could continue a failing action but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
 
3.9 The Sunk Cost Effect 
 
                                               
137 For example, see http://www.bath.ac.uk/~ensab/Csp/quits.html, 09/04/05 
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that they fallaciously have inclusion importance and effect importance138 on a given 
situation; sunk costs are often included in a person’s decision making process and, 
moreover, often given high priority during this process. Fundamentally, people are prone 
to “honoring [their] sunk costs.”139
It is sensible to illustrate exactly what sunk costs are argued to be before looking at 
what effects they can have on a decision maker. Again, multiple interpretations exist. 
According to Baumol and Willig, they are “those costs that in some short or intermediate 
run cannot be eliminated, even by total cessation of production. As such, once 
committed, sunk costs are no longer a portion of the opportunity cost of production.”
 
140 
Whyte states that sunk costs are an “irrevocable investment in a course of action.”141 
Holcomb and Evans142 add that sunk costs are “those costs which, once expended, cannot 
be recovered,” while Guy143 is more specific; dividing sunk costs into three strands: setup 
costs (irrevocable costs of an initial investment), accumulated costs (incurred by 
operational actions) and exit costs (when a project is abandoned or finished). Mycroft 
argues that depreciation is also a sunk cost;144 and Garland and Newport,145 as well as 
giving concrete examples of sunk costs – considered by them as “money, time or 
effort”146
                                               
138 H. T. Tan and J. F. Yates, ‘Sunk Costs Effects: The Influences of Instruction and Future Return 
Estimates’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 63, No. 3, 1995, pp. 311-319 
139 J. W. Leland, ‘Informal Reasoning in Decision Theory’, in J. F. Voss et al. (Eds.), Informal Reasoning 
and Education, (New Jersey, USA: Erlbaum, 1991), p. 218 
140 W. J. Baumol and R. D. Willig, ‘Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers and Sustainability of 
Monopoly’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 96, No. 3, 1981, p. 406 
141 G. Whyte, ‘Diffusion of Responsibility: Effects on the Escalation Tendency’, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Vol. 76, No. 3, 1991, p. 409 
142 J. H. Holcomb and D. A. Evans, ‘The Effect of Sunk Costs on Uncertain Decisions in Experimental 
Markets’, Journal of Behavioral Economics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1987, p. 59 
143 C. M. Guy, ‘Exit Strategies and Sunk Costs: The Implications for Multiple Retailers’, International 
Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, Vol. 27, No. 6, 1999, pp. 237-246 
144 Mycroft, ‘Depreciation: Two Fallacies Re-Exposed’, Accountancy, Vol. 81, No. 924, 1970, pp. 594-597 
 – argue that sunk costs should be divided into relative (expressed as a 
proportion of total resources) and absolute (the amount of sunk costs in absolute units) 
costs. They additionally argue that it is relative sunk costs which ultimately dictate a 
person’s sunk cost behaviour. 
145 H. Garland and S. Newport, ‘Effect of Absolute and Relative Sunk Costs on the Decision to Persist with 
a Course of Action’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 48, No. 1, 1991, pp. 
55-69 
146 Ibid., p. 55 
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However, while an interesting and useful argument, it is considered that the 
absolute and relative separation itself is problematic in several ways, discussed further 
later in this thesis, but including the contention that if sunk costs are argued to be total 
sunk costs incurred not just ‘conscious’ sunk investments, they cannot easily be 
expressed as ‘relative to available investment’, owing to the nature of some costs. 
Furthermore, issues related to the ‘relative importance’ of cost types are also felt to be 
present; in situations where more than one type of cost is incurred. More simply, some 
situations do not state what amounts of resources are available at the outset. Wang and 
Yang147
The two principal SCE authors are Doug Walton and Hal Arkes. According to 
Arkes and Blumer, the SCE is “a greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an [non-
refundable] investment in money, effort or time has been made.”
 discuss further the differences in the various definitions of sunk costs, yet the 
common element is that sunk costs are costs that have been incurred and are 
irretrievable no matter how the actor behaves subsequently. Although not explicitly 
stated, this would imply that sunk costs are non-refundable and can only be recouped in 
terms of the income from the finished action (and only if it is in an investment context, 
not a compliance-type context where the action cannot be continued). It should be noted 
that sunk costs are discussed independently of sunk cost effects; principally regarding 
entry and exit business situations. These situations have relevance to this thesis in that 
they state that sunk costs can pose an obstacle to beginning and, most importantly, ending 
a task. 
148 It is, then, a 
maladaptive behaviour, borne of the actor’s wish not to appear wasteful.149
                                               
147 X. Wang and B. Z. Yang, ‘On the Treatment of Fixed and Sunk Costs in Principles Textbooks: A 
Comment and a Reply’, Journal of Economic Education, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2004, pp. 365-370 
148 H. R. Arkes and C. Blumer, ‘The Psychology of Sunk Cost’, Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1985, p. 124 
149 Ibid., p. 125 
 One of Arkes’ 
best known experiments concerns theatre season tickets; sold at varying prices to a 
randomised group of people. Discounts were explained as a promotion by the theatre. It 
was discovered that an individual who bought a higher priced ticket used it significantly 
more often than an individual who bought a discounted ticket. Arkes concludes that 
individuals who bought tickets at face value ‘appreciated’ their sunk costs more readily 
than those who bought discounted tickets. Certainly, this study is an interesting and 
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complex example of the SCE, and requires further investigation than can be performed 
here. The need not to waste150 is indeed Arkes’ main explanation for the SCE; he 
recognises that justification of sunk costs is a continuance motive.151 Arkes and Blumer 
note that, normally, the SCE lasts approximately six months before deferring to normal 
cost/benefit conditions. When considering justification though, Arkes does not 
distinguish between justifying the sunk costs themselves, as a continuance motive, and 
justifying the action that required the sunk costs; rather he considers them together as 
part of the same phenomenon: the SCE.152
Walton
 Staw however does separate these two 
justification forms. In reality, both circumstances could be envisaged. An actor could be 
less concerned about the effects of failing a project than the sunk costs he has incurred 
from it. Thus, sunk cost justification makes him continue, not self- or external 
justification. Conversely, sunk costs may just influence the actor’s sensitivity to self- and 
external justification following negative feedback. 
153 looks at the ‘Sunk Cost Fallacy’ (SCF) or ‘argument from waste’, as 
opposed to the SCE rubric specifically. His main point is to challenge the notion that all 
sunk cost reasoning is, as Arkes and others would put it, ‘maladaptive’. He argues that 
sunk cost reasoning is “fallacious in some cases but reasonable in other cases.”154 Basing 
his argument upon the questionable definition of rationality, Walton argues that sunk cost 
reasoning is rational when taken in terms of ‘precommitment’ and ‘autoepistemic 
reasoning’.155 According to Walton, the latter terms are a “species”156 of the SCE. 
Furthermore, Walton argues that the SCE should be taught as a fallacy to the novice 
economist, but not to the expert economist; yet this is what is happening.157
                                               
150 H. R. Arkes, ‘The Psychology of Waste’, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Vol. 9, No. 3, 1996, 
pp. 213-224 
 Walton 
draws upon the fictional example of Mary, who buys the most expensive exercise bike 
she can because she knows, autoepistemically, that she will likely grow tired of 
151 P. Ayton and H. Arkes, ‘Call it Quits’, New Scientist, Vol. 158, No. 2135, 1998, pp. 40-44 
152 H. R. Arkes and P. Ayton, ‘Think Like a Dog’, Psychology Today, Vol. 33, No. 1, 2000, pp. 10-11 
153 D. Walton, ‘The Sunk Costs Fallacy or Argument from Waste’, Argumentation, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2002, 
pp. 473-503 
154 Ibid., p. 474 
155 Ibid., p. 483. Autoepistemic reasoning, according to Walton, is “reasoning about one’s own reasoning.” 
Here, one is manipulating one’s own failings (in this case, the Sunk Cost Effect), for the greater good. 
156 Ibid., p. 477 
157 Ibid., p. 500 
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exercising but her precommitment will force her to use the apparatus, knowing also that 
she hates waste from sunk costs;158 she is ‘meta-reasoning’: reasoning about her own 
reasoning. Walton also rationalises sunk costs in another way. He argues that an actor can 
purposely sink resources into a competitive scenario (for example, an electronics firm 
that buys specific equipment suitable only for one task) to force rivals to recognise that 
he will not quit this scenario since he is now committed through his sunk costs and 
therefore it would be pointless to compete against him.159 Walton argues finally that 
labelling sunk costs as fallacious or not “depends upon the context of use”160 and that 
sunk costs “could rightly be judged to be relevant from one point of view on rationality, 
while at the same time, they could rightly be judged to be irrelevant from a different point 
of view.”161 He concludes by arguing that “dismissing all instances of argument from 
sunk cost as fallacious has definitely been ruled out.”162
While Walton and Arkes could be considered the main authors concerning the SCE, 
numerous other authors also discuss the phenomenon. Elster is also a major contributor, 
regarding sunk cost precommitment.
 
163 He makes many of the same points as Walton, 
under the rubric of “passionate precommitment.”164 Elster though focuses upon the 
flaws165 of precommitment using rational argument, which fall outside this thesis’ scope. 
Elster however is not the only other precommitment theory contributor. Nozick is 
another166 along with Nulden,167 Kelly,168 Weatherson169 and Paraye.170
                                               
158 Ibid., p. 483 
159 Ibid., p. 485. Walton calls this the “sunk cost strategy.” Compare this with M. Grinfeld et al., ‘A 
Probabilistic Framework for Hysteresis’, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Vol. 287, 
No. 3-4, 2000, p. 585 who state the entrapping, rather than the strategic, nature of sunk cost reasoning in 
the duopolistic (and in this case the commercial) arena. They state “that this case is non-trivial can be 
seen from a game-theoretic setting involving just two firms. Clearly, if both of them are in the market 
which cannot support the two of them, it makes no sense for any of the firms to leave it, thus 
relinquishing all the profits to the rival and losing the sunk costs as well.” Compare Walton’s argument 
also with the later discussion of deterrence and spiral conflicts. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., pp. 491-492 
162 Ibid., p. 500 
163 J. Elster, Sour Grapes, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), J. Elster, Ulysses and the 
Sirens, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984) and J. Elster (Ed.), Rational choice, 
(Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1986) 
164 J. Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment and Constraints, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 19 
165 Ibid., p. 79 
 And as Walton 
166 R. Nozick, The Nature of Rationality, (Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
p. 23. Similarly to Walton, Nozick argues that sunk cost consideration can be autoepistemically rational. 
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argues that sunk costs can be used to convince oneself to continue an unpopular exercise 
regime or show an opponent that we mean business, Cole171 argues that government 
organisations can use the SCE in an underhand way to force through illegal projects, 
when a third party adjudicator is involved, by investing much public funds while an 
enjoining decision is looming, knowing the natural stance of adjudicators is to prevent 
wasteful public spending. Similarly, Kopf illustrates this tactic from the perspective of 
commercial organisations violating environmental laws.172 In both cases, sunk costs are a 
“manifestation of the fait accompli tactic…a time proven strategy.”173 Diekmann et al.174
                                                                                                                                            
He states that “we can knowingly employ our tendency to take sunk costs seriously as a means of 
increasing our future rewards. If this is irrational it can be rationally utilized.” He argues further that 
blanket ignorance of sunk costs as an autoepistemic tool is not an “appropriate general principle” in 
terms of avoiding immediate but smaller gains, not just the Waltonian gain/loss schism, because 
honouring sunk costs can “prevent us from choosing a more immediate but smaller reward because we 
will have invested in advance to prevent us from doing this and making us go the whole way.” In other 
words, not utilising precommitment “deprives us of a valuable tool for getting past temptations of the 
moment.” Nozick concludes that while the utility of honouring sunk cost is dependent upon the situation, 
“if someone offered us a pill that henceforth would make us people who never honored sunk costs, we 
might be ill advised to accept it.” Nozick’s arguments are disputed by D. R. Steele, ‘Nozick on Sunk 
Costs’, Ethics, Vol. 106, No. 3, 1996, pp. 605-620. 
167 U. Nulden, ‘Failing Projects: Harder to Abandon than to Continue’, Working Paper, (Goteborg 
University, Department of Informatics, Sweden: 1996), p. 2. Nulden states that “it is important to 
emphasize that when commitment induces a person to complete a difficult or unpleasant task that 
benefits him and others, then commitment is a good thing. Obviously, without commitment the hard 
work required will not be done.” 
168 T. Kelly, ‘Sunk Costs, Rationality and Acting for the Sake of the Past’, Nous, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2004, pp. 
60-86 
 
observe the SCE during negotiations. They argue that it can be transmitted from one actor 
to another insofar as a buyer will acknowledge that a seller will take on board his sunk 
costs held in an item (for example, the original cost of a corporation), even if more recent 
169 http://www.crookedtimber.org/archives/001517.html, 12/12/04 
170 R. Paraye, ‘The Strategic Implications of Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Perspective’, Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1995, pp. 417-442 
171 D. E. Cole, ‘Judicial Discretion and the ‘Sunk Costs’ Strategy of Government Agencies’, Boston 
College Environmental Affairs Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2003, pp. 689-728 
172 J. S. Kopf, ‘Steamrolling Section 7(d) of the Endangered Species Act: How Sunk Costs Undermine 
Environmental Regulation’, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1996, 
pp. 393-394. Kopf states that “the proponent foresees that development may violate some environmental 
laws…. To avoid costly compliance with environmental regulations…the developer employs a devious 
strategy…sinking money and resources into early and tangential phases of the project.... By the time 
opponents of the project can get a court to consider enjoining the project, the court faces a fait accompli. 
Much damage to the environment has already been done…. However the court faces tremendous 
practical pressures not to enforce the environmental laws…[to avoid] short term waste.” 
173 Ibid., p. 393 
174 K. A. Diekmann et al., ‘The Descriptive and Prescriptive Use of Previous Purchase Price in 
Negotiations’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 66, No. 2, 1996, pp. 179-
191 
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‘value information’ is available. Thus, a sunk cost aware buyer will choose a seller who 
incurred low sunk costs originally, to gain a financial hold on the negotiations. Ellingsen 
and Johannesson,175 Carmichael and MacLoed176 and Troger177
Many authors also express opinions about the antecedents of the SCE. Astebro and 
Simons
 also discuss sunk costs 
during bargaining and negotiation. 
178 argue that successful actors ignore sunk costs when decision making. 
Bornstein and Chapman179 argue that, in a losing situation, decision makers recognise 
their actions are suboptimal but they continue, in order to learn a lesson, suffer self-
punishment for a bad decision and satisfy the desire to appear consistent to others. They 
also argue180 that an actor is ‘split’ into two ‘selves’, a ‘teacher’ and a ‘student’, with the 
overall result of the actor behaving for long term utility (learning from mistakes), rather 
than acting for immediate utility. This is a somewhat esoteric interpretation of SCE 
determinants, yet should at least be acknowledged if only because it has wider utility for 
EoC behaviour overall. Wilson and Qing share some of Bornstein and Chapman’s 
opinions, when they state that curiosity and the wish to learn about the phenomenon 
contributes to the SCE.181 Laughhunn and Payne,182
                                               
175 T. Ellingsen and M. Johannesson, ‘Sunk Costs and Fairness in Incomplete Information Bargaining’, 
Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 50, No. 2, 2005, pp. 155-177 
176 L. Carmichael and W. B. MacLeod, ‘Caring about Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Solution to Hold-Up 
Problems with Small Stakes’, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2003, pp. 
106-118 
177 T. Troger, ‘Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach’, Journal of 
Economic Theory, Vol. 102, No. 2, 2002, pp. 375-402 
178 T. Astebro and K. L. Simons, ‘Innovation Exit: Why Entrepreneurs Pull the Plug on their Innovations’, 
Working Paper, (Toronto University, Rotman School of Management, Toronto, Canada: 2003), pp. 1-24 
179 B. H. Bornstein and G. B. Chapman, ‘Learning Lessons from Sunk Costs’, Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1995, pp. 251-269 
180 Ibid. 
181 R. M. S. Wilson and Z. Qing, ‘Entrapment and Escalating Commitment in Investment Decision Making: 
A Review’, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1997, p. 285 
182 D. Laughhunn and J. W. Payne, ‘The Impact of Sunk Outcomes on Risky Choice Behaviour’, INFOR, 
Vol. 22, No. 2, 1984, pp. 155-181 
 like the proponents of CEST, argue 
that individuals make sunk cost decisions because they rely not just on the economics of 
the situation (the minimal account) but also on the emotions of the situation (the 
psychological account). This thesis suggests however that Laughhunn and Payne’s work 
may be better suited as a determinant of EoC behaviour as a whole rather than just the 
SCE. An already expressed, contentious, antecedent, from Garland and Newport, is that 
sunk costs can be divided into absolute and relative costs and it is relative costs which 
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trigger the SCE. Garland alone also argues this.183 Beyond the ‘relative’ argument, 
Garland et al. argue that when negative feedback is directly informative of the project’s 
outcome, the SCE will not occur.184 This argument contrasts with other authors’ 
viewpoints, stated earlier. These viewpoints are generally applied in the context of EoC 
behaviour rather than solely sunk costs however. Regarding the severity of the SCE and 
Garland and Newport’s earlier money, time and effort comment, Guterman argues that the 
effect is more severe when money is the principal cost.185
As has already been observed, some authors subdivide their interpretations of sunk 
costs.
 However, Guterman’s 
statement is open to interpretation. Spending one’s time on a failing project for example, 
could mean that profit from another venture is bypassed, or that one runs out of ‘effort’. 
186 Yet some authors also subdivide their interpretations of the SCE. E. Fantino, S. 
Fantino and Navarro argue that there are two distinct versions of SCE;187 the ‘resource 
allocation version’ (when an individual chooses one alternative over another [for 
example, one holiday over another when two holidays have been purchased but the dates 
clash] because it is worth more, not because the expected utility is higher) and the 
‘continuing to invest version’ (when one reinvests in a situation because of sunk costs). 
This subdivision is supported by Keasey and Moon188 and Garland and Conlon (under 
adoption and progress).189 Eyster190
                                               
183 H. Garland, ‘Throwing Good Money after Bad: The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Decision to Escalate 
Commitment to an Ongoing Project’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 75, No. 6, 1990, pp. 728-731 
184 H. Garland et al., ‘De-Escalation of Commitment in Oil Exploration: When Sunk Costs and Negative 
Feedback Coincide’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 75, No. 6, 1990, pp. 721-727 
185 J. Guterman, ‘Don't Throw Good Money (or Time) after Bad’, Harvard Management Update, Vol. 7, 
No. 5, 2002, p. 8 
186 Guy, ‘Exit Strategies…’ 
187 E. Fantino, ‘Behavior-Analytic Approaches to Decision Making’, Behavioural Processes, Vol. 66, No. 
3, 2004, pp. 279-288, E. Fantino and S. Stolarz-Fantino, ‘From Patterns to Prosperity: A Review of 
Rachlin’s ‘The Science of Self-Control’’, Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, Vol. 78, No. 
1, 2002, pp. 117-125 and A. D. Navarro and E. Fantino, ‘The Sunk Cost Effect in Pigeons and Humans’, 
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, Vol. 83, No. 1, 2005, pp. 1-13 
188 K. Keasey and P. Moon, ‘Sunk Cost Effects: A Test of the Importance of Context’, Economics Letters, 
Vol. 66, No. 1, 2000, pp. 55-59 
 similarly argues that there is a SCF (when one 
confuses average with marginal costs) and a SCE (which incorporates E. Fantino’s, S. 
Fantino’s and Navarro’s interpretations). Eyster further raises the prospect of an Unsunk 
189 H. Garland and D. E. Conlon, ‘Too Close to Quit: The Role of Project Completion in Maintaining 
Commitment’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 28, No. 22, 1998, pp. 2025-2049 
190 E. Eyster, ‘Rationalizing the Past: A Taste for Consistency’, Working Paper, (Oxford University, 
Nuffield College, Oxford, UK: 2002), pp. 1-48 
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Cost Effect; where an actor, in a two period investment scheme, invests fewer resources 
than is optimal in the second period to justify an overly low investment in the first.191 
Note that Eyster interprets the SCE predominantly in the mindset of justification and 
consistency motives for actions and their associated costs, instead of predominantly cost 
motives.192 Johnstone193 and Zeelenberg and Van Dijk194 argue there is a reverse SCE, 
where one abandons a situation prematurely because of sunk costs. The suggested 
reasons this occurs are: one has been a victim of the standard SCE previously and is 
sensitised to it and poor mental budgeting may confuse one’s perception of the marginal 
gains of persistence. Heath and Peterson support this argument.195 Romanus et al.196 also 
comment upon sensitivity to sunk costs. Kelly’s197
The relationship between the SCE as an EoC behaviour determinant and the SCE as 
an EoC behaviour theory in itself is open to interpretation. Arkes’ opening definition of 
the SCE could perhaps be taken as meaning the same as Staw’s EoC theory for example 
(and, as demonstrated later, the SCE often is understood to be the same by some EoC 
behaviour authors). However, looking at the definitions above in greater detail, the SCE 
appears to describe a slightly different phenomenon: including one’s previously sunk 
costs on future decision making, and it is this phenomenon that is a determinant of 
 two SCE ‘versions’ include 
Johnstone’s reverse model and the ‘standard’ effect of investing to avoid waste and 
justify costs. 
                                               
191 Ibid., p. 4 
192 Ibid., p. 1. Eyster is basically arguing that whether negative feedback occurs or not, one will act in a 
consistent manner; basing future action upon the optimality of the initial decision. He states that “when 
past and present actions are strategic complements, then a past action higher than optimal leads to a 
present action also higher than optimal – the Sunk Cost Effect – and a past action lower than optimal 
leads to a present action also lower than optimal: an ‘Unsunk Cost Effect’.” 
193 D. Johnstone, ‘The ‘Reverse’ Sunk Cost Effect and Explanations, Rational and Irrational’, Working 
Paper, (Wollongong University, Department of Accounting and Finance, Wollongong, New South 
Wales, Australia: 2000), pp. 1-25 
194 M. Zeelenberg and E. Van Dijk, ‘A Reverse Sunk Cost Effect in Risky Decision Making: Sometimes 
We have too Much Invested to Gamble’, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 6, 1997, pp. 
677-691 
195 C. Heath and M. A. Peterson, ‘Premature De-Escalation in Response to Failed Investment: A Test of 
Escalating Commitment, Marginal Decision Making and Mental Budgeting’, Working Paper, (Chicago 
University, Graduate School of Business, Chicago, USA: 2001), pp. 1-40 and C. Heath, ‘Escalation and 
De-Escalation of Commitment to Sunk Costs: The Role of Budgeting in Mental Accounting’, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1995, pp. 38-54 
196 J. Romanus et al., ‘A Loss Sensitivity Explanation of Integration of Prior Outcomes in Risky Decisions’, 
Acta Psychologica, Vol. 93, No. 1-3, 1996, pp. 173-183 
197 Kelly, ‘Sunk Costs, Rationality…’ 
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another behaviour: EoC behaviour. It has already been demonstrated that Staw chooses to 
treat the SCE as an EoC behaviour determinant by including the former within his EoC 
framework; being the product of faulty heuristics of mental budgeting and justification 
for costs motives. Even if the above attempts at definitional disambiguation are put aside, 
it is not just sunk cost justification/waste motives that make one continue under Staw’s 
EoC theory anyway, but other factors such as the project economics and contextual and 
organisational factors that tend not to appreciate the individual’s wish to continue or quit. 
Thus, comparing the SCE to Staw’s EoC interpretation is perhaps misguided. However, 
as a later exploration of the SCE literature reveals, the issues of the SCE being or not 
being an EoC behaviour theory and the SCE meaning the same as Staw’s EoC 
interpretation are complex and problematic; not least because some authors treat the SCE 
and Staw’s EoC theory much differently from their initial or literal meanings. For now 
though it would seem prudent to simply question the similarity between one choosing to 
go to a theatre in a one-off choice to justify expense and one prosecuting an ongoing, 
complex situation for a number of psychological, social and organisational reasons. 
A related theory to the SCE is the Concorde Fallacy. The Concorde Fallacy is 
principally a biological theory, yet is explored here owing to its similarity to the SCE and 
some authors’ attempts to translate it into the social science and particularly the political 
field. Explained in this thesis’ introduction, the fallacy, founded by Dawkins and 
Carlisle198 in 1976 from a critique of Trivers’199 ‘Parental Investment Theory’, relates to 
the supposed bias by animals and insects200 to their past behaviour; namely their sunk 
costs. The fallacy is a disputed phenomenon however,201 with authors, including Dawkins 
and Brockman, providing alternate explanations. Regarding the digger wasp case,202
                                               
198 R. Dawkins and T. R. Carlisle, ‘Parental Investment, Mate Desertion and a Fallacy’, Nature, Vol. 262, 
No. 5564, 1976, pp. 131-133 and R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, (Oxford, UK: OUP, 1989) 
199 R. L. Trivers, ‘Parental Investment and Sexual Selection’, in B. Campbell (Ed.), Sexual Selection and 
the Descent of Man, (Chicago, USA: Aldine, 1972), pp. 136-179 
200 R. Dawkins and H. J. Brockman, ‘Do Digger Wasps Commit the Concorde Fallacy?’, Animal 
Behaviour, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1980, pp. 892-896 
201 R. M. Coleman and M. R. Gross, ‘How to Rescue the Concorde Fallacy – Reply’, Trends in Ecology & 
Evolution, Vol. 7, No. 5, 1992, p. 169, J. Jokela and T. Vuorisalo, ‘How to Rescue the Concorde 
Fallacy’, Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Vol. 7, No. 5, 1992, p. 169 and D. W. Winkler, ‘Parental 
Investment Decision Rules in Tree Swallows: Parental Defense, Abandonment and the So-Called 
Concorde Fallacy’, Behavioral Ecology, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1990, pp. 133-142 
 
202 R. Dawkins, Personal Communication, (Email, 02/11/04). In Dawkins’ words, “if the wasps were 
fighting harder for better-stocked burrows, of course it would be sensible and non-concordian. But that is 
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some authors argue that the wasps may not be able to count the total amount of prey and 
simply treat their individual contribution as the total amount present, as a rule of 
thumb.203 Some observations need to be made here though. That any of the wasps quit 
fighting at all puts some distance between the Concorde Fallacy and the SCE since sunk 
costs tend to be cumulative to a situation and contribute to an actor’s future behaviour; 
not just his behaviour according to the original investment. Also, does it matter which 
wasp makes the nest? Dawkins and Brockman argue that it does not matter, that the 
digger wasp does not count the effort of building the nest when fighting, but surely nest 
building counts as a sunk investment too? The real relevance of the fallacy to this thesis 
however is its transfer to social science literature. All that really needs to be 
acknowledged is that the fallacy, when taken in non-life science terms, is synonymous 
with the general understanding of the SCE. Even Dawkins, with Brockman, makes some 
allusions to human application of the fallacy, calling it the “Our Boys Should Not Have 
Died in Vain Fallacy.”204 Arkes and Ayton claim to make the link between the fallacy 
and the SCE and argue205
Also related to the SCE is the Project Completion Hypothesis (PCH). The basic 
PCH argues that the nearer a project is to completion the more likely an actor is to 
reinvest after negative feedback. While the PCH is a standalone EoC behaviour 
determinant, Staw discusses
 that the fallacy is simply the biological science version of the 
SCE. One should note then that as the SCE is often treated as a theory of the broader EoC 
behaviour, the fallacy is too. Arkes and Ayton’s claims to be the innovators of such 
transference of terms – between the biological and social sciences – are however, 
dubious, when taken in the milieu of earlier research and this dubiousness deserves 
further scrutiny. 
206
                                                                                                                                            
NOT what they were doing. Each was [sic] was fighting harder only for the contribution that she herself 
had made.” 
203 Ibid., “It was as if she [the wasp] was blind to the contents of the nest, and knew only about her own 
contributions to it. Indeed, that is the suggestion we ended up making.” 
204 Dawkins and Brockman, ‘Do Digger Wasps Commit…’, p. 892 
205 H. R. Arkes and P. Ayton, ‘The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less Rational than 
Lower Animals?’, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 125, No. 5, 1999, pp. 591-600 and Ayton and Arkes, 
‘Call it…’ 
206 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update…’, p. 202 
 project completion as a function of the SCE (in that 
individuals believe that many sunk costs, particularly when viewed relatively, indicate 
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that a project is nearly completed, when the two conditions may be unrelated). However, 
it is also argued that in certain cases where sunk costs have been blamed for EoC 
behaviour, the project completion level was actually the main responsible factor.207 
Where there is no ‘project’ however, project completion is not relevant opposition to the 
SCE. Like Prospect Theory and self-justification however, the PCH and the SCE do not 
necessarily need to be rival theories. Moon208 attempts to reconcile the two theories under 
a mathematical model, where EoC behaviour is a function of the degree of project 
completion and the amount of sunk costs. Moon argues that project completion and sunk 
costs can exert simultaneous and synergistic pressures upon the individual, not just 
independent pressures. Related to the PCH, Fox and Hoffman209 after combining 
Lewinian and Atkinson approaches,210
                                               
207 D. M. Boehne and P. W. Paese, ‘Deciding Whether to Complete or Terminate an Unfinished Project: A 
Strong Test of the Project Completion Hypothesis’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, Vol. 81, No. 2, 2000, pp. 178-194, D. E. Conlon and H. Garland, ‘The Role of Project 
Completion Information in Resource Allocation Decisions’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36, 
No. 2, 1993, pp. 402-413 and Garland and Conlon, ‘Too Close to Quit…’ 
208 H. Moon, ‘Looking Forward and Looking Back: Integrating Completion and Sunk-Cost Effects within 
an Escalation-of-Commitment Progress Decision’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 86, No. 1, 2001, 
pp. 104-113 
209 S. Fox and M. Hoffman, ‘Escalation Behavior as a Specific Case of Goal-Directed Activity: A 
Persistence Paradigm’, Basic and Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2002, pp. 273-285 
210 For more information on these approaches, see D. Cartwright (Ed.), Field Theory in Social Science: 
Selected Theoretical Papers, (New York, USA: Harper, 1951) 
 argue that EoC behaviour can be caused by 
‘proximal closure’, where completing the project is an end in itself, and by ‘clarity of 
completion’, where the more clear the steps or path to completing the goal are, the more 
effort an actor will ‘invest’. Hence, this is related to information, where any feedback, 
even negative, can be argued to encourage continuance, since it provides information. 
This chapter has described the origin of EoC behaviour research and has introduced EoC 
behaviour research itself. Through this exploration, several ‘issues’ have been highlighted 
for further examination. Chapter four continues the EoC behaviour research exploration; 
in the milieu of IR. 
 85 
4.0 International Relations Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
Escalation of Commitment (EoC) behaviour is researched predominantly in the 
realm of social science. However, within this broad field there is much EoC behaviour 
research in the disciplines of International Relations (IR) and, to a lesser extent, political 
decision making. This chapter reviews EoC behaviour research within these disciplines. 
The chapter begins with a historical study of two important EoC behaviour theories that 
are applied predominantly in the IR sphere: Joel Brockner’s Entrapment and Allan 
Teger’s Too Much Invested To Quit (TMITQ). Then, other political and IR based EoC 
behaviour relevant research that uses these EoC behaviour rubrics, previously 
undiscussed rubrics and rubrics already encountered is examined. 
 
4.1 Entrapment and Too Much Invested To Quit 
 
Brockner’s Entrapment and Teger’s TMITQ, like Staw’s EoC theory, investigate 
EoC behaviour. However, although there is some crossover regarding subject matter, 
Staw’s theory is applied mainly in business-centric, organisational contexts and 
Entrapment and TMITQ are applied predominantly to (often competitive), governmental, 
IR and political situations. The Entrapment concept was present in IR literature before 
Brockner became the principal author on the subject. At this time though, Entrapment 
literature was principally an ancillary explanation for what is known traditionally as 
‘conflict escalation’ (taken here to mean broad intensification behaviour between two, 
usually international level opponents and predominantly in, or leading to, a hot military 
situation) rather than a ‘standalone theory’. Shubik in 1971, for example, utilises 
Entrapment to explain why escalation occurs between nations. Shubik utilises the ‘Dollar 
Auction’, an application of Game Theory, in which multiple players bid for a dollar bill. 
The unique condition here is that the winner expends his bid and gains the dollar, while 
the runner up simply loses his bid. Thus, once only two bidders remain, a continuance 
motive emerges, of being unable to quit for fear of losing one’s investment entirely. Each 
player thus increases his bid, provoking the same from his opponent. The final two 
bidders are essentially entrapped. The auction often ends with significantly more than 
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one dollar having been bid. Shubik claims that, despite the individual level of analysis, 
the auction is a “paradigm for escalation”;1
The true precursor to contemporary Entrapment theory occurs with Rubin’s 1975 
paper;
 based upon sunk costs appreciation by 
participants. Immediately then there is an EoC behaviour ‘feel’ to Entrapment theory, but 
also a theoretical link between Entrapment (and thus EoC behaviour situations in general) 
and ‘traditional’ conflict escalation. The Dollar Auction is more complex than this brief 
explanation implies however and is discussed again, later in this chapter. 
2 undertaken with Brockner. This paper is important in that it introduces the 
concept of time within Entrapment situations, (Entrapment as a passive, waiting situation 
not just a conscious investment situation) and the allusion that Entrapment does not 
always have to be applied to intensifying, duopolistic, IR/intra-nation conflict situations; 
but to a variety of maintenance level, subnational and individual ‘everyday conflicts’ too, 
and in non-competitive contexts. Following this paper, although Rubin continues to 
significantly contribute to the Entrapment discussion, Brockner becomes the most 
authoritative author concerning the theory. In 1979, Brockner et al. investigate 
Entrapment and state that “one particularly perplexing feature of certain escalating 
conflicts is their tendency to be self-perpetuating…entrapping in nature…in which a 
decision maker continues to expend resources at least in part to justify previous 
expenditures.”3 They state that Entrapment also requires a series of conditions in order to 
be considered.4
                                               
1 M. Shubik, ‘The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Non-Cooperative Behavior and Escalation’, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1971, p. 111 
2 J. Z. Rubin and J. Brockner, ‘Factors Affecting Entrapment in Waiting Situations: The Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern Effect’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 6, 1975, pp. 1054-1063 
3 J. Brockner et al., ‘Factors Affecting Withdrawal from an Escalating Conflict: Quitting Before it’s too 
Late’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 5, 1979, p. 493 
4 Ibid. 
 These conditions state that costs are also considered by the actor as 
investments (insofar as the costs increase the likelihood of ‘achievement’); a decision 
maker must have an alternative course of action to choose between (meaning here, being 
able to quit); the probability of achieving the goal is less than ‘1’ and the motives for 
continuing an action change as the project proceeds. Brockner et al.’s progress model 
mirrors somewhat Staw’s temporal models; proceeding from project factors through to 
psychological justification factors. Brockner et al. also distinguish between passive and 
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active Entrapment.5
A recurring facet of Entrapment, according to Brockner, is that time is considered a 
resource, and waiting is a subject of study; in addition to the other resource types 
typically associated with EoC behaviour. The Entrapment definition is rephrased in 1981 
when Brockner et al. state that Entrapment occurs when “individuals have made 
substantial unrealized investments in pursuit of some goal and feel compelled to justify 
these expenditures with continued investments, even if the likelihood of goal attainment 
is low…perhaps in part because of the individual’s need to justify all that has been 
expended up to that point.”
 The former occurs when the actor does not need to act in order to 
continue a project, while the latter occurs when the actor consciously needs to reinvest in 
order to continue. 
6 In 1984, Brockner et al. characterise Entrapment as the 
“tendency for individuals to make increasing commitments to some failing course of 
action, in large part to justify the appropriateness of previous investments made in that 
situation.”7 Entrapment, then, according to Brockner, can be summed up by the words of 
Rubin et al. It is a “class of escalating conflict”8 where actors continue to invest in losing 
projects because they feel trapped; where “commitment begets commitment and 
investment begets investment.”9 “Entrapment is a monstrosity born of choice.”10
Although Brockner uses journals to explore Entrapment theory, it is his book, with 
Rubin
 
11 where the majority of his work is undertaken. Here, they focus upon research 
from authors such as Shubik and EoC behaviour authors like Staw and Teger; drawing 
some comparisons between these theories. They then explore some of the determinants of 
Entrapment; revisiting experiments concerning sex differences,12
                                               
5 Ibid., p. 494 
6 J. Brockner et al., ‘Face Saving and Entrapment’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 17, 
No. 1, 1981, pp. 68-69 
7 J. Brockner et al., ‘The Role of Modeling Processes in the ‘Knee Deep in the Big Muddy Phenomenon’’, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 33, 1984, p. 77 
8 J. Z. Rubin et al., ‘Factors Affecting Entry into Psychological Traps’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 
24, No. 3, 1980, p. 406 
9 Ibid. 
10 J. Z. Rubin, ‘Caught by Choice: The Psychological Snares We Set Ourselves’, Sciences, Vol. 22, No. 7, 
1982, p. 22 
11 J. Brockner and J. Z. Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis, (New 
York, USA: Springer-Perlag, 1985) 
12 Ibid., p. 65 
 (males are more likely 
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to escalate commitment than females), personality facets like aggression and group 
dynamics. 
 
4.2 ‘Escalating Conflicts’ and More Limitations of Entrapment 
 
A confusing discovery to emerge from Brockner’s and Rubin’s work is their 
treatment of the concept of ‘escalating conflicts’. It has been shown above that Brockner 
et al. use this term somewhat sporadically; intertwining it with some definitions of 
Entrapment and Brockner and Rubin use the term in their book title. Based upon aspects 
of their work (some Decision Making Unit [DMU] types used and some of the ‘everyday’ 
Entrapment examples provided), it appears that Brockner and Rubin do not mean to apply 
‘escalating conflict’ in, what is thought here to be, its most literal, intuitive or traditional 
sense: an intergovernmental, militaristic, intensifying, dyadic competition. What they do 
mean however is uncertain. Within some contexts of their work it is considered that the 
term ‘conflict’ means the psychological conflict that emerges from within the DMU when 
it is faced with a failing course of action, (regarding whether to continue or quit) and 
‘escalating’ means the continuance of this action. Entrapment here then is considered as a 
cause of this continuance. A somewhat complementary view is that ‘conflict’ could be 
understood simply to mean any ongoing, problematic situation or project involving a 
DMU, with ‘escalation’, again, meaning continuance. Brockner and Rubin use the terms 
social and non-social interaction to describe competitive and non-competitive situations 
respectively.13 Thus, ‘escalating conflicts’ here appear to refer to persisting, non-
competitive and competitive situations. As an aside, Staw14
Ultimately, like Staw, important concepts such as ‘escalation’, ‘conflict escalation’ 
and ‘escalating conflicts’ are simply not adequately defined by Brockner and Rubin, and 
 also discusses conflict 
situations, again to describe the ‘tugging’ of emotions in different directions to continue 
or quit. Staw uses the term interpersonal to describe what Brockner and Rubin call social 
interaction. Staw uses the word ‘social’ to describe the context of ‘other people’, but not 
necessarily in a competitive sense. 
                                               
13 Ibid., p. 58 
14 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents, Prototypes and Solutions’, 
Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 9, 1987, p. 71 
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are seemingly employed in a number of different senses. Above, other interpretations of 
‘conflict escalation’ are given, yet the more traditional interpretation also appears to 
emerge when reading Brockner’s and Rubin’s work. While defining Entrapment in their 
book, Brockner and Rubin argue that: 
 
[Entrapment is] not identical to escalation, or even conflict 
escalation. Rather it is a particular type of conflict escalation, 
based on the individual’s need to feel that their past commitment 
to a chosen course of action was not made in vain15
Assuming that Entrapment here can best be considered loosely as persistence in or 
continuance of a failing action, (be it between opposing DMUs, or involving only a 
single DMU, involved in some project), no explicit, concrete statement is made in 
Brockner’s and Rubin’s work regarding what continuance means. Does it mean 
maintenance of the situation? Can it include intensification? Is deescalation applicable 
too? No definition of any of these terms is given throughout Brockner’s and Rubin’s 
work, but intuitive definitions are assumed in this chapter based upon ideas that emerged 
from the continuance discussion in chapter three. Similar to the conclusions of the 
previous discussion, very little information is given here regarding ‘values’ or the 
 
 
Reverting to the traditional, intuitive intensification and versus meaning of conflict 
escalation, the previous quotation in isolation strongly implies that Entrapment is only 
applicable to governmental, duopolistic, competitive situations that are intensifying; yet 
previously Brockner and Rubin imply that Entrapment can be applied too to many non-
social aspects of life where non-governmental decision makers simply maintain an 
action. The use of the ‘individual’ in the above quote also serves to undermine the 
traditional conflict escalation meaning, as does the aforementioned terminological schism 
of ‘social’ and ‘non-social’ interaction. In short, while Brockner and Rubin use the words 
escalation and conflict escalation, they do not adequately define or contrast either term, 
which makes it difficult to establish a context within which Entrapment, and EoC 
behaviour in general, can be located. Currently, there are no clear answers to this 
dilemma. 
                                               
15 Brockner and Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts…, p. 6 
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measures/methods used to gauge ‘continuance type’. Providing minor clarification, 
Brockner and Rubin do state in their book that “as [actors] escalate their commitment to a 
failing course of action…tactics tend to become more heavy handed, the number of issues 
and the number of parties…tend to increase.”16 This implies material intensification. 
Moreover, an email from Brockner17
Perhaps providing the most support for the inclusion of intensification, is that 
Entrapment, in Brockner’s and Rubin’s work at least, ironically does focus more on IR 
situations and, most importantly, the predominant context of the case studies is 
duopolistic and competitive, concerning ‘hot wars’, much like the commonly accepted 
meaning of conflict escalation. An immediate lemma then, based upon the predominant 
types of examples used by Brockner and Rubin, is that, although not explicitly stated in 
their work, intensification can be a form of Entrapment continuance.
 implies that Entrapment can include maintenance, 
but more importantly numerical intensification. Here, Brockner employs the ‘rate 
measurement’ suggested in chapter three; using a single value (dollar investment). It 
would seem then that Entrapment includes maintenance and both forms of intensification 
(material and numerical); and continuance type is represented by some combination of 
the rates of investment of values and the overall nature of the action. 
18
Several complex issues emerge when considering the inclusion of ‘competition’ in 
an EoC behaviour situation. For example, while the most common situation is a 
‘simplified’ two player ‘versus’ situation (A versus B for control of X) – which is the 
predominant focus of the ‘competitive’ EoC behaviour literature, the predominant 
interpretation of ‘competition’ in this thesis and the predominant scenario when talking of 
‘conflict escalation’ – other situations can be envisaged. Some examples could be, first, a 
‘race’ between A and B to complete a project (such as a novel invention) or perform best 
at a counter game and, second, where A is engaged in a project that involves an opponent 
as a ‘side issue’ (such as trying to complete a bridge while the enemy attacks it). It is 
 However, many of 
the same social examples are periodically presented in non-social, DMU versus project 
terms too. 
                                               
16 Ibid., p. 258 
17 J. Brockner, Personal Communication, (Email, 15/07/05) 
18 Such an example is the El Salvador conflict, discussed in Brockner and Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating 
Conflicts…, p. 246 and discussed further below. 
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recognised too that there may be more than two DMUs with opposing motives in a 
situation. The specific effects of competition then (beating the opponent, revenge and 
punishment) which are suggested to contribute to EoC behaviour may not be present in 
their totality/intensity in all competitive situations. 
In a simplified two player situation, the enemy’s actions would appear to provide a 
further context against which continuation type could be measured. If the enemy’s value 
investment increase is considered greater than the primary DMU in a time period for 
example, then could intensification still be argued even though the DMU intensified 
apropos his own previous actions? Bearing in mind the word considered above, the type 
of measure used could be argued to be more important when interpreting the continuance 
type undertaken by the DMU in a social context than in a non-social one, owing to 
statistical distortions for example. 
Moreover, a DMU’s feedback could be argued to be a function of the enemy 
DMU’s, inverse, corresponding feedback. Intuitively, the enemy ‘is’ the project. 
Importantly, it could be argued that the primary DMU’s investment level may be dictated 
by the enemy anyway. For example, where there is an option for deescalation or 
maintenance in real terms, this could result in the situation being forcefully finished (the 
enemy would take control of the situation). Thus intuitively, the enemy would have to 
undertake the same behaviour for the calming of investment to be feasible. An important 
qualifying point here is that, like the motivations of beating, punishment and revenge, the 
observations above concerning intensity measurements, the comparative gauging of 
feedback and coerced investment levels may not be as applicable in other more complex 
or differently structured competitive situations. This brief exploration however is based 
upon many subjective concepts and may therefore be prone to logical fallacies currently. 
Thus, these issues deserve further investigation. 
The entire discussion above also raises issues such as the potential 
‘change/continuance paradox’. There is, in sum, a very similar set of problems here as 
when discussing Staw’s ‘figure 3.1’. Certainly, Entrapment, from the perspective of 
Brockner’s and Rubin’s work, not only has the conceptual problems discussed above, it 
does pose a difficult question regarding the theoretical ‘ubiety’ of itself, and EoC 
behaviour research in general, vis-à-vis traditional conflict escalation research. 
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Regarding the IR examples of Entrapment studied by Brockner and Rubin then; 
while acknowledging that the exploration of Vietnam is “beyond the scope” of their 
book19 focus here is applied instead to the El Salvador conflict. They argue that the 
“escalated commitment of the US in El Salvador is a manifestation of Entrapment.”20 It is 
believed that this statement refers to the general continuance of the action rather than a 
more specific form of continuance. One could assume the form of continuance being 
discussed is intensification but the fact that Brockner and Rubin also talk of “small but 
steady investments”21
Brockner and Rubin do briefly investigate the Vietnam Conflict. They argue that 
the conflict falls into the active Entrapment type, since “it was necessary for the United 
States’ policy makers to decide consciously and deliberately to take an active step in 
order to increase their commitment.”
 in the El Salvador conflict implies too a maintenance approach. 
The above discussion concerning the effect of enemy involvement on continuance type 
makes this statement less clear cut still. Brockner and Rubin discuss the El Salvador 
study in terms of the conditions for Entrapment discussed above. They also discuss 
organisational and cultural factors, such as Reagan’s reelection campaign creating 
pressure to succeed. They conclude that while the El Salvador conflict shows the 
symptoms of Entrapment, it is very difficult to prove that justification motives are 
responsible in any situation because the actor is reluctant to admit this motive. 
22 How the commitment is increased is not 
discussed, but given the nature of the war, intensification of investment both numerically 
and in terms of ‘nature’ could be inferred. They also state that external justification was a 
reason for the US staying in Vietnam.23
Brockner’s Entrapment research, like Staw’s EoC theory, changes and develops 
with time and Brockner expands the determinants of Entrapment from simple profit and 
 The issue of policy resistance (regarding action 
commencement) is also considered as a reason for the difficulty in withdrawing from 
Vietnam. 
                                               
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., p. 247 
22 Ibid., p. 43 
23 Ibid., p. 102. Brockner and Rubin state that “[The US found it extremely difficult to withdraw because] 
our nation’s leaders were concerned with the appearance of the US government and military in the eyes 
of the American public and the world at large.” 
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justification motives to include other measures, like self-esteem,24 project completion 
issues,25 and pride, punishment and revenge26 (in competition). This expansion is 
exemplified by his definition of Entrapment in later texts, when he omits the suffix: in 
large part to justify and simply states that it “refers to the tendency for decision makers to 
persist with failing courses of action.”27 The justification motive, then, appears to be no 
longer of sole importance. However, as a comparative measure, Brockner’s overall 
interpretation of Entrapment is generally less broad in terms of its determinants and focus 
than Staw’s view of his EoC theory. Despite this, Brockner argues frequently that 
Entrapment is “also known as Escalation of Commitment, the Sunk Cost Effect, The 
Knee Deep in the Big Muddy Effect [after Staw] and The Too Much Invested to Quit 
Effect.”28
Another important issue regarding Brockner’s Entrapment, is the nature of the 
DMU. Many similar issues exist regarding DMU usage by Brockner as those stated 
regarding Staw. Brockner talks explicitly of individuals. Yet some of Brockner’s 
examples – here of a different kind: intergovernmental conflicts and hot wars – and his 
word choices like ‘governments’, ‘actors’, ‘decision makers’ and ‘policy makers’ (not to 
mention the vagueness regarding whether he intends to use these words as general plurals 
or as ‘collectives’ of individuals) imply strongly that other DMUs beyond ‘the individual’ 
are felt by Brockner to be subject to Entrapment too. Unlike Staw though, Brockner 
explicitly talks of groups in Entrapment behaviour in his book; but largely in relation to 
 Given the statement immediately above, and the description of the SCE in 
chapter three, it would immediately seem absurd for Brockner to argue for this 
‘convergence’. 
                                               
24 For example, L. E. Sandelands et al., ‘If at First You don’t Succeed, Try, Try, Again: Effects of 
Persistence – Performance Contingencies, Ego Involvement and Self-Esteem on Task Persistence’, 
Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1988, pp. 208-216, J. Brockner et al., ‘Self-Esteem and 
Reactions to Negative Feedback: Toward Greater Generalizability’, Journal of Research in Personality, 
Vol. 21, No. 3, 1987, pp. 318-333 and M. H. Kernis et al., ‘Self-Esteem and Reactions to Failure: The 
Mediating Role of Overgeneralization’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 57, No. 4, 
1989, pp. 707-715. 
25 S. Nathanson et al., ‘Toward the Reduction of Entrapment’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 
12, No. 3, 1982, pp. 193-208 
26 J. Brockner, ‘The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward Theoretical 
Progress’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1992, pp. 39-61 
27 Ibid., p. 39 
28 J. Brockner et al., ‘Escalation of Commitment to an Ineffective Course of Action: The Effect of Feedback 
Having Negative Implications for Self-Identity’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1986, 
p. 109 
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‘group specific’ determinants (determinants only applicable to groups). It is assumed 
then, but is not stated explicitly by Brockner, that some determinants discussed in his 
greater body of work, (without explicit mention of groups, only implicating examples), 
affect groups in the same way as they do individuals. In a limited, non-group specific 
context, Brockner does argue that some previously discussed determinants affect groups 
differently from individuals. Like Staw, Brockner does not define ‘DMU’ nor 
‘organisation’ (or related terms such as ‘government’). Entrapment theory, as employed 
by other authors, is discussed below, after Teger’s TMITQ theory has been examined. 
 
4.3 Too Much Invested To Quit 
 
Very similar to Brockner’s work is Teger’s TMITQ paradigm. Teger discusses 
escalation situations. This term is not clearly defined, but in the context of Teger’s 
literature, an escalation situation is assumed to mean a situation in which a project has 
delivered negative feedback and the opportunity to continue the project, which entails 
further investment, exists. Teger argues that escalation situations can cause the DMU to 
become trapped in a losing course of action. Like Entrapment, justification motives – 
both emotional and regarding sunk costs – are given as the predominant reasons such 
entrapment arises; as implied by the name of the paradigm. Other facets are also briefly 
discussed; mainly regarding gender differences and the male propensity to escalate. 
Teger argues that TMITQ situations can be conflicting (involving opponents) or 
non-conflicting (not involving opponents).29 These descriptive terms, although meaning 
the same, differ with Brockner’s social and non-social and Staw’s interpersonal labels. 
Moreover, Brockner, (it is argued), and Staw, (certainly), use conflict to mean the internal 
argument that occurs when the DMU is debating whether or not to proceed.30
                                               
29 A. I. Teger, Too Much Invested to Quit, (New York, USA: Pergamon, 1980), p. 2 
30 As discussed earlier, Brockner’s intent with the word ‘conflict’ is only inferred from reading his work, 
while Staw specifically mentions his intent, such as in Staw and Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: 
Antecedents…’, p. 71. 
 Like 
Brockner’s Entrapment, the paradigm is applied to ‘everyday situations’ involving the 
individual in both competitive and non-competitive situations. However, the TMITQ 
paradigm principally concerns “how a nation can become trapped, by its own 
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commitments, in a clearly unproductive military escalation.”31
Teger utilises the Dollar Auction to analyse TMITQ in conflict situations. Teger 
argues that, depending on each stage of the pricing situation, the motives for such 
escalation ‘evolve’ in dominance from simple profit making, to reducing losses, to 
justifying previous investments/waste avoidance, to beating and even just punishing one’s 
opponent regardless of cost or outcome. This account holds stark similarity to Staw’s – 
discredited – temporal process; in that project factors are superseded by psychological 
ones as the game proceeds. The auction however is complex and could represent several 
behaviour patterns, depending upon one’s perspective and regardless of the accepted sunk 
costs motive. The auction could be taken in the context of a war and describe general 
intensification behaviour in terms of ‘investment units’, (not just money). The dollar 
represents the goal of overcoming the opponent, while the increasing bids – if they were 
taken as separate investments (a yearly investment, for example) – could be materially 
harsher tactics and/or greater intensity of existing tactics (including dollar investment). 
Yet the auction could also represent maintenance escalation behaviour in that the greater 
bids are the total amount of investment so far and are thus representative of uniform 
increases of investment, since even maintenance type escalation involves periodic 
reinvestment that increases the total amount invested. Here, the bids would need to 
increase by greater amounts in each episode for intensification to be considered. 
Although this immediate exploration leaves unexplored some complex aspects of the 
auction,
 Thus what Teger terms 
conflict situations are the primary concern here, but he does not define what he means by 
escalation. He may mean general continuance of military conflict or specifically 
intensification behaviour. Interestingly, a proportion of Teger’s thesis is dedicated to 
examining non-IR TMITQ situations with the apparent purpose of drawing conclusions 
that can then be applied to IR ones. 
32
Teger argues in his book that there is ample literature on the escalation of events 
leading up to hot conflict, but much less on the process of escalation during a war. His 
 one conclusion is that it is a useful tool for representing EoC behaviour and 
traditional conflict scenarios using ‘individual’ examples. 
                                               
31 Teger, Too Much…, p. xi 
32 For more information on the Dollar Auction see B. O’Neil, ‘International Escalation and the Dollar 
Auction’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 30, No. 1, 1986, pp. 33-50. 
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thesis therefore aims to contribute to the latter, using Vietnam as a case study. Here, 
Teger seems to consider escalation to mean intensification (specifically, the nature of the 
conflict), since events must intensify in this way in order to reach the point of war. Yet 
during war, it can be argued that neither the nature nor the numerical/frequency 
investment of existing behaviours need to intensify but can instead be maintained. It is 
uncertain if Teger recognises this. Teger’s discussion of the Vietnam Conflict is slightly 
more detailed than Brockner’s. The conflict, like from Brockner’s perspective, is treated 
in some places as a non-conflict scenario and in others as a conflict scenario (that is, 
investments are the focus at some points33 and not the enemy). In places, the conflict is 
also treated as a maintenance scenario (Teger talks periodically of reinvestment rather 
than intensification). He does apply the motivation dominance changes discussed apropos 
the Dollar Auction in this conflict, by utilising the employment of symbolism34
Brockner’s and Teger’s work has significant relevance to this thesis. Although less 
developed in terms of determinants than Staw’s EoC theory, their work does expand the 
situations and contexts in which EoC behaviour can occur and also expands the resources 
and costs associated with EoC behaviour situations. Brockner and Teger develop Garland 
and Newport’s money, time and effort to include such facets as manpower, death, 
injuries, collateral damage and human abuses. Their use of the Dollar Auction is also 
beneficial, yet the auction discussion fails to include the numerous subtleties that can 
occur during conflict (sharing the prize and negotiation, for example). Importantly, 
Brockner’s Entrapment and Teger’s TMITQ highlight further the uncertain theoretical 
 by the 
administration at the time; indicating that through more personal attacks on the enemy, 
the conflict became more personal than political. Teger’s work contains many of the 
uncertainties that have been raised so far, including the uncertain use of ‘escalation’, the 
unexplored relationship between EoC behaviour and traditional escalation, uncertainty 
regarding how TMITQ actually proceeds and the ambiguous ‘treatment’ of DMUs; which 
is identical to Brockner’s treatment. 
                                               
33 Teger, Too Much…, p. 4 
34 Ibid., pp. 96-100. Teger discusses positive symbols, negative symbols, commitment symbols and status 
symbols to represent the changes of motivations (from winning to punishment) for prosecuting the war. 
The reason for bombing the North of Vietnam, for example, is given by Teger as the revenge motive in 
action. 
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ubiety between EoC behaviour and traditional conflict escalation theory and the resultant 
difficulty in establishing a boundary between the two subjects. 
 
4.4 International Relations Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Literature Beyond 
Brockner and Teger 
 
The majority of the remaining literature concerning EoC behaviour in IR follows a 
similar pattern – and contains similar issues – to that highlighted above. Furthermore, 
such literature invents yet more rubrics to describe the EoC phenomenon. Christopher 
Mitchell is a major contributor to Entrapment theory. Mitchell asks what “the overall 
process to ending a conflict”35 actually constitutes; demonstrating, by implication, that 
Entrapment is principally a social and conflict based theory. “Choosing to negotiate,” 
Mitchell argues, is the “essential first step”36 in any form of conflict termination. He 
observes that many authors adopt an Expected Utility (EU) approach when looking at 
conflict termination, and argues that “their assumption is that decisions about conflict 
termination, like other human decisions, are the product of a rational process of choice 
and can thus be best understood by using a formal model of rational decision-making.”37 
Yet Mitchell argues that there may be more useful ways of looking at the processes that 
“actually occur”38 when attempting to end a conflict. Mitchell argues that conflict is 
divided into two modes. The first involves everyday war decisions and incremental 
resource allocation, the so-called “Incremental Continuation Mode”39 (ICM). The second 
mode occurs when decision makers consider negotiation; the “Comprehensive 
Reconsideration Phase”40 (CRP). This mode occurs after certain “trigger points”41
                                               
35 C. R. Mitchell, ‘Ending Conflicts and Wars: Judgement, Rationality and Entrapment’, International 
Social Science Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1991, p. 35 
36 Ibid., p. 36 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 37 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
 in the 
first phase, (such as a battlefield defeat). While it may seem that examination of the ICM 
would be more prudent to this thesis, it is in fact what Mitchell proposes concerning the 
CRP that provides the most interest. Mitchell critiques the EU model and concludes that 
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“actors do not always behave in a rational, utility maximizing fashion. A number of wars, 
strikes and even interpersonal disputes continue far beyond the point at which either 
adversary can hope to gain the equivalent of their losses in the struggle.”42 Mitchell 
divides factors that influence such irrational decision making in to “four broad 
headings.”43 These are ‘Interparty Factors’, ‘Intra-party Factors’, ‘Intra-ally Factors’ and 
‘Extra-conflict Factors’. These factors and headings bear much similarity to those in 
Staw’s framework; particularly regarding leadership rivalry, personal interest (Agency 
Theory) and Low-Balling & Foot-in-the-Door techniques. Such similarity is compounded 
when Mitchell recognises the dynamic nature of the factors (expressed as the ‘temporal 
model’ by Staw). Mitchell also discusses the ‘–’ and ‘+’ values of each facet, like Staw. 
Entrapment here then is more similar to Staw’s EoC theory than Brockner’s 
interpretation. 
 
                                               
42 Ibid., p. 41 
43 Ibid., p. 43 
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Regarding dynamism, Mitchell argues that: 
 
It is easy to say that such factors can all influence decisions 
about conflict termination, and that some may play a greater or 
lesser role in determining the utility of the outcomes as the 
conflict proceeds. It is less easy to determine those which might 
have a major influence at a given moment and, more importantly, 
how this degree of influence might change over time…. The 
central argument in this article is that judgements of the utility of 
alternative outcomes are dynamic, in the sense that not only the 
outcomes but also the factors which influence decision makers’ 
evaluations change44
Mitchell uses sunk costs as an example for such dynamic properties of Entrapment. 
At the start of a conflict, sunk costs are regarded as investments, evaluation procedures 
and agents to increase the likelihood of an action coming about. However, Mitchell 
argues that at a certain point sunk costs begin to adopt the role of sacrifices and become 
reasons for continuing towards the goal in themselves. He suggests that this may occur 
when sunk costs are linked to project completion or when the ratio of costs to remaining 




While arguing that it is the “hurt itself [that], paradoxically, becomes a reason for 
continuing [in order to] justify both the psychological and political sacrifices already 
made,”
 
Entrapment model, figure 4.2, which is very similar to Staw’s abandoned EoC temporal 
models. Mitchell wishes to explain why he believes that certain factors’ importance 
changes over time. He argues that it is because of the evolving motives of the decision 
makers. The model begins with reward pursuit, through to goal relinquishing. 
46 he argues that “ripeness”47 is required for Entrapment to cease: a realisation that 
the action is not working and is likely to never succeed and that past costs are indeed 
“bygones.”48
                                               
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., p. 49 
46 C. R. Mitchell, ‘Cutting Losses: Reflections on Appropriate Timing’, Working Paper No. 9, (George 
Mason University, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, Virginia, USA: 1996), p. 4 
47 Ibid., p. 5 
48 Ibid. 
 The model also involves a punishment dominance stage, though Mitchell 
concedes not all Entrapment situations are competitive. 
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Maoz is also a major supporter of Brockner’s ideas. In Paradoxes of War,49 Maoz 
discusses four paradoxes that have relevance to this thesis. First, he discusses an arms 
race as an example of conflict escalation, under the ‘parabellum paradox’.50 Second, he 
discusses deterrence51 as a cause of conflict. Third, he discusses crisis escalation.52 These 
facets are discussed later in this thesis. However, it is his examination of sunk costs as a 
facet of Entrapment that is important here. Maoz, argues that not only do nations persist 
in wars because of sunk costs, but they will do this even if they know they are going to 
lose.53 Maoz also examines the Vietnam Conflict to demonstrate sunk cost reasoning. 
Maoz argues that several factors must54
                                               
49 Z. Maoz, Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment, (Boston, Massachusetts, USA: 
Unwin Hyman, 1990) 
50 Ibid., p. 31-64 
51 Ibid., p. 65-101 
52 Ibid., p. 103-134 
53 Ibid., p. 282. Maoz states that “actors usually do not admit that they are going to be defeated, even if they 
know that they are…and wish to get out of it but, for a variety of reasons, cannot do so.” 
54 Ibid., p. 283. Maoz argues that there must be, firstly, an acknowledgement that the war cannot be won 
and may be lost. Second this realisation must emerge less than halfway between the beginning of the war 
and the end. Thirdly, the number of casualties at this point must be less than half of the total amount. 
Fourthly, it must be shown that there has been a goal modification process. These are indeed very 
specific conditions, yet worthy of note. 
 be present if sunk cost reasoning is to be 
considered prevalent in a war. 
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Ben Shimon55 discusses self-Entrapment with regard to Vietnam; as a cause of the 
Domino theory. He argues, correctly, that while Vietnam is considered the epitome of 
entrapping conflicts, “surprisingly little”56 research has been conducted on the conflict in 
this way and in IR as a whole. Labs effectively replicates Entrapment under his term 
“Blood Price Hypothesis;”57 where the ‘Blood Price’ is equatable to sunk costs in terms 
of lives, injury and suffering. Monk examines the concerns of NATO regarding 
Entrapment and risk-management in the case study of Kosovo58 and Taliaferro argues 
that Entrapment occurs because political leaders are “generally not sensitive to marginal 
costs and diminishing returns.”59 Von Hippel argues that sunk costs are “inherent in 
many irredentist disputes.”60 “Decisions based on sunk cost reasoning,” he argues, 
“interfere with government policy making and direction, and subsequently render 
conflicts more intractable.”61 Sunk costs provide a possible explanation for “persistent 
US involvement in Vietnam and Central America, as a factor in Israel’s 1982 invasion of 
Lebanon, the Argentine campaign in the Falkland Islands and Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan.”62 Heipertz and Verdun63
                                               
55 D. Ben-Shimon, ‘Self-Entrapment and the Domino Theory’, Masters Thesis, (The Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, Israel: 2000) 
56 Ibid., p. 3 
57 E. J. Labs, ‘Integrating Offensive Realism and Domestic Politics: British War Aims after World War I’, 
Paper Presented at the 40th International Studies Association Annual Convention, Washington D.C., 
USA, 16-20th February, 1999, pp. 1-24 
 discuss sunk costs relating to problems European 
nations now face with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Furthermore, Wallner 
58 P. Monk, ‘Entrapment and Escalation: Risk Management in Kosovo’, Quadrant, Vol. 43, No. 5, 1999, p. 
35 
59 J. W. Taliaferro, ‘Quagmires in the Periphery: Foreign Wars and Escalating Commitment in International 
Conflict’, Working Paper No. 97-6, (Harvard University, The Weatherhead Center for International 
Affairs, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: 1997), p. 1. Taliaferro states that “national leaders’ aversion to 
perceived losses leads them to persevere in such conflicts far longer than a standard cost benefit analysis 
would suggest…. States at the top of the international hierarchy persist in fighting wars in strategically 
tertiary regions, despite the lack of any structural incentive for such behavior and in the face of mounting 
political and economic costs…. [Examples include] Vietnam, Afghanistan…France’s war against 
independence movements in Indochina and Algeria in the 1950s, Great Britain’s involvement in the Boer 
War and Imperial Japan’s war against the Guomindang in China from 1937 to 1945.” 
60 K. Von Hippel, ‘Sunk in the Sahara: The Applicability of the Sunk Cost Effect to Irredentist Disputes’, 
Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, p. 95 
61 Ibid., p. 96 
62 Ibid., p. 97 
63 M. Heipertz and A. Verdun, ‘The Dog that Would Never Bite? The Past and Future of the Stability and 
Growth Pact’, Working Paper, (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, Germany: 
2003), p. 20 
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comments upon an anticipatory sunk costs related price that applicants to the EU face.64 
Moreover, the precise difficulties that sunk costs present when switching to a new 
institution or set of rules are exemplified by Ikenberry65 and Mayer.66 Berman too states 
that political actors will persist in failing policies because of sunk costs,67 as does Betts 
when examining America’s fractious relationship with China, and the former’s support 
for Taiwanese independence;68 while Boutwell notes that Iran’s commitment to nuclear 
fission is the result of sunk costs invested in the energy source in the past.69 Clawson 
makes the same point about Iran.70 However, while most authors present IR examples in 
which sunk costs have been honoured and the result is disastrous,71 Dawes72 instead 
draws our attention to cases (including the Bay of Pigs fiasco and Hirohito’s surrender, 
following the atomic bombs) where sunk costs have been ignored and ‘success’ 
(prevention of probable ultimate failure) has prevailed; making the same point – that sunk 
costs are irrelevant – while also highlighting that sometimes decision makers do make the 
right choice. What many of the above authors are arguing here, in the words of Downs, is 
that the actor is “gambling for resurrection”;73 looking for a high payoff, despite low 
odds of success, while simultaneously incurring costs. Under the rubric of EoC, Bowen74
                                               
64 K. Wallner, ‘Specific Investments and the EU Enlargement’, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, No. 
5-6, 2003, p. 879. Wallner states that “EU specific anticipatory investments of private investors lower an 
applicant’s outside option. The EU can take advantage of the increased dependency and extract more 
surplus through entrance conditions that benefit it but impose costs on applicants.” 
65 G. J. Ikenberry, ‘Distant Gains: When do States Make Choices for the Long Term?’, Working Paper, 
(Pennsylvania University, Browne Center for International Politics, Pennsylvania, USA: 1997), p. 6 
66 F. W. Mayer, Interpreting NAFTA: The Science and Art of Political Analysis, (New York, USA: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), p. 21 
67 S. Berman, ‘Ideas and Culture in Political Analysis’, Paper Presented at the Ideas, Culture and Political 
Analysis Workshop, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, USA, 1998, pp. 1-19 
68 R. K. Betts and T. J. Christensen, ‘China: Getting the Questions Right’, The National Interest, Winter, 
No. 62, 2000, p. 29 
69 J. Boutwell (Ed.), ‘Middle East Security and Iran’, Proceedings of the Pugwash Conference No. 288, 
Tehran, Iran, 6-8 September 2003, p. 7 
70 P. Clawson (Ed.), ‘Considering the Options: U.S. Policy toward Iran’s Nuclear Program’, Proceedings of 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Conference, The Elizabeth M. and Walter P. Stern 
Library, Washington D.C., USA, 9th October 2003, pp. 1-77 
71 For example, D. Friedman et al., ‘Searching for the Sunk Cost Fallacy’, Working Paper, (California 
University, California, USA: 2004), pp. 1-33. 
72 R. M. Dawes, Everyday Irrationality: How Pseudo Scientists, Lunatics, and the Rest of Us Systematically 
Fail to Think Rationally, (Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 2001), p. 24 
73 G. W. Downs, ‘The Lessons of Disengagement’, in A. E. Levite et al. (Eds.), Foreign Military 
Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict, (New York, USA: Columbia University Press, 1992), 
p. 287 
74 M. G. Bowen, ‘The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors?’, 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1987, pp. 52-66 
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questions the legitimacy of using Vietnam as the classic case of EoC behaviour; 
questioning whether continuance occurred there in light of the negative feedback 
received.75
Lipshitz discusses EoC behaviour with relevance to Operation Desert Storm. 
Lipshitz principally utilises his own ‘Single Option Paradigm’ of EoC behaviour to 
perform such analysis. The differences between this paradigm and other interpretations of 
EoC are complex, yet Lipshitz argues that EoC behaviour is “a necessary response to 
uncertainty…not a dysfunctional response to failure”;
 While this is a legitimate point, Bowen then returns to his premise that all 
EoC behaviour situations must involve the actor continuing, despite unequivocal 
feedback that the project/action is doomed and applies this condition to further discredit 
the argument for Vietnam being the classic case. The main issue however is that Bowen 
does not just argue for unambiguous feedback as being the case for EoC behaviour, he 
actually infers and implies that this is what Staw argues too. This premise however is in 
direct contrast to Staw’s interpretation of EoC behaviour which, Staw states, is bound to 
have some equivocal information within it. This misapplication certainly merits further 
examination. 
76 where options are chosen for a 
“variety of reasons”77 including somewhat deontologically “how a person’s values affect 
the utility of the action and not just the utility for the goal.”78
Several authors
 While Lipshitz’ paradigm 
does indeed have merit, many of Lipshitz’ key facets are in fundamental opposition to 
much of EoC behaviour research and so is deemed beyond the scope of this thesis. 
79
                                               
75 Ibid., p. 53 
76 R. Lipshitz, ‘The Road to Desert Storm’, Organization Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1995, p. 243 
77 Ibid., p. 245 
78 Ibid. 
79 C. W. Chow et al., ‘Escalating Commitment to Unprofitable Projects: Replication and Cross-Cultural 
Extension’, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1997, pp. 347-361, C. R. Greer and G. K. 
Stephens, ‘Escalation of Commitment: A Comparison of Differences between Mexican and U. S. 
Decision Makers’, Journal of Management, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2001, pp. 51-78, S. B. Salter and D. J. Sharp, 
‘Agency Effects and Escalation of Commitment: Do Small National Culture Differences Matter?’, The 
International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2001, pp. 33-45 and D. J. Sharp and S. B. Salter, 
‘Project Escalation and Sunk Costs: A Test of the International Generalizability of Agency and Prospect 
Theories’, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1997, pp. 101-121 
 examine EoC behaviour with reference to national culture. Chow 
et al., Salter and Sharp all observe that national culture does indeed affect one’s 
propensity for EoC behaviour. Greer and Stephens discovered that in a study between 
Mexican and US decision makers, while the Mexican subjects escalated more easily and 
 104 
with more confidence, it was the US decision makers who made much larger incremental 
investments when they were personally responsible for the failing decision. 
Davis and Bobko80 apply an EoC behaviour determinant – Prospect Theory – to 
explain why President Carter did not label the Iranian hostage debacle as a disaster but 
instead as an “incomplete success.” Apart from the obvious face saving measure, such a 
statement, it is argued, not only self-justified his choice (the rescue attempt) in order to 
stave off cognitive dissonance (from the irreversible dead hostages) but also distorted the 
otherwise negative domain to one of a neutral or even positive domain; thus lessening the 
need to take further risks. Schultz also utilises Prospect Theory to examine political EoC 
behaviour; namely Eisenhower’s decision making processes during Operation Market 
Garden.81
While it has been observed above that EoC behaviour is applicable to IR, there is a 
cloudy research area where EoC behaviour is applied to areas that, while still political 
and often conflict based, are not entirely international in nature. Before concluding the 
exploration of international EoC behaviour literature, a brief exploration of this national 
level literature should be explored. Sisk,
 
 
4.5 ‘National’ Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
82 regarding civil wars, broadly supports 
Brockner’s interpretation of Entrapment. Baird too discusses the difficulties of ceasing 
ethnic conflicts, in relation to sunk costs.83 Moller supports Baird’s view, using the 
Palestinian question.84
                                               
80 M. A. Davis and P. Bobko, ‘Contextual Effects on Escalation Processes in Public Sector Decision 
Making’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 37, 1986, p. 136 
81 J. V. Schultz, ‘A Framework for Military Decision Making under Risks’, Graduation Thesis, (Maxwell 
Air force Base, The School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Alabama, USA: 1997) 
82 T. D. Sisk, ‘Peacemaking in Civil Wars: Obstacles, Options and Opportunities’, Working Paper, (Notre 
Dame University, Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame, France: 2001), p. 4 
83 A. Baird, ‘An Atmosphere of Reconciliation: A Theory of Resolving Ethnic Conflicts Based on the 
Transcaucasian Conflicts’, Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1999, p. 13. 
Baird states that “grievances cannot be written away. Deaths and atrocities cannot be erased. Women 
have been raped, children killed, houses looted and burned. Seeds of mistrust and hatred have been sown 
deep between each group. Each side, however, must be convinced that ‘sunk costs do not matter’, that the 
past cannot be changed, and the future must not be held slave to the past. Each side must learn to forgive. 
To do this, an atmosphere of reconciliation must be developed.” 
 Brand argues that international alliances can be strengthened by 
84 B. Moller, ‘Three Futures for Israel and Palestine’, Working Paper, (Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute, Copenahgen, Denmark: 1999), p. 6. Moller states that “neither side will thus be able to defeat 
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the inclusion of sunk costs at a national level, citing the case of Syrian economic foreign 
policy and the Syrian’s reluctance to break ties with economic partners, since Syrian 
plant investments would be wasted within the host country.85 Similarly, Chisik applies 
sunk costs to free trade agreements with so-called “self-enforcing” relationships 
“increasing the costs of defection” at a national level; thus promoting successful 
relationships.86 Sidak87 observes the use of sunk cost reasoning by government regulators 
to restrict freedom of speech. Furthermore, Wei states that sunk cost ‘blackmail’ can be 
much less subtle when it comes to less industrialised nations.88 Klair argues that sunk 
costs “drag against change”89 in the context of armed forces and higher decision making 
procedures. As an example of this, Pierce90 argues that the US navy’s decision to 
continue with a Cooperative Engagement Capability network at the expense of a more 
advanced Tactical Component Network is due to the consideration of the sunk costs of 
the former. Carpenter91 argues that national industrial strikes, are often perpetuated 
because of sunk costs; even when both sides are reaching agreement. Zisk92
                                                                                                                                            
the other decisively. Unfortunately, this does not mean that the conflicting sides realize the futility of 
their quest for victory. As long as victory seems achievable, if only as a dim prospect for the distant 
future, there will be a temptation to fight on, if only as a way of justifying the ‘sunk costs’ of previous 
years of (futile) struggle.” Also, B. Moller, ‘Ethnic Conflict and Postmodern Warfare: What is the 
Problem? What Could be Done?’, Paper Presented at the Anthropological Perspectives on the Roots of 
Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean Conference, Malta University, Valetta, Malta, 4-5th October 1996, 
p. 14 
85 L. A. Brand, Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making, (New York, 
USA: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 155. Brand states that “at very least the benefits from the 
expanded economic relationship as well as the sunk costs would force Syria (or any other state for that 
matter) to think twice before attempting to cut all relations, as it had done in 1970.” 
86 R. Chisik, ‘Gradualism in Free Trade Agreements: A Theoretical Justification’, Journal of International 
Economics, Vol. 59, No. 2, 2003, p. 367 
87 J. G. Sidak, ‘An Economic Theory of Censorship’, Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 11, No. 81, 
2003, pp. 81, 124 
88 S. Wei, ‘Corruption and Globalization’, Working Paper No. 79, (The Brookings Institution, Washington 
D.C., USA: 2001), p. 4. Wei states that “once an investment is made, corrupt local officials, knowing that 
it cannot easily be withdrawn, may threaten to raise obstacles to that investment’s success unless they are 
bribed.” 
89 H. P. S. Klair, ‘Force Structure for the Army and Higher Decision-Making’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 24, 
No. 4, 2000, p. 716 
90 T. C. Pierce, ‘Sunk Costs Sink Innovation’, Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol. 128, 
No. 5, 2002, p. 1 
91 J. Carpenter and M. Rudisill, ‘Fairness, Escalation, Deference and Spite: Strategies Used in Labor-
Management Bargaining Experiments with Outside Options’, Labour Economics, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2003, 
pp. 427-442 
92 K. M. Zisk, Weapons, Culture and Self-Interest: Soviet Defense Managers in the New Russia, (New 
York, USA: Columbia University Press, 1997) 
 states that 
the reason many – otherwise insolvent – Soviet weapons factories continue to operate is 
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because of the reluctance of national government rather than private corporations to 
accept sunk costs. Two historic and esoteric examples of sunk costs in national behaviour 
come from Jansen and Schatz. Jansen et al. and Jansen and Scheffer93 discuss sunk costs 
as contributing to the demise of ancient civilisations; illustrating a project that was 
continued to completion despite the damage it was causing to the community being 
known. Schatz94 argues that because of “profound sunk costs…capital cities rarely 
move.”95
As implied above, conflict, conflict escalation and EoC behaviour can occur in 
personal relationships and national level situations, where war is not on the table. 
However, there is an application here in relation to IR situations. As argued by Teger, 
conflict, conflict escalation and EoC behaviour exist not only in hot war but also in 
international conflicts where there is a possibility of war; where EoC behaviour 
considerations may lead to it. Several other authors examine this distinction of IR pre-
war conflict. Maoz discusses the paradoxes of arms races, deterrence and crisis 




4.6 Escalation of Commitment Behaviour in the Lead Up to War 
 
96 appears to take both a ‘social trap’ and a ‘simulative’ approach when 
exploring EoC behaviour in IR. Fearon argues that in the event of a nation signalling its 
foreign policy interests to an enemy, the nation can potentially sustain both audience 
costs – so-called “tying hands costs”97
                                               
93 M. A. Janssen et al., ‘Sunk-Cost Effects and Vulnerability to Collapse in Ancient Societies’, Current 
Anthropology, Vol. 44, No. 5, 2003, pp. 722-729 and M. A. Janssen and M. Scheffer, ‘Overexploitation 
of Renewable Resources by Ancient Societies and the Role of Sunk Cost Effects’, Ecology and Society, 
Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004, pp. 6-20 
94 E. Schatz, ‘When Capital Cities Move: The Political Geography of Nation and State’, Working Paper No. 
303, (Southern Illinois University, Illinois, USA: 2003), pp. 1-29 
95 Ibid., p. 2 
 – and sunk costs. Audience costs involve the 
nation making threats about what it will do if an action is not undertaken by its opponent, 
yet at the time the threat is made, there is no real cost. Fearon comments that tangible 
costs only emerge if the enemy does not succumb to such threats and the aggressor backs 
96 J. D. Fearon, ‘Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1, 1997, pp. 68-90 
97 Ibid., p. 70 
 107 
down; and the nature of such costs are popularity and reputation.98 Sunk costs, Fearon 
argues, are concrete costs invested regardless of whether the enemy complies or not and 
are thus only costly as they are made and have no cost later on. This distinction is 
somewhat hazy however. If a leader sinks costs and then backs down if his bluff is called, 
it is arguable that there will be audience type costs whether threats were made or not, 
since the threat was implicit. Furthermore, making threats against an enemy may damage 
the actor’s relationship with another country’s leadership that is opposed to the conflict. 
This damage ‘cost’ is instantaneous once the threat is made, whether war occurs or not. 
Regardless of this issue, Fearon calls the result of acting because of these costs as a “lock 
in”99 effect. Although the situation here appears to represent more the ‘social trap’, the 
commitment could too be considered simulative100 when taken in the context of the 
acting state committing costs to the issue to purposely make the opposing state think that 
it will act if its threat is ignored, because of these costs. Schelling101 calls this approach a 
“trip wire in front of the enemy.” This ‘burning bridges’ approach though can be 
dangerous, as shown by Fearon, where the enemy does not fold and the aggressor acts 
because of costs and not situational merit. The simulative context shows some similarity 
to Walton’s simulative work and deserves further examination. One immediate 
observation concerning the above example, with Walton in mind, is that autoepistemic 
actions (incurring costs) could be engaged in deliberately to force the DMU itself to go to 
war, knowing that the signalling would likely fail, when it would otherwise hesitate when 
it came to declaring war. Patashnik celebrates all forms of precommitment type 
reasoning, arguing that “restraints can be liberating”102
While Jervis explores conflict intensification and ‘conflict spirals’, he discusses the 
effects sunk costs have upon both the instigation of war and the problems of ceasing war. 
 when alternative paths present 
themselves. Precommitment, he argues, ensures that the decision maker does not have to 
consider these alternatives when they emerge. 
                                               
98 J. D. Fearon, ‘Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes’, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, 1994, pp. 577-593 
99 Ibid., p. 578 
100 Simulative reasoning means anticipating the future behaviour of another actor. The Prisoner Dilemma 
and Chicken are two games which involve simulative reasoning. 
101 T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (USA: Harvard University Press, 2003) , p. 6 
102 E. M. Patashnik, ‘Unfolding Promises: Trust Funds and the Politics of Precommitment’, Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 112, No. 3, 1997, p. 434 
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Like Fearon, Jervis argues that audience and sunk costs can play a part in promoting 
aggression during the run up to war, though he does not distinguish specifically between 
the two cost types and places less emphasis on signalling; rather just the sinking of costs 
in pre-war conflict. Although discussing wars here, it can be argued that threat making, 
the sinking of costs in preparation for action and simulative reasoning have utility as well 
for the everyday and national level situations discussed throughout this chapter, not to 
mention during military conflict, not just before it. Jervis also argues that when hot 
conflict is underway, sunk costs can also prevent cessation.103 Jervis also examines 
political EoC behaviour (under the term loss aversion) from a Prospect Theory approach, 
where “losing ten dollars annoys us more than gaining ten dollars gratifies us.”104 
Furthermore, Jervis reintroduces Agency Theory,105 where the actor continues because 
the action is rational for himself (in terms of potentially saving his reputation) and not for 
the ‘organisation’ as a whole. This is very similar to the Tragedy of the Commons. Simon 
succinctly encapsulates Agency Theory when he argues that “statements of human goals 
usually distinguish between a ‘we’ for whom the goals are shaped and a ‘they’ whose 
welfare is not ‘our’ primary concern.”106 Moller also touches upon the theory when 
discussing ethnic conflicts.107
                                               
103 R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, New Jersey, USA: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 398. Quoting Prime Minister Tojo about Japan’s continued action 
in China in 1941, Jervis states that “the war has cost us over 100,000 men dead and wounded, their 
bereaved families, hardship for four years and a national expenditure of several tens of billions of yen. 
We must by all means get satisfactory results from this.” 
104 R. Jervis, ‘The Political Implications of Loss Aversion’, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992, p. 
187. For more information on Loss Aversion, see E. Nielsen, ‘Sunk Cost’, Region Focus Online, Winter, 
2005, p. 6. 
105 Jervis, ‘The Political Implications…’, pp. 188-190. Jervis states that “a leader who accepts even a 
limited defeat is likely to be punished at the polls…. Gambling by accepting a chance of a greater loss in 
return for a chance of no loss (or even a victory) might be irrational from the standpoint of the national 
interest, but rational from the standpoint of the power seeking politician…. [Thus] the refusal to accept a 
loss can be functional.” Furthermore, Jervis, Perception and Misperception…, p. 135. With regard to 
Vietnam, and quoting a McGeorge Bundy memo to President Johnson, Jervis states that “even if it fails, 
the policy will be worth it. At a minimum it will damp down the charge that we did not do all that we 
could have done, and this charge will be important in many countries.” 
106 H. A. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs, (Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 9 
107 Moller, ‘Ethnic Conflict and Postmodern Warfare…’, p. 14. Moller states that “rationally, national 
leaders are faced with a growing problem of ‘sunk costs’, making war termination on terms less 
favorable than victory increasingly hard to justify. Since one can only justify unspeakable suffering with 
a really spectacular victory, leaders have an incentive to press on for the ‘jackpot’, even if the probability 
of winning rapidly approaches zero. Even though this may well be perfectly rational for individuals (or 
for groups such as political parties or ruling cliques) it is far from rational from the point of view of the 
community as whole.” 
 Jervis also approaches modelling from an IR 
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perspective.108 Succinctly, Jervis uses the adage “nothing fails like success”109 to 
emphasise the sometimes superficial similarities between two case studies. For the sake 
of parsimony, it is enough to state also that Jervis, explores the fundamental tenets of 
self-justification and other forms of dissonance reduction, (principally information 
distortion).110 More uniquely, Jervis appears to comment that, in a pattern very similar to 
self-inference, an actor who has undertaken a certain action will follow the values of that 
action in future decisions, not so much because of self-inference but to reduce dissonance 
from what he could have done/gained in the first instance111
While there are many situations, both IR and non-IR, in which EoC behaviour can 
occur, in terms of case studies the Vietnam Conflict is a common study that is referred to 
in both contexts. Yet authors who study the Vietnam in a historical context, with no 
particular focus on EoC behaviour, also mention EoC behaviour motives; usually when 
asking why it was such a fiasco. While it is not the place here to explore in depth such 
historical literature, some authors deserve particular reference. Apart from authors 
already mentioned, (including Staw, who was triggered to investigate EoC behaviour 
specifically because of his observations concerning Vietnam)
 (for example, refusing a 
bribe); a form of Unsunk Cost Effect. Perhaps there is an autoepistemic element at play 
here too (deliberately avoiding a tempting situation at first, to not want to undertake it in 
the future, because of the first denial). 
 
4.7 ‘Unfocussed’ International Relations Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
112 other, non-EoC 
behaviour, authors including Steinberg,113 George,114 Ball,115 Berman,116 Burke,117
                                               
108 Jervis, Perception and Misperception…, p. 278. Jervis states that “when a policy has brought notable 
success, actors are likely to apply it to a range of later situations. Seeing these cases as resembling the 
past one, the actor will believe that they are amenable to the policy that worked previously. If the attempt 
to use exiles to overthrow Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 had failed, would the CIA have proposed a 
similar plan for the Bay of Pigs in 1961?” 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., pp. 382-387 
111 Ibid., p. 392 
112 B. M. Staw, Personal Communication, (Email, 23/07/05). Staw states that “I started using the term to 
help explain the increase in U.S. commitment to the Vietnam War….” 
113 B. S. Steinberg, Shame and Humiliation: Presidential Decision Making on Vietnam, (Montreal, Canada: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 1996) 
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Werner,118 Kearns,119 Komer,120 McNamara121 and Neustadt122 make relevant statements. 
These authors and their opinions are not investigated in detail here; needless to say they 
discuss justification and sunk cost determinants apropos Vietnam. Gelb and Betts123 
however make some unique points. They present justification motives as a noticeable 
tenet of America’s involvement in Vietnam. They also argue that US war involvement 
did not escalate in relative terms as time progressed, involvement only intensified to 
maintain the same aims, in the face of growing Viet Cong activity. They lend less support 
to the ‘Investment Trap’ theory124
Discussing EoC behaviour in the same breath as Vietnam, conflict spirals and 
Schelling’s ‘trip wires’ means that either a point has been reached where the relationship 
between EoC behaviour and conflict escalation has been reconciled or the thesis is 
perilously close to falling into a trap of its own making: that of using both terms 
interchangeably. It is believed that there is an extremely complex, knitted relationship 
 (succinctly: sunk costs caused persistence). Again, that 
Vietnam, the beau ideal of ‘traditional escalation situations’, is discussed by EoC 
behaviour authors and non-EoC behaviour authors alike implies a deep connection 




                                                                                                                                            
114 A. L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and 
Advice, (Boulder, Colorado, USA: Westview Press, 1980) 
115 G. W. Ball, The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs, (New York, USA: W. W. Norton, 1982) 
116 L. S. Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam, (New York, USA: W. 
W. Norton and Company, 1982) 
117 J. Burke and F. I. Greenstein, How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam 1954 and 1965, (New 
York, USA: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989) 
118 J. S. Werner and L. D. Huynh (Eds.), The Vietnam War: Vietnamese and American Perspectives, 
(Armonk, New York, USA: M. E. Sharpe, 1997) 
119 D. K. Goodwin, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, (New York, USA: Harper and Row, 1976) 
120 R. W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict, (Boulder, Colorado, USA: 
Westview Press, 1986) 
121 R. S. McNamara and B. VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, (New York, 
USA: Times Books, 1995) 
122 R. E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from FDR to Carter, (New York, USA: 
John Wiley, 1980) and R. E. Neustadt and E. R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for 
Decision Makers, (New York, USA: Free Press, 1986) 
123 L. H. Gelb and R. K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, (Washington D.C., USA: 
Brookings Institute, 1979) 
124 Ibid., pp. 192, 244 
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between these two concepts. Moreover, it should be clear that numerous other issues exist 
in IR EoC behaviour research; like those that were discussed in the previous chapter. 
While perhaps uncomfortable to bear, it is felt prudent that an issue discussed briefly 
already – namely the aforementioned DMU type/group EoC behaviour issue – be 
examined now before attempting to reconcile all that has been learned about EoC 
behaviour research. 
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5.0 Exploring Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Decision Making Units and Group 
Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
It has been suggested in the previous chapters that there is an ‘elusiveness’ in 
Escalation of Commitment (EoC) behaviour literature regarding which Decision Making 
Units (DMU) types are applicable to EoC behaviour. There are however many complex 
facets to this apparently straightforward statement and some clarifying statements need to 
be made immediately. 
The first statement is that (1) all EoC behaviour research recognises explicitly the 
individual DMU. Within this body of research however a number of ‘classifications’ of 
author behaviour can be observed. (2) Some authors recognise only the individual DMU 
and focus specifically on individuals in individual level ‘everyday’ EoC behaviour 
situations, applying various EoC behaviour determinants. (3) However, other authors use 
examples and wording which imply DMUs other than the individual are subject to EoC 
behaviour (such as governmental/organisational situations) without explicitly discussing 
other DMU types. From this research, the reader is left to create subjective DMUs that he 
thinks apply to the situations portrayed and left too to assume that the determinants 
discussed apply to these subjective DMUs, in the same way as to the individual DMU. 
(4) Still others do explicitly recognise a DMU other than the individual and this other 
DMU is the group. Yet, in not discussing this DMU in isolation, some of these authors 
leave the reader to assume that the determinants they talk about apply equally to the 
group as to the individual DMU; and to the same effect. What remains of the research 
then consists first, (5) of authors who explicitly recognise the group DMU and make 
some attempt to discern whether or not the determinants they recognise as causing EoC 
behaviour in the individual DMU affect the group too and, if so, in the same way or not. 
Second, (6) the research includes authors who explicitly recognise the group DMU but, 
when discussing the group, examine only what can be termed ‘group specific’ EoC 
behaviour determinants. These are determinants that cannot – in their present form – be 
realistically applied to the individual DMU too. Again, in terms of the discussed 
individual determinants’ effects on the group, the reader is left to wonder. Finally, (7) 
some authors do both (recognise the group DMU, make some attempt to discern whether 
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or not the determinants they recognise as causing EoC behaviour in the individual DMU 
affect the group too and, if so, in the same way or not and examine ‘group specific’ EoC 
behaviour determinants). 
However, it is contended that the above scheme is somewhat oversimplified, as 
several issues exist here which complicate matters. (A) The first issue is that the 
classification scheme is somewhat idealised in that some authors can be argued to come 
under more than one category, depending upon which piece, or even which part, of their 
work is studied. In other cases, owing to clarity issues in the research, it is difficult to 
ascertain which category an author or piece of work comes under. Moreover, (B) research 
that does examine individual EoC behaviour determinants in relation to the group DMU 
appears limited in scope; predominantly involving justification and sunk cost motives. 
(C) Furthermore, regardless of how sophisticated it is, much research of this type does 
not discuss all the raised determinants discussed in the realm of the individual DMU in 
relation to the group (again, it is predominantly justification motives that are the focus); 
leaving the reader to assume that either the remainder of determinants do apply to the 
group, in the same way, or do not apply to the group at all. (D) A further issue is that, 
despite encompassing IR and the wider social science EoC behaviour literature, there is 
actually a very small amount of research which explicitly recognises the group DMU, 
relative to the size of the overall EoC behaviour body of literature. (E) Moreover, 
research that discusses ‘group specific’ EoC behaviour determinants tends to be the 
dominant type of group EoC behaviour research. In addition, (F) it is contended that this 
specific type of research has its own set of issues. The main issue is that it is deemed to 
be dominated by Groupthink theory, rather than being inclusive of other group specific 
determinants from wider, yet arguably less dominant and/or less obviously conceptually 
related, group dynamics research. As an aside, an issue that also emerges is that (G) a 
small amount of group EoC behaviour research discusses determinants of group EoC 
behaviour that are not particularly ‘group specific’, but could reasonably be applicable to 
the individual too. This chapter, then, aims to explore, expand upon and clarify the 




5.1 The Main Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Authors’ Group Research 
 
The ‘big three’ of EoC behaviour research (Staw, Brockner and Teger) contribute to 
the group dimension of EoC behaviour to varying degrees. Of the three, it is Staw who 
offers the least input on group dynamics EoC behaviour.1 To avoid repetition, Staw’s 
examples and syntax imply other DMUs exist than the individual, without explicitly 
discussing this issue further. Brockner, with Rubin, investigates further. They 
acknowledge in their book that “as of this writing, very little research has explored group 
decision making in entrapping dilemmas.”2 Thus, they proceed to meta-analyse the little 
EoC behaviour group dynamics literature which existed then, along with some generic 
group dynamics literature3
                                               
1 Staw’s most relevant ideas are found in B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of 
Action’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1981, pp. 577-587. 
2 J. Brockner and J. Z. Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis, (New 
York, USA: Springer-Perlag, 1985), p. 93 
3 Brockner and Rubin refer to J. M. Darley and B. Latane, ‘Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: 
Diffusion of Responsibility’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1968, pp. 377-
383, C. Mynatt and S. J. Sherman, ‘Responsibility Attribution in Groups and Individuals: A Direct Test 
of the Diffusion of Responsibility Hypothesis’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 32, 
No. 6, 1975, pp. 1111-1118 and P. G. Zimbardo, ‘Pathology of Imprisonment’, Society, Vol. 9, No. 6, 
1972, pp. 4-8. 
 to argue that the group dynamic can be subject to EoC 
behaviour and in ways different to the individual – and perhaps ‘other’ – DMU. One 
claim is that as Staw argues feelings of responsibility affect EoC behaviour, 
correspondingly, the group dynamic affects feelings of responsibility. Brockner and 
Rubin’s principal group dynamics meta-analysis concerns literature by Teger and Janis, 
the latter of whom’s work is explored in isolation later in this chapter. Although Teger 
makes many relevant contributions to EoC behaviour research, in the case of group 
dynamics at least Brockner and Rubin extract the finer tenets of Teger’s own work than 
that of the author himself; since, here, Teger’s work is meta-analysed in the context of 
other group dynamics literature. As has already been observed from earlier observations 
of Teger’s work, males are more likely to escalate commitment than females in the 
individual condition. However, Brockner and Rubin note from Teger’s work that in 
groups, it was females who escalated more than males. One explanation proffered for this 
anomaly is that males and females feel able to shed their stereotypical and enforced 
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personas in group situations where their social identity and conspicuousness is blurred.4
Whyte, has much to say on group EoC behaviour, but it is prudent to first elucidate 
on what he feels is responsible for individual EoC behaviour; under the rubric of 
Entrapment. First, he argues that framing the situation negatively as a choice between 
losses (certain loss if one quits now or a greater loss with the possibility of salvation later 
 
Overall, Brockner and Rubin’s contribution to the group EoC behaviour field is a fairly 
sound one. Despite overlooking some pre-1985 EoC behaviour group dynamics literature, 
Brockner and Rubin recognise, correctly, that in 1985 there was a distinct lack of 
literature detailing the group dynamic and EoC behaviour. Furthermore, they generate 
ideas (mainly that group dynamics affects feelings of responsibility) that pave the way for 
future studies. However, weakness does exist in the forms of ambiguous DMU 
application in some areas (the question being “is the group [or some other] DMU being 
implied in this part of Brockner and Rubin’s work or only the individual?”), the 
incomplete presence of all the general determinants in Brockner and Rubin’s separate 
group analysis, the justification-centric focus of Brockner’s Entrapment theory anyway 
and a predominant focus on group specific determinants. Brockner’s group work post-
1985 has been minimal. The same argument applies to Teger. 
It is contended that other ancillary authors make a greater and more lucid 
contribution regarding the group EoC behaviour context than the main authors. Arguably, 
this should be expected, since it is rare for the founders of a behaviour to also lead the 
way concerning its many burgeoning applications. However, to call specifying the 
applicable levels of analysis in a theory as a ‘burgeoning application’ is arguably dubious 
in itself. Perhaps as a result of Teger’s and Brockner’s work however, group dynamics 
EoC behaviour research did increase in the late 1980s. Again, this research is subject to 
many of the aspects laid down in the ‘classification scheme’. 
 
5.2 Other Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Authors’ Group Research 
 
                                               
4 Brockner and Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts…, p. 96. Brockner and Rubin state that “males 
in groups are free to deviate from the macho, tough guy image whereas female teams are released from 
their socialized inhibitions against aggressive behavior.” 
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on) encourages EoC behaviour in individuals.5 Second, he states that justification 
motives are not essential in EoC behaviour situations. He is, then, restating Prospect 
Theory; where individuals make riskier decisions as they incur losses (when they are in 
the ‘domain of losses’ as opposed to ‘gains’), but not necessarily for justification reasons. 




Whyte argues that individuals can pick up from where other decision makers left off 
and thus may not be personally responsible for the initial decision, yet they still escalate, 
                                               
5 G. Whyte, ‘Entrapment: Are Groups Less Susceptible?’, Working Paper, (Toronto University, Faculty of 
Management, Toronto, Canada: 1990), p. 231 
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because of Prospect Theory. Thus, justification “does not appear to be a necessary 
condition for inappropriate escalation.”6
Now that Whyte’s beliefs as to individual EoC behaviour have been established, his 
take on group EoC behaviour can be explored. As well as arguing that his above opinions 
regarding individual EoC behaviour apply mainly to groups too, Whyte argues that EoC 
behaviour in groups (1) will generally occur more frequently relative to individual 
decision making and (2) “will become stronger relative to individual decision making.”
 To support this argument, Whyte refers to 
President Johnson’s decision to escalate the Vietnam Conflict, when his predecessors 
were responsible for the initial decision. However, Whyte fails to note that actors, 
especially in a political context, often come to power on the back of promises to ‘sort 
things out’, such as Nixon’s ‘peace with honour’ and thus may still feel justification 
motives apropos the initial decision. Moreover, following the first personal reinvestment 
responsibility may be assumed anyway. 
7 
He explains this argument by utilising two group dynamic theories. First, he draws upon 
group polarisation: “the tendency for group discussion to enhance the point of view 
initially dominant in the group.”8 He argues that this “manifests the escalation tendency 
to an even greater degree than individual decision making;”9 supporting proposition (2). 
This is a form of ‘risky shift’ behaviour. This argument could also imply that there is an 
overly increased level of acceptable risk in a group decision making process. Whyte also 
discusses group conformity pressures,10
                                               
6 G. Whyte, ‘Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Prospect Theory 
Approach’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 54, No. 3, 1993, p. 448 




 where discussion generates pressure on group 
members to conform to the majority opinion of the group, even if the majority is wrong 
and the minority knows this. Thus if the majority, (or perhaps even the dominant 
minority), support EoC behaviour, then the group will tend to escalate, supporting 
proposition (1). There does seem to be some connection between the two theories; the 
tendency for the group decision to mimic and intensify the initially dominant viewpoint 
could be a result of conformity pressures, for example. Although not considered essential, 
Whyte does acknowledge justification motives when exploring EoC behaviour. In 
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individuals, Whyte argues, justification motives cause EoC behaviour. The same applies 
to groups, but in groups, Whyte argues, justification motives are considerably decreased 
anyway and thus contrast with the proposed amplificatory effects of the two theories 
discussed above. To explain his justification argument, Whyte discusses the moderating 
effect of group decision making upon feelings of responsibility. Whyte argues that when 
a decision is made by a group, which subsequently generates negative feedback, there 
may be less of a need for the group to escalate, owing to justification motives, since there 
is a “group diffusion of responsibility;”11
Bazerman et al.
 where no single individual can be blamed for 
the decision and thus each person is less likely to feel the need to self-justify. He adds 
further that an individual would be less likely to subsequently escalate a failing decision 
on his own if a group, of which he was a member, made the initial decision, because of 
this ‘responsibility’ effect. However, Whyte does not mention how the individual’s 
support or opposition for the ultimate group decision, in a majority decision rule context 
for example, would affect this argument. If the individual had supported the overall group 
decision, he may still feel as if he needs to justify the decision as if it was his own. 
12 however argue that reduced responsibility owing to group 
diffusion, correlates with a lack of accountability, and the latter is a fundamental 
antecedent of the risky shift phenomenon – in terms of undertaking more risky actions –
thus accentuating EoC behaviour in groups. This is because blame cannot be placed as 
easily on group members as on the solitary individual. This may be linked to the 
‘Tragedy of the Commons’, discussed earlier. Leatherwood and Conlon13
Nowakowski et al.
 also discuss the 
effects of diffusibility of blame regarding persistence in a project. Presumably then, if the 
group did not make the initial decision, accountability could be argued to be even less. 
14
                                               
11 G. Whyte, ‘Diffusion of Responsibility: Effects on the Escalation Tendency’, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Vol. 76, No. 3, 1991, p. 408 
12 M. H. Bazerman et al., ‘Escalation in Individual and Group Decision Making’, Organizational Behavior 
and Human Performance, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1984, p. 143 
13 M. L. Leatherwood and E. J. Conlon, ‘Diffusibility of Blame: Effects on Persistence in a Project’, 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1987, pp. 836-847 
14 J. M. Nowakowski et al., ‘Does the Project Completion Effect Extend to Groups? The Effects of Group 
Structure, Sunk Costs, and Project Completion on Escalation and Unethical Behavior’, Paper Presented 
at the 18th Annual Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology Conference, Orlando, Florida, 
USA, 10-13th April, 2003, pp. 1-18 
 argue that in groups it is the level of project completion that 
predominantly influences groups to escalate their commitment. Nowakowski et al. also 
 119 
argue that the Sunk Cost Effect (SCE) is not a significant group EoC behaviour 
determinant. Instead, they argue that sunk cost levels can irrationally be considered as 
correlative to the level of project completion. Consequently, where the SCE is deemed 
responsible for EoC behaviour, it has in fact been the Project Completion Hypothesis 
(PCH). However, Nowakowski et al.’s opinions aside, the SCE and the PCH should not 
be considered ‘mutually exclusive’; they can exist alone and simultaneously. Their 
opinion that sunk costs do not apply significantly to group dynamics is also disputed. 
Smith et al.15 disagree with Nowakowski et al., and argue that groups, like 
individuals, do take “dead losses” into account when reasoning – retrospectively – about 
their next move, as does Lambert.16 Rutledge17 supports framing as an antecedent of EoC 
behaviour in groups. Rutledge also argues that groups are more likely to escalate when 
they are responsible for the initial action, than if they are not; though a positive frame – a 
“decision maker’s conception [of the situation]”18 – can reduce this. Furthermore, 
Rutledge posits that though a group may withdraw from a failing project if it is not 
responsible for the initial decision, a negative frame can stimulate EoC behaviour despite 
the absence of such responsibility.19
Taliaferro posits that groups generally amplify individual EoC behaviour.
 
20
                                               
15 C. M. Smith et al., ‘Investment Decisions by Individuals and Groups in ‘Sunk Cost’ Situations: The 
Potential Impact of Shared Representations’, Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
1998, p. 188 
16 N. B. Lambert, ‘Group Reactions to Failure: A Social Identity approach’, Masters Thesis, (Pittsburgh 
University, Pittsburgh, USA: 2005) 
17 R. W. Rutledge, ‘Escalation of Commitment in Groups and the Moderating Effects of Information 
Framing’, Journal of Applied Business Research, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 17-24 
18 Ibid., p. 20 
19 Ibid., p. 23 
20 J. W. Taliaferro, ‘Quagmires in the Periphery: Foreign Wars and Escalating Commitment in International 
Conflict’, Working Paper No. 97-6, (Harvard University, The Weatherhead Center for International 
Affairs, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: 1997), p. 4 
 
However he does accept that as the group dynamic can cause risky shifts, it can also 
generate a cautious shift, in that if the predominant thought in the group is to decrease 
commitment, group discussion may lead to support for total cessation, (presumably, 
conformity pressures will also act negatively here). Taliaferro does not expand upon the 
determinants of polarisation, arguing that such an examination would be beyond the 
scope of his paper. He states simply that “it depends on the circumstances [of the 
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group]”21
Hartman and Nelson take a largely Prospect Theory group EoC behaviour 
approach, and acknowledge too that risky shift may mean “group decisions [are] often 
riskier than the prior private decisions of individual group members.”
 and suggests leadership factors as a possible cause. Framing is also deemed a 
likely factor. 
22 But they also 
recognise that the “ego involvement and self-identity issues”23
One interesting issue to emerge from the review of literature above is the 
relationship between responsibility, justification and accountability. Some authors argue 
that the group ‘diffuses’ responsibility, thus reducing justification EoC behaviour in a 
responsible situation, apropos the individual. However, other authors state that because of 
this lower responsibility level, group members will be less individually accountable; thus 
encouraging EoC behaviour to a greater extent than in the individual. Thus, not only are 
justification and accountability motives polarised, but their effects on the group in 
relation to the individual DMU are also polarised. In a non-responsible situation thus, 
justification motives could be argued to be equally low for both DMU types (there is no 
need to escalate because they were not responsible for the initial decision). 
Accountability motives too could be argued to be equally higher for both DMUs. This 
issue deserves further investigation. However, from this cursory and often conflicting 
review, it can be seen that two recurring themes, which are group specific in nature, are 
group polarisation and group conformity. Indeed, group specific EoC behaviour research 
is predominant in the greater body of group EoC behaviour exploration and polarisation 
and conformity issues are central. Crucially however, and not evident from the above 
review, the majority of group specific EoC behaviour research focuses ‘cybernetically’
 present in many individual 
EoC behaviour cases also apply to group EoC behaviour and that they have the same – 
compounding – effect. 
24
                                               
21 Ibid., p. 5 
22 S. J. Hartman and B. H. Nelson, ‘Group Decision Making in the Negative Domain’, Group & 
Organization Management, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1996, p. 149 
23 Ibid., p. 150 
24 Cybernetic is used here to mean ‘blinkered’ or ‘pathologically focussed’. 
 
upon the somewhat coverall theory of Groupthink. This literature does not simply state 
that Groupthink causes EoC behaviour; it is more complex than this. Much of the 
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research focuses on the conceptual link between the two theories. Before this complex 
literature is explored, it is considered prudent here to examine briefly what Groupthink is. 
 
5.3 Exploring Groupthink Theory 
 
Groupthink is “a complex psychological contagion”25
A quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people 
engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, 
when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action
 and as it (and its many 
constituents in isolation) is argued by several authors to be the major effector of EoC 
behaviour in groups, it deserves a suitable level of exploration here. Groupthink then, 
according to Janis, is: 
 
26
Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality 






Janis however does disabuse the reader of any assumptions that Groupthink is 




In his second examination of Groupthink,29 Janis structures Groupthink in terms of its 
antecedent conditions and its observable consequences. Following an assumption of 
decision makers forming a cohesive group,30
                                               
25 I. L. Janis, ‘Groupthink and Group Dynamics: A Social Psychological Analysis of Defective Policy 
Decisions’, Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1973, p. 21 
26 I. L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (2nd Ed.), (Boston, 
Massachusetts, USA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 9 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., p. 11 
29 Janis’ original Groupthink examination was undertaken in I. L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A 
Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, (Boston, Massachusetts, USA: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1972), though is generally considered to be superseded by Ibid. 
30 Janis does not provide a comprehensive definition of cohesiveness but it is understood, from L. 
Festinger, ‘Informal Social Communication’, Psychological Review, Vol. 57, No. 5, 1950, p. 274, to 
mean “the total field of forces which act on members to remain in the group.” 
 the antecedents of Groupthink are further 
subdivided into structural faults of the organisation and a provocative situational context. 
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These factors cause a concurrence seeking tendency (Groupthink), which cause the 
observable consequences. Observable consequences are subdivided into symptoms of 
Groupthink and, leading on from these symptoms, symptoms of defective decision 
making. Ultimately, the outcome is a low probability of a successful outcome. The factors 
themselves and their interactions are represented in figure 5.2. From figure 5.2 it could be 
argued that all the constituents of the structural faults and provocative situational context 
categories along with many of the two types of symptoms of Groupthink are also 
antecedents of EoC behaviour in groups. However, before attempting to theoretically 
solidify such connections, it is prudent to acknowledge that, like EoC behaviour, varied 
opinions exist as to the exact definition, causes and pathology of Groupthink. 
As Kramer states, “Groupthink has not been uncritically accepted.”31 It can be 
argued that such disagreements between scholars concerning Groupthink are bifurcated 
between Janis’ selective use of case studies to test Groupthink and the antecedent 
conditions and definitions of Groupthink which Janis describes. It is the latter 
‘disagreement set’ that is of the most concern here. The main determinant of Groupthink, 
according to Janis is group cohesiveness and this too is where the bulk of disagreement 
among academics can be found. Cohesiveness, according to Janis is the “major 
[antecedent] condition.” of Groupthink.32 Janis states however that although cohesion is 
essential, “Groupthink is unlikely to occur to such an extent that it interferes with 
effective decision making, unless certain additional antecedent conditions are also 
present.”33
                                               
31 R. M. Kramer, ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam Decisions 25 Years Later: How Well has the 
Groupthink Hypothesis Stood the Test of Time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, Vol. 73, No. 2/3, 1998, p. 237 
32 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies…, p. 176 
33 Ibid. 
 These include group insulation from expert and critical opinion, lack of 
impartial leadership and a lack of methodological norms for decision making (in other 





Callaway and Esser34 broadly support Janis’ viewpoint that high cohesiveness 
coupled with poor decision contexts and overbearing leaders cause Groupthink and argue 
that medium cohesiveness with proper decision rules facilitate good decision making. 
Callaway et al. add in a later paper though35 that although good decision making 
procedures do facilitate good decision making, they may not be as relevant to preventing 
Groupthink as previously thought or, to put it another way, poor decision rules may not 
be as great an antecedent of Groupthink as Janis proposes. Instead, Callaway et al. 
propose that dominance of the individuals in the group is negatively correlative to 
Groupthink; with groups containing a greater number of dominant members suffering 
less from Groupthink than groups with a smaller number. But not all authors consider 
cohesiveness to be so essential. Flowers36 argues that “a revision of Janis’s theory may be 
justified, one which would eliminate cohesiveness as a critical variable.”37
Fodor and Smith
 
38 agree that cohesiveness may not be essential, but qualify their 
opinion by stating that Janis’ interpretation of cohesiveness and other authors’ viewpoints 
of it may not coincide. They state that “[a given study] operationally defined 
cohesiveness in a way that was different from the meaning Janis intended.”39 Janis’ view 
of cohesiveness, according to Fodor and Smith, revolves around the members’ close 
relationship with the leader, while many researchers view cohesiveness as members’ 
respective relationships with other members. McCauley argues that group size is an 
important Groupthink determinant. He argues that “Janis does not give much attention to 
group size, and does not suggest any particular relation between group size and the 
likelihood of Groupthink.”40 He adds that “tentative”41
                                               
34 M. R. Callaway and J. K. Esser, ‘Groupthink: Effects of Cohesiveness and Problem-Solving Procedures 
on Group Decision Making’, Social Behavior and Personality, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1984, pp. 157-164 
35 M. R. Callaway et al., ‘Effects of Dominance on Group Decision Making: Toward a Stress Reduction 
Explanation of Groupthink’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1985, pp. 
949-952 
36 M. L. Flowers, ‘A Laboratory Test of Some Implications of Janis’s Groupthink Hypothesis’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 35, No. 12, 1977, pp. 888-896 
37 Ibid., p. 895 
38 E. M. Fodor and T. Smith, ‘The Power Motive as an Influence on Group Decision Making’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1982, pp. 178-185 
39 Ibid., p. 184 
40 C. McCauley, ‘Group Dynamics in Janis’s Theory of Groupthink: Backward and Forward’, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes Vol. 73, No. 2/3, 1998, p. 154 
41 Ibid. 
 extrapolation of the number of 
actors in Janis’ case studies suggests that extremely small group size coupled with 
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cohesiveness generally leads to less Groupthink type behaviour. He adds, in a non-
Groupthink literature context, that cohesiveness generally in larger groups causes the 
poorest decision making, though not through Groupthink, but rather social loafing 
(laziness) and deindividuation (an inattention to ‘self’). Moorhead et al.42
Tetlock is just one of several authors
 argue that time 
is also a neglected Groupthink determinant. Moorhead et al. acknowledge that Janis 
discusses time indirectly as a function of cohesion; in that time affects mental efficiency 
and judgement and ability to weigh up alternative courses of action. As a source of stress 
however, it induces cohesion. Moorhead et al. state that time pressures force self-
censorship, lack of consultation of outside experts and avoidance of argument and thus 
cause concurrence seeking behaviour. 
43 who look at the case study ‘angle’ when 
critiquing Groupthink. Tetlock argues that Janis provides no quantitative evidence 
“bearing on the validity of foreign policy deliberations into the Groupthink and non-
Groupthink categories.”44 He argues further that Janis’s sources were prone to 
retrospective distortion and that Janis did not specify the criteria he used to include or 
exclude data.45 From this, Tetlock states that a new method of determining the presence 
of Groupthink is by looking at the integrative complexity of the speeches made by the 
decision makers. He argues that simple speeches and announcements are symptomatic of 
Groupthink, owing to an oversimplification of the issues under discussion. Tetlock et al. 
also argue that multiple analyses of the same case studies are difficult to compare, while 
comparison between different case studies is virtually impossible.46
                                               
42 G. Moorhead et al., ‘Group Decision Fiascos Continue: Space Shuttle Challenger and a Revised 
Groupthink Framework’, Human Relations, Vol. 44, No. 6, 1991, pp. 539-550 
43 See also Flowers, ‘A Laboratory Test of Some Implications…’ and Foder and Smith, ‘The Power 
Motive…’. 
44 P. E. Tetlock, ‘Identifying Victims of Groupthink from Public Statements of Decision Makers’, Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 37, No. 8, 1979, p. 1315 
45 Ibid., p. 1316 
46 P. E. Tetlock et al., ‘Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the Groupthink Model’, Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 63, No. 3, 1992, p. 404 
 Tetlock et al. suggest 
a methodology called the Group Dynamics Q Sort (GDQS) – which involves scaled 
verdicts of group qualities – and argue that GDQS supports the bipolar ‘vigilant’ and 
‘Groupthink’ categories proposed by Janis. However a subsequent LISREL statistical 
analysis does not support Janis’ causal model of Groupthink. ’t Hart also questions the 
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legitimacy of the case study approach.47 Specifically he questions the “selective 
interpretation of the case study material”48 and he argues further that “reconstructive-
analytical and evaluative approach is open to accusations of producing circular 
statements: Groupthink is inferred from policy failure and failure is explained in terms of 
Groupthink.”49 Longley and Pruitt discuss three principal problems with Groupthink. It is 
argued first that Janis’ definition of Groupthink is “inadequate,”50 because the definition 
refers to variables at three points in the “causal chain”51 (group cohesiveness is an 
antecedent of strivings for unanimity, which is an antecedent of the failure to realistically 
appraise alternative courses of action). However, the definitional issue is alleviated by the 
inclusion of figure 5.2, in Janis’ later work which adds “clarification of the causal 
sequences in Janis’s thinking.”52 In the context of the flowchart, it can be seen that 
Groupthink is redefined as a concurrence seeking tendency. This leads on to the second 
problem discussed by Longley and Pruitt. They argue that a negative evaluation of 
Groupthink “pervades all of Janis’s writings;”53 with concurrence seeking argued to 
produce defective decision making. This assumption, they argue, is fallacious. 
Concurrence seeking is not always counterproductive to good decision making; it is 
actually a fundamental part of making a sound decision.54 Longley and Pruitt utilise two 
ideas by Lawrence and Lorsch55
                                               
47 P. ’t Hart, ‘Irving L. Janis’ Victims of Groupthink’, Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1991, p. 251. ’t 
Hart states that “historians are bound to criticize the focussed and potentially superficial case accounts 
and interpretations…and experimentally inclined psychologists will point to empirical ambiguities and 
difficulties in pinpointing causality due to the post hoc nature of case study research.” 
48 Ibid., p. 268 
49 Ibid. 
50 J. Longley and D. G. Pruitt, ‘Groupthink: A Critique of Janis’s Theory’, Review of Personality and 
Social Psychology, Vol. 1, 1980, pp. 74-93 
51 Ibid., p. 75 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., p. 77 
54 Ibid. 
55 P. R. Lawrence and J. W. Lorsch, Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and 
Integration, (Homewood, Illinois, USA: Irwin, 1969) 
 to expand this issue. Here, decision making is divided 
between “differentiation” (proliferation of ideas and debate) and “integration” (efforts to 
achieve unity). Groupthink can be thought of as a decision process that involves too 
much integration and too little differentiation, but both processes are still necessary for 
any progress in decision making. Thus, Longley and Pruitt argue, Groupthink is better 
labelled as premature concurrence seeking (that is to say premature integration and too 
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little differentiation). Yet Longley and Pruitt continue by arguing that even when decision 
making is premature, it does not always have to be negatively construed, since the type of 
task is important to the effect of Groupthink. Longley and Pruitt refer to Katz and 
Khan’s56 decision tasks to illustrate this point. If the task is a dilemma (a novel task 
requiring innovation) then premature concurrence is definitely bad, yet if the task is a 
problem, (a simple, routine, repetitious task) it can be the most efficient course of action. 
However, it is contended in this thesis that premature is always bad and that it would 
seem Longley and Pruitt have confused the meaning of premature with quick regarding 
routine tasks. Premature means ‘too soon’ in every situation. The third problem relates to 
the classification of the symptoms of Groupthink compared to the antecedents of 
Groupthink. Longley and Pruitt argue that some supposed symptoms of concurrence 
seeking are actually antecedents of concurrence seeking.57 Overall, Longley and Pruitt 
lament the “complexity and indefiniteneness”58 of Groupthink, the oversimplification of 
the theory, the poor definition of the phenomenon and the lack of definitions of its 
constituent parts59 and the “many unclarities and gaps in statements about the 
relationships between variables.”60
Thus not only is Groupthink related to EoC behaviour in terms of it being a 
potential antecedent of Group EoC behaviour; but the flaws of Groupthink theory itself 
also present some stark similarities to those already highlighted regarding EoC behaviour 
research. The upshot of this brief examination is that Groupthink is not a perfect theory 
and, according to many authors, it has major faults. Similarly, many authors have 




                                               
56 D. Katz and R. L. Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (2nd Ed.), (New York, USA: Wiley, 
1978) 
57 Longley and Pruitt, ‘Groupthink: A Critique…’, p. 79 
58 Ibid., p. 81 
59 Ibid. Longley and Pruitt comment that “no definition of cohesiveness is provided.” 
60 Ibid., p. 75 
61 P. ’t Hart, Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure, (Baltimore, 
Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) 
 upon more complex ‘pathways’ for Groupthink (establishing linkages between 
the causal variables themselves) and bifurcating Groupthink into Avoidance Groupthink 
and Optimistic Groupthink (negatively viewed dilemma vs. positively viewed opportunity 






Though it is clear that Groupthink is in ‘theoretical’ flux, this is not as important a 
consideration for this thesis as one may assume. Establishing a connection between 
Groupthink and EoC behaviour is the priority here, rather than establishing the most 
acceptable form of Groupthink to apply – beyond that of establishing an accepted model 
necessary for a working definition. 
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5.4 Literature Which Argues a Link between Groupthink and Escalation of Commitment 
Behaviour 
 
Having explored the meaning of Groupthink, it is now prudent to explore the 
literature that argues for a link between Groupthink and EoC behaviour. There exists 
literature that simply assumes a pre-existing link between the two,62 (stating superficially 
that Groupthink is a determinant of group EoC behaviour) yet some authors believe that 
such an assumption is premature and attempt to firmly back up said assumption with 
investigations. Some of this literature also focuses upon the conceptual link between the 
two theories. Apart from Brockner and Rubin, who make some astute preliminary links,63
To do this however, Janis’ view on EoC behaviour in general is also required. Janis 
does not investigate explicitly EoC behaviour. Indeed, for much of his work, EoC 
behaviour research was either not in existence or was in its embryonic stages. However, 
what Janis does discuss is the general decision making process of a DMU and how 
various variables and determinants, including the receipt of negative feedback, can affect 
decision pathways. Thus, this research has relevance to EoC behaviour. Janis’ research is 
deemed to be remarkably forward thinking, even when compared to today’s EoC 
behaviour research. Given Janis’ history, and the connection he makes between 
Groupthink and EoC behaviour – discussed below – it is clear that Janis recognises the 
group as a DMU. In much of his more general EoC behaviour relevant work however, 
Janis talks explicitly of the individual and not of the group. Thus, it is unclear in some of 
his work exactly which DMUs he is applying his purported EoC behaviour type 
determinants to. In some research, Janis talks only of individuals, yet at times he draws 
together individuals and groups in his EoC behaviour type analysis. Thus, the problems 
laid out in the introduction apply here; Janis as an EoC behaviour author cannot be easily 
 
authors who investigate EoC behaviour and Groupthink and attempt to explore any link 
in greater depth are: Janis, Kameda and Sugimori, Street and Anthony, Thompson et al. 
and ’t Hart. Having just explored Janis’ Groupthink theory, it would seem prudent to look 
first at what Janis has to say on the relationship. 
                                               
62 For example, Bazerman et al., ‘Escalation in Individual…’, p. 143 and D. McElhinney and T. Proctor, 
‘Concept of Entrapment and Decision-Making’, Management Decision, Vol. 43, No. 2, 2005, p. 191. 
63 Brockner and Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts…, pp. 97-99 
 131 
‘classified’ regarding DMUs. It is assumed here that Janis is referring to both DMU types 
in most cases and that the word ‘individuals’ is used for simplicity or as a plural. Indeed, 
much of Janis’ work can be applied to the larger level of analysis without much 
imagination. Janis’ EoC behaviour relevant ideas here could be described as ‘stress-
centric’. That is to say, the level of stress an individual feels following negative feedback 
dictates his behaviour.64 To this end, Janis creates the Conflict Theory Model of Decision 
Making. 
 
                                               
64 I. L. Janis, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment, (New 
York, USA: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 46-80 
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As can be observed from figure 5.5, the model argues that negative feedback is an 
‘assumed’ condition. If the risks of not changing are not serious (such as an extremely 
gradual, drip-drip, loss) then stress is low and the actor escalates commitment in terms of 
continuance or unconflicted adherence. If the risks are serious if the actor does not 
change and the risks are serious if he does and there is no realistic hope of a better 
solution, then the actor experiences high stress, practices defensive avoidance, which 
again leads to a form of EoC behaviour under some circumstances (figure 5.6). 
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What must be reemphasised however is that figure 5.6 is not strictly a model of 
EoC behaviour, since the model is concerned primarily with what the possible options are 
in a negative feedback decision context, rather than focusing on continuing or quitting or 
asking why someone continues with a failing action. Yet this model does open up new 
avenues for the origins of EoC behaviour. Janis also discusses more familiar aspects of 
EoC behaviour as reasons for some decision pathways including self-inference,65 self- 
and external justification,66 (the latter as “social commitment”), autoepistemic 
behaviour,67 ambiguous information,68 Agency Theory,69 cognitive scripting70 and 
punishment of an opponent.71 Factors not normally linked to EoC behaviour though are 
also discussed. Janis talks of manipulation72 (including the Foot-in-the-Door technique) 
and also coercion73 which could be considered an EoC behaviour determinant, depending 
upon what conditions are deemed necessary for EoC behaviour to occur. Brockner, for 
example, would not allow coercion, or the ‘No Realistic Hope’ condition for that matter, 
since he believes the actor must have options. Janis talks also of “gut feelings”74 
‘guiding’ one to follow an action and also the ‘Illusion of No Choice’75 (known also as 
the Eichmann Effect), where the actor believes, or is told, he has no choice but to 
continue, when in fact there are choices. ‘Emotional Inoculation’76
                                               
65 Ibid., p. 292 and I. L. Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policy Making and Crisis Management, 
(New York, USA: The Free Press, 1989), p. 65. Janis states that “sometimes [actors] end up convincing 
themselves that the justifications they give to others are the real reasons.” 
66 Janis, Decision Making…, pp. 280-283 
67 Ibid., p. 283 
68 Ibid., p. 83. Janis examines this under “Bolstering.” 
69 Janis, Crucial Decisions…, pp. 46, 66. Janis examines this theory under the “Cover Your Ass” rule, 
where the individual (the agent) agrees with the superior (the principal) for personal gain over the good 
of the principal (for example, the organisation, the contractor or presumably even the group he is a 
member of) and under the “Personal Aggrandizement” rule, where the individual “looks at the policy 
problem mainly from the standpoint of what’s in it for me?” In a group context, both rules differ from 
Groupthink in that the individual is behaving to protect himself over group harmony. Agency Theory 
could also arguably be applied to an entire group’s actions (behaving as an agent unit). It is uncertain if 
Janis means to imply this. 
70 Ibid., p. 76. Janis examines this under the “Can Do” rule. 
71 Ibid., p. 73. Janis examines this under the “Retaliate” rule. 
72 Janis, Decision Making…, pp. 287-308. Janis talks of Foot-in-the-Door manipulation using the terms 
“Slippage” and “Entrapment” (the latter term being entirely separate from Brockner’s Entrapment 
theory). 
73 Ibid., p. 226 
74 Janis, Crucial Decisions…, p. 71 
75 Janis, Decision Making…, p. 268 
76 Ibid., pp. 155, 388 
 is discussed too, 
relating to the effects of warnings of possible negative feedback an actor receives prior to 
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making a commitment, though inoculation is presented by Janis in the context of making 
the actor more stable in decision making; rather than in the possible context of irrational 
persistence because the actor expects negative feedback anyway. Finally, Janis discusses 
beneficial and hazardous personality characteristics concerning general decision making, 
but not specifically under negative feedback conditions.77
In establishing a link between Groupthink and EoC behaviour, Janis, first, observes 
more sharply the fundamentals of contemporary EoC behaviour; including external 
justification, distortion of endogenous and exogenous factors and the uncertainty of 
future actions and proceeds to apply these factors explicitly to the group.
 Janis’ work then, although not 
‘EoC behaviour specific’, certainly has relevance for the subject. 
78 Janis then 
observes how a cohesive group context can either disrupt the natural tendency to justify 
an action or reinforce it, depending on the group’s norms and other factors; expanded in 
the footnote.79 In other words, Janis is arguing that Groupthink can accentuate the 
justification urge, while ‘good cohesion’ (medium cohesion with positive norms, if we 
accept Callaway and Esser’s80
                                               
77 Janis, Crucial Decisions…, p. 203 
78 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies…, p. 113. Janis states that “we know that individuals become 
heavily ego involved in maintaining their commitment to any important decision for which they feel at 
least partly responsible. Once a decision maker has publicly announced the course of action he has 
selected, he is inclined to avoid looking at evidence of the unfavorable consequences. He tries to 
reinterpret setbacks as victories, to invent new arguments to convince himself and others that he made the 
right decision, clinging stubbornly to unsuccessful policies long after everyone else can see that a change 
is needed. Each policy maker, whether he has made the crucial decisions by himself or as a member of a 
group is thus motivated to perpetuate his past errors; provided, of course, that his nose is not rubbed in 
inescapable evidence” 
79 Ibid. Janis states that “like attitudes of detachment and derogatory stereotypes, the tendency to recommit 
oneself to prior decisions can be greatly augmented by social pressures that arise within a cohesive 
group. From time to time, setbacks induce a policy maker to doubt the wisdom of past decisions in which 
he has participated. But what a man does about his doubts, if he is a member of an in-group of policy 
makers, depends in large part on the norms of the group. If the members agree that loyalty to their group 
and their goals requires rigorous support of the group’s primary commitment to open minded scrutiny of 
new evidence and willingness to admit errors (as in a group committed to the ideals of scientific 
research), the usual psychological tendency to recommit themselves to their past decisions after a setback 
can give way to a careful reappraisal of the wisdom of their past judgments. The group norm in such a 
case inclines them to compare their policy with alternative courses of action and may lead them to 
reverse their earlier decisions. On the other hand, if, as often happens, the members feel that loyalty to 
the group requires unwavering support of the group’s past policy decisions, the usual psychological 
tendency to bolster past commitments is reinforced.” 
80 Callaway and Esser, ‘Groupthink: Effects of Cohesiveness…’ 
 interpretation) can prevent it. However, Janis’ argument 
can also be understood to mean that specific ‘parts’ of Groupthink, not just the 
Groupthink ‘product’ as a whole, can also trigger EoC behaviour in groups. 
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It is Kameda and Sugimori, Thompson et al., Street and Anthony and especially ’t 
Hart however who explore the conceptual link between Groupthink and EoC behaviour to 
the greatest depth; with specific mention of EoC behaviour and EoC behaviour rubrics. 
Kameda and Sugimori compare “collective Entrapment”81 (Entrapment in groups) and 
Groupthink and argue that their “conceptual proximity”82 means there are “important 
similarities between the two phenomena.”83
Their broad argument – assuming the reader can look beyond the obvious similarity 
of the group DMU in collective Entrapment and Groupthink – is that in collective 
Entrapment, social costs are more readily felt by the group after failure, and social and 
interpersonal considerations are more tangible, than in individuals, and this is a facet 
shared by Groupthink. Thus, a group may continue not only to justify, but to protect the 
group ego. While, as a broad argument, this may be correct, further reading reveals that 
Kameda and Sugimori appear to be arguing that individual Entrapment contains no 
psychological justification element at all.
 Kameda and Sugimori qualify their position 
by stating that collective Entrapment shares unique similarities with Groupthink that 
individual Entrapment does not. 
84 This argument is thought to be fundamentally 
incorrect and more similar to a SCE argument than an Entrapment argument. Kameda 
and Sugimori make further mistakes when, after misinterpreting the first of Janis’ two 
quotes (footnote 78), they argue that “Groupthink and Entrapment are both characterised 
by the perpetuation of the ongoing course of action in face of objectively negative 
feedback.”85
                                               
81 T. Kameda and S. Sugimori, ‘Psychological Entrapment in Group Decision Making: An Assigned 
Decision Rule and a Groupthink Phenomenon’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.  65, 
No. 2, 1993, p. 283 
82 Ibid., p. 291 
83 Ibid., p. 283 
84 Ibid. Kameda and Sugimori state that “we think that Entrapment in its collective form may share unique 
key features with Groupthink that do not exist in individual decision making. [Apart from the obvious 
similarity of the group in group Entrapment and Groupthink,] what seems to make group Entrapment 
particularly distinct from individual Entrapment is that the prior investments at stake in a group context 
may not necessarily be limited to physical costs such as money, time, energy, and so forth. When a group 
faces an unfavorable outcome resulting from a previously chosen policy, the group needs to consider not 
only the accumulating physical costs, but also social and interpersonal outcomes associated with 
abandoning the ongoing plan…that is, proposing a change may cause loss of face for some member, may 
violate group harmony, and so on. In other words, group solidarity is also at stake in this case and this 
aspect makes the notion of collective Entrapment particularly parallel to Groupthink.” 
85 Ibid. 
 There are a number of apparently obvious faults with this statement. Not 
only is Entrapment generally assumed to be undertaken after ambiguous rather than 
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unequivocal feedback (in that, although negative, feedback is also usually ambiguous as 
to whether continuation will succeed or not), but Groupthink can take place in one-shot 
scenarios, thus not necessarily after negative feedback; as in the Bay of Pigs fiasco for 
example. 
The Bay of Pigs illustrates a further major schism between Groupthink and EoC 
behaviour. Kameda and Sugimori, (referring to Vietnam), argue “it is perhaps more than 
a coincidence that the same historical fiascos have been referred to as examples of both 
Groupthink and collective Entrapment.”86 However, while the Bay of Pigs fiasco is the 
archetype of Groupthink, it is one example where Entrapment, after failure, has not 
occurred. Thus, Entrapment can occur without Groupthink and visa versa. Furthermore, 
though Vietnam is often cited as an example of EoC behaviour, only President Johnson’s 
‘Tuesday Group’ has been examined in detail, vis-à-vis Groupthink, not the Vietnam 
Conflict as a whole, under all administrations. In conclusion, Kameda and Sugimori 
argue that Entrapment should be considered a “central subset”87
’t Hart argues that “groups are just as susceptible to becoming prisoners of past 
decisions and actions as individuals”.
 of Groupthink. While 
this conclusion has some merit, ’t Hart takes a more cautious view. 
88 He continues this acknowledgement by stating 
that “[group] Entrapment is [a] type of Groupthink.”89
It is hypothesized that Groupthink is one of the modes of 
decision making that produce [group] Entrapment. In turn, 
[group] Entrapment is viewed as one of the possible outcomes of 
a Groupthink decision process. In other words, [group] 
Entrapment is a specific pattern of defective decision making 
resulting from Groupthink
 He clarifies this apparently 
concurring statement, apropos Kameda and Sugimori, by stating that: 
 
90
Here then, the subset issue is less relevant than the issue of how similar the two 
phenomena are and how one phenomenon leads to the other. ’t Hart continues by 
 
 
                                               
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. ‘Subset’ means set A is a subset of set B if all of the members of A are also members of B, 
‘members’ here meaning ‘facets’. 
88 ’t Hart, Groupthink in Government…, p. 94 
89 Ibid., p. 95 
90 Ibid., p. 96 
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highlighting a number of similarities between Groupthink and Entrapment in general, not 
just in terms of one being a group level determinant of the other. Firstly, ’t Hart states 
that “both concepts are associated with defective decision making and policy failure: 
Groupthink describes how failure may arise, Entrapment describes a specific pattern of 
failure. The two concepts fit nicely.”91 However, he adds a condition to Groupthink and 
notes a conceptual weakness in the Entrapment literature: “yet it should be reminded that 
Groupthink may result in other types of failure and that at this point, Entrapment is still 
very much an individual level phenomenon.”92 He continues his study, regarding 
accurately the similarities of the antecedent conditions of both phenomena, but also 
talking of Staw’s EoC as well as Entrapment.93 An interesting point here is that ’t Hart 
appears to treat EoC as synonymous with Entrapment. As a final point, ’t Hart notes the 
similarities in the functions of both Groupthink and Entrapment: emotional protection.94
                                               
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., p. 97 
94 Ibid. 
 
From ’t Hart’s perspective then, it can be understood that both theories share 
several similarities, including their antecedent conditions (the structural and social origins 
of each phenomenon), their individual relationship to failure (Groupthink causes failure, 
Entrapment is a reaction to failure), their joint relationship to failure and each other 
(Groupthink may cause the initial failure (the first negative feedback), and with the 
negative feedback it then contributes to the prevailing Entrapment tendency of the group 
by preventing adequate discussion and reconsideration of the action) and their basic 
function (psychological protection). ’t Hart attempts to represent figuratively this 
symbiotic (or more aptly, parasitic) relationship, related to his earlier ‘three path’ 




                                               
95 L. Thompson et al., ‘Cohesion and Respect: An Examination of Group Decision Making in Social and 
Escalation Dilemmas’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1998, pp. 289-311 
 while not specifically exploring a relationship between 
Groupthink and EoC behaviour, do explore a link between respect, cohesiveness and 
group EoC behaviour. Although Thompson et al. raise many complex points in their 
work, their interest can be argued to rest in two types of dilemma: a social dilemma (a 
group Agency Theory situation where an individual’s interest within the group and 
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overall group interest clash) and an EoC behaviour situation. Thompson et al. here do not 
make the link between Agency Theory and EoC behaviour, only the effect of 
cohesiveness and respect on both situations. Thompson et al. assert that friends are more 
likely to cooperate (avoid the temptation to put self-interest over group interest) than a 
group of strangers; thus the group prospers in an Agency situation. Yet, such high 
cohesiveness, coupled with low respect from outsiders does contribute to group EoC 
behaviour situations, through a Groupthink type process. This raises the prospect of “the 
very factors that lead to rational decision making in one circumstance [being] the ones 
that fuel the fires of group disaster in another.”96
It is Street and Anthony
 Thompson et al.’s work though, by 
implication, emphasises better many other points of interest; most notably, the separate 
impacts of Groupthink variables on group – and perhaps even non-group – EoC 
behaviour (contended here to be investigated less than the Groupthink ‘whole’), the 
presence of Agency Theory in relation to the group dynamic and how very high or very 
low group cohesiveness, and thus very low or very high Agency motives, will impact 
upon other EoC behaviour variables and group EoC behaviour as a whole. Respect is also 
raised as a valid group EoC behaviour determinant here, and is arguably applicable to an 
individual DMU in an EoC behaviour situation too. 
97 however who undertake a specific study to establish a 
link between EoC behaviour and Groupthink. Staw’s EoC model is the focus of Street 
and Anthony’s attentions here and, incidentally, they appear to argue that the variables 
discussed by Staw in his model apply equally to groups as individuals. Street and 
Anthony begin with the somewhat inconsistent argument that many case studies 
illustrating Groupthink also illustrate EoC behaviour.98 They use this dubious lemma 
however to state correctly that “in sum, studies such as these lend support to the idea that 
the two concepts may be related;”99
                                               
96 Ibid., p. 291 
97 M. D. Street and W. P. Anthony, ‘A Conceptual Framework Establishing the Relationship between 
Groupthink and Escalating Commitment Behavior’, Small Group Research, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1997, pp. 
267-293 
98 Ibid., p. 267 
99 Ibid., p. 268 
 arriving ultimately, like ’t Hart, at the greater 
assertion that “groups suffering from Groupthink will engage in escalating commitment 
 140 
behaviors to a greater extent than will groups not suffering from Groupthink.”100 Street 
and Anthony state that four assumptions are needed before any propositions relating 
Groupthink and EoC behaviour can be discussed.101
First, related to Groupthink, Street and Anthony redefine cohesion. While accepting 
that cohesion, as defined by some authors, comprises of three elements – interpersonal 
attraction within the group, pride in the group (both positively correlated to Groupthink) 
and task cohesion (the extent to which group members are attracted to the group as a 
function of their mutual desire to accomplish the task at hand; and negatively correlated 
to Groupthink) – Street and Anthony remove task cohesion since they are studying 
cohesion as a positive correlate of Groupthink.
 
102
For each of the three propositions, the group is assumed to be 
cohesive in the sense of assumption one and suffers from one of 
the other two sets of antecedent conditions in the Groupthink 
model before it is exposed to an escalation situation
 
 
Assumption two dictates that: 
 
103
Much more plausible is the situation in which a cohesive group is 
hindered by the presence of a smaller number of other antecedent 
variables…Groupthink can emerge with as few as one additional 
antecedent variable in the model being present
 
 
However Street and Anthony complicate matters when they also state that: 
 
104






 is self-explanatory. The final assumption is important in that it adds an 
EoC behaviour determinant: 
                                               
100 Ibid., pp. 268-9 
101 Ibid., p. 276. Street and Anthony state that “inasmuch as the ensuing propositions attempt to link the two 
models together, four assumptions important to the theoretical foundation from which the propositions 
derive will be presented at this point. These assumptions are listed in decreasing order of importance.” 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid., p. 277 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., p. 278 
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Group cohesion, as defined earlier, also plays a role in increasing 
the [group] tendency to escalate commitment to a losing course 
of action106
Rendering a relationship between the provocative situational 
context variables in the Groupthink model and the psychological 




Street and Anthony continue with three bifurcated propositions, based upon the 
assumptions. The first proposition is complex, and is aimed at: 
 
107
This proposition builds upon ’t Hart’s proposition that Groupthink may cause the 
initial failure and interferes with reconsiderations, thus Entrapment results owing to the 
pressures for concurrence and thus poor discussion norms. Street and Anthony argue that 
a cohesive group (as per assumption one) suffering from provocative situational variables 
described in the Groupthink model, prior to an EoC behaviour situation, will experience 
pressure for concurrence (Groupthink). They posit escalation situations “will exacerbate 
the levels of stress and feelings of low self-esteem…thereby compounding the pressure 
for concurrence seeking among group members.”
 
 
108 Furthermore, Street and Anthony 
argue that in a circular way “the group will respond to this situation by escalating 
commitment to the previously incorrect decision path.”109
Cohesive groups operating under conditions of high stress or low 
levels of self-esteem are more likely to engage in escalation 
behavior when exposed to an escalation situation than cohesive 
groups not operating under conditions of high stress or low levels 
of self-esteem when exposed to an escalation situation
 The discussion supporting 
proposition one is complex, but centres on EoC behaviour situations being perceived as 
an ‘external threat’ and thus they cause Groupthink. Ultimately though, Street and 





                                               
106 Ibid., p. 279 
107 Ibid., p. 280 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., p. 282 
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Proposition two repeats proposition one, this time with the structural faults in the 
Groupthink model: 
 
Rendering a relationship between the structural faults variables 
in the Groupthink model and the psychological and social 
commitment determinants in [Staw’s] escalation model111
Cohesive groups operating under conditions consistent with the 
structural faults category of antecedent conditions in the 
Groupthink model are more likely to engage in escalation 
behaviors when exposed to an escalation situation than are 
cohesive groups not operating under conditions consistent with 
the structural faults category of antecedent conditions in the 
Groupthink model when exposed to an escalation situation
 
 
This proposition is more straightforward than the previous one and presents several 
new determinants of group EoC behaviour. Briefly, Street and Anthony argue that the 
structural faults all contribute to poor information processing, information distortion, 
poor reconsideration of a failing project and thus EoC behaviour. They state: 
 
112
Proposition three is a summation of the preceding two propositions; exploring 




Cohesive groups characterized by the presence of all Groupthink 
antecedent conditions are more likely to engage in escalation 
behaviors when exposed to an escalation situation than are 
cohesive groups not characterized by the presence of all 
Groupthink antecedent conditions when exposed to an escalation 
situation
 Street and Anthony posit that:  
 
114
Street and Anthony’s propositions are represented in figure 5.8. Their analysis is 
indeed complex and deserves further study. It is not without problems however. First, 
Street and Anthony argue that “a theoretical foundation proposing a relationship between 
 
 
                                               
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid., p. 285 
113 Ibid., p. 286 
114 Ibid. 
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the models does not currently exist.”115 While recognising work by Kameda and 
Sugimori they ignore the work already undertaken by ’t Hart. This absence of literature is 
problematic in itself yet, it is difficult to understand how the statement was ever made 
given that Kameda and Sugimori are referenced. Kameda and Sugimori’s work, although 
arguably less advanced, is underplayed here by Street and Anthony. Moreover, Street and 
Anthony bifurcate the important and unimportant parts of Groupthink and Staw’s EoC 
model. Regarding Groupthink, they argue that the symptoms of Groupthink category 
“although important to the overall Groupthink model,” does not contribute to “the 
conceptual linking of Groupthink and escalation situations.”116 This is wholly wrong, 
since at least one symptom of Groupthink, ‘Illusion of Invulnerability’, most definitely 
links in with EoC behaviour. Indeed it is a fundamental cause of EoC behaviour 
according to Staw, when related to reinforcement history. It is considered appropriate 
here to argue that all aspects of Groupthink may cause EoC behaviour, not just the 
antecedent aspects. Regarding EoC behaviour, Street and Anthony omit two facets of 
Staw’s framework from analysis: project and structural (organisational) determinants. 
They justify this decision by arguing that “these two variables…relate to objective 
aspects…[and] though important to the overall escalation model, do not contribute to the 
conceptual joining of the Groupthink and escalation situation frameworks.”117
                                               
115 Ibid., p. 268 
116 Ibid., p. 272 
117 Ibid., p. 276 
 While this 
omission is perhaps more justified than the omission of the symptoms of Groupthink, 
(because project factors are indeed the most rational aspects), Street and Anthony fail to 
explain fully why these factors are removed. They fail to state why the rational nature of 
these variables should preclude them from comparative analysis with the irrational 






Finally, Street and Anthony’s model (figure 5.9) of Staw’s EoC is actually an 
adapted model of one previously proffered by Staw which Staw modifies in his later work 
to generate the aggregate model. While the two models are similar, the ‘Contextual 
Effects’ heading is not included in Street and Anthony’s “currently accepted [EoC] 
model”118 and such misunderstanding of the accepted form of Staw’s EoC model could 
undermine future progress. 
 
The analysis of Street and Anthony’s paper concludes the investigation of the 
relationship between Groupthink and EoC behaviour, the broader analysis of group EoC 
behaviour research and the analysis of EoC behaviour research DMU treatment. The 
analysis also concludes the tri-chapter preliminary exploration of EoC behaviour and its 
research. It has been argued in this troika of chapters that EoC behaviour is a real and 
powerful phenomenon in contemporary decision making theory. Yet this study has also 
demonstrated that numerous issues exist concerning EoC behaviour research which 
deserve detailed investigation. Chapter six investigates further the issues raised in this 
preliminary study. It also analyses hitherto undiscussed issues that are argued to exist 
within EoC behaviour research. 
                                               
118 Ibid., p. 273 
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6.0 Identifying the Issues of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
In this chapter it is contended that many other Escalation of Commitment (EoC) 
behaviour research issues exist than those highlighted previously. This chapter describes 
and analyses further the new issues and previously highlighted issues respectively. 
Exploring the causes and effects of these issues is not a core aim of this chapter – this 
occurs in chapter seven – but several preliminary links are made throughout in order to 
aid understanding of some issues. Including here an accompanying explanation for each 
issue and an examination of its effects, would be counterproductive and repetitious in the 
immediacy, for several reasons. First, recall that while the proposed issues themselves are 
chiefly evidence based, their proposed causes and effects are largely hypothetical and 
indicative. Thus, such hypothetical reasoning would clash with the more empirical 
descriptions in this chapter. Second, the complexity of the proposed causes and effects 
would detract from the important issues raised here. It is suggested that (1) many of the 
issues interact directly with one another apropos their causes and effects; (2) a number of 
what could be termed intermediate issues exist that are causative of many of the 
immediate issues discussed here, and (3) several overriding issues exist that first caused 
these intermediate and immediate issues. Ultimately it is suggested that there exists a 
complex staged, temporal history through which all the issues developed. 
This chapter’s examination begins with some new issues that were implied in 
previous chapters. These issues are discussed immediately in order to give the reader an 
introduction to the type of issues that are contended to pervade EoC behaviour research. 
Following this, the main three concerns of the chapter, multiple rubrics, claims of 
synonymy and Multiple Incongruent Definitions, are explored. Following further 
definitional issues, an exploration of more ‘conceptual’ issues occurs. Then, the 
predominantly negative author viewpoint of EoC behaviour is explored and the treatment 
of Decision Making Unit (DMU) types by EoC behaviour authors is reinvestigated, in 
conjunction with a further critique of group EoC behaviour research. Finally, an 
argument is made regarding the large amount of currently unexplored potential 
determinants and applications of determinants pertinent to EoC behaviour. 
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6.1 Two Indicative Issues from the Satellite Literature 
 
If Staw’s own core literature is bypassed for the immediacy, what remains is the 
ancillary or satellite literature; research which exists in relation to Staw’s work and 
studies EoC behaviour under many different rubrics. Specifically such terms are 
misnomers, since satellite literature conveys the image of related works orbiting, in 
harmony, the central core, when in fact such research, it is contended here, often collides 
with each other and with the central core. However, for the purpose of illustrating the 
schism of relative importance between Staw’s and others’ works, it is deemed an 
acceptable metaphor. The first two, closely connected, issues occur in the satellite 
literature and are considered representative of the species of issues that pervade EoC 
behaviour research. 
The first issue regards what can be termed erroneous claims. Some literature makes 
claims, typically of some new discovery or new relationship when in fact, the claims are 
flawed or the claim is in fact not original. The previous chapters looked at the Sunk Cost 
Effect (SCE) and its many ‘versions’. Connected to the SCE is the Concorde Fallacy: the 
biological version of the SCE. The previous chapters demonstrate that great effort is 
made by Arkes and Ayton in two papers concerning the SCE to convey that no research 
existed, prior to their own, that tied the two forms together. It is they, they argue, that 
establish the link.1 Even a cursory examination of sunk cost and Concorde literature 
however reveals that several texts prior to Arkes and Ayton’s work not only investigate 
human applications of the Concorde Fallacy, but also link the SCE to the Concorde 
Fallacy and reference works of both theories in the same piece of research. McLean, for 
example, discusses the Concorde Fallacy apropos “digger wasps…[and] policy makers.”2 
Colman also refers to the Concorde Fallacy in the non-biological context,3 as does Curio4
                                               
1 P. Ayton and H. Arkes, ‘Call it Quits’, New Scientist, Vol. 158, No. 2135, 1998, p. 41 and H. R. Arkes 
and P. Ayton, ‘The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less Rational than Lower Animals?’, 
Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 125, No. 5, 1999, p. 591 
2 I. McLean, ‘Concorde Fallacy’, in I. McLean (Ed.), Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, (Oxford, UK: 
OUP, 1996), pp. 95-96 
3 A. M. Colman, Game Theory and Experimental Games: The Study of Strategic Interaction, (Oxford, UK: 
Pergamon, 1982), p. 144 
4 E. Curio, ‘Animal Decision-Making and the Concorde Fallacy’, Trends in Ecology & Evolution, Vol. 2, 
No. 6, 1987, pp. 148-152 
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and Von Hippel;5 the latter of who specifically references Concorde literature in his 
bibliography of what is a SCE paper. Even Dawkins, who co-founded the Concorde 
Fallacy, refers to Vietnam when attempting to portray the theory.6
The next author, Gerritt,
 Although such an 
oversight by Arkes and Ayton could be deemed innocuous and a result of academic over 
exuberance, the fact that Dawkins’ work – the central core in relation to the Concorde 
Fallacy – is overlooked in relation to its human application of the Concorde theory is 
ominous. Such claims convey poor background reading and serve to undermine the sound 
conclusions that ultimately emerge from Arkes and Ayton’s research. Arkes and Ayton 
are not the sole culprits of overlooking previous research in this manner, merely one of 
the most representative. 
7
One possible reason for this issue, and linked closely to the first issue, is that there 
is not enough background reading and comprehension taking place, consequently the 
author in question is unaware of existing research and thus replicates it. Alternatively, the 
replicating author may observe similar duplication in other EoC behaviour literature and 
may deem such repetition ‘acceptable practice’, or he may just want to repeat the 
 exemplifies what can be described as the issue of 
repetition or no new research. While the previous chapters of this thesis could be 
considered somewhat oversaturated with EoC behaviour literature, such an impression 
disguises the significant literary culling that occurred, without a significant loss of unique 
research. It is contended that such repetitious research leaves the reader with no new 
significant information for his efforts. This issue is particularly relevant to research that 
was laid down by the pioneers of EoC behaviour concerning such core facets as 
responsibility, social conditions and feedback, which have been duplicated profusely. 
Gerritt’s paper then, while delivering some slight additional insight, does not represent 
research almost twenty years removed from Staw and the other founders. 
                                               
5 K. Von Hippel, ‘Sunk in the Sahara: The Applicability of the Sunk Cost Effect to Irredentist Disputes’, 
Journal of North African Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1996, p. 95. Von Hippel states that “in biology, King 
Hassan’s reasoning would be called the Concorde Fallacy; in economics and psychology, the Sunk Cost 
Effect. In all these disciplines, it means the same thing….” Von Hippel also references numerous pieces 
of Concorde literature in his bibliography. 
6 R. Dawkins and H. J. Brockman, ‘Do Digger Wasps Commit the Concorde Fallacy?’, Animal Behaviour, 
Vol. 28, No. 3, 1980, p. 892 
7 A. Gerritt, ‘Entrapments in Risky Investments’, Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1995, pp. 
447-462 
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research. However, it is deemed sufficient at this point in the chapter to simply be aware 
of the issues rather than the reasons behind them. Three chief concerns regarding EoC 
behaviour research are now addressed. 
 
6.2 A Multiplicity of Theories 
 
There are a very large number of theories, in a number of disciplines, that deal with 
the broad notion of why a DMU continues with an action that has delivered negative 
feedback. Below is a list of these theories and in parentheses are examples of authors who 
refer to each particular label. References are included for authors who do not feature in 
the literature review of the previous chapters: 
 
Escalation of Commitment (Staw, Greer and Stephens, Lipshitz) 
Entrapment (Brockner) 
Too Much Invested to Quit (TMITQ) (Teger) 
The Sunk Cost Effect (Arkes and Ayton, Bornstein, Guterman) 
The Sunk Cost Fallacy (SCF) (Ayton and Arkes) 
Sunk Cost Strategy (Cole) 
Caring About Sunk Costs (Carmichael and MacLoed) 
Honouring Sunk Costs (Leland) 
The Concorde Fallacy (Dawkins and Carlisle, Coleman and Gross, Colman) 
The Concord (sic) Fallacy (S. Fox and Hoffman) 
The Concorde Effect (Arkes and Ayton) 
The Blood Price Hypothesis (BPH) (Labs) 
The Dead Loss Effect (C. M. Smith et al.) 
The ‘Our Boys Should Not have Died in Vain’ Fallacy (Dawkins and Brockman) 
Escalation Bias (Armstrong et al.,8
                                               
8 J. S. Armstrong et al., ‘Escalation Bias: Does it Extend to Marketing?’, Journal of the Academy of 
Marketing Science, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1993, pp. 247-253 
 Biyalagorsky et al.) 
Escalation (Bazerman et al., S. Fox and Hoffman) 
Self-Entrapment (Ben-Shimon, Maoz) 
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Escalation Phenomenon (Ghosh,9
Some authors deem it acceptable to argue that one EoC behaviour label is 
representative of another. Bornstein and Chapman for example, make the most common 
assumption when they state “decision makers display the sunk cost (or escalation) 
effect….”
 Bowen) 
Knee Deep in the Big Muddy (Staw) 
Gambling for Resurrection (Downs) 
Lock In (Fearon) 
Escalation Situations (Bobocel and Meyer) 
Collective Entrapment (Kameda and Sugimori) 
Escalation Error (Kanodia et al.) 
Runaway Project (Sabherwal et al.) 
Escalation Behaviour (Schoorman and Holahan) 
Avoidable Over-Commitment (McElhinney and Proctor) 
 
There are at least twenty seven titles that deal with EoC behaviour. This is a very 
large number of theories which, specifics aside, attempt to explain the same phenomenon; 
relative to, for example, Groupthink which has three titles: concurrence seeking, 
premature concurrence seeking and Groupthink. The quantity of titles that exist within 
EoC behaviour research has significance for the other definitional issues discussed. 
 
6.3 Claims of Synonymy 
 
10 Brockner also makes sweeping assumptions when he declares “[Escalation of 
Commitment is] also known as: Entrapment, Sunk Cost Effect, ‘The Knee Deep in the 
Big Muddy Effect’, and the ‘Too Much Invested to Quit Effect’.”11
                                               
9 D. Ghosh, ‘De-Escalation Strategies: Some Experimental Evidence’, Behavioral Research in Accounting, 
Vol. 9, 1997, p. 88 
10 B. H. Bornstein and G. B. Chapman, ‘Learning Lessons from Sunk Costs’, Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1995, p. 251 
11 J. Brockner et al., ‘Escalation of Commitment to an Ineffective Course of Action: The Effect of Feedback 
Having Negative Implications for Self-Identity’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1986, 
p. 109 
 It is important to 
realise here that not only is Brockner implying that Staw’s EoC is the same as the other 
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named theories, but he is also implying, through a form of conversational implicature,12 
that the theories are the same as each other; that all the theories are in effect subject to the 
indiscernability of identicals principle.13 Similarly, Dawkins and Brockman treat the 
Concorde Fallacy as the ‘Our Boys Should Not have Died in Vain’ Fallacy.14 Ghosh 
equates EoC with both “Escalation Phenomena”15 and “The Sunk Cost Fallacy.”16 
Kanodia et al. argue that “[the Sunk Cost Effect] is also known as Escalation Error.”17 
Karlsson et al. state “the sunk-cost effect…or escalation [of Commitment].”18 
“Entrapment,” according to McElhinney and Proctor, is also “Avoidable Over-
Commitment.”19 Simonson and Staw argue that EoC behaviour is studied “under the 
rubrics of Sunk Cost Effects, Entrapment, Too Much Invested to Quit and Escalation of 
Commitment,”20 with no subsequent dissection of any specific characteristics. Similarly, 
Smith et al. draw together “[the] Sunk Cost Effect, Entrapment and the Dead Loss 
Effect.”21 Walton states that the “Sunk Cost Fallacy [is the same as] ‘Argument from 
Waste’.”22 Whyte states that “[EoC behaviour] has several names: Too Much Invested To 
Quit, The Sunk Cost Effect, The Dead Loss Effect and Entrapment.”23
                                               
12 S. Blackburn, ‘Conversational Implicature’, in S. Blackburn (Ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 
(Oxford, UK: OUP, 1996), pp. 188-189. Conversational implicature here can be taken to mean when a 
person communicates one thing and thereby communicates something else in addition. 
13 S. Blackburn, ‘Indiscernability of Identicals’, in S. Blackburn (Ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 
(Oxford, UK: OUP, 1996), p. 191. This principle states that if two or more objects are in fact identical, 
there can be no property held by one and not by the others. 
14 Dawkins and Brockman, ‘Do Digger Wasps Commit…’, p. 892 
15 Ghosh, ‘De-Escalation Strategies…’, p. 88 
16 D. Ghosh, ‘De-Escalation Strategies of the Sunk Cost Effect: Some Experimental Evidence’, Paper 
Presented at the Accounting, Behavior and Organization Research Conference, San Antonio, USA, 1994, 
pp. 1-4 
 Finally, Staw and 
Ross independently observe that EoC is also known as “Entrapment, the Sunk Cost Effect 
17 C. R. Kanodia et al., ‘Escalation Errors and the Sunk Cost Effect: An Explanation Based on Reputation 
and Information Asymmetries’, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1989, p. 60 
18 N. Karlsson et al., ‘Impact of Decision Goal on Escalation’, Acta Psychologica, Vol. 111, No. 3, 2002, 
pp. 309-310 
19 D. McElhinney and T. Proctor, ‘Concept of Entrapment and Decision-Making’, Management Decision, 
Vol. 43, No. 2, 2005, p. 189 
20 I. Simonson and B. M. Staw, ‘De-Escalation Strategies: A Comparison of Techniques for Reducing 
Commitment to Losing Courses of Action’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1992, p. 419 
21 C. M. Smith et al., ‘Investment Decisions by Individuals and Groups in ‘Sunk Cost’ Situations: The 
Potential Impact of Shared Representations’, Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
1998, p. 177 
22 D. Walton, ‘The Sunk Costs Fallacy or Argument from Waste’, Argumentation, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2002, p. 
473 
23 G. Whyte, ‘Escalating Commitment in Individual and Group Decision Making: A Prospect Theory 
Approach’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 54, No. 3, 1993, pp. 430-431 
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and Too Much Invested to Quit.”24
A greater tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment 
in money, effort or time has been made. The prior investment, 
which is motivating the present decision to continue, does so 
despite the fact that it objectively should not influence the 
decision
 The frequency of this type of statement belies the 
fact, based upon definitions from the founding authors of these theories, that these 
comparisons are fundamentally erroneous. Most of the theories, despite all of them 
researching behaviour following negative feedback, have unique characteristics; again, 
based upon the definition of the founding author. 
 
6.4 Testing the Validity of Claims of Synonymy 
 
The observations above state that some authors treat one or a number of EoC 
behaviour theories as synonymous. The most obvious exemplar to illustrate this is Staw’s 
EoC theory. Several authors determine the SCE to be the same as EoC. If the statement 
that ‘EoC is also known as the SCE’ is explored using two definitions of the SCE from 
the founding SCE authors then it should be possible to match the SCE with what Staw 
considers his EoC to be; but only if the synonymy claim is valid. Arkes and Blumer 
define the SCE as: 
 
25
The human tendency to judge options according to the size of 




Ayton and Arkes state it as: 
 
26
From the viewpoint of the above statements, the interpretation of Staw’s theory then 
would be that sunk costs are considered as the essential and predominant component of 
 
 
                                               
24 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Understanding Behavior in Escalation Situations’, Science, Vol. 246, No. 4927, 
1989, p. 216 
25 H. R. Arkes and C. Blumer, ‘The Psychology of Sunk Cost’, Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1985, p. 124 
26 Ayton and Arkes, ‘Call it…’, p. 40 
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Staw’s EoC theory. Although sunk costs are important in Staw’s EoC, Staw emphasises 
that sunk costs are not always the linchpin for continuance; rather they are just one, albeit 
important, issue of many and that sunk costs are not always considered when an agent 
decides to prolong a failing decision. This is demonstrated by Staw including the SCE as 
simply an ingredient of the ‘Psychological Determinants’ heading which is but an 
ingredient of his framework. Yet the authors who make comparisons between the SCE 
and EoC give the impression that money and costs, and the consideration of these in a 
limited economic way, are solely responsible for EoC behaviour according to Staw’s 
EoC; based upon the founding authors’ definitions of the SCE. 
An intuitive criticism of this argument however could be that such comparisons are 
arguably time sensitive, in that they should perhaps be looked at in the context of what 
was the generally accepted definition of each of the theories in question when the 
comparison was made. It can be argued that there is little immediate justification for 
using only the founding authors’ definitions in the above analysis. In fact, it is potentially 
fallacious to argue that a claim of synonymy is incorrect if the definitions of each theory 
used to argue such invalidity are from any different historical points in the theory’s 
history, relative to when the comparison was made. There are two distinct elements to 
this argument. 
First, if a comparison statement between two theories is looked at using a definition 
of each theory from the same future or the past era, relative to when the comparison was 
made, then the comparison may be untrue because at this point in time, the theories may 
have been, or be, different from each other. It can be argued that theories take time to 
converge and may also diverge in the future. The second element is that not only could 
the definitions of the theories be older or younger relative to the date of comparison, but 
they could also be older or younger relative to each other as well as to the comparison. 
Thus, a null hypothesis, that the claims of synonymy are not invalid, would appear to be 
the most legitimate opinion, until the claims are tested using the contemporary (in its 
most literal meaning) definition of each theory, relative to both the definitions and the 
comparison itself.  However, this issue is made more complex by another suggested EoC 




6.5 Multiple Incongruent Definitions 
 
It is contended in this chapter that for most EoC behaviour rubrics, multiple 
incongruent definitions exist. MIDs here means a number of things. Before the term is 
investigated, it is felt that the basic term definition should be explored. Definition here 
means the description of a theory; the major features of the description being: what the 
theory is about (glibly, continuing after bad feedback), what conditions are deemed 
necessary for the behaviour to be considered, in what situations the theory could be 
applied, how various concepts important to the theory are defined and finally, what 
determinants affect such behaviour. 
It is acknowledged that conditions required and concepts are vaguely described 
here and these are discussed shortly. However now that definition has been generally 
explored, what does it mean if multiple, incongruent definitions exist for most rubrics? 
What must be done immediately, for the sake of clarity, is to consider this question in 
terms of just one generic EoC behaviour rubric, not in the context of any actual rubric. It 
is contended here that the definitions within most EoC behaviour rubrics differ in a 
number of complex ways. First, they differ in the amount of determinants included in the 
definition. If several definitions were compared, some would have a greater amount of 
determinants than others. Second, the treatment of these determinants differ too in that 
some definitions treat a given determinant as an intensifier of EoC behaviour while others 
treat the same determinant as a moderator. The existing forms of some determinants also 
differ. The extent of the situations in which EoC behaviour is thought applicable also 
differs between definitions. These applicable elements, include facets like, the type of 
DMUs that can engage in EoC behaviour, whether an initial choice actually needs to be 
made or not and whether it is just the actor who made the initial decision that commits 
EoC behaviour or if others can too. 
The conditions required for EoC behaviour to be considered also differ between 
definitions of a given rubric. The conditions that differ include elements such as whether 
the feedback must predict definite future failure or whether the feedback is ambiguous 
and whether the actor has a choice to quit or not. The distinction between potential 
 155 
applications of EoC behaviour and conditions required for EoC behaviour consideration 
is considered here to be subjective; the latter term is thought to be of a more compulsory 
‘either/or’ and permanent nature while the former is considered more experimental, 
‘complementary’ and progressive and similar to the nature of EoC behaviour 
determinants. This view is indeed subjective however, and both facets could perhaps be 
expected to change or remain constant over time. The understandings of concepts used 
within the definitions differ too. The concepts and how they are interpreted are discussed 
later in this chapter, but include success, resource, failure, feedback, continuance, 
escalation and commitment and DMU. 
Again, an intuitive temporal criticism of this argument could be that multiple 
definitions of an EoC behaviour rubric, or of any theory for that matter, are bound to exist 
because this signifies research progress. The criticism would continue; that the founding 
author’s definition will always exist but it will, and should, be replaced in terms of its use 
by the most accepted interpretation of the theory at the time; illustrating a progression of 
research. The latest definition in a single piece of research should generally incorporate 
the previous research on the subject, including the founding authors work. A suitable 
analogy could be of the piece of research as a snowball. 
The snowball starts small at the top of the mountain. As it rolls downhill, it gathers 
all the contributions of snow from elsewhere and grows bigger, more complex than at the 
beginning and, ultimately, accommodative of the other inputs. The snowball that existed 
previous to the latest addition of snow no longer exists in isolation but is incorporated 
within the larger body. The implication of this criticism is that all definitions of a theory 
will always exist, but in a historical sense only, with only one or two definitions actually 
used by contemporary researchers. However, this criticism is a straw man response 
against the real meaning and intent of the MIDs argument. Several clarifications are 
needed here to dismantle this straw man. What is actually being suggested with MIDs is 
that: 
 
1. Multiple definitions of a given EoC behaviour theory, in the manner described 
above, exist concurrently, not just linearly or historically. That is to say, multiple 
definitions of a theory exist together at the same time. 
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2. The dispersal of determinant amount/treatment, situational applications and 
conditions/concept description between current pieces of research is as that 
between current research and past research. Thus: 
3. The distribution of the multiple definitions’ content between concurrent research 
and past research is non-linear. That is to say, not only are concurrent definitions 
more or less complex than, and in conflict with, each other but the complexity 
and conflict of definitions from different times is irregularly dispersed relative 
to what would be expected. Thus, some far earlier definitions of a theory are 
considered to be more complex and less conflicting than much later ones. 
Intuitively, it might be expected that later definitions of any theory be generally 
more complex than earlier ones and contain less conflict of conditions and 
concepts. 
4. Some research includes, within its starting definition, determinants, situational 
applications and condition/concept descriptions that are not present in any 
previous research of the rubric. 
5. No single definition discusses all the determinants/situational applications of 
previous research in the rubric. 
 
The above description has been discerned from chronological background reading 
in chapters three, four and five and it is suggested that a similar reading technique from 
the reader would result in the same conclusions. However, some preliminary examples to 
support the above description are considered immediately useful. Barton et al.27
                                               
27 S. L. Barton et al., ‘An Empirical Test of Staw and Ross’s Prescription for the Management of Escalation 
of Commitment Behavior in Organizations’, Decision Sciences, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1989, p. 532. Barton et 
al. state correctly that “Escalation of Commitment is defined as a decision maker’s continued 
commitment to a specific course of action despite information that suggests the course of action is 
failing.” Yet Barton et al. choose an old description of  the phenomenon when they state that “the reasons 
why decision makers escalate has to do with the psychological mechanism of commitment…where 
negative feedback leads to justification and/or self-justification…to save reputation, face and role 
performance.” 
 for 
example deliver a definition of EoC. The properties of their definition however are basic; 
being closer to Staw’s starting definition of EoC, despite the 1987 antecedents 
framework being available at the time of Barton et al.’s publication. As a somewhat 
coverall example of the main arguments; from chapters three, four and five it can be seen 
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that Staw’s Escalation of Commitment rubric has been updated in many ways including 
by Staw himself. It has already been argued in the previous chapters exactly what Staw 
believes EoC to be; depicted by his 1997 categorised framework. Moreover, it has 
already been established that several authors’ EoC works disagree with Staw and each 
other about particular conditions of EoC or make significant determinant or application 
additions to it. Such elements constitute: how many phases EoC occurs in,28 the 
weighting of each variable of EoC,29 whether it is ambiguous or unambiguous feedback 
which is a necessary precursor of EoC,30 the role of responsibility in EoC,31 the role of 
choice and the rationality of EoC32 and whether it is only a possible choice which is the 
necessary component of EoC.33 New determinants include self-esteem,34 self-efficacy,35 
national culture,36 area of expertise37 and the type of EoC project that can exist.38
                                               
28 E. Biyalagorsky et al., ‘Stuck in the Past: Why Organizations Exhibit Escalation Bias’, Working Paper, 
(Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA: 2001), pp 1-59 
29 D. R. Bobocel and J. P. Meyer, ‘Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Separating the 
Roles of Choice and Justification’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 79, No. 3, 1994, pp. 360-363, S. 
M. Goltz, ‘A Sequential Analysis of Continued Investments of Organizational Resources in Non-
Performing Courses of Action’, Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, Vol. 25, No. 3, 1992, pp. 561-574 
and Kanodia et al., ‘Escalation Errors…’ 
30 M. G. Bowen, ‘The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or Decision Errors?’, 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1987, pp. 52-66 and N. Karlsson et al., ‘Escalation of 
Commitment with Transparent Future Outcomes’, Experimental Psychology, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2005, pp. 
67-73 
31 M. A. Davis and P. Bobko, ‘Contextual Effects on Escalation Processes in Public Sector Decision 
Making’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 37, 1986, pp. 121-138 
32 R. Lipshitz, ‘The Road to Desert Storm’, Organization Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1995, pp. 243-263 
33 F. D. Schoorman and P. J. Holahan, ‘Psychological Antecedents of Escalation Behavior: Effects of 
Choice, Responsibility and Decision Consequences’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 81, No. 6, 
1996, pp. 786-794 
34 D. B. McFarlin et al., ‘On Knowing when to Quit: Task Failure, Self-Esteem, Advice and Non-
Productive Persistence’, Journal of Personality, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1984, pp. 138-156 
35 G. Whyte et al., ‘When Success Breeds Failure: The Role of Self-Efficacy in Escalating Commitment to 
a Losing Course of Action’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 18, No. 5, 1997, pp. 415-432 
36 Among others, C. R. Greer and G. K. Stephens, ‘Escalation of Commitment: A Comparison of 
Differences between Mexican and U. S. Decision Makers’, Journal of Management, Vol. 27, No. 1, 
2001, pp. 51-78. 
37 S. Fox et al., ‘Escalation Behavior in Domains Related and Unrelated to Decision Makers’ Academic 
Background’, Journal of Psychology and Business, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1995, pp. 245-259 
38 H. Drummond, ‘Too Little too Late: A Case Study of Escalation in Decision Making’, Organization 
Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1994, pp. 591-607 
 Yet it is 
the case that these determinants and applications of EoC do not appear summarised 
together as background information in later EoC research. Exploring why the proposed 
conditions exist, and their implications, is largely hypothetical. Some possible reasons are 
explored below, with more examples from the literature to support the basic propositions. 
 158 
6.6 Suggesting why the Multiple Incongruent Definitions Situation Exists and Proposing 
some Implications 
 
The introduction and conclusion to the intuitive criticism paragraph above is indeed 
a straw man response against this chapter’s contention: that multiple definitions of an 
EoC theory do exist concurrently, not just linearly or historically. However, the content 
of the intuitive criticism paragraph – describing how a theory progresses or should 
progress – provides suggestions as to why this concurrent situation is the case. It is 
suggested that in the current situation, during background reading of a given theory, a 
given author not only (1) adopts just one previous definition, or takes into account a 
relatively small number of previous definitions, but also (2) tends to be sporadic 
regarding which definition(s) he chooses; meaning that very old or newer definitions 
alone or combined are adopted. The author then performs his research; usually creating a 
further39
                                               
39 Further if multiple background research already creates a new composite definition. 
 modification to the definitions(s) with a new determinant or application. This 
piece of research and definition then enters the academic domain. This process is termed 
here as poor intra-theory communication, but could equally be understood as poor 
background reading technique. 
Before this explanation is taken further, it must be reiterated that most authors in an 
EoC behaviour rubric are suggested to follow this pattern of behaviour. Thus, it is 
suggested that the concepts, the conditions considered necessary for EoC behaviour and 
the number and types of applications/determinants present in the definition adopted in a 
piece of research depend upon how many and more importantly what research texts were 
selected for reading. Selecting just one – older or more contemporary – piece of research 
for example may give a detailed account of determinants if the author of this selected text 
performed a large amount of research and/or picked detailed text(s) for his own research, 
again regardless of whether these texts were older or newer. Indeed it must be restated 
that the terms newer and older research should be understood with caution here and not 
taken to be concomitant with ‘complexity of the definition’ as perhaps they could be with 
other theories. It is suggested that in Barton et al.’s case, they may have chosen 
background reading such that it conveyed only the basics of the theory. 
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By implication of the argument that authors only select one or two definitions, old 
or new, it can be argued that older definitions of a given theory, regardless of complexity, 
remain in use in isolation, instead of becoming obsolete by being engulfed by other 
definitions. It is contended that they may be adopted, used to create a new definition – by 
combination if more than one definition is used, and/or through a new finding that is 
subsequently generated, for example – and then may be used again in their original form 
by other authors to create a different definition still. The same situation can be argued to 
apply to the definitions that were created from them. 
Furthermore, again by implication of the main argument, it is contended that a 
finding of a piece of research can become lost or dispersed through time amidst the body 
of research of one EoC behaviour theory; it is ignored for a while, only to reemerge in a 
later definition or, instead, become forever hapax legomenon. There is then no uniform 
pattern or accurate prediction as to when it will eventually be picked up by future 
research. Thus, an addition to condition three is that some concurrent definitions, when 
taken as a whole in a given time frame, may have more or less determinants as a whole 
than earlier definitions but may also be missing determinants/applications that are present 
in the earlier ones. 
The above exploration gives some degree of explanation for the MIDs situation of a 
given EoC behaviour theory. Indeed, the explanation for the MIDs situation – poor 
background reading or poor intra-theory communication – appears to reinforce why the 
first two issues discussed at the start of this chapter (erroneous claims and repetition of 
research) may have come about too. However, several important points have not been 
tackled here. One aspect of the situation that has not been questioned is that the 
conditions and treatment of concepts set out for a given definition of a theory may be 
different compared to another definition. It is believed here that conditions and concepts 
should generally be standardised throughout each rubric’s research and not be different, 
though this is merely the opinion of this thesis’ author. Conditions and concept 
understandings should generally remain constant over time, since it is contended they 
form the ‘guts’ of the theory. Such difference thus is considered abnormal and has serious 
implications for the theory. When a combination of previous definitions is used to make a 
new definition, it is possible these definitions may conflict in terms of a condition or 
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concept understanding. Yet it is also the case that very few authors actually discuss such 
disagreement. Thus, it is assumed here that if the texts used do indeed conflict then the 
author merely adopts one view of the conflict. This means that the determinants that are 
created under the abandoned condition are now adopted under another. Another feasible 
possibility is that, if multiple conflicting elements are present, no one particular definition 
is given preference and adopted in full from those being read, but a mixture of the 
definitions is generated. This would appear to cast doubt upon the validity of any 
experimental findings in a given EoC behaviour theory, since the exigent question would 
be “would the determinants have still emerged under the new conditions/understandings 
of concepts?” It should be apparent that the same argument could arguably apply to those 
determinants merely copied from the summaries of said research pieces, yet some of 
these may also have suffered the same ‘experimental fate’ as what has just been 
described. As an aside, disagreement regarding the nature of a given determinant is rarely 
mentioned either. A similar ‘adoption effect’ as above could be assumed to be at least 
partially responsible for this. Yet the question as to why different versions of 
conditions/concepts exist in the first place has still to be answered. Furthermore, issue 
four, that determinants, applications, conditions and concepts appear in starting 
definitions of a theory that were not present previously, has also not been addressed. 
Another question awaiting an answer is “why claims of synonymy occur if multiple 
concurrent definitions of a given theory exist?” In other words, it appears fallacious to 
argue that an undefined theory is the same as another undefined theory. How then can 
claims of synonymy possibly be made if the measure of synonymy – the description of 
both definitions being the same – is missing? It is suggested here that the answers to these 
questions – and moreover a contributing factor to the entire MIDs situation – lies in the 
kind of relationship that exists between authors of different EoC behaviour theories. 
 
6.7 Suggesting a Relationship between Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Theories 
 
What must be restated immediately is that the term “a given EoC theory” was only 
used in the above discussion of MIDs for simplification purposes. It is contended here 
that this MIDs situation occurs in most of the EoC behaviour rubrics. Let us now explore 
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the claims of synonymy issue. Why claims of synonymy are made between rubrics, even 
when multiple concurrent definitions exist in both, is a difficult issue to isolate. Simply, it 
is fair to say that an author makes a claim of synonymy when he considers two or more 
theories to be the same. An obvious argument could be that an author looks at one or a 
number of the multiple contemporary definitions of two or more theories and makes a 
statement of synonymy if they, singularly or summatively, match. Another explanation is 
that the author performs detailed historical research on the theories and makes his own 
contemporary definition. However, bearing in mind the authors’ proposed questionable 
intra-theory research behaviour detailed in the above lemma, it is suggested here to be 
more likely that an author undertakes other EoC behaviour theory research as he does his 
own theory; this could be called poor intertheory communication. Essentially, it is 
suggested that an author identifies one or a number of definitions from both theories, in 
the atemporal40
A complementary view could be that some authors simply look at the theories from 
a much more general point of view than specified above. They may disregard the 
variance in the complexity of determinants and applications between definitions of 
different theories and make claims of synonymy simply because they notice that the 
theories investigate behaviour following negative feedback. For example, one of 
Brockner’s later definitions of Entrapment is that it “refers to the tendency for decision 
makers to persist with failing courses of action.”
 manner described above, and if they match, singularly or summatively, 
then he may make a claim of synonymy, such as “theory x = theory y.” This situation is 
also argued to occur when an author makes multiple comparisons, for example “x = y, z 
and a.” 
41
                                               
40 Atemporal means here ‘not considering the factor of time’. 
41 J. Brockner, ‘The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward Theoretical 
Progress’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1992, p. 39 
 This definition is identical to the 
essence of Staw’s definition of EoC. Thus we have a theory that in terms of its definition 
is identical to Staw’s EoC. Yet upon examination of its properties, Brockner’s 
Entrapment is still far less developed than Staw’s EoC. This approach could still be 
argued to be a legitimate method of research however, since the core description of each 
theory could be argued to be the same when the determinants and applications research of 
each is stripped away. Yet the variance in conditions within and between EoC theories 
 162 
may undermine this legitimacy, since it can be argued that the conditions go some way to 
forming the core description of a theory. 
Thus it is up to the researcher, it would seem, as to what degree of similarity is 
necessary before claims of synonymy are made. He may be rigorous and include 
determinant and application complexity and conditions; solely consider the conditions of 
the theory or simply look superficially at several theories and notice that there is a vague 
descriptive similarity and so make a claim of synonymy. Some element of Edwardian 
redefinition42
The above description suggests how claims of synonymy may originate. However, 
it does not answer how such claims of synonymy are treated once they are in the 
academic domain. It is suggested that the consideration of claims of synonymy impacts 
upon several elements of the MIDs situation above. It is suggested here that an author 
may observe, atemporally, a claim of synonymy (such as “x = y”) and with this claim in 
mind, transfer aspects of one theory and use them under another theory. Again, given that 
most theories are argued to suffer from the same problems, the aspects that are 
transferred are reliant upon the research of the other EoC behaviour theory that the author 
reads. This description may explain to some degree too issue four: how some aspects of 
research of a given EoC behaviour theory suddenly appear. It may also explain the 
 appears to exist here then; with synonymy claims being correct or incorrect 
relative to the subjective level of definitional analysis selected. Finally, although not 
essentially a cause of claims of synonymy, it could be argued that an author may simply 
include a claim of synonymy from other research, in his own. Based upon this argument 
it is contended that a new claim of synonymy may be created if the author notices two 
claims that “theory x = theory y” and “theory x = theory z” and thus may create a new 
claim that “theory y = theory z.” Similarly, an author may make the statement that 
“theory x = y, z and a” because he has witnessed separate claims in other research. It 
seems reasonable to suggest that the author may also perform the reverse and separate 
multiple claims and make singular ones in his own research. 
                                               
42 Redefinitions relate to the defining of terms more or less ‘tightly’ (containing more [High] or less [Low] 
conditions and detail) to make them true or false in a given situation. For more information on 
redefinitions see A. Flew, How to Think Straight: An Introduction to Critical Reasoning, (New York, 
USA: Prometheus Books, 1998), pp. 49-61. 
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variances in the conditions and concepts of a theory, since the conditions from one theory 
too may be transferred to another. 
An example of point four is research by Abdel-Khalik. Abdel-Khalik43
Some authors distinguish between EoC behaviour rubrics, as opposed to stating that 
they are synonymous. This could be termed partial synonymy.
 under the 
rubric of the SCE paraphrases Staw’s 1997 framework. Thus, somehow Staw’s EoC 
determinants and applications have emerged in the SCE without any of these aspects of 
the situation emerging previously. The SCE is actually a unique EoC behaviour rubric 
since it is a determinant of EoC behaviour according to some rubrics, yet is also 
considered as a standalone EoC behaviour theory. Thus it is subject to the research 
behaviour described above. Paradoxically then, from Abdel-Khalik’s example, it can be 
seen that the SCE can adopt the description of a theory that includes the SCE as a 
determinant of it! As a research quality issue, the trend of determinants of a theory also 
representing the theory itself is also unique; and perplexing to the unfamiliar researcher. 
It is suggested that the same ‘condition amalgamation’ problems exist when taking facets 
of one theory to another as when definitions of the same theory are exploited. This is 
because the definition of the other theory that is examined – and aspects of it taken – may 
indeed utilise conditions that are different from that of the final created definition of the 
chosen theory. From the arguments above, an initial conclusion could be that there is 
some kind of cyclical contributory relationship between synonymy claim making and 
some elements of the MIDs situation: intuitively, it is suggested that claims of synonymy 
contribute to multiple concurrent definitions by the transference of aspects of one EoC 
behaviour theory to another, and many varying definitions could, depending upon author 
behaviour, spark claims of synonymy if they are deemed to match. 
 
6.8 Partial Synonymy 
 
44
                                               
43 R. Abdel-Khalik, ‘Sunk Costs’, in R. Abdel-Khalik (Ed.), Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
Accounting, (London, UK: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 272-275 
44 This term ‘partial synonymy’ is used because it is the opposite of synonymy and means ‘different but not 
opposite’ and is not intended to suggest the idea of an author measuring the qualities of two theories, in a 
comparative fashion, as it may imply. The word ‘antonymy’ was not used since it means the ‘opposite of 
a concept’, which is impossible in this context. 
 Bowen for example 
 164 
makes a division between EoC and Entrapment, stating that Entrapment is merely 
“related research”45 and that “in contrast to escalation research, subjects in Entrapment 
situations typically incur small continuous losses as they wait to seek a goal…as a simple 
function of time.”46 Bowen closely replicates an earlier statement by McCain which 
states “Entrapment is a process similar to Escalation…. The major operational difference 
has been that Entrapment studies have made increasing investment a strict function of 
waiting time, whereas Escalation studies have made the amount of investment an 
independent decision.”47 Von Hippel48 argues Entrapment and the SCE are different too 
when he states they are “similar psychological phenomena;” but he does not expand 
explicitly on this argument. Moreover, DeNicolis and Hantula separate the SCE from 
Staw’s EoC theory, treating the former as an explanatory determinant of the latter,49 
while investigating the SCE in the NBA league (as Staw and Hoang did in 1995). 
Camerer and Weber also isolate the SCE (but as Fallacy) for follow up research on Staw 
and Hoang’s NBA data.50
Complication unsurprisingly occurs then when partial synonymy claims are in 
direct conflict with claims of synonymy. Moreover, if a partial synonymy claim is made 
between ‘x’ and ‘y’, and a synonymy claim is made between both ‘x’ and ‘z’ and ‘y’ and 
‘z’, this presents confusion as to the true nature of ‘z’ owing to a form of inconsistent 
 
                                               
45 Bowen, ‘The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered…’, p. 53 
46 Ibid. 
47 B. E. McCain, ‘Continuing Investment under Conditions of Failure: A Laboratory Study of the Limits to 
Escalation’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 71, No. 2, 1986, p. 280 
48 Von Hippel, ‘Sunk in the Sahara…’, p. 114 
49 J. L.DeNicolis and D. A. Hantula, ‘Sinking Shots and Sinking Costs? Or, how Long Can I Play in the 
NBA?’, Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1996, p. 66. Here, the theory Escalation of 
Commitment is defined as “the tendency to become entrenched in a losing course of action, or to 
continue to invest in a situation that is likely to fail.” DeNicolis and Hantula separate the SCE from EoC 
behaviour by stating that “one explanation [my italics] for Escalation of Commitment suggests that the 
resources initially expended in a course of action (sunk costs) affect subsequent commitment to that 
action.” 
50 C. F. Camerer and R. A. Weber, ‘The Econometrics and Behavioral Economics of Escalation of 
Commitment: A Re-Examination of Staw and Hoang’s NBA Data’, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Vol. 39, No. 1, 1999, p. 60. Camerer and Weber state that “Escalation of Commitment and 
the Sunk Cost Fallacy are essentially the same phenomenon: both lead decision makers to exaggerate 
investments following previous commitment of resources. One distinction is that escalation may be 
associated with forms of commitment other than previous expenditures of economic resources, or sunk 
costs. For instance, it is possible for a decision maker to escalate following a verbal commitment. This 
implies that escalation is a more general phenomenon which includes escalating commitment to sunk 
costs.” Although the reasoning behind this distinction can be argued to be not entirely correct, (EoC is 
the act of reinvesting in a previous action, it does not lead to it) the schism does lend some credibility to 
Camerer and Weber. 
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triad.51
There is a further element to consider regarding the poor intra- and inter theory 
communication proposed above. EoC behaviour is researched in many disciplines as well 
as under many rubrics; with some rubrics only existing in some disciplines. Based upon, 
and relative to, the proposed intra-disciplinary (intra-disciplinary intra- and inter theory) 
behaviour, it is suggested that communication between EoC behaviour rubrics of different 
disciplines is arguably even less effective, owing to academic dissimilarity, or academic 
distance, between disciplines. Moreover, such interaction may improve the closer, 
academically, the two disciplines are. The rubrics are not ‘rigidly isolated’ according to 
discipline however. Claims of synonymy for example do arise between interdisciplinary 
theories, and it is feasible that a theory definition could be used in a theory of another 
discipline because of such claims.
 It is contended here that partial synonymy claims are generated in a similar but 
inverse way as standard claims of synonymy. However, the facet of a noticed difference 
between theories implies some aspect of meticulousness among these authors. Yet, the 
close similarity between Bowen and McCain’s statements raises the prospect that as 
synonymy claims may be superficially copied from one author to another without 
examination, so perhaps can claims of partial synonymy. 
 
6.9 Interdisciplinary Communication and the Translation of Escalation of Commitment 
Behaviour Theories 
 
52 A further observation is that some rubrics have been 
translated (‘adopted’) from one discipline to another (research under a given rubric is 
undertaken in an environment or discipline other than the original). Yet it is suggested 
here that a translated theory in another discipline develops in near isolation from its 
namesakes, in the original/other disciplines. It is contended that some authors consult 
cross disciplinary literature when studying a theory and some do not.53
                                               
51 T. Mautner, ‘Inconsistent Triad’, in T. Mautner (Ed.), The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, (London, 
UK: The Penguin Group, 2000), pp. 271-272. An inconsistent triad consists of three propositions of 
which at most two can be true at any one time. 
52 Intuitively, a definition from one theory could even end up back in the same discipline from which it 
came, owing to it ‘travelling’ by synonymy claims. 
 This issue may 
53 For example, D. Walton, Personal Communication, (Email, 24/10/04). Walton states that “as far as I 
know, nothing hasbeen [sic] done on the foreign policy aspects of sunk costs argumentation, but it would 
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contribute to the repetition of research and erroneous claims issues. Moreover, the earlier 
argument, that there is poor communication between authors studying the same theory in 
the same discipline, is suggested to also apply to translated theories. Thus not only is 
there poor communication between authors of the same theory in different disciplines but 
also between authors studying the same translated theory within a discipline.54
It is suggested here that another possible cause of varying applications, conditions 
and concepts within a theory lies with a theoretical construct labelled here as semantic 
errors. Semantic errors mean here slight shifts in word usage when a definition is copied 




6.10 Semantic Errors 
 
55
                                                                                                                                            
be a very good topic for research. Maybe I am overlooking something, because I am not expert in 
political science or foreign policy matters. There is material on it in economics (quite a bit)….” 
54 For example, I. McLean, Personal Communication, (Email, 21/10/04). McLean reveals an uncertain 
amount of communication when he states that “I borrowed the term from Richard Dawkins. Despite my 
efforts it has not been much used in political science.” While the claim that it has not been used much in 
political science is true, and he does state that Dawkins founded the theory, he does not mention the texts 
raised in the earlier part of this chapter (when critiquing Arkes and Ayton), that do mention the Concorde 
Fallacy in the political sphere. 
55 A. Proctor, ‘Strategic Windows and Entrapment’, Management Decision, Vol. 31, No. 5, 1993, p. 55 
 Proctor here, presents a definition of Entrapment. He states “a 
responsible individual increases a commitment to an ineffective course of action to justify 
the previous allocation of resources.” One could argue that numerous semantic issues 
could exist here, or have already occurred, that would change the meaning of the theory. 
Proctor’s “responsible individual” could turn into just “individual” and his “to justify” 
could turn into “in large part to justify.” Conversely, Proctor may have already made 
semantic errors when making this definition from elsewhere: Brockner, for example, uses 
“in large part to justify.” The resultant definitional, semantic nuances are potentially 
multitudinous. Moreover, such semantic differences may promote claims of 
synonymy/partial synonymy where they may not have otherwise occurred. As an aside, 
semantic errors made when creating a definition may cause adopted determinants to be 
‘invalidated’, since an altered condition/concept is now part of the definition. 
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6.11 Quality Based Issues Related to Multiple Rubrics, Multiple Incongruent Definitions 
and Synonymy Claims 
 
If the core issues of the above debate are relegated momentarily, a number of 
quality based issues also exist which involve multiple rubrics, multiple incongruent 
definitions of each theory and synonymy claims between theories. One such issue is that 
some authors change their terminology of a chosen theory within one piece of research 
(for example, in one paper, Whyte changes his chosen theory of EoC to Entrapment).56 
Moreover, some authors change their view, between research texts, concerning the level 
of synonymy between particular EoC behaviour theories, without explanation. In the first 
of two papers, Janssen et al. label the terms SCE and EoC as synonymous.57 Yet in the 
latter paper, Janssen and Scheffer comment that “Escalation of Commitment is very 
similar [italics mine] to the Sunk Cost Effect”58 and do not explain this change of 
opinion. Some authors also change their definition of a chosen rubric between research 
pieces. For instance, in earlier definitions, Brockner argues that Entrapment is the 
“tendency for individuals to make increasing commitments to some failing course of 
action, in large part to justify the appropriateness of previous investments made in that 
situation.”59 However, in a later paper, without explanation, Brockner removes the 
‘justify’ element. Here, Entrapment “refers to the tendency for decision makers to persist 
with failing courses of action.”60
Finally, in some instances, an author’s chosen definition of a theory appears to 
contradict itself. A paper by Paraye appears to demonstrate this and, additionally, 
includes a change in terminology mid-text. Regarding the SCE, Paraye states “by letting 
 The change/absence of just part of a definition, then, 
can drastically shape one’s interpretation of a theory. The most important point here 
however is that the definition changes without explanation. 
                                               
56 G. Whyte, ‘Escalating Commitment to a Course of Action: A Reinterpretation’, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1986, p. 318 
57 M. A. Janssen et al., ‘Sunk-Cost Effects and Vulnerability to Collapse in Ancient Societies’, Current 
Anthropology, Vol. 44, No. 5, 2003, p. 722 
58 M. A. Janssen and M. Scheffer, ‘Overexploitation of Renewable Resources by Ancient Societies and the 
Role of Sunk Cost Effects’, Ecology and Society, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2004, p. 11 
59 J. Brockner et al., ‘The Role of Modeling Processes in the ‘Knee Deep in the Big Muddy Phenomenon’’, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 33, 1984, p. 77 
60 Brockner, ‘The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing…’, p. 39 
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go of the project, it will be difficult for the manager to escape the feeling that the 
resources previously committed have been wasted.”61 Two errors are then made. First, 
Paraye states that “the sunk cost phenomenon…entails psychological costs of switching 
that exceed purely economic switching costs”62 yet later states that “Escalation of 
Commitment [italics mine] is justified on purely economic grounds.”63
Most EoC behaviour theories have a degree of utility regarding their specialisms or 
research findings that would be useful or applicable to another EoC behaviour theory 
(e.g. Bornstein et al. give some novel facets to their understanding of the SCE that could 
also apply to EoC
 Here then there is 
not only a change in terminology within the paper, but the definition appears to self-
conflict too. 
 
6.12 The Lack of Research Sharing 
 
64
The analogy of the snowball earlier in this chapter can be expanded by arguing that 
the all-encompassing snowball doesn’t just roll downhill, it often changes direction in 
that it gathers research based upon a particular aspect of the theory. The Groupthink 
snowball for example has recently focussed upon questioning how necessary group 
cohesion is for triggering Groupthink. It is argued here that the EoC behaviour snowball 
). Yet, overall, such aspects are not shared between theories. This is 
suggested to be the fault of another kind of poor intertheory communication, related to 
ignorance of other work. This argument may seem to contradict the previous arguments 
that synonymy claims allow aspects of one theory to be ‘expressed’ by another. However, 
the argument here concerns the lack of purposeful and explicit intertheory aspect 
transference. 
 
6.13 The Lack of Research Direction 
 
                                               
61 R. Paraye, ‘The Strategic Implications of Sunk Costs: A Behavioral Perspective’, Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1995, p. 418 
62 Ibid., p. 419 
63 Ibid. 
64 B. H. Bornstein et al., ‘Rationality in Medical Treatment Decisions: Is there a Sunk-Cost Effect?’, Social 
Science & Medicine, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1999, pp. 215-222 
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whether as a whole or apropos particular theories has no such direction; a number of 
vastly different determinant and application directions seem to occur simultaneously, 
with little sense of common purpose. This aspect of EoC behaviour research is important, 
not least because it relates to a general lack of focus and also a lack of ‘attachment’ 
between both intra- and inter theory authors. 
 
6.14 Escalating Commitment and Becoming Entrapped 
 
Another issue is that ‘Escalation of Commitment’ and ‘Entrapment’ are not only 
the names of theories, but they are also verbs. One can escalate commitment simply as a 
verb, when one reinvests purely because of sunk costs, regardless of Staw’s named 
theory. Similarly, one can become entrapped in both EoC and the SCE theory because 
one wants to stave off losses, however with no relevance to the theory of Entrapment.65
It has been argued above that twenty seven theories exist which describe EoC 
behaviour. It is contended here that usage issues exist with some of these theories. For 
instance, many of the theories are used once only: by the theory’s inventor (e.g. the ‘Our 
Boys...’ Fallacy, ‘Lock In’, the ‘BPH’ and the ‘Dead Loss Effect’). TMITQ could be 
considered here too but, in mitigation, it was one of the first EoC behaviour theories in 
conflict escalation literature. Furthermore, some theories in the list consist of a slight 
 
This argument may explain some of the examples of interchangeable theories between 
texts and mid-text cited above, and some of the synonymy claims. Yet it should at the 
same time be acknowledged that it does not excuse the changing of definitions and 
properties within or between pieces of research, without explanation. Moreover, criticism 
can still be levelled at the authors in question for not making this point themselves, 
knowing that confusion may be caused to authors who have taken the time to familiarise 
themselves with the many names, nuances and subtleties of EoC behaviour theories. 
 
6.15 Looking Again at the Twenty Seven Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Rubrics 
 
                                               
65 One example of this proposed phenomenon could be J. Brockner and J. Z. Rubin, Entrapment in 
Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis, (New York, USA: Springer-Perlag, 1985), p. 6. 
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variation in terminology (e.g. the SCF, Honouring Sunk Costs, the Concorde Effect, the 
Concorde Fallacy and the Concord Fallacy [no E]). Finally, some theories are not even 
defined (e.g. the ‘Our Boys...’ Fallacy; used as a comparison for the Concorde Fallacy). 
The large number of labels could be a reaction to a, largely unspecified, recognition that 
multiple incongruent definitions of the established theories exist, and a quasi clean break 
is sought through a new label. However, undermining this argument, claims of synonymy 
with the established theories are usually made. It is unlikely that ignorance of every form 
of prior EoC behaviour research is responsible either, since even a cursory investigation 
will produce a large amount of such research. The benefits numerous labels bring to EoC 
behaviour theory are uncertain. One limitation is clear however: unnecessary complexity. 
A new label, the substitution of effect with fallacy or the absence of an ‘E’ may seem 
unimportant, yet as EoC behaviour is suggested here to be pathologically complex and 
disjointed, further complexity is undesired. Even if the decision is an unconscious one, 
changing the name of a theory or inventing a new name, suggests a questionable research 
practice as does the absence of a letter in the word that is the focus of one’s essay through 
a typographical error. The issue of semantic errors then may also figure with this issue. 
In sum, through examination of all the theories, it is suggested that – even at their most 
radical – they are still just variations of one of the following: EoC theory, Entrapment, 
TMITQ, the SCE and the Concorde Fallacy. Theory disputes/differing interpretations and 
new definitions/discoveries could, should, and in some sense already do, reside within the 
established theories; such aspects are made no more valid by making new labels to 
accompany them. 
 
6.16 Misrepresentation of Previous Research by Escalation of Commitment Behaviour 
Authors 
 
It is suggested here that some authors directly misinterpret founding or other 
authors when criticising them; a form of ignoratio elenchi,66
                                               
66 Literally meaning ‘misconception of the refutation’, ignoratio elenchi means arguing against something 
that the other party has not proposed. 
 or a straw man argument. It 
should be emphasised here what is not being criticised: valid criticism and modification 
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that is well signposted. Many authors validly carry out their critique of Staw for example. 
Lipshitz modifies Staw’s EoC concept with what he labels as the Single Option Paradigm 
(SOP). While it is considered that the SOP is somewhat saddled with over-complexity, 
Lipshitz does not misinterpret Staw’s own concept and this is to be commended. 
However, other authors are not so accommodating. Bowen for example, argues that 
Vietnam is not a perfect example of EoC behaviour because it involved ambiguous 
information regarding the utility of continuance, instead of unambiguous information, 
which Bowen attributes as one of Staw’s conditions. However, Staw specifically states 
that ambiguous feedback is a condition of EoC. It would have been more acceptable for 
Bowen to argue for unambiguous information to be the condition, instead of 
misinterpreting Staw.67 Staw responds to Bowen’s straw man argument, but does not 
seem to explicitly recognise the misrepresentation.68 Hartman and Nelson also talk of 
“Staw’s notions of Entrapment,”69
It was suggested at the start of this chapter that important concepts utilised within 
EoC behaviour rubrics are not properly entrenched. Indeed, some concepts are not even 
defined or explored, in any EoC behaviour theory. Many concepts are, to use Dumbrell’s 
 when looking at EoC behaviour in group dynamics. 
Such misinterpretation confuses matters in that, first, valid modifications or suggestions 
can be made to a theory but these are then undermined by awareness among the readers 
that there has been an acute misreading of the original theory by the author. Second, such 
work could be easily adopted by a researcher who is meta-analysing a theory and who 
takes the misinterpreted information as a given. 
 
6.17 Issues Relating to the Concepts of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour 
 
                                               
67 Bowen, ‘The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered…’, p. 53. With relevance to Staw’s framework, 
Bowen states “for an escalation explanation to be appropriate, decision makers must have had 
unequivocal feedback that their reinvestments in the war would fail to bring victory.” This refutation, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, is incorrect. 
68 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update and Appraisal’, in Z. Shapira (Ed.), 
Organizational Decision Making, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 193. Staw 
states “meeting with such a high hurdle has generally been resisted. Few doubt that escalation effects 
would disappear if the decision maker is confronted with clear cut information that persistence will lead 
to disaster.” 
69 S. J. Hartman and B. H. Nelson, ‘Group Decision Making in the Negative Domain’, Group & 
Organization Management, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1996, p. 151 
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words, “poorly defined and vacuous.”70
The concept of a resource also figures with the concepts of recoupability, 
refundability, costs and sunk costs. Sunk costs could be considered simply as invested, 
non-refundable resources: dead money is non-refundable, dead soldiers cannot be 
resurrected, time cannot be regained. Sunk costs however could be argued to be 
potentially recoupable. If the project has some rewards at the end (even following a net 
loss), then the sunk costs can be argued to have been recouped (for instance, the money it 
cost to build machinery is recouped as income on the objects it manufactures). Although 
recoupability could just be seen as benefits detached from sunk costs, recoupability could 
be argued to be linked to sunk costs since benefits would not arise if it was not for their 
initial investment. Some sunk costs though are felt never to be recoupable, notably time 
and life. Instead, it is suggested that non-recoupable sunk resources are converted to other 
 EoC behaviour concepts should be defined and 
entrenched throughout, not just among singular, EoC behaviour theories, since these 
concepts form the backbone of the entire behaviour. The previous chapters investigate 
several of these issues comprehensively. However, some issues do need to be revisited. 
The issue of a resource, for instance, is dubious. No author defines what a resource ‘is’, 
in terms of nature, classification and function. Regarding instances of a resource, some 
authors only recognise money; others recognise time, energy and lives. The resource 
‘idea’ though is perhaps dependent upon the discipline the author inhabits. An important 
implication here is that just because some resources are not considered as resources in 
certain theories or, if considered, not investigated in certain studies within these theories, 
does not mean that they are not resources and that they do not cause EoC behaviour. 
Moreover, it is contended that some resources are present in every EoC behaviour 
situation, notably time and energy/effort. EoC behaviour authors do not recognise this 
argument. Nor do they recognise that some resources are implicitly connected, so that if 
one resource is employed, another will be also (for instance, when time is expended 
money is typically concomitant). A complete, uniform definition and a classification 
scheme of resource types would be useful, but both are absent from EoC behaviour 
research. 
                                               
70 J. Dumbrell, ‘Unilateralism and ‘America First’? President George W. Bush’s Foreign Policy’, The 
Political Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 3, 2002, p. 286 
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resources, in the rewards domain (e.g. soldiers’ lives could be argued to be converted to 
political face, following successful military action). And, as some resources are implicitly 
connected, some rewards may be too (e.g. a profitable project will also likely produce a 
gain in face). If face is considered a sunk cost, then the SCE may actually contain 
significant justification motives after all, since not wanting to ‘waste invested face’ is 
arguably equatable to justifying ones actions. However, that face can even be considered 
as a resource is deemed questionable. Zeelenberg and Van Dijk71
As Escalation is a dubious term, so too is Commitment. Staw, Brockner, Teger nor 
Arkes provide a definition of what it is to be committed and/or to have commitment. 
Understanding of commitment, in EoC behaviour research, comes from ‘subsidiary’ 
 do distinguish between 
behavioural and non-behavioural sunk costs. A complex observation emerges when 
looking at sunk costs: some resource types can be invested and refunded – and thus are 
not sunk costs – unless a particular action occurs. For example, soldiers can be 
withdrawn from combat unless they are KIA. The apparent sunk costs associated with 
living soldiers then are actually money (for feeding/equipment/salaries). Resources, costs, 
sunk costs, recoupability and refundability require much further examination than the 
mere possibilities outlined above. 
It has also been demonstrated that disagreement exists regarding how EoC 
behaviour proceeds and what EoC behaviour means. Authors generally do not state what 
escalation means beyond vague ‘continuance’. In some cases, escalation and/or 
continuance appear to comprise maintenance and intensification, yet escalation is often 
used to describe intensification too, creating considerable confusion regarding what form 
of escalation is being discussed. Important issues related to this discussion (deescalation, 
defining and separating maintenance and intensification, numerical and nature 
perspectives, the meaning and adoption of values and measures, and competition 
contexts) are explored in the critique of Staw’s and Brockner’s work; the argument here 
however is that these observations are generally applicable to all EoC behaviour 
research. 
                                               
71 M. Zeelenberg and E. Van Dijk, ‘A Reverse Sunk Cost Effect in Risky Decision Making: Sometimes We 
have too Much Invested to Gamble’, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 18, No. 6, 1997, p. 682 
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authors.72
Success is also a problematic, and arguably subjective, term. It is not stated in EoC 
behaviour research how one determines whether or not an action has been successful, or 
if one should feel gratified by the outcome. The ‘solution’ could be deemed obvious and 
undeserving of articulation: measure success in terms of completed goals. Yet goals may 
be ambiguous, and attaining even a precise goal could still be interpreted as unsuccessful; 
if significant costs were incurred in the process, for instance. This discussion has 
implications for other poorly defined concepts like negative and positive feedback, failure 
and rationality. For instance, an outsider could view a feedback episode as positive, while 
the actor may view it as negative; for reasons related to those outlined above (including 
feedback ambiguity and interpretation and incurred cost information availability and 
interpretation). There is also the matter of correctly interpreting the likelihood of success 
associated with feedback. The outsider may therefore believe that the actor is behaving 
rationally by continuing, whereas he is actually committing irrational EoC behaviour. 
There is then an overriding issue of how one can objectively determine success and 
failure and discern rational from irrational reinvestment. It would also seem that the 
terms ‘failure’ and ‘success’ are reliant upon the outcome of the ‘change’ discussion 
above, since if an action is deemed to have changed, then it could also be argued that it is 
no longer occurring. This issue in particular requires much further exploration. 
Schoorman and Holahan’s interpretation of EoC behaviour also has relevance to 
‘feedback’. Linking the outcomes of selected and unselected choices however is deemed 
problematic and tenuous; just because an alternative performs well, for instance, does not 
mean that the unselected choice would have performed badly/worse. Another important, 
 Understanding also comes from non-EoC behaviour research (particularly by 
Festinger). These interpretations, though, conflict. Another – related – issue involves the 
concept of change and the apparent paradox that exists between the continuance nature of 
EoC behaviour and the proposed ‘changes’ that may occur when one escalates 
commitment. Furthermore, the relationship between EoC behaviour and what is termed 
‘traditional escalation’ has also been shown to be dubious; warranting further 
investigation. 
                                               
72 For instance, Barton et al., ‘An Empirical Test of Staw and Ross’s Prescription…’ and McElhinney and 
Proctor, ‘Concept of Entrapment…’. 
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but hitherto undiscussed, aspect of feedback concerns how it is measured and what values 
are used to gauge it. Moreover, a competitive situation could potentially complicate one’s 
interpretation of feedback and success/failure.73
There is an assumption by virtually all EoC behaviour authors that EoC behaviour 
is either a negative or neutral phenomenon;
 Overall, negative and positive feedback, 
success, failure and rationality are deemed complex terms that are poorly entrenched in 
EoC behaviour literature. 
A further conceptual problem concerns the use of conflicting terminology among 
authors. Staw, Brockner and Teger use differing terminology to express competitive, non-
competitive and solitary situations. One could argue that founding authors are entitled to 
employ differing terminology in their theories and that only authors who make or use 
synonymy claims between theories need to explain any terminological differences. Yet 
founding authors, like ‘non-founding’ authors, often do make comparisons without 
mentioning terminological differences or suggesting terminological priorities. There is 
also the issue of some authors using differing terminology within existing theories. 
Another concept in EoC behaviour research is the DMU. Problematically, no author 
defines what a DMU ‘is’ or states the range of DMUs that exist, irrespective of whether 
or not they believe these apply to EoC behaviour. The nature of the DMU and the range 
of DMUs that exist are ‘implied’ by authors when they describe what DMUs they believe 
can commit EoC behaviour and/or in the language they use. The DMU issue however is 
more complex than as expressed here and is explored further below. 
 
6.18 The Negative and Neutral Treatment of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour 
 
74
                                               
73 As previously stated, competition can emerge in various forms and it is suggested that although the 
duopolistic, head-to-head form is the dominant ‘species’ in terms of literature covered, the focus of this 
thesis and the nature of ‘conflict escalation’, other forms do exist and the argued determinant effects 
(beating/punishment), coercion of reinvestment levels and additional feedback and intensity measures 
may not be as prevalent or suitable in some forms of competition as others. 
74 The general treatment of EoC behaviour, apropos sunk costs at least, is summed up neatly by R. Jervis, 
‘The Political Implications of Loss Aversion’, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 2, 1992, p. 188. Jervis 
states simply that “it is not rational to be influenced by sunk costs.” 
 where the main question is whether 
continuing after negative feedback is either rational or irrational, with a focus on the 
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latter. While authors like Nozick, Elster and Diekman et al.75 argue that a conventionally 
irrational determinant of EoC behaviour – sunk cost reasoning – may be beneficial, it is 
contended that only Walton argues explicitly and in detail for the utility of suffering from 
the SCE, through autoepistemic reasoning. What Walton’s work serves to do is inform 
the readership that escalating commitment in this way may not only be rational but, more 
importantly, optimal and can be brought on by deliberate meta-reasoning. That is to say, 
there may be times when obeying sunk costs does not necessarily mean an opening of the 
“normative descriptive gap.”76
This however is only one side of the coin. One could reason further and envisage a 
predicament where the autoepistemic actor has ‘deliberately’ over-invested resources (the 
expensive treadmill) but then carries on despite unexpected feedback (e.g. suffering an 
injury) because of such over-investment. Thus, autoepistemic reasoning could be argued 
to trigger what could be termed the Autoepistemic Sunk Cost Effect and ‘irrational’ 
behaviour. Similarly, regarding the electronics firm example, when this simulative 
signalling manoeuvre fails, a Simulative Sunk Cost Effect could be suggested; where 
continuance occurs because of the sunk costs invested. Thus the firm is trapped in an 
unprofitable venture. In Fearon’s example too, the actor may continue because of the 
simulatively invested costs. It was also argued when looking at Fearon’s example in 
 The EoC and Entrapment theories predominantly deal 
with situations where the actor would probably be better off quitting and try to explain 
why this does not occur, by discussing determinants such as sunk costs. Yet Walton’s 
autoepistemic reasoning deals with the actor deliberately considering this conventionally 
irrational facet to overcome negative feedback, in a situation where the greater, optimal 
good is served (for example, an anticipated aversion to exercise is blocked by purchasing 
an expensive treadmill). Examined literature, for instance the electronics firm example in 
chapter three and Fearon’s ‘lock in’ tactic in chapter four, also concerns using sunk cost 
reasoning against others, in competitive situations. 
                                               
75 R. Nozick, The Nature of Rationality, (Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 1993), 
p. 23, J. Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment and Constraints, (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 19 and K. A. Diekmann et al., ‘The Descriptive and 
Prescriptive Use of Previous Purchase Price in Negotiations’, Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, Vol. 66, No. 2, 1996, pp. 179-191. 
76 P. A. Klaczynski, ‘Framing Effects on Adolescent Task Representations, Analytic and Heuristic 
Processing and Decision Making: Implications for the Normative/Descriptive Gap’, Journal of Applied 
Developmental Psychology, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2001, p. 290 
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chapter four that autoepistemic reasoning can be undertaken in competitive situations. 
One could also argue that the costs could serve a dual autoepistemic/simulative purpose 
here; not only in priming the actor to act when the time comes, but also in letting the 
enemy know the actor is serious; perhaps ironically avoiding a war that the actor was 
actually willing to fight. 
However, sunk costs are only one part of EoC behaviour. The question that needs to 
be asked is could other elements of Staw’s framework (for example) be used in a 
utilitarian sense and in the examples above? Fearon already talks of ‘audience costs’, 
which could be translated into ‘external justification/face’ motives; already in Staw’s 
framework. In the autoepistemic exercise example, Mary could deliberately tell others of 
her intentions to lose ten pounds in weight, knowing in advance that when she falters, she 
will carry on so as not to lose face. ‘Side bets’ too (a diffuse factor, meaning something 
slightly different from Becker’s77
Other non-autoepistemic/simulative determinants also deserve consideration in this 
discussion though. Pressure to continue from stakeholders for example may be utilitarian 
if the decision maker is weak. The question that is inevitably begged
 original intent, but taken for now to indicate other 
factors which are reliant upon the outcome of the situation under investigation) may also 
serve some utility here, with the actor deliberately linking the action under investigation 
to ‘other actions’; which are dependent upon the outcome of said action. It is reasonable 
to assume here that side bets could be applied to simulative reasoning events too. Both 
determinants could of course be applied in autoepistemic or simulative examples when 
the actor really should quit. 
78
                                               
77 For more information on side bets, see H. S. Becker, ‘Notes on the Concept of Commitment’, American 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 66, No. 1, 1960, pp. 32-40. 
78 This phrase is used here in the contemporary sense, rather than the traditional, petitio principii, sense. 
 however is: does 
this consideration invalidate the purpose of EoC behaviour research as a whole? On a 
simpler note, EoC behaviour when feedback is good is arguably rational, yet inclusion of 
this in the EoC behaviour concept is dubious, since negative feedback is the focus of EoC 
behaviour. All these issues certainly need more analysis as to their validity and their 
applicability to EoC behaviour. However, some Groupthink literature authors have 
already cited the utilitarian effects of Groupthink; renaming standard Groupthink as 
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premature concurrence seeking. Such advancement has not occurred with EoC behaviour 
research; even though it may be possible and beneficial to do so. 
 
6.19 The Treatment of the Decision Making Unit and Group Dynamics in Escalation of 
Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
Numerous issues exist in EoC behaviour literature regarding DMUs. Not only is 
‘DMU’ left undefined, but there is also ambiguity regarding which DMU types are 
considered applicable to EoC behaviour. Even when DMU types are explicitly suggested, 
further issues are argued to exist. Recall the classification scheme – points 1-7 and A-G – 
from chapter five. Although it is not the intention here to explain the issues outlined 
there, it is deemed prudent to expand upon several of them. As stated in points six and F, 
there is indeed a cybernetic focus79 of group EoC behaviour literature upon the 
Groupthink phenomenon. One possible reason for this could be the obviousness of the 
link between EoC behaviour and Groupthink. Another reason could be that most 
contemporary group dynamics literature in general also focuses cybernetically upon 
Groupthink. Kramer, for example,80 states that “Groupthink has acquired the status of a 
metaphor for organizational and group decision making.” ’t Hart argues the same apropos 
foreign policy making.81
Finally, ’t Hart states that “Groupthink theory is in danger of becoming an all 
purpose label stuck on flawed policies….”
 
82
                                               
79 To clarify, ‘cybernetic’ is considered to be the best word to represent the ‘pathological blinkeredness’ 
argued to be in existence. 
80 R. M. Kramer, ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam Decisions 25 Years Later: How Well has the 
Groupthink Hypothesis Stood the Test of Time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, Vol. 73, No. 2/3, 1998, p. 267 
81 P. ’t Hart et al., ‘Foreign Policy-Making at the Top: Political Group Dynamics’, in P. ’t Hart et al. (Eds.), 
Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
USA: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 11-12 
82 P. ’t Hart, Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure, (Baltimore, 
Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 129 
 However, a fact which undermines this 
argument is that recent post-Groupthink research has occurred in group dynamics theory, 
which, moreover, suggests many facets that are potentially applicable to group (and 
perhaps even individual) EoC behaviour research. Indeed much of the new research is 
created by the same authors who criticise the cybernetic Groupthink focus of group 
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dynamics research. Importantly, this approach has not been replicated in group EoC 
behaviour research. The issue then would appear to be not that group EoC behaviour 
literature is dominated by Groupthink per se, but that it has not moved on with other 
group dynamics research. It is suggested that since Groupthink dynamics have been 
argued to influence group EoC behaviour, this post-Groupthink research also has 
potential utility and it would be beneficial for it to be explored and, if applicable, 
assimilated into EoC behaviour research. 
It should also be noted that the word ‘group’ is not defined anywhere in EoC 
behaviour literature; any definitions of what a group is come from group dynamics 
literature. It appears to be assumed in EoC behaviour literature that the reader is already 
knowledgeable of group dynamics, even though, given the minority nature of group EoC 
behaviour research within the greater EoC behaviour research body, this is not likely to 
be the case. In addition to the classification scheme, there are also secondary issues to 
consider. For instance, group EoC behaviour literature suffers from erroneous/false 
claims, discussed in chapter five apropos Street and Anthony, who also exclude parts of 
Groupthink and Staw’s EoC when exploring both theories and employ an older model of 
EoC. Given the embryonic state of Groupthink/EoC behaviour research it is considered 
premature here for researchers to preclude parts of both behaviours from comparison. 
Although some of the issues raised in this classification study may be intuitively 
explained by the other issues raised in this chapter, it is considered that the reasons some 
other DMU/group issues exist are not clear and require further exploration. 
 
6.20 The Many Unexplored Facets of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour 
 
As has been argued throughout this thesis, it is considered that a very large number 
of unexplored determinants and applications of determinants exist which may have utility 
for EoC behaviour. This argument can be summed up using two highly specific 
arguments and one ‘condition’. 
First, based upon EoC behaviour and non-EoC behaviour literature, the author 
posits that a large number of entirely new and unexplored DMU specific and non-DMU 
specific determinants of EoC behaviour exist. Second, it is posited that many existing 
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facets from non-EoC behaviour literature may have utility for EoC behaviour research. 
As a condition it is considered that existing EoC behaviour and non-EoC behaviour 
determinants, where deemed applicable, can be applied to other DMUs than those stated. 
To clarify these points, some potential facets relate, for example, to the flip side of 
EoC behaviour research, that of prevention and mitigation. It is thought that measures 
deemed to prevent or limit EoC behaviour may actually encourage it. Importance is also 
placed here upon certain EoC behaviour determinants that have only been explored in 
one DMU type and the adaptation of more generalised determinants to create 




This chapter has explored what are considered to be important issues concerning 
EoC behaviour. The following chapter explores further why these issues exist. 
Importantly, it suggests some overriding causes and, moreover, presents a temporal 
process through which the issues under discussion may have originated. Based upon the 
issues above and their hypothesised causes, an informed judgement is then made 
regarding the current state of EoC behaviour research. Finally, the chapter prescribes the 
actions which may improve the state of EoC behaviour research. 
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7.0 Exploring Further the Causes and Effects of the Issues Discussed; Illustrating the 
State of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research and Prescribing Measures to 
Improve it 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that many issues exist which have relevance to 
contemporary EoC behaviour research. The issues were explored as to their nature, 
frequency and, in some cases, most obvious causes and effects. This chapter expands 
upon this analysis. The first aim of this chapter is to explore further the causes and effects 
of the issues discussed previously. It is suggested that the causes and effects of the issues 
are very difficult to separate; as one issue is often the effect of another and interactions 
are frequently thought to be extremely complex and in some cases potentially self-
perpetuating. Those issues which cause other issues are labelled as intermediate issues, 
and those which do not are labelled as immediate issues. It is then argued that the overall 
genesis of the immediate and intermediate issues is the result of less obvious, more 
insidious and more powerful causative factors, called overriding issues. It is argued that 
these issues too may interact both with each other and with the immediate and 
intermediate concerns. Complementing this argument, it is contended that a powerful 
temporal dynamic once existed that dictated by what process and in what order the issues 
under discussion originated. 
Following this study, the second aim of this chapter is applied: to settle on the 
current state of EoC behaviour research. The judgement is a summative reflection of the 
issues’ natures, supposed rates of occurrence, causes and effects. Ultimately, the 
judgement is based upon the proven or falsified hypothesis that the current state of EoC 
behaviour research is extremely poor. Once the state of EoC behaviour research has been 
announced, the final aim of this chapter, to prescribe measures that would improve the 
state of EoC behaviour research, is performed. 
 
7.1 Suggesting Further Causes and Effects of the Issues 
 
Chapter six argued that some of the issues discussed may actually be responsible for 
other issues, and in complex ways (recall particularly poor intra- and intertheory 
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communication, claims of synonymy and semantic errors). Additionally, here, the usage 
of some determinants as standalone theories also could be the fault of poor intertheory 
communication. Several of the listed DMU/group issues could be blamed on background 
reading issues too, since DMU types, it is suggested, fall under ‘applications’ in the MID 
situation. Thus, issues like the relatively small body of literature that explicitly recognises 
the group DMU and the Groupthink-centric focus of group specific research could be 
explained through the process of poor communication; perhaps through lack of 
recognition of new, relevant research. Similarly, semantic errors could be held 
responsible for some instances of ambiguity regarding which DMUs are being referred to 
in a piece of work. 
Overall, then, it is suggested above that many of the issues have some likely and 
straightforward origins, if the reader applies these issues to the research situation 
described in chapter six. However, to discuss here each possible cause, and form and 
degree of interaction would be counterproductive. Instead, two more important issues 
need to be discussed. The first is to explore the reasons for which the proposed 
intermediate issues that have not been given a cause exist in the first place. The second is 
to hypothesise what causes exist to explain the immediate issues that have had no 
proposed origin up to now. It is suggested that overriding issues exist that answer best the 
remaining questions. These issues are labelled overriding because it is thought that they 
were the first steps in the ‘interactive situation’ that many of the EoC behaviour research 
issues are argued to be in; they are the cause of the issues that have been given no 
proposed origin and they help maintain the current situation. As implied here, there is 
considered to be a temporal aspect to this situation that suggests in what order all issue 
types came about. 
 
7.2 Exploring the Overriding Issues 
 
It is contended that the main overriding issue concerning EoC behaviour research 
issues is the nature of EoC behaviour itself: namely its scope. Two elements of scope are 
implied here. First, EoC behaviour can be applied hypothetically to many, vastly 
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different, situations1
However, it is suggested that each of the theories possessed a number of similar 
initial errors; mainly conceptual ones. There was also a general vagueness regarding the 
circumstances where EoC behaviour was considered applicable and where it was not. 
Following this, it is contended that several important events occurred. First, other authors 
beyond the founding authors began researching the existing EoC behaviour theories in 
their respective disciplines. The theories were still researched in isolation however with 
respect to other theories and disciplines. Then, the vast scope of the theories created two 
effects. First, as the theories were highly complex, minor semantic errors – meaning here 
slight variations in existing definitions, properties or explanatory theories but not new 
discoveries or valid comments – between authors studying the same theory had greater 
significance here than with most other theories. This is because adding to, changing or 
modifying said facets of an EoC behaviour theory, no matter how slight, gave new 
meanings that in turn could be misinterpreted by other authors, who may indeed add 
 and disciplines. The second aspect of scope is that a multitude of 
complex determinants can be argued to cause EoC behaviour within these varying 
situations. 
Scope then, at its most basic, can be argued to contribute somewhat to the large 
number of rubrics related to EoC behaviour. At this point, it is felt that the other effects 
of scope should be explored in a progressive temporal context. The temporal element is a 
fuzzy logic suggestion of what may have occurred at the genesis of EoC behaviour 
research to cause the current situation. It is contended that, initially, a small number of 
similar but unique, highly complex EoC behaviour theories existed in isolation to one 
another; such isolation engendered by the research ‘distance’ between disciplines. The 
unique aspects thus were predominantly dependent upon the theories’ respective 
disciplines. The theories in question originated at approximately the same time (the late 
1970s through early/mid 1980s). 
                                               
1 Literature that illustrates this variance in subject matter includes D. Kimberg, ‘Thinking Outside the Box’, 
Card Player Magazine Online, Vol. 17, No. 25, 2004, p. 1, J. A. Aloysius, ‘Rational Escalation of Costs 
by Playing a Sequence of Unfavorable Gambles: The Martingale’, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2003, pp. 111-129, H. Cheng-Suang et al., ‘De-Escalation of Commitment 
in Software Projects: Who Matters? What matters?’, Information & Management, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2003, 
pp. 99-110 and R. L. Leahy, Overcoming Resistance in Cognitive Therapy, (New York, USA: Guilford 
Publications, 2003), p. 17. 
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semantic errors to these, akin to a game of ‘Chinese Whispers’.2
The second effect of scope was that a vast quantity of research was produced in a 
very short space of time. Indeed, the current scope and quantity of EoC behaviour 
literature should not be understated. The quantity of research produced was so vast 
because so many aspects of EoC behaviour could be researched and also because EoC 
behaviour as a whole was ill defined and not adequately ringfenced. Furthermore, such 
was the nature of EoC behaviour research that unrelated research carried out decades 
before now had some relevance to the phenomenon. This “long stream”
 Thus it is contended that 
multiple EoC behaviour rubrics and some aspects of the MIDs situation, as well as new 
versions of the already vague concepts, were promoted in this way. 
3 of research 
further increased the quantity of research under evaluation.4
                                               
2 The insidiousness of semantic ambiguity cannot be overemphasised, and is found in almost every opinion 
and statement of EoC behaviour. Consider for example, N. Karlsson et al., ‘Impact of Decision Goal on 
Escalation’, Acta Psychologica, Vol. 111, No. 3, 2002, p. 309. Karlsson et al. state that escalation is “the 
irrational tendency to choose to continue to invest money, time or effort following unsuccessful 
investments.” This sentence could imply to some that only money, time or effort, (not combinations of 
all three), are valid inputs for escalation. Furthermore, it could imply that no other resource is allowed, 
such as manpower.  Also, “to choose to continue to,” instead of just “to continue to” could imply that 
only the choice is made and not the continuance action itself. Finally, here, escalation is only an 
“irrational tendency,” not a potentially rational one. Consider also S. Nathanson et al., ‘Toward the 
Reduction of Entrapment’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1982, p. 194. They 
state that “in the process of justifying already committed resources, the individual can be drawn into an 
extremely costly or even irrational course of action.” Surely based upon the belief of the irrationality of 
recognising sunk costs the decision to justify them will always be irrational? Furthermore, A. Proctor, 
‘Strategic Windows and Entrapment’, Management Decision, Vol. 31, No. 5, 1993, p. 55 also brings to 
the fore the complexities of semantics in EoC behaviour in his definition of Entrapment. He states that “a 
responsible individual increases a commitment to an ineffective course of action to justify the previous 
allocation of resources.” In the milieu of semantics then, is it just ‘responsible’ individuals who escalate, 
or those who take over the job? Moreover, is it only the individual and not a group of individuals? Must 
the action be totally ineffective or can it be scaled? And is it ‘to justify’ or ‘to largely justify’ (the latter 
opening the floodgates to other determinants)? Finally, consider E. A. Thames, ‘The Sunk-Cost Effect: 
The Importance of Context’, Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1996, pp. 817-
827, paying attention to the so-called attainability of entrapping situations. 
3 I. Simonson and B. M. Staw, ‘De-Escalation Strategies: A Comparison of Techniques for Reducing 
Commitment to Losing Courses of Action’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1992, p. 419 
4 For example, beyond Festinger’s work in the 1950s, other authors also investigated escalation tendencies 
such as N. T. Feather, ‘The Study of Persistence’, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 59, No. 1, 1962, p. 94 
who talks of “temporal persistence.” C. A. Kiesler et al., ‘The Effect of Commitment to Future 
Interaction on Reactions to Norm Violations’, Journal of Personality, Vol. 35, No. 4, 1967, pp. 585-599 
discuss the notion of commitment. C. A. Kiesler, The Psychology of Commitment, (New York, USA: 
Academic Press, 1971) also discusses the notions of strength of attack and implications of change. 
 The quantity of produced 
literature, it is argued, compounded the semantic errors because it increased the 
frequency of variations of the theories; it also perpetuated and disseminated existing 
errors and differences. Thus the generation of multiple labels and elements of the MIDs 
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situation were expedited. This in turn increased the complexity of the situation, but in a 
different, more ‘pathological’ way. 
Most importantly, it is suggested that sheer quantity of literature restricted 
researchers from performing adequate background reading, meaning there was, in effect, 
poor intra-theory communication. It is contended here that this situation caused further 
the MIDs situation, duplication of research, erroneous claims and a general poor research 
direction.5
The above description however is not to say that genuine, unmitigated, poor 
research technique has no part to play in the current situation; EoC behaviour researchers 
are not merely the ‘victims of circumstance’. It is contended that poor research technique 
has a large part to play. For example, the use of an EoC behaviour determinant as a 
standalone theory that proceeds to transfer definitions from other EoC behaviour theories 
that paradoxically treat it as a determinant, is poor technique. Poor technique can also be 
argued to be responsible for the creation of multiple rubrics by missing letters off theories 
as well as authors not using common sense to include research under existing rubrics in a 
 Add to this situation a further event: some researchers began to make links 
between theories, both within and between disciplines. Claims of synonymy occurred, 
owing to poor intertheory communication; encouraging the irregular, unrecognised, 
transference of facets of one theory to another. It should be borne in mind however that 
each EoC behaviour theory in question is argued to have been in the same state and mode 
of behaviour as described above, thus any transferred elements were ‘fed into’ the 
prevailing situation. Theories were also translated, and fell into the situation of poor 
intra- and inter theory communication and also poor interdisciplinary communication 
and, thus, the problems these are argued to create. The above fuzzy logic description gives 
some hypothetical indications as to why the proposed situation exists. However, it is 
considered that the overriding factors of scope, quantity and complexity are key to 
understanding the underlying fragility of EoC behaviour research. 
                                               
5 Janis also discusses the problematic effects quantity of literature in I. L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological 
Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (2nd Ed.), (Boston, Massachusetts, USA: Houghton Mifflin, 
1982), p. ix. He states that “I was repeatedly reminded of George Bernard Shaw’s remark that when an 
historian had to rely on one document he was safe, but if there were two to be consulted he was in 
difficulty, and if three were available his position was hopeless.” Indeed the situation becomes hopeless 
from a historical vista because of the effects of quantity on reliability and bias, whereas hopelessness 
emerges apropos EoC behaviour research, it is posited, principally through the effects of quantity on 
definitional stability. 
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discipline. The changing claims of synonymy/partial synonymy between texts of the 
same author, changing the theory label mid-text, using internally conflicting definitions, 
poor verb usage, misrepresentation of other authors’ opinions and the lack of 
entrenchment of key conceptual terms and conditions in the beginning of the EoC 
behaviour research lifespan also suggest poor research technique. Poor technique could 
also be attributed to the treatment of condition/concept differences in a created definition 
– leading to the adoption of determinants into a definition that does not share the same 
‘conditions scenario’ – and to the treatment of conflicting accounts of some determinants’ 
natures. Some DMU/group issues like DMU ambiguity, the assumption of some group 
DMU recognising authors that their recognised determinants apply equally to groups as 
to individuals, the trend of group researchers to focus on group specific determinants (it is 
arguably more logical to research group DMU applications of existing individual DMU 
determinants first) and the dominance of Groupthink as a group specific determinant can 
all be argued to be the fault of poor research technique also. It is argued further that the 
poor intra-theory and intertheory communication was not always the fault of the high 
quantity of research preventing adequate research. It is considered that in some cases 
research was just not performed in an in depth and consistent manner, particularly when 
authors make and apply claims of synonymy, atemporally. The rarity of the conscious 
recognition and sharing of determinants and applications of different EoC behaviour 
theories is also problematic. Duplication of research may also have some more direct 
‘poor technique’ related causes. Overall, it is argued that poor research technique like this 
still takes place but, such is the state of EoC behaviour research, it is not clear how 
significant the effect of said poor research technique is now, nor if it is possible to 
distinguish between hindered research technique and poor research technique. One 
argument is thought to be clear however: that another species of poor research practice is 
responsible for allowing this entire situation to emerge; and to perpetuate. 
 
7.3 Perpetuating the Situation 
 
Such is the prevalence of the research issues discussed throughout this chapter that 
it is felt to be obvious, even through the most cursory of research, that serious problems 
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exist with EoC behaviour research and have done for a significant period of time. Yet 
little recognition of the issues occurs in the general body of EoC behaviour literature. It is 
argued here that the current severe situation, in terms of the amount of issues and their 
prevalence, has emerged because issues have not been recognised and have been allowed 
to perpetuate; to the point where EoC behaviour research overall is considered to be 
unworkable. 
It is suggested here that several issues discussed, especially the prevailing 
negative/neutral slant on EoC behaviour, the large number of new potential determinants 
and applications of determinants of EoC behaviour, the relatively small amount of 
literature that explicitly mentions the group DMU and the dominance of Groupthink in 
group specific EoC behaviour research could signify a kind of ‘stagnation’ of research; 
where authors cannot move on with the research because it has become so unworkable. 
Yet no real efforts have been made to fix this situation. At the same time, theories like 
group dynamics and Groupthink have moved on, thanks to the works of ’t Hart and Fuller 
and Aldag.6 The former theory has moved beyond the stranglehold of Groupthink and 
authors in the latter theory have recognised that Groupthink theory has errors. It is felt 
that the varying degrees of recognition of the issues discussed above by EoC behaviour 
authors should now be examined in order to highlight the level of ignorance that is 
argued to exist but also, ironically, to provide some validity to this entire thesis: that 
problems do exist with EoC behaviour research. Biyalagorsky et al. represent a 
microcosm of the level of recognition of the issues by most EoC behaviour authors when 
they state, somewhat glibly, that some accounts of EoC behaviour are “complementary 
[and] some [are] competing.”7 Even ’t Hart, who can be considered a non-EoC behaviour 
author, shows an apparent greater understanding than most EoC behaviour authors when 
he states “[Escalation of Commitment behaviour] has been identified in many variants 
and…has been given many names.”8
                                               
6 S. R. Fuller and R. J. Aldag, ‘Challenging the Mindguards: Moving Small Group Analysis Beyond 
Groupthink’, in P. ’t Hart et al. (Eds.), Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign 
Policy-Making, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 55-94 
7 E. Biyalagorsky et al., ‘Stuck in the Past: Why Organizations Exhibit Escalation Bias’, Working Paper, 
(Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA: 2001), p. 2 
8 P. ’t Hart, Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure, (Baltimore, 
Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 87 
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It is Staw and Ross though who discuss most the issues from an overall EoC 
behaviour standpoint. However, despite some interesting input regarding these issues, 
most issues discussed in this thesis are not covered. During a paper in 1986, Ross and 
Staw make an interesting statement regarding EoC behaviour research following Staw’s 
original texts on EoC behaviour in the 1970s: 
 
Later research…[by other authors has] added a large number of 
potential determinants of commitment, moderating variables and 
some conflicting findings. As the volume of empirical studies 
has grown, the literature on escalation has become increasingly 
difficult to summarize and integrate. Escalation research has not 
only become increasingly complex but it has increasingly 
become more and more detached from its object of study: how 
commitment builds up over time9
They continue, stating that there has been little effort made to distinguish between 
the ‘potency’ of the proposed determinants; that only the strong determinants should be 
analysed, lest the research will be pulled off track and eventually be made 
indistinguishable from other research.
 
 
10 Furthermore, Ross and Staw argue that the type 
of research regarding EoC behaviour overall is methodologically one-sided. They argue 
that for a phenomenon that emerged out of ‘real world’ situations, too much EoC 
behaviour research is determined in the laboratory. They state that many determinants of 
EoC behaviour cannot be found in the laboratory since real world examples provide the 
‘milieu’ where EoC behaviour can thrive.11
                                               
9 J. Ross and B. M. Staw, ‘Expo 86: An Escalation Prototype’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, 
No. 2, 1986, p. 275 
10 Ibid., p. 279 
 The basis of this argument could be 
11 Ibid., p. 278. Ross and Staw state that “many of the problems facing escalation research stem from the 
fact that most of the empirical studies of this phenomenon have been laboratory based…. Laboratory 
studies were probably appropriate for the early development of theory in the escalation area. As opposed 
to more traditional behavioral research areas where theories are first formulated and then applied to field 
events, escalation research stemmed from an issue that was faced by individuals and organizations for 
which little theoretical explanation existed. Laboratory studies therefore sought to find causes for 
escalation behavior by manipulating variables associated with the development of commitment in 
decision situations…. Some obvious problems with the laboratory approach stem from the possibility 
that variables chosen for manipulation as well as the contextual elements held constant in these studies 
may not parallel real world situations. For example, most escalation experiments have tested individual 
level variables in attempting to explain persistence in or by organizations. Thus processes such as 
institutionalization have been virtually ignored in the literature, even though they may underlie many 
organizational examples of escalation. In addition, most laboratory studies have manipulated variables in 
 189 
interpreted as a kind of ‘anti-syncretic’ conflict between inductive and deductive 
approaches to research. Their final statement summates their above criticisms: 
 
It should be apparent that escalation research is now at 
something of a crossroads, suffering from several problems often 
associated with maturing streams of work12
Ross and Staw appear to actively discourage research; and in two ways. First, they 
argue that only the anticipated strongest determinants of EoC behaviour should be 
investigated. This is considered to be incorrect in two ways. The first reason is a 
rhetorical question: “how does an author know if one variable is stronger that another if it 
is not tested?” Second, Ross and Staw simply do not justify why only strong variables 
should be chosen for research, at the expense of weaker ones. They state only that such 
research makes the behaviour hard to summarise and will “pull us off track.”
 
 
While the above critique may seem a very astute recognition of the issues discussed 
in this chapter, numerous caveats exist. Overall, Ross and Staw do not state explicitly the 
issues that are contended – in this thesis – to exist. Despite this being a comparatively 
‘early’ paper (1986) the issues discussed here were able to be potentially discerned at this 
time. The complexity Ross and Staw recognise is argued to be just an undeveloped 
recognition that there are many determinants of EoC behaviour. Ross and Staw’s 
‘solutions’ to this recognition are interesting, but also arguably counterproductive, and 
further demonstrate their ignorance regarding the real issues of the current situation. 
13
                                                                                                                                            
single instances or over short periods of time, whereas actual escalation situations can evolve gradually 
or involve more time dependent processes. Determinants of commitment could vary in strength as a 
situation ages, with some sources of escalation affecting others over time. We might, for example, find 
that psychological and social bases of commitment evolve into more structural determinants of escalation 
as a situation unfolds. Yet, these temporal and cross level processes are exactly the type of forces that are 
not likely to be uncovered using the laboratory methods now practiced in escalation research.” 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., p. 279 
 Yet the 
difficulty in summarising the behaviour is not owing to the number of weak variables, 
since they have as much right to be included as strong ones. The difficulty in 
summarising the behaviour is because the behaviour is a complex and problematic one 
and no substantial framework is in existence to cope. No researcher should actively 
discourage research of any type, since even if hypotheses chosen for EoC behaviour 
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research turn out to be null, they at least serve to discount a future line of wasteful 
research. One could argue that this discouragement contributes to the duplication of 
research of primary determinants, and also to the large amount of remaining determinants 
still to be researched. 
The second way Ross and Staw discourage research is to argue that laboratory 
research should be researched less and real world situations more. Regarding laboratory 
research, Ross and Staw do make a valid point: some EoC behaviour variables can only 
really be investigated in the field and this is not being done to the same level as lab work. 
Yet they do not state with similar fervor that laboratory work has its own unique benefits. 
Such work is useful in terms of fairness and isolation of variables. Ross and Staw appear 
to argue the converse; that isolation of variables is not really useful in EoC behaviour 
research. Some EoC behaviour determinants can only really be researched with 
confidence in a laboratory. Furthermore, Ross and Staw do not mention the expense and 
difficulty that can be involved in observing real life situations in situ and not in a lab; nor 
do they state the human bias that can be observed if record based/historical case studies 
are used to reduce said expense of ‘live experiments’. Alas, Ross and Staw’s solution to 
this issue is to perform a case study of Expo ’86. Again, this discouragement could have 
the same effects as those described above. 
The most interesting ‘solution’ however, is that Ross and Staw summarise the large 
body of EoC behaviour research and create the forerunner to Staw’s main 1997 EoC 
behaviour framework. Importantly, the framework is an amalgamation of work from 
different theories and disciplines. The framework is, then, an attempt also to solve the 
problems – as Ross and Staw see them here – of the behaviour as a whole; through a form 
of integration. This is to be applauded as a motive. Yet numerous limitations apply. First, 
because Ross and Staw do not recognise the ‘real’ issues, the authors’ works they 
integrate are not qualified by Ross and Staw. That is to say, first, the flaws the framework 
may have inherited are not stated. Furthermore, by integrating findings from research 
without stating the ‘conditions differences’ present – in relation to Ross and Staw’s 
theory, and to the other research – the framework in effect treats all the research from 
which the determinants emerge as the same and arguably invalidates itself. It is noted in 
previous chapters of this thesis that Staw’s understanding of EoC behaviour becomes less 
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specific over time, regarding the conditions ‘necessary’ for EoC behaviour to be 
recognised. Perhaps this is an attempt to be more integrative and is also a form of 
recognition that definitions of, and conditions ‘required’ for, EoC behaviour vary; though 
this approach is thought not to solve the issue discussed. Another issue however is that 
because Ross and Staw do not recognise the problems discussed in this thesis, they do not 
specify them to their readers. This means that readers are not made aware of the dangers 
of EoC behaviour research and the potential utility of using just one integrated 
framework; thus the framework has become just another definition to be modified and 
affected by the issues described. Additionally, because Ross and Staw do not recognise 
the effects of quantity and also the poor communication between and within disciplines 
and theories, the framework, while of significance, has ultimately ‘gotten lost’ in the 
quagmire of already existing research. It can also be argued that the framework does not 
include all the facets of EoC behaviour situations and variables present at the time 
anyway, such as the then embryonic group research, idiographic research such as sex and 
age determinants, the detailed duopolistic competition research performed by Brockner 
and Teger and also the plethora of minor discoveries that were emerging, including the 
multiple versions of some determinants and the conflicting opinions regarding some 
determinants’ effects. 
The reasons this omission of research, from an apparently coverall framework, 
occurs may be because important research was difficult to come by (through quantity) or 
that research technique was just ‘poor’, but it may also be because Ross and Staw argue 
in the same text that research variables should be limited to the most ‘obvious’ situations. 
Thus variables and situations deemed unimportant by Ross and Staw were perhaps 
ignored. This is considered here to be counterproductive; a framework should not be 
incomplete in order to compensate for complexity, it should be inclusive and, if 
necessary, better designed. Not including all research in a comprehensive integrated 
framework of any theory could certainly cause duplication of research since authors 
would look at the framework (and its subsequent claim to encapsulate existing research) 
and see a ‘gap’ that doesn’t really exist. Specifically, by not including the totality of EoC 
behaviour research Ross and Staw made it difficult for the framework to serve as the 
‘hub’ where future EoC behaviour research could be added. Where would an author 
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interested in idiographic or group dynamics EoC behaviour research at this time, for 
example, put his findings? He could add a ‘Group’ or ‘Idiographic’ heading to the 
framework, which may also become lost owing to the issues discussed, but he could just 
as easily ignore the framework as too much effort or, recognising the absence of past 
idiographic or group research, treat the framework, undeservedly, as totally useless and, 
again, ignore it. The final point regarding the framework is that it has not been 
significantly updated since its inception in 1986. Staw updates the framework alone in 
1997, but not only does he still not recognise the problems discussed in this chapter, he 
still does not include all research observations and findings available, including 
idiographic research and the, now larger, amount of group EoC behaviour research. 
A point worth remaking here, and which has relevance to the paragraphs above, is 
that Staw is not explicit in his employment of DMU types.14
One must be very cautious in claiming that any particular set of 
effects has been fully supported within the commitment research 
area…because of a lack of clear cut research
 He talks of ‘individuals’ and 
perhaps the group and the organisation, but important to this immediate discussion is 
that at no point does Staw talk explicitly of EoC behaviour in ‘the group’. Intuitively, the 
organisation as a DMU is considered, by this thesis’ author, to be a dubious assumption. 
Another important criticism is that Staw sometimes contradicts statements he makes at an 
earlier time. During his research with Ross for example, he states vaguely that: 
 
15




                                               
14 For more information on Decision Making Units, see R. K. Beasley et al., ‘People and Processes in 
Foreign Policy Making: Insights from Comparative Case Studies’, International Studies Review, Vol. 3, 
No. 2, 2001, pp. 217-250, M. G. Hermann, ‘How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical 
Framework’, International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No 2, 2001, pp. 47-81 and U. Nulden, ‘Failing 
Projects: Harder to Abandon than to Continue’, Working Paper, (Goteborg University, Department of 
Informatics, Sweden: 1996), pp. 1-9. 
15 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Commitment to a Policy Decision: A Multi-Theoretical Perspective’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1978, p. 40 
16 F. V. Fox and B. M. Staw, ‘The Trapped Administrator: Effects of Job Insecurity and Policy Resistance 
upon Commitment to a Course of Action’, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1979, p. 
470 
 EoC behaviour 
research onto unrelated research is acceptable. This is despite his argument with Ross, in 
1986, that EoC behaviour research should be focussed and specific. He repeats the same 
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contradictory argument, again with Ross, in 1987.17 Although the argument itself is 
dubious, a logical explanation for this apparent contradictory approach could be that the 
calls for extra research are made in the late seventies, at the start of EoC behaviour 
research, and the observations that there is too much EoC behaviour research are made a 
decade later; after the research body has grown dramatically. Thus both statements are 
valid (chronologically, not necessarily academically) when looked at in this light. 
However, Staw does not mention anywhere in his later texts that he may be responsible 
for the situation which he now condemns! In a later text, Staw comes close to recognising 
that multiple concurrent definitions of the same theory exist.18
A final source of criticism of EoC behaviour comes from personal communication 
between myself and EoC behaviour authors. In communication with Staw,
 Yet there is no mention of 
multiple concurrent definitions explicitly nor any of the other issues that have been 
recognised in this thesis. 
19 he states 
only that “you’re [myself] right in questioning some of the definitions….”20 He adds, 
“Brockner’s usage of ‘Entrapment’ is also a bit narrower than my [Staw’s] usage of 
‘Escalation’.”21 This is despite him implying in an earlier text that his EoC theory and 
Brockner’s Entrapment theory are synonymous. Regarding the uncertain relationship 
between EoC behaviour and Conflict Escalation and what it means to escalate, Staw 
argues that “the escalation of conflict literature is a bit different…although Tegar’s [sic] 
work is a sort of bridge between decisional and conflict escalation.”22
                                               
17 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents, Prototypes and Solutions’, 
Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 9, 1987, pp. 41-42 
18 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update and Appraisal’, in Z. Shapira (Ed.), 
Organizational Decision Making, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 192, 196, 
211 




 Although this is the 
summation of personal communication with Staw, he did kindly provide a working 
chapter from an unpublished work on the history and historiography of his EoC theory 
and EoC behaviour. Regarding the translation of theories from one discipline to another, 
Staw does not seem to recognise that this occurs. Nor does he appear to recognise the 
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effects of poor communication.23 The chapter also reinforces Staw’s dislike of the 
‘overproduction’ of variables.24 The unpublished chapter also appears to recognise that 
old definitions of Staw’s EoC theory are being simultaneously used with newer ones. It 
does not recognise however that other theories also suffer the same fate and that the cause 
of this phenomenon is principally poor intra-theory communication compounded by 
quantity of literature.25 In addition to Staw, Brockner was also contacted.26
I would view conflict escalation as descriptive, (that conflicts are 
getting more intense), whereas Entrapment is designed to be 
more explanatory of why or how that is happening
 His main 
input regards ‘continuance’ and ‘escalation’ in EoC behaviour and the meaning of 
‘conflict escalation’. Brockner states: 
 
27
If I spend $20m of additional funds in persisting with a previous 
course of action, versus $10m, I am escalating in both cases just 
more intensely in the case of $20m than $10m
 
 




I also agree that escalation refers to the continuance of the 
previous course of action
 
 
To finish, Brockner adds: 
 
29
Numerous points are considered to be unclear with this email correspondence. 
Broadly, these points reflect the discussion of Brockner’s written research, in chapter four 
and Staw’s research in chapter three. Thus, to avoid both repetition and pre-emption of 
the discussion in the following chapter, these uncertainties are not examined here. 
 
 
                                               
23 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: Steps Toward an Organizational Theory’, Working Paper, 
(California University, Haas School of Business, Berkeley, California, USA: 2004), pp. 6-7 
24 Ibid., p. 8 
25 Ibid., p. 11 





7.4 The Current State of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
Even a most cursory and skeptical examination of this thesis up to this point leads 
one, it is argued, to the conclusion that the current state of EoC behaviour research is 
extremely poor. In short there is: 
 
(1) Little direction or consistency concerning EoC behaviour research. 
(2) No real division between EoC behaviour theories owing to multiple definitions 
of each theory, claims of synonymy and the transferring of definitions and 
properties between them. 
(3) Poor communication within and between EoC behaviour theories, leading to 
multiple, simultaneous understandings of the same theory. 
(4) Numerous interactive feedback cycles concerning the issues discussed; which 
are predominantly caused by scope, quantity and complexity, but compounded by 
poor research technique and ignorance of the issues; as well as by misguided 
attempts to solve issues, where recognition has occurred. 
(5) Many conceptual issues and uncertainties underlying EoC behaviour research. 
(6) No effective central hub in which researchers of EoC behaviour from all 
disciplines can gain accurate background knowledge of EoC behaviour research, 
be made aware of the numerous potential pitfalls posed by the current state of 
EoC behaviour research and place their research in a uniform manner once it is 
completed. Thus, EoC behaviour research in all disciplines is missing out upon 
information that would be potentially useful to its advancement. 
 
7.5 Prescribing for Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
It is contended that the mere comprehension of this thesis will assist EoC behaviour 
researchers regarding the propositions above in that it may not only confirm any pre-
existing doubts over the research, but may also provide awareness of the faults in the first 
instance, or both. It may also, therefore, guide researchers as to preventing perpetuation 
of the current situation, by making them aware of the dangers of current research 
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patterns; the importance of semantic errors and the utility of not making unqualified 
claims of synonymy, for example. It may also encourage researchers to study further the 
issues raised in this chapter and in chapter six, to discover other origins for them and to 
discover new issues altogether. Indeed, if researchers can perpetuate this thesis’ 
recognition of the flaws of EoC behaviour research in their work, through warnings or 
through actual research on the issues – and, ideally, referencing the thesis and 
recognising the valuable effect of such recognition and perpetuation – instead of 
perpetuating the flaws themselves, they may reduce further its poor state. Such 
perpetuation is deemed essential here since this thesis is unlikely to completely reach the 
target audience directly. 
However, even this effect is deemed not enough. Such is the nature of the situation, 
it is argued that along with a recognition of the problems, researchers do in fact need a 
mutual, concrete and “theoretically neutral, systematic,”30 framework with which to work 
and ultimately perpetuate. What is required then is a three pronged solution of 
prescription, integration and direction because, as Anderson argues, “we must approach 
every problem with a general rule or principle in mind”31 and as ’t Hart argues “good 
theory specifies the conditions under which it applies…. [It must] have clearly defined 
boundaries and domains of validity. If these are lacking, risks of overgeneralization and 
misapplication loom large….”32
A good starting point then would be to prescribe for the many core conceptual and 
definitional difficulties that face EoC behaviour. A “convergent approximation”
 
33 of 
concepts is required, from a discussion of all existing interpretations. In other words, a 
summative and syncretic solution to these concepts will emerge that is broadly acceptable 
to all versions of pre-existing EoC behaviour understanding.34
                                               
30 K. R. Hammond et al., Human Judgment and Decision Making: Theories, Methods, and Procedures, 
(New York, USA: Praeger, 1980), p. 7 
31 C. W. Anderson, ‘Political Judgment and Policy Analysis’, Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 11, 
No. 4, 1988, p. 451 
32 ’t Hart, Groupthink in Government…, p. 129 
33 N. Rescher, Realistic Pragmatism: An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy, (Albany, New York, USA: 
State University of New York Press, 2000), p. 122 
34 Where such pre-existing understanding exists, as some concepts have never been explored and thus the 
opinions of the author of this thesis are used. 
 The discussion of these 
multiple understandings under each concept heading prepares the reader for what he may 
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encounter in further reading and suggests that there is an opportunity for further research; 
assisting future research direction. 
In harmony with this “conceptual mating,”35
It is recognised that a collective of determinants formed from research that 
appreciates differing definitional and conceptual interpretations of EoC behaviour, both 
to each other as well as to the summative framework of this thesis, is problematic. The 
framework could simply be argued to suffer from the same weaknesses as Staw’s 
integrated framework, for example. However, it is contended that the recognition of the 
variations, absences and ambiguities of EoC behaviour concepts and definitions, coupled 
with a summative interpretation of each, provides some legitimacy and sets this 
framework apart from Staw’s. Yet in reality, this summative approach does question the 
authority of every EoC behaviour finding, when looked at through the filter of the 
framework’s concept definitions; since said findings were not generated under these 
conditions. This is likely to stimulate much new research, though, unfortunately, not 
necessarily research focus. Another argument against creating a ‘completist’ framework 
is that it would dilute the research and make it too complex. Ross and Staw believe that 
researching the minutiae of variables of EoC behaviour leads to, in Gellner’s words, 
“boundless, unconstrained and undisciplined”
 it is contended that utility would arise 
from a truly integrated framework which includes all existing EoC behaviour 
determinants, from all EoC behaviour theories in all disciplines. The framework 
appreciates two important facets, not generally appreciated in EoC behaviour research. 
First, it appreciates variations in opinion as to the nature of each determinant; (the SCE 
for example has many interpretations). It also appreciates variations in opinion as to 
determinants’ effects on EoC behaviour. Ultimately, a summative, syncretic working 
description is delivered as to the nature and effects of each determinant. Again, the 
discussion of multiple understandings of determinants not only prepares the reader for 
what he may encounter, but stimulates future research and thus research direction. 
36
                                               
35 M. D. Street and W. P. Anthony, ‘A Conceptual Framework Establishing the Relationship between 
Groupthink and Escalating Commitment Behavior’, Small Group Research, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1997, p. 290 
36 E. Gellner,  Reason and Culture: New Perspectives on the Past, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1992), p. 31 
 research. This thesis argues that 
boundless and unconstrained research should be promoted and sought after. Furthermore, 
it is contended that EoC behaviour research is only undisciplined because first, no author 
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recognises the true issues that contribute to such disorderliness and, second, EoC 
behaviour authors have not effectively created a truly integrated framework because they 
want to limit its complexity like “cognitive misers.”37
A wholly summative, “multiple lens”
 
38 solution is deemed appropriate now since it 
is considered that it is too late to attempt to separate the EoC behaviour theories again, 
back to their core, unique constituents owing to the level of intermixing of the theories 
over time. The summative solution is deemed the best way to not only represent logically 
the behaviour as it stands today, but the best way to proceed for the future. It is uncertain 
that there is actually an alternative choice, short of listing every different version of every 
different EoC behaviour theory and concept. And this would not serve any notable 
purpose for the future, save sounding the death knell of reliable EoC behaviour research 
and ultimately placing the theory itself in what Dumbrell would term “history’s 
dustbin.”39 The new framework, then, serves all disciplines by completely sharing the 
foundation of EoC behaviour and also sharing new discoveries as they occur.40
The framework itself is based heavily upon Staw’s categorised framework, but with 
some noticeable differences. First, the new framework includes variables that existed at 
the time of Staw’s last framework (1997) but were not included in Staw’s work. Second, 
it includes variables that have emerged since Staw’s framework was created, thus 
functioning as an ‘update’. Third, the framework includes so-called new facets. The new 
facets are based upon the ‘ideas’ by this thesis’ author and are bifurcated; yet, 
additionally, tied to a condition. The new facets involve (1) entirely new DMU and non-
DMU specific determinants from the author, inspired by background reading of EoC 
behaviour and non-EoC behaviour literature, (2) existing determinants of non-EoC 
 
                                               
37 I. Simonson and P. Nye, ‘The Effect of Accountability on Susceptibility to Decision Errors’, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 51, No. 3, 1992, p. 417 
38 R. M. Kramer, ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam Decisions 25 Years Later: How Well has the 
Groupthink Hypothesis Stood the Test of Time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, Vol. 73, No. 2/3, 1998, p. 268 
39 J. Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK ‘Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2004, p. 437 
40 Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies…, p. x. As well as acknowledging the problems of quantity, 
discussed earlier, Janis appears to appreciate too the utility of sharing discoveries, when he states that 
“this book is obviously at an intersection of three disciplines: social psychology, political science, and 
history. I hope that the interpretations and theoretical conceptions suggested…will add something to the 
thinking of scholars in each of these disciplines.” 
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behaviour theories that may apply to EoC behaviour and (3) new DMU applications of 
existing EoC and, where applicable, non-EoC behaviour determinants. 
The ‘new facets’ serve an important purpose here in that not only do they provide 
new potential determinants and applications of determinants of EoC behaviour, they also 
provide future direction for EoC behaviour research; something that has been sorely 
lacking in recent history. Direction is deemed important to rescuing EoC behaviour 
research because it provides focus to a behaviour which previously had none. Janis’ 
reasoning during the construction of his Groupthink theory has significant similarities 
with the intended goals of the new facets in the proposed framework. Janis states in his 
first Groupthink books that the “purpose of hypothesis construction…[is the] stage of 
inquiry with which this book is concerned”41 and that the reader “must be willing to 
make some inferential leaps”42 in relation to his theory. This is precisely what it is hoped 
the new facets will achieve: a guided spark for future scholarly study.43
The framework also modifies Staw’s original ‘Project’, ‘Psychological’, ‘Social’, 
‘Organisational’ and ‘Contextual Effects’ headings. This is for several reasons. First, it is 
suggested that modified headings accommodate better both the new facets and the 
existing EoC behaviour factors not placed by Staw through ignorance, deliberate 
omission or because they were discovered after 1997. At a more basic level however, it is 
suggested that some of the headings are simply not necessary. This is because some 
determinants under Staw’s headings can be ‘expanded’ to several situations and, once 
expanded, belong better elsewhere. This leaves a category empty and defunct. The 
‘Contextual Effects’ heading is such an example. The proposed headings are also a 
reflection of the exploration of the DMU issue. The framework represents fully the 
DMUs acknowledged in the proposed conceptual examination. It is anticipated that the 
modified headings will also encourage and facilitate future EoC behaviour research by 
making it easier for new determinants to be included in the framework. The following 
chapter then executes this plan of action; beginning with an exploration and subsequent 
working model of the conceptual issues, followed by a truly integrated framework of all 
of the determinants of EoC behaviour. 
 
                                               
41 Ibid., p. ix 
42 Ibid. 
43 Street and Anthony, ‘A Conceptual Framework…’, p. 269 
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8.0 Implementing Improvements to Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Research 
 
This chapter puts into practice the recommendations of chapter seven. The first 
action of this chapter is to investigate the many vague concepts related to EoC behaviour 
and to create a working, summative definition of each. Some concepts however have not 
ever been discussed and thus are explored solely from the perspective of this thesis’ 
author. Once the concepts of EoC behaviour have been suitably defined, a new, truly 
integrated, EoC behaviour determinant framework is constructed, which includes all 
existing EoC behaviour determinants, from all EoC behaviour theories in all disciplines 
to date. In addition to the explanation of the framework, made in chapter seven, an 
important point that needs to be made here is that the framework takes into account a 
specific construct to emerge from the concept discussion, termed ‘goal conditions’. 
Effectively, this means that discussion points related to several determinants in the 
framework are analysed immediately before the framework is set out, in order to preserve 
overall clarity. This issue too presents a research opportunity of a kind for readers. The 
implications of ‘goal conditions’ are discussed in greater detail during the framework 
introduction, while the nature of the construct itself is explained below. Following the 
integrated framework, the overall findings of this chapter are discussed. 
 
8.1 The Concepts of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour 
 
8.1.1 Escalation of Commitment Behaviour, Escalation and Continuance 
 
The subtitle above implies, correctly, that several of the concepts under discussion 
in this chapter are interrelated. It is felt prudent here to discuss these concepts together 
immediately as well as in isolation, and in greater detail, later on. It is argued that the 
overriding conceptual issue in this section and indeed in this chapter is how EoC 
behaviour proceeds; despite EoC behaviour itself and its constituent parts not yet being 
fully defined here. Indeed, the ‘process’ discussion leads one on, logically, to these 
concepts. 
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It is contended here that EoC behaviour consists of three possible actions: 
maintenance, intensification and deescalation of a behaviour in the face of negative 
feedback. These three possible behaviours are all covered under the terms continuance 
and escalation. The first issue to clarify is that escalation means here continuance and 
not intensification of behaviour. It was noted in chapter three that Staw appears to be 
ambiguous regarding what forms of escalation he is referring to in his work: continuance 
(which constitutes all three behaviours) or, specifically, intensification. It was argued to 
be uncertain if Staw even recognises deescalation in his work. Thus, utilising the word 
intensification – instead of escalation in two simultaneous ways – it is contended, 
removes such ambiguity. 
What remains now is a discussion as to how one continues with an action and how 
each of these particular behaviours is identified, and what distinguishes them from each 
other. Investment is key to performing an action as well as continuing an action, and 
investment levels are important when deciding what form of continuance is occurring. 
Investment, it is argued, is determined by actions or values which, in turn, utilise 
resources; discussed in detail later. Time, as a measurement, is also an important factor 
here. It is contended that investment is gauged by a flat rate measurement: ‘(value) per 
uniform time period’. An example of a value would be ‘dollar investment’, using the 
resource of ‘money’. With the time measurement, the value would be expressed as 
‘$/year’. Given that, in an EoC behaviour situation, one is reinvesting following 
feedback, the investment levels can be listed, over uniform time periods. As long as 
overall, cumulative, investment is increasing, the situation can be argued to be 
continuing. Naturally, another measurement, one which compares investment levels over 
time periods would be useful here too. A measure such as ‘value increase on previous 
year’ would seem prudent. Using the dollar example, if the figure was positive, this 
figure would represent intensification. If neutral (0) it would represent maintenance and if 
negative, but not an absolute cessation of investment, then it would demonstrate 
deescalation. This would appear to be an effective and easy way of establishing what 
form of EoC behaviour is occurring. Yet several intricate concerns exist. 
The data presented above is measured only in the most basic of terms (value per 
year and increase/decrease on previous year). However there exist a large number of 
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ways in which the data could be measured, applied and analysed and these measures 
could argue for conflicting forms of EoC behaviour. A very basic example would be that 
of the measure of ‘percentage increase on previous year’. If the flat amount of the value 
was to increase year on year, the flat increase amount would be positive and so too would 
the percentage increase, signifying intensification. However, if the flat level of increase 
did not keep up proportionally with the flat level of the value then the percentage 
increase, although remaining positive, would decline. One could argue therefore that the 
situation although escalating in real terms was deescalating in terms of the percentage 
increase. The inverse argument could be expected from a flat amount decrease. 
Numerous other measures could be imagined to exist, including ones that ‘meta-analyse’ 
and interpret other analytical measures, ad infinitum. A question emerges therefore as to 
what statistical measurement takes priority when deciding what form of EoC behaviour is 
occurring. 
A further complication is that singular values are not the norm in EoC behaviour 
situations. This observation is twofold. First, it can be argued that virtually every EoC 
behaviour situation involves several discrete values that have starkly different 
characteristics, yet occur simultaneously. Though ‘dollars spent’ could be expected to be 
the predominant value in most EoC behaviour situations, in a war for example other 
values involving troop and aircraft deployment could be applicable. More generally, 
effort spent and even ‘time spent’ (even though it is also the measure used to gauge 
investment) could also be present. Second, it is apparent that almost every given discrete 
value can be subdivided and framed to the point where a massive amount of ‘subvalues’ 
could be argued to exist (for example, total ordnance used [per year], aerial bombs 
dropped [per year], bomb type [per year]). It could even be argued that an infinite amount 
of new values could be created from the interaction of values and subvalues present in a 
situation (such as $/man/year, bombing runs/aircraft stationed/year or incendiary bombs 
dropped/total bombs dropped/year). Crucially, both the larger values and their subvalues, 
would not necessarily follow the same pattern (e.g. not a uniform increase trend across 
the board of values, different rates of increase and some may decrease too). Conversely, 
it can also be argued that the values may influence each other too (if dollar investment 
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decreases, certain reliant actions may also decrease and if some values increase more 
money may be invested). 
The question then, regardless of the statistical measure which is adopted, is to 
decide which value takes priority when deciding continuance type. Alternatively, should 
some kind of amalgamation of values be used, to create a mean continuance type based 
upon all values? If the latter is taken as the optimal choice, numerous, subjective, 
complications are then created. Apart from a larger dilemma of deciding what is and what 
is not a valid value, these complications include, most simply, deciding how to represent 
each value in a compatible way, regardless of the value being measured. The earlier 
‘percentage increase/decrease’ measure would appear to be helpful here. Another 
complication arises from deciding if each value is considered equal, or weighted in terms 
of its relative importance to the situation. If adopted, how is this weighting decided and 
implemented? Moreover, since each given value and subvalue impacts on the overriding 
trend of continuance type, all values would need to be represented fairly, to an equal level 
of detail. Just what specificity level is optimal? 
To make things even more complex, a still further variable is considered to exist 
when deciding continuance type. Not only can the rates and quantities of existing values 
change, but the nature of the overall action can too. Aside from rates of existing values, 
the DMU can escalate commitment by introducing entirely new values or subvalues (e.g. 
the introduction of bombing raids into a troop war). The DMU could also eliminate some 
pre-existing values, by reducing investment by 100%. An interesting aside here is that as 
long as a value is not reduced by 100% from the previous time period, then it is 
continuing owing to a kind of dichotomy paradox.1
                                               
1 S. Blackburn, ‘Zeno’s Paradoxes’, in S. Blackburn (Ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, (Oxford, UK: 
OUP, 1996), pp. 404-405. The dichotomy paradox, one of a number of Zeno paradoxes, states that for a 
distance to be travelled, the midpoint must always be reached first. Thus, it is argued that the distance 
will never be travelled fully since the midpoint between two points will always exist, becoming 
incrementally smaller. Thus, in an escalation context, if investment is decreased as a percentage less than 
100, investment will always exist. 
 This ‘nature’ inclusion however 
raises many new issues. How, for example, can new values be integrated into the 
hypothesised amalgamated rate equation above, if no previous measurement information 
exists? Again, there is also a ‘subjectivity’ dilemma regarding what constitutes a worthy 
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new value or subvalue. This issue represents a kind of heap paradox,2
But can some values, even if they are quantitatively increasing or newly introduced, 
even be considered as intensifying a situation? ‘Negotiation’ during battle could be 
considered an additional method aimed at a goal but does it really ‘intensify’ the 
situation? Kissinger negotiated with the NVA
 where the heap 
would represent the ‘new value’ threshold. And still further issues remain. How would 
the weighting of certain values affect matters, for example? Moreover, an overriding 
question remains as to how some values can even be measured at all. Invading a third 
party country during a war is intensification, but how could this action be effectively 
measured? Furthermore, since this value in particular would not be likely to happen in 
the following time period how would this affect any calculation of escalation?  It is 
considered that some values should perhaps remain as a 0% value rather than a -100% 
decrease, even if they do not reoccur, since they have a ‘lasting effect’ (they/their effects 
are still occurring). It can be argued that showing a -100% decrease for some given 
values, although perhaps technically correct in a mathematical equation, would distort the 
situation. 
3
Another unanswered issue could be framed as ‘is continuance type gauged from the 
‘settings’ at the beginning of the task/project or just the previous time period?’. It is 
argued here that it is more useful for the decision to be gauged from the previous time 
 while simultaneously bombing North 
Vietnam, but do historians consider these tactics to be ‘travelling in the same direction?’ 
Thus, do contradictory values exist, where some values have an ameliorative impact – 
reducing the intensification level in an amalgamated hypothetical calculation – when 
these are increased or introduced? It is contended here that in an EoC behaviour situation, 
every value is positive, even ones that are intuitively considered as deintensifying a 
situation. The thinking behind this is that all values are aimed at the goal of the project 
and are thus intensifying the effort to achieve this goal, regardless of the ameliorative 
impact. However, this description is perhaps somewhat simplistic and overlooks several 
complexities; especially some related to traditional escalation. 
                                               
2 The sorites or, more commonly, ‘heap’ paradox commonly means the difficulty and subjectivity that is 
present when deciding if one value has become another through graduation. Here it means deciding when 
one action is worthy of separation from another. The phalakros (bald man) variant of the paradox is also 
considered relevant to this thesis. 
3 J. H. Willbanks, The Battle of An Loc, (Indiana, USA: Indiana University Press, 2005), pp. 166-172 
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frame, but it may be beneficial for some values to be judged from the beginning of the 
action; to ensure accurate gauging of continuance type (this is related to values unlikely 
to reoccur but which have a ‘legacy value’, like invading a third party country). More 
generally, do all EoC behaviour situations involve multiple, measurable values anyway? 
In some EoC behaviour situations, it may be difficult to find more than one value, and 
even subvalue, to measure (such as waiting on a telephone line). This also raises the issue 
as to whether or not a DMU always has a full range of choices as to what form of 
continuance it will engage in. It can be argued that some situations may dictate what form 
of continuance can occur (how does one intensify the above waiting situation, for 
example?). Moreover, some situations may demand a minimum level of reinvestment 
(certain solitary and duopolistic situations for example) or failure would otherwise occur. 
This does not necessarily mean intensification, because investment levels, not rates, are 
the keyword here; so as long as the demanded investment is met, this can constitute all 
three continuation types. 
What the previous point also raises is that some EoC behaviour situations involve 
an opponent. Enemy investments could be argued to impact upon a decision regarding 
what form of continuance a DMU is enacting. Even if a DMU’s selected value and 
measurement calculation shows intensification, for example, if the enemy is intensifying 
equally or further, then maintenance or deescalation respectively could be suggested; the 
opponent’s actions could serve as a lens; a filter through which continuance type can be 
gauged. However, a DMU could invest a much larger flat amount of resources in the 
action and still be considered as deescalating, because the previous amount was much 
larger for the DMU than the enemy too (and so percentage increase measurements would 
be less for the DMU). Caution needs to be taken here therefore. This issue should also be 
considered in light of the earlier point; where enemy behaviour may also dictate what 
level of reinvestment must be undertaken by the DMU. Finally, does the above 
rates/nature discussion even represent all the forms of gauging continuance anyway? 
Assuming, for now, that the rates/nature discussion does encompass all forms of gauging 
continuance, it is believed that some kind of mathematical equation, which is beyond the 
scope of thesis, needs to be created; and it needs to be sophisticated enough to be able to 
consider all of the above points; most of which are subject to human bias. 
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Something which has not been discussed here is the contribution of EoC behaviour 
authors to this complex discussion. Some comment has been made in earlier chapters as 
to the ambiguity of EoC behaviour authors regarding how the behaviour proceeds and 
what strains of the behaviour exist. These comments centred predominantly on Staw, 
Brockner and Teger. As can be seen from the previous discussions, aside from the 
ambiguous forms of EoC behaviour outlined, there was even less comment upon such 
issues as how EoC behaviour is measured, what values are adopted and how the 
ambiguous verdicts of continuance ‘type’ were arrived at. Moreover, few authors beyond 
Staw et al. have commented upon the process of EoC behaviour. Again, they seem to 
prefer instead the adoption of a safer yet ambiguous coverall concept of EoC behaviour 
meaning simply the continuity of a course of action. Two authors who have made further 
headway are Sabherwal et al. and Dietz-Uhler. Yet limitations exist within both these 
analyses, similar to those of Staw et al. and these limitations can be seen when comparing 
the above complex discussion with the arguably basic discussions outlined now. 
Sabherwal et al.4
                                               
4 R. Sabherwal et al., ‘Escalating Commitment to Information System Projects: Findings from Two 
Simulated Experiments’, Working Paper, (Missouri University, Missouri, USA: 2000), pp. 1-46 
 argue that escalation in EoC behaviour constitutes either 
maintenance of investment or intensification of investment. While apparently more 
advanced than what has just been stated regarding author sophistication, they do not use 
the words maintenance or intensification (merely “A” and “B”), do not appear to consider 
deescalation as EoC behaviour escalation, nor do they comment in detail upon how 
continuance is actually calculated. It appears that a single value and measurement is the 
norm for Sabherwal et al. They create a graph to demonstrate what is and what is not EoC 
escalation (figure 8.1). Perhaps a separated geometric axis – as opposed to an arithmetic 




Dietz-Uhler, recognises that there are “problems with much of this [EoC behaviour] 
research”5 when regarding research on how EoC behaviour proceeds. She proceeds to 
discuss all three types of EoC behaviour, though under slightly different rubrics. She also 
observes that as long as some investment is occurring, then the action is continuing. 
Moreover, the importance of time in gauging the types of escalation is implied.6
                                               
5 B. Dietz-Uhler, ‘The Escalation of Commitment in Political Decision-Making Groups: A Social Identity 
Approach’, European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1996, p. 612 
6 Ibid., pp. 612-613. Dietz-Uhler states that “a related problem with research on the escalation of 
commitment involves defining and operationalizing escalation. Escalation requires a cumulative increase 
in investment over time. Anyone who does not completely abandon a failing project is thus escalating his 
or her commitment to it. However, there are several types of escalation that can be identified, depending 
on the size of the investment made at each point in time. One type of escalation, which could be called 
‘strong escalation’, occurs when the size of the investment increases at each point in time. A second type 
of escalation, which could be called ‘moderate escalation’ or ‘maintenance’, occurs when the size of the 
investment is the same at each point in time. Finally, ‘weak escalation’ occurs when the size of the 
investment at each point in time decreases.” Dietz-Uhler also recognises here some other problems – 
raised in the previous chapters of this thesis – including the ubiquity of lab research, the paucity of EoC 
behaviour group research and the nature of time as a resource, though does not recognise any underlying 
issues for the poor state of EoC behaviour research. 
 She also 
argues that escalation type can be measured as a function of available resources. Thus, 
even if the amount of actual investment is reduced from the previous time period, if this 
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investment is an increase relative to the available resources then intensification escalation 
has also occurred.7
What must be discussed now is an issue that was labelled as ‘a paradox’ in earlier 
chapters: the concept of change. This concept is no less complex or subjective than the 
above discussion and so undoubtedly will require further analysis beyond that which is 
performed here. Change is also heavily related to many of the concepts contained within 
the earlier discussion. One major difference here is that the concept of change in EoC 
behaviour is not discussed by any EoC behaviour authors
 Separately, little mention is made of multiple values and nature 
change and the related complications. 
 
8.1.2 Continuance and Change: A Paradox 
 
8
As stated throughout this thesis there appears to be an inherent paradox relating to 
the core of EoC behaviour: the continuance of a course of action. If one continues with a 
course of action, how can one simultaneously intensify or deescalate it? The concept of 
continuance contains a ‘self-destructive’ element. Ultimately, the question is how to 
solve this apparent paradox of self-contradiction. The paradox may actually be a 
nonentity, as there is an intrinsic assumption here as to the relative importance of what 
can be termed the ends and the means in EoC behaviour situations, as well as subjectivity 
concerning what a course of action actually consists of. It can be argued that it does not 
matter, with regard to EoC behaviour, that the means (the methods/rates of methods to 
achieve the goal) change within or during a situation as long as the ends (the goal of the 
project, perhaps with certain goal conditions like ‘dollar profit margins’, for example) 
remain unchanged. Using this interpretation, it is solely the ends of the project that are 
the focus of EoC behaviour situations and the context in which determinants of the 
behaviour are applied. Thus, there is no paradox and, as long as ends remain the same, 
the – EoC behaviour – situation is still occurring. 
 and so is developed here from 
scratch. 
                                               
7 Ibid., p. 613 
8 It is T. Van Assche, ‘Sequential Decision Making: The Effects of Prior Choices on Change in Foreign 
Policy Crisis Decision Making’, Working Paper, (Syracuse University, Campbell Public Affairs Institute, 
The Maxwell School, New York, USA: 2005), pp. 1-43 who comes closest to recognising the inherent 
lack of norms concerning what is considered change and what is not in EoC behaviour. 
 209 
However, this argument is based on a somewhat simplistic assumption. It can be 
envisaged that, in certain situations, the DMU’s methods (the means conditions outlined 
above) chosen to achieve the goal are a fundamental part of the overall EoC behaviour 
situation; as fundamental as the goal itself, and thus will have significance when 
considering whether EoC behaviour is still occurring or not. The means chosen may have 
significant importance to the DMU here and, accordingly, be subject to EoC behaviour 
determinants themselves (especially, it is surmised, external and self-justification). Did 
US presidents during the Vietnam Conflict really feel no embarrassment as Kissinger 
opened negotiations9 with the North while scaling back troop levels? How did Donald 
Rumsfeld reconcile talks with Sunni Insurgents in 2005 with previously dismissing such 
actions as unwarranted?10
To put this argument more clearly, it is contended that the complexity of 
‘background information’ provided in a given situation can affect whether ‘unacceptable 
change’ can be argued (by a spectator, observer, critic, stakeholder, reader or researcher, 
for instance) to have occurred or not. If a situation argues, for example, that “goal x must 
be accomplished by means a, b and c,” then by a DMU using new means or abandoning 
some required means, the action may be argued to have changed unacceptably. Some 
situations however will not provide so much information and complexity, but simply 
outline the goal of the project, providing no such information regarding the means to be 
employed. Thus, failure (owing to unacceptable change) can be argued in one case but 
not the other, based upon information. There are then acceptable and unacceptable forms 
of change which shift in nature according to situation type and the framing of the 
situation. What can be argued immediately though is that if the ends (goal) change or if 
the means change (in opposition to a statement regarding the importance of the means 
conditions in the brief) then the EoC behaviour has changed unacceptably and the 
situation has failed and has ‘ceased to be’ an instance of EoC behaviour; even if in reality 
the situation may be seen to ‘continue’ in some highly similar form. Yet numerous 
 The difference in importance between ends and means then is 
not clear cut but is instead indefinite, based upon the warp and weft and ‘framing’ of each 
particular situation. 
                                               
9 P. Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi and the Making of the Paris Agreement, (North Carolina, 
USA: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002) 
10 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/26/AR2005062600096.html, 23/06/07 
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caveats and differing interpretations of this theoretical situation exist and need to be 
discussed. 
It can be argued that regardless of background information complexity, the 
changing of the means in a situation always represents unreasonable change since means 
are always intrinsic to an EoC behaviour situation. Here, once again, the argument would 
be that the DMU has recognised that the situation, as the DMU initially tried to solve it, 
has failed and so the DMU changes it. With the focus here apparently only on material 
means, the above discussion implies that material means changes, ends changes but not 
rate of means changes have importance to the ‘change’ discussion (and too that rates may 
not count in the above ‘continuance’ discussion after all, only the more ‘material’ 
means). The discussion also appears to imply that ‘rate change’ is not only used to 
escalate commitment to the ends but also to the ‘material’ means initially selected; as a 
result of determinants acting upon the DMU. 
From this last point in particular, it can be envisaged that the means of a course of 
action may even be the primary concern in EoC behaviour situations anyway. Many EoC 
behaviour authors’ works can be looked at in a different light; where material means 
conditions are the primary concern regarding EoC behaviour determinants not the ends; 
as authors do not define what a course of action ‘is’. Schoorman and Holahan’s work11
                                               
11 F. D. Schoorman and P. J. Holahan, ‘Psychological Antecedents of Escalation Behavior: Effects of 
Choice, Responsibility and Decision Consequences’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 81, No. 6, 
1996, pp. 786-794 
 
for example, discusses an actor who makes a choice regarding a course of action but is 
overruled by the manager and another choice is undertaken. Relevant to this argument, 
the choice could be interpreted as relating to the selection of means to the same course of 
action, rather than competing, separate projects. 
Yet returning to the situation at hand, even a rate change, regardless of the 
complexity of background information, could be interpreted as an unacceptable change 
(the act has changed; the losing situation has been recognised). Given that rate change is 
considered to be the most basic form of change, under this situation any form of change 
would certainly be paradoxical as there would be no available, acceptable type of change 
remaining. 
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It is clear then that this situation is multifaceted and requires a working, workable 
statement of understanding. It is argued that information is all important in an EoC 
behaviour situation when deciding acceptable and unacceptable change. It is contended 
that the goal/goal conditions of a situation must never change, and where the means 
conditions of the situation are made implicit in the background information they must be 
followed. Means conditions can include rates (an unlikely condition to include in a brief 
though) as well as the ‘material’ means to be used; but it all depends upon the complexity 
of the information. If the information is minimal then changing the means during an 
action is deemed acceptable. 
This opinion is the middle ground of acceptable change. Intuitively, some 
consistency in EoC behaviour situations needs to be retained otherwise the behaviour 
would become indefinable and arguably useless if nothing needed to remain constant for 
EoC behaviour to be considered. This opinion is subjective too though and much more 
relaxed conditions could be considered the norm by some authors when deciding 
acceptable and unacceptable change (another sorites paradox perhaps brought on by 
multiple redefinitions of ‘change’). Yet it is contended here that an ‘anchor point’ to the 
original situation is needed for the concept of ‘continuance’ to be reasonably argued for. 
Several caveats exist here too however and most of these relate to how change is 
measured. First, consider that a change in means is determined largely by the ‘values’ 
one adopts. In turn, these values are decided subjectively. Thus, if the DMU does not feel 
that a ‘new’ action is worthy of a new value or subvalue, for example, then change has 
not occurred, unacceptable or otherwise. One could also argue that adopting a new value 
or ceasing a value may not be unacceptable change, even in a situation with means 
conditions, as it could be deemed by the DMU to be inclusive of the conditions set out, 
though a spectator may still view this as unacceptable change nonetheless, because he 
subjectively views a new action as beyond the means set out and/or he believes any 
change in means when an action has started is unacceptable anyway. Related in part to 
the previous point, it is argued that unacceptable change is also subject to the exact 
syntax and phrasing of the information (must use, can use, etc.). Again, this is subject to 
personal interpretation. Additionally, ‘rate’ changes are determined by the measures 
used. Thus a different measure may deliver a different opinion as to whether change has 
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occurred or not. Regarding all these points, an observer with a ‘Parmenides’12
Regarding goal/goal conditions, and, crucially, including here the inclusion of any 
‘means’ conditions;
 outlook 
would be in stark contrast with an observer who is more logically strict with the word 
‘change’. The heap paradox thus is relevant to this discussion. 
13
An important element of the current discussion is that measuring change is argued 
here not to be the same as measuring continuance type. Regarding the continuance 
measurement, bypassing some uncertainties, each value in a course of action is measured, 
then is shown to have intensified, been maintained or deescalated; according to a 
‘percentage change from previous time’ measure (this could be termed a meta-measure 
since it reinterprets the original raw data). This percentage measure is positive, neutral or 
negative. Any new values are given a token percentage (perhaps 100%), since no 
previous measure is available and values which are ceased are given a -100% value 
 then an obvious way in which one can change these is by altering 
the statements of intent and background information provided. However, it is contended 
that the DMU’s already subjective interpretation of this information can also change over 
time, despite the real information remaining the same. This can include, for example, 
what one deems a particular goal to mean or what a particular mean ‘value’ can consist of 
or what the instructions (must use, can use) relating to these values actually convey. 
Thus, semantics and interpretation and the face saving cover they often provide can 
disguise actual change. It is contended that change in this way can be determined best by 
the internal interpretation in the mind of the DMU as to what the background information 
‘means’ to it. Thus any internal alteration in interpretation over time could be considered 
as ‘change’. This discussion clearly has relevance to ambiguous briefings as well as the 
success/failure discussion later in this chapter. 
                                               
12 http://www.evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/parmenides.htm, 23/06/07. Parmenides was a pre-
Socratic philosopher who denied change existed. Change was instead a nonentity. “What exists is now, 
all at once, one and continuous…. Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike; nor is there any more or less of 
it in one place which might prevent it from holding together, but all is full of what is. And it is all one to 
me. Where I am to begin; for I shall return there again.” 
13 This is considered a complex yet crucial point because means can not only be monitored as to whether 
they (1) change ‘in the field’ but also (2) if they change as part of the explicit information statement and 
(3) as part of internal information reinterpretation. The changing of the heap levels needed for a new 
value may have particular relevance here. 
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(except a certain few with a ‘legacy’14 value). These values are then amalgamated, 
(percentages totalled, positive and negative percentages cancelled out and then the 
remainder value is divided by number of values), perhaps with some element of 
weighting15
It is considered that acceptable change and unacceptable change could be observed 
in both methods by looking at exactly what parts of the situation have changed with 
respect to the information provided. However one crucial benefit of the preferred 
measure is that if a 0% change value is given, then it is known instantly that the situation 
has not changed at all. This would be useful for a situation with numerous values and 
subvalues. More simply, a further disadvantage of ‘mathematical change’ is that it would 
be awkward arguing for change on one hand while simultaneously arguing for no change 
on the other. This could not occur with the preferred method. 
 for certain values, and an overall picture of continuance type is delivered. 
However, change cannot simply adopt the continuance percentage value. If this was 
the case, then any amount of change could occur in a situation, yet if it balanced itself out 
to create a maintenance value (0%), ‘no change’ could be argued. This is felt to be an 
incorrect way of determining change, yet it is a subjective decision of the author as this 
‘no change’ verdict would be related to ‘mathematical change’ rather than ‘actual 
change’. Instead, it is argued that when deciding change, all percent measurements 
should have a positive percent value and the rest of the equation is the same as the 
continuance equation. This modification recognises that change occurs whether the 
situation, or parts of the situation, are decreasing or increasing in intensity. Thus a change 
percentage could still be registered on situations that are argued to have been maintained 
at 0% using the continuance equation, as well as with situations that have intensified and 
deescalated. 
                                               
14 To recap, a legacy value here is one where although the action has not been repeated it still is occurring 
(e.g. the invasion of a third party country is still occurring, if the country is still occupied, but the act of 
invading a third party country has not been repeated). 
15 Weighting here is considered to be a concept that is both difficult to pinpoint and is subjective, but is 
thought to be necessary to give some kind of emphasis to particular values. It is considered that not only 
should the significance of the value be taken into account with weighting (the subjective meaning of 
value importance relative to other values) but also the impact of raw data, which may be otherwise 
distorted by a percentage representation (two values may increase by 25% yet one value may be 
extremely low and so has increased by a low raw amount and another may be extremely high and so the 
same percentage increase means more raw investment has occurred). It is contended that some kind of 
recognition of these elements would be beneficial. These two forms of weighting could also be foreseen 
to interact. 
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The reader should be aware by now that the earlier statement that continuance type 
is determined only by nature and rate changes is actually incomplete. The above 
discussion states that change and continuance are actually two sides of the same 
‘measurement coin’ (the only difference being the reversing of negative values). 
However, the change examination also discusses how the goal of the situation can change 
in addition to the nature and rates of the values used to attain the goal. Thus, it can now 
be argued that the goal can also be part of the continuance equation and thus contribute to 
the decision as to whether the overall situation can be argued to have intensified, been 
maintained or deescalated. Moreover, not only can the actual goal be intensified, 
maintained or deescalated, but any associated goal conditions (such as the ‘dollar profit 
margin’) too. The background information conditions regarding allowable means can also 
be expanded/maintained/shrunk. Finally, the internal interpretation of the goal, goal 
conditions and means conditions can also be argued to be able to intensify, be maintained 
or deescalate, though fitting this in the equation may be difficult. 
However, changing a documented goal and any goal conditions or means conditions 
is still a form of unacceptable change as is changing one’s internal interpretations, and if 
these actions occur then the EoC behaviour situation is felt to have ceased, even if the 
course of action itself ‘continues’ in some new and highly similar format. Moreover, it is 
pointless to argue for intensification, owing to a background information goal/means 
conditions/internal expansion, if real investment in the action ceases, since although goal 
expansion can be argued to intensify the situation for example, goals are intangible and 
are not related to investment in real terms. Thus it can be argued that goal expansion only 
figures in the continuance equation if there is real investment to accompany it; even if 
this real investment decreases sharply. 
At this stage, both the continuance and change discussions have reached a point 
where little more new input can be provided without causing unnecessary complication. 
Indubitably, further research is required regarding these multifaceted, subjective topics. 
Yet the work above has provided at least the groundwork for an accepted understanding 
of both concepts as well as delivering enough immediate understanding to the reader for 
him to apply the concepts within the subsequent framework and within the discussions of 
some of the other concepts below. 
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One required final discussion here however comprises first of a clarification, 
necessary to aid understanding of the analysis above, and, second, of several relevant 
peripheral ‘ideas’, which may benefit from further exploration. The clarification regards 
what have been termed ‘means conditions’ and ‘goal conditions’ and the presumption 
here of a difference between them. It is implied above that the means conditions can 
cause unacceptable change in three ways: by changing the means ‘in the field’ in a way 
that violates the conditions, by explicitly changing the means conditions themselves as 
part of the background information provided and by internally changing the significance 
of the means conditions. The goal conditions however are contended to cause 
unacceptable change in only two ways: by explicitly changing in background information 
and by internally changing. Yet the goal conditions can still be violated during a course 
of action, so why is this instance not considered as ‘unacceptable change’? Means are felt 
to be changed or violated consciously by the DMU, through choice, while the occurrence 
of goal conditions being violated during the course of action is deemed to be an outcome 
of the situation; largely out of the hands of the DMU and often as a result of the use of 
means. It is a highly subjective schism between means conditions and goal conditions 
however, and some authors might perhaps decide a means condition is actually a goal 
condition, or others may argue that all goal conditions should be treated the same as 
means conditions or vice versa, creating one ‘combined conditions’ category with or 
without the ‘in the field’ category. Although the choice made in the analysis above is 
considered to be optimal, especially since it aids in the success/failure discussion below, 
a change in perspective is thought to be by no means unjustified. 
Now let us look briefly at some peripheral ideas that may hold future benefit for the 
continuance and change analyses. 
 
• An additional, discrete, means condition could be termed ‘resource types 
adopted’; in addition to the ‘values adopted’ condition. Although already implicit 
in ‘values adopted’ and perhaps synonymous with some values (like ‘troops’ and 
‘dollars spent’), other values, like ‘bombing runs’, can be conducted using many 
types of resource. Thus, recognising this extra potential condition may help the 
change equation, by making it simpler and ‘more sensitive’. It is thus also useful 
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to the continuance equation in the same way. It may be subject to shifts and 
subjectivity too however. 
• To what extent do DMUs escalate commitment in order to justify the means not 
just the ends of the project? Does an actor need to have specified the means 
during the brief for this to occur, or can ‘means justification’ occur anyway, or 
develop over time? 
• Although any change is deemed here to be unacceptable regarding the goal/goal 
conditions and means/means conditions as well as internal change, perhaps 
instead of saying all other forms of change are acceptable regardless of 
magnitude, there could be some form of graduated change where ‘margins’ of 
change would decide if change was acceptable or unacceptable. A change above a 
certain percentage margin limit could be deemed too much and thus unacceptable. 
Some issues here would include whether single values would be the focus here, 
groups of values (rates, means) or the entirety of values. Some authors may also 
wish to include here the aforementioned unchangeable elements which are 
considered intrinsic to the change decision; though this is considered to be 
incorrect here. 
• Is change measured from the start of the project or from the previous time period? 
Like continuance, the measure is thought to be most appropriate from the 
previous time period. However, the arguments for measuring from the start of the 
project are more valid for the change discussion, especially when taking into 
account internal interpretations and perhaps the margin limits argument. 
• Should the same measure type be used for continuance as for change? It is 
suggested that the measure type should be the same throughout both analyses and 
remain the same. Indeed, internal change may involve measure change. 
• Can all situations actually be changed (especially waiting situations)? 
• Can one’s broader interpretation of what is acceptable and unacceptable change 
(for example, a transition from ‘anything is allowed to change’ to ‘everything 
must remain the same’) ironically also alter over time? 
• What one person may view as a ‘goal’ can also be interpreted as a ‘mean’ for a 
still wider goal. An example of this would be to view the goal of ‘victory in Iraq’ 
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as simply a means for the goal of ‘a successful US foreign presence’ which could 
be viewed as a means for a ‘strong US’. Goals tend to get more abstract when 
looked in this way. This issue may have some relevance for future research in 
deciding what unacceptable change is. 
 
8.1.3 The Relationship between Escalation of Commitment Behaviour and ‘Traditional 
Escalation’ 
 
The relationship between EoC behaviour and traditional escalation is considered 
here to be an intangible and subjective one, not least because ‘traditional escalation’ is an 
invented label; used throughout this thesis to describe how the concept of escalation has 
traditionally been, and still is, treated and defined in research. Let us immediately restate 
some of what has been laid down about EoC behaviour. EoC behaviour constitutes 
intensification, maintenance or deescalation by a DMU in the face of negative feedback 
within a multitude of scenario types. These multiple ‘varieties’ of behaviour are 
encompassed under the terms continuance and escalation. It has been stated already how 
such forms of continuance are decided upon. Now let us look at the intuitive meaning of 
traditional escalation. If we look beyond the ‘dictionary definition’ of escalation, then 
throughout this thesis the concept of traditional escalation has been related to a particular 
trend of behaviour concomitant with competitive, duopolistic, conflict – predominantly 
between armies and states – with events generally considered to be getting worse and 
increasingly intractable in terms of “words and deeds.”16
Kriesberg describes escalation as “an increase in the severity of coercive 
inducements [and in the] scope of participation.”
 If we examine now literature 
which has informed this intuitive description we can see that the concept has a much 
more uniform description that EoC behaviour has. 
17
                                               
16 M. Shubik, ‘On the Study of Disarmament and Escalation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 12, No. 
1, 1968, p. 95 
17 L. Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Resolution, (Lanham, Maryland, USA: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 151 
 He also contends that the measures 
used to calculate such intensification include: persons killed or incidents of direct 
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violence per month or year.18 While the latter measure is considered to be a legitimate, 
though vague, indicator, it is felt instinctively that the number of deaths is not, since 
death may just be caused by poor tactics than an actual increase in hostility. However, it 
is enough to note that severity within a usually governmental or military conflict is the 
key characteristic of traditional escalation here. Maoz, links the notion of traditional 
escalation to concepts such as arms races, deterrence and crises;19 all with negative, 
worsening, connotations. Schelling20 too discusses traditional escalation in the realms of 
spiralling conflicts, as do Holsti,21 Jervis22 and Heifetz and Segev.23 Kahn argues that 
there are three factors that constitute traditional escalation: an increase in intensity, a 
wider area of conflict and ‘compound’ escalation24
                                               
18 Ibid. 
19 Z. Maoz, Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment, (Boston, Massachusetts, USA: 
Unwin Hyman, 1990), pp. 31-134 
20 T. C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (USA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 6 
21 O. R. Holsti, Crisis, Escalation, War, (London, UK: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1972) 
22 R. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), pp. 58-78. Jervis argues that there are two opposing models of traditional 
escalation: deterrence and the spiral model. The former model argues that the state is obliged to stock 
weaponry and adopt dominant stances in international politics because “great dangers arise if an 
aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve.” Furthermore, Jervis 
states that “this belief will lead the former to test its opponents, usually starting with a small and 
apparently unimportant issue. If the status quo powers retreat, they will not only lose the specific value at 
stake but, more important in the long run, will encourage the aggressor to press harder. Even if the 
defenders later recognize their plight and are willing to pay a higher price to prevent further retreats, they 
will find it increasingly difficult to convince the aggressor of their new-found resolve. The choice will 
then be between continuing to retreat and thereby sacrificing basic values or fighting…. [Actors must] 
display the ability and willingness to wage war.” However, “[the states] may not be able to ignore minor 
conflicts or to judge disputes on their merits. Issues of little intrinsic value become highly significant as 
indices of resolve…[to the point where] even civility is dangerous.” Jervis opposes the deterrence model 
with the spiral model which argues that such posturing, even if no aggressive intentions are meant, can 
signal danger to the opponent and thus provoke similar posturing, leading eventually to war. Thus, 
because of a “correct appreciation of living in a Hobbesian state of nature…most means of self-
protection simultaneously menace others.” Deterrence and the spiral model then give “opposite answers 
to the central question of the effect of negative sanctions.” 
23 A. Heifetz and E. Segev, ‘Escalation and Delay in Protracted International Conflicts’, Mathematical 
Social Sciences, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2005, pp. 17-37 
24 H. Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios, (New York, USA: Praeger, 1965), p. 4 





Kahn also presents a ladder that describes the possible pathways of escalation 
(figure 8.3). Furthermore, Kahn discusses escalation in relation to nuclear brinkmanship 
and potential thermonuclear conflict scenarios.25
                                               
25 H. Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable, (London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962) 
 Of all the early traditional escalation 




Details aside, it is clear that ‘traditional escalation’ focuses upon competitive, 
duopolistic, intensifying and predominantly international and military, situations. 
Interestingly, it can be seen that traditional escalation is measured in similar ways (values 
 221 
and measures) as those put forward in the main discussion of establishing continuance 
type in EoC behaviour. Yet the relationship between the two concepts has still not been 
cemented. An immediate, if somewhat cryptic, statement is that “EoC behaviour and 
traditional escalation can exist simultaneously in a carefully defined situation yet in other 
situations can be diametrically opposed.” This is because of the scope and flexibility of 
each concept. A suitable metaphor would be a Venn diagram, figure 8.4. Where the 
circles of each concept overlap (representing a mutually acceptable situation) they can 




Thus what are the common qualities of each concept that make for a mutually 
acceptable situation? EoC behaviour occurs within a situation where negative feedback 
has been received and the DMU reactively escalates by intensifying, maintaining or 
deescalating its behaviour; taking into account the goal and ‘conditions’ information 
within the background briefing. The situation can be solitary or competitive26
                                               
26 It has already been recognised that competition scenarios do not necessarily occur in a head-to-head type 
scenario nor are they always duopolistic (two player), but this is the interpretation of traditional 
escalation literature, EoC behaviour literature and of this thesis. It has been previously stated that the 
other forms of competition may affect a number of points made throughout this thesis concerning 
 and can be 
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applied to a wide variety of scenarios: from divorces, to strikes, to waiting for a bus. 
Traditional escalation occurs when a DMU intensifies its behaviour to a competitive, 
duopolistic, predominantly international and military scenario. Little importance is placed 
upon the sanctity of the goal of or conditions for the behaviour, nor of the need for 
negative feedback to be the antecedent for the action, nor for the action to be any form of 
reaction anyway (traditional escalation can be proactive too). Thus EoC behaviour and 
traditional escalation become “wedded conceptually”27 in a competitive, duopolistic, 
military situation where negative feedback has been received and the DMU reacts by 
instigating intensifying behaviour which does not unacceptably change the goal/goal 
conditions or means/means conditions of the situation. There is then a plethora of 
literature which exemplifies this close relationship between EoC behaviour and traditional 
escalation (literature which analyses traditional escalation in the realm of EoC 
behaviour). Literature which represents what could be termed the ‘blue ellipse effect’28
Unacceptable change is considered to be a difficult issue to reconcile between EoC 
behaviour and traditional escalation. Although a goal, certainly, and goal conditions and 
means conditions, possibly, are present in a traditional situation, it does not matter, it 
seems, if they are violated/changed unacceptably; much less consideration is paid to 
unacceptable change. Certainly, this issue requires further research. It is apparent 
however that it is equally difficult to assess ‘change’ in traditional situations as EoC 
behaviour situations. What this discussion does raise is that, in traditional escalation, the 
goal and any conditions can be part of the escalation equation and are acceptably changed 
or violated. To carry this argument to its logical conclusion, taking into account the 
differences between both concepts outlined above, (the many forms of EoC behaviour 
compared to the one form of traditional escalation, the multiple levels of analysis of EoC 
behaviour compared to the solely competitive duopolistic level of traditional escalation, 
the negative feedback related reactive nature of EoC behaviour compared to the negative 
 
includes research by Brockner, Rubin and Teger. 
                                                                                                                                            
competition and enemy behaviour; namely the enemy as a measure and as a dictator of reinvestment 
levels and the motivations for continuance in competitive scenarios. 
27 To use out of context a term by L. J. Carlson, ‘A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 3, 1995, p. 512. 
28 This thesis’ specific neologism could realistically be applied to any theories which occupy the same 
‘theoretical space’ in some situations while also being incompatible in others. Consider EoC behaviour 
and Groupthink for example. 
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and positive, reactive and proactive nature of traditional escalation) it can be argued that 
the schism between the theories is most polarised when an EoC behaviour situation 
involves a DMU engaging in non-competitive, non-military or political deescalation EoC 
behaviour as a reaction to negative feedback. In terms of a traditional situation, the 
schism would be most clear during a proactive, goal and conditions busting, competitive, 
duopolistic, military action. Two interesting points to finish this section are, first, an 
observation that a situation that is both traditional and EoC in nature can shift to just 
traditional or EoC or neither in the following time phase, depending upon behaviour (the 
latter would occur, for example, if the goal and/or various conditions are unacceptably 
altered and the situation also declines in a deescalating manner). Second, it is reasonable 
to suggest that the motives behind traditional escalation have relevance to EoC behaviour 
situations. Similarly, some EoC behaviour determinants may also have relevance to 
traditional escalation. 
 
8.1.4 A Case Study of the Vietnam Conflict to Illustrate the Above Arguments 
 
It is deemed useful here to illustrate the complex theoretical issues discussed above 
through a real life, retrospective, case study. It is important to realise that the purpose of 
this study is not to comprehensively discuss and apply itself to every aspect of this thesis, 
rather it is to apply itself specifically to the issues discussed in this chapter up to this 
point and, as demonstrated later, to assist in the analysis of one other aspect addressed 
later in this chapter. The Vietnam Conflict is considered to be the most suitable study for 
this ‘focussed’ purpose. It has, for instance, been utilised as a model of traditional 
escalation and EoC behaviour. The conflict also illustrates the concept of continuance 
and the related concepts of intensification, maintenance, deescalation, values and 
measures. The fluid concepts of change (both acceptable and unacceptable), means and 
ends are also discussed in terms of the conflict. Relevant historical literature regarding 
the Vietnam Conflict, including literature outlined in previous chapters of this thesis, is 
used in conjunction with a timeline approach – which underlines key moments in the 
conflict – to achieve the ‘limited’ goals of the study. 
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The Vietnam Conflict illustrates both forms of escalation; traditional and EoC 
behaviour. Moreover, in particular periods it is contended that the conflict illustrates both 
forms simultaneously while at other stages demonstrates only one form. Thus, it is argued 
here that as the conflict progresses, the form of escalation which it best conveys (EoC 
behaviour, traditional escalation or both) changes. In terms of traditional escalation, the 
conflict was certainly competitive and duopolistic; essentially between two groups of 
countries with polarised ideologies; West and East, Capitalist and Communist.29 On one 
side was a South Vietnam (officially the Republic of Vietnam, [RoV] incorporating the 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam [ARVN])/US and allies coalition and on the other,30 
the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), Viet Cong (VC), the USSR and the ChiComs.31 The 
goal (end), from the US perspective, was to save South Vietnam from communist rule, 
with the larger aim – as illustrated by the Pentagon Papers – of preventing a domino 
effect32 to the rest of Asia; all within the larger context of the Cold War.33 Moreover, the 
conflict also intensified for much, but not all, of its duration.34 Crucially, from the 
perspective of EoC behaviour, negative feedback was an inherent feature of the war too35 
with regular, bloody, setbacks for the US. However, as demonstrated by the discussion 
made before this case study, the very terms used when discussing the forms of escalation 
are not as straightforward as they first appear and need to be illustrated from the 
perspective of the Vietnam Conflict too. Let us look at two important values in the 
conflict: troop numbers36
 
 and the dollar investment in the war, per year. Figure 8.5 
illustrates US troop levels from 1959 to 1968. 
                                               
29 D. C. Hallin, The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam, (New York, USA: OUP, 1986), pp. 50-
57 
30 The countries involved on both sides are discussed by T. Findlay, ‘Turning the Corner in Southeast 
Asia’, in M. E. Brown (Ed.), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, (Massachusetts, USA: 
The MIT Press, 1996), p. 178. 
31 ChiCom are Chinese Communists as described by R. H. Johnson, ‘Escalation: Then and Now’, Foreign 
Policy, No. 60, 1985, p. 135. 
32 M. Gravel, The Pentagon Papers (Gravel Edition) Volume 1, (Boston, USA: 1971, Beacon Press), p. 84 
33 M. H. Hunt, Lyndon Johnson’s War: America’s Cold War Crusade in Vietnam 1945-1968, (New York, 
USA: Hill and Wang, 1997), p. 128 
34 Intensification of the conflict is discussed by N. Chomsky, Rethinking Camelot: JFK, the Vietnam War 
and US Political Culture, (Massachusetts, USA: South End Press, 1993), pp. 38, 48, 51, 70, 83, 85, 94. 
35 For instance, G. M. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam, (USA: Knopf, 
1986), p. 236. 
36 More detailed information on troop investment patterns can be found in G. Warner, ‘Lyndon Johnson’s 
War?’, International Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4, 2003, pp. 829-853. 
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Note first how the value of troop investment is represented using the measurement 
of uniform time periods. Now note how a crude calculation of ‘current year – previous 
year’ can deliver a verdict as to if the action is intensifying, being maintained or 
deescalating. This can then be turned into the preferred percentage value, which aids 
uniformity of calculation in the overall amalgamation of values. It can be seen then that 
the troop levels from 1959 to 1968 intensified. If the dollar investment of the war is now 
considered, the process can be repeated. One should note however that data regarding this 
value is difficult to locate and what data is available is highly subjective. Some authors 
deliver an overall value for a given time period,37 (which is useless for measuring 
continuance type) while others separate the years.38
                                               
37 For example, L. Bilmes and J. E. Stiglitz, ‘The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three 
Years after the Beginning of the Conflict’, Working Paper, (Harvard University, Cambridge: 
Massachusetts, USA: 2006), p. 34. Bilmes and Stiglitz state that the Vietnam War cost $494 billion. 
38 For example, Foreign Affairs Division Congressional Research Service (FADCRS), ‘Impact of the 
Vietnam War’, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Committee Print, (Washington, 
USA: 1971), pp. 1-41. 
 Moreover, the data relating to 
separated years was found to be incomplete; representing only selected years of the 
conflict. This is thought to be because all the available separated data was calculated 
during the war itself, not from a historical standpoint. The chosen data, for example, is 
only recorded from 1965 up to 1971. The overall cost data too was often incomplete and 
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gathered during the conflict. Furthermore, this data, especially when compiled after the 
war had ended, often did not state what the time period for the measurements was 
anyway,39 perhaps signifying an ambiguity as to when the ‘situation’ began and ended; 
indeed, as addressed by Statler, the US was ‘involved’ in Vietnam from at least the 
1950s; assisting the French to retake their colony following their defeat in World War 
Two.40
Regarding all calculations, there are also multiple interpretations of what the dollar 
investment was in the war anyway, owing to what data particular authors include in their 
calculations. Some authors include aspects such as aid packages to the south, rebuilding 
grants, interest payments on war loans, loss of domestic productivity, drug
 
41/injury 
rehabilitation costs and unemployment/disability benefits paid to veterans,42
This knowledge begs an important question. When calculating dollar investment to 
find continuance type, should all dollar costs be taken on board? While costs like interest 
costs, drug rehab costs and disability benefits could be argued to be relevant when 
looking at the overall costs of the Vietnam Conflict, are they really relevant when 
deciding the pattern of dollar investment aimed at fulfilling the action; that is, investment 
aimed at accomplishing the goal? The answer is a subjective one. The above costs are not 
really investments in achieving the goal; rather they could be considered as incidental 
costs emerging from the action. Dollar costs that are also investments are considered to be 
those that are used in actions that actively seek to attain the goal. Separating these costs 
however is considered to be reliant upon one’s interpretation as to what is contributing 
towards the goal and what is not. Something which has already been stated in the 
 while others 
include only ‘bullets and bombs’ costs. Some authors do not even state what values were 
included to calculate the dollar investment. Thus, the separated years data could not be 
mixed and matched to create a larger time frame. 
                                               
39 For example, Bilmes and Stiglitz, ‘The Economic Costs…’ 
40 K. C. Statler, Replacing France: The Origins of American Intervention in Vietnam, (Kentucky, USA: The 
University Press of Kentucky, 2007) 
41 Kolko describes the widespread drug use as “the GI’s anodyne for the minutes and days of terror and 
boredom” in G. Kolko, Vietnam: Anatomy of a War 1940-1975, (London, UK: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 
p. 363. 
42 FADCRS, ‘Impact…’, p. 6.  It is stated here that “in principle, a figure for the total cost of the Vietnam 
war should encompass not only direct military spending on the war, but also indirect costs…economic 
assistance…reconstruction aid…benefits to American veterans…[and] inflationary impact of the war on 
the US economy.” 
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discussion earlier is that many, if not most, values considered pertinent to goal attainment 
that are not explicitly dollar related have an impact upon the overall dollar investment 
value anyway, and vice versa, (troop deployment, for example). 
This investment/cost issue applies to other EoC behaviour situations. It can be 
argued that in some situations not all dollar expenditure is investment towards the goal; 
rather some expenditure is just to deal with attendant costs. Moreover, these incidental 
costs can be argued to be not just limited to money but other resources too and, perhaps, 
not limited to definable resources at all, but including what could be termed ‘non-
resource’ costs as well (e.g. general destruction). Even these costs may have a 
simultaneous dollar cost however. Yet all costs, it can be argued, do have an impact on 
the DMU when it is acting because of the SCE. These issues are more complex than 
outlined here and are discussed in greater detail under the resource subheading. 
Returning to this case study, it is uncertain when looking at some data if the dollar 
amount takes into account inflation to the year of publication. Also important is that the 
dollar investment data is often applied using a meta-measure called the incremental dollar 
investment: “the net difference between wartime and peacetime needs.”43 What is 
presented here then is just one representation; a token set of values for illustrative, rather 
than informative, purposes. Let us look now at an example of a budgeted annual dollar 
investment for the Vietnam Conflict: “the military personnel (deployed and backup) 
added for Southeast Asia…and the costs of equipping and supporting forces in Southeast 
Asia.”44 
 




Using the same process as with troop numbers, it can be argued that up to 1969, 
financial investment in the war intensified; or, to borrow an analogy from Dumbrell, the 
kite of investment was being flown ever higher and to the ever increasing howls of 
failure.45 This comment is only subjectively correct however, owing to the ambiguities 
noted above. The aid budget, for example, located in the same document was not 
included in this calculation of dollar investment. 
 
 
Even here however, an incremental value could be taken into account, since aid 
would have been given to the Vietnamese even if the war had not taken place. Financial 
aid to an ally is considered here as part of the means to achieve the goal. 
Moving on now from the focus upon ‘existing’ values, it is also argued in the 
theoretical discussion above that the nature of the course of action can change too; with 
the addition or removal of particular values and actions aimed at accomplishing the goal. 
Regarding intensification of the nature of the Vietnam Conflict, landmark dates can be a 
useful tool; though some landmarks which may seem indicative of new values could, it is 
suggested, be included as quantitative increases in pre-existing values (especially major 
bombing campaigns, battles and troop offensives). Moreover, some events may be 
difficult to put into the form of a measurable value at all. Some landmarks marked below 
are not related to US intensification – such as the Tet Offensive – but instead opponent 
intensification. This is to remind the reader that in conflict situations, continuance, and all 
the complications this brings, occurs in relation to both sides. 
                                               
45 J. Dumbrell, ‘Strengthening the Legislative Power of the Purse: The Origins of the 1974 Budgetary 
Reforms in the U.S. Congress’, Public Administration, Vol. 58, No. 4, 1980, p. 492. In its original form, 
the kite represents “fiscal irresponsibility.” 
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Janis describes the Vietnam Conflict in terms of “aerial bombardment, harassment 
and interdiction, artillery fire, defoliation and population displacement…whatever violent 
means necessary.”46 Furthermore, Janis argues that each worsening act constitutes “major 
escalation decisions.”47 Nature intensification certainly occurred from the early 1960s to 
1968, mainly from the US; from what William Bundy – CIA agent and Foreign Affairs 
Adviser – called “pin pricks...pretty small potatoes” to, in the words of the US Saigon 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, “mak[ing] them scream.”48 Westheider, for instance, 
describes how, on January 12th 1962, Operation Chopper49 saw US troops being involved 
for the first time in combat operations; flying helicopters for the South Vietnamese Army. 
Then, intensification in the form of defoliant usage under Operation Ranch Hand – 
spraying 12 million gallons of ‘Rainbow Herbicides’, most notably Agent Orange – 
occurred, also in 1962.50 1963 saw the battle of Ap Bac, where a superior US 
adviser/RoV force was defeated by the VC; their first major victory.51 A major 
intensification, discussed – and criticised – by Logevall, was the Tonkin Resolution in 
1964,52 which gave carte blanche to the US president to wage undeclared war upon North 
Vietnam. This followed an NVA ‘attack’ upon the USS Maddox in neutral waters in 
early August of the same year. This reality of this attack however was, and remains, 
dubious.53 A further escalation emerged outside the Vietnam sphere. In October 1964 
China tested its first A-Bomb, as a tacit warning to the USA concerning its ever 
intensifying actions against North Vietnam.54
                                               
46 I. L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (2nd Ed.), (Boston, 
Massachusetts, USA: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 98 
47 Ibid., p. 104 
48 E. E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War, (North Carolina, USA: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 22 
49 J. E. Westheider, The Vietnam War, (Connecticut, USA: Greenwood Press, 2007), p. 10 
50 G. Lewy, America in Vietnam, (New York, USA: OUP, 1978), pp. 263-265, 349 
51 D. M. Toczek, The Battle of Ap Bac, Vietnam: They Did Everything but Learn from it, (Connecticut, 
USA: Greenwood Press, 2001) 
52 According to F. Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in 
Vietnam, (Los Angeles, USA: University of California Press, 1999), p. 193, the Gulf of Tonkin 
Resolution was “rammed through Congress...giving it carte blanche to ‘take all necessary steps’ to 
defend South Vietnam.” 
53 A detailed analysis of the mystery attack is made by R. J. Hanyok, ‘Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds and 
the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964’, Cryptologic Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 4 
and Vol. 20, No. 1, 2000 and 2001, pp. 1-55. 
54 L. B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, (USA: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1972), p. 469 
 1965 saw Operation Rolling Thunder, 
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described by McNamara et al. as a three year relentless bombing campaign of North 
Vietnam by US B-52 bombers.55 Further landmarks include the Tet Offensive of January 
30th 1968, orchestrated by the NVA and VC56 – a strategic loss, but a propaganda victory 
for them – and the My Lai massacre of March 16th 1968, carried out by US troops in 
which up to 504 civilians were murdered.57
The traditional concept of escalation then – a growing sense of competitive, 
duopolistic intensification and intractability – certainly was present in the Vietnam 
Conflict. Furthermore, such intensification was coupled with negative feedback for the 
US and a tacit knowledge among all players that the US campaign was failing.
 
58 Thus, 
EoC behaviour was present in the conflict too. Yet, if we now look at the other side of the 
coin, it can be argued that the Vietnam Conflict also illustrates a type of escalation that is 
not akin to the traditional form yet is still suitable for EoC behaviour. From 1968 to 1973, 
US troop levels in Vietnam deescalated, as demonstrated in figure 8.8. 
 
 
Similarly if one looks again at the indicative dollar investment (figure 8.6) it can be 
seen that dollar investment deescalated from 1969. Furthermore, the physical nature of 
                                               
55 R. S. McNamara et al., Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy, (New 
York, USA: Public Affairs, 1999), pp. 173, 189, 335-337, 347 
56 G. M. Kahin and J. W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam (2nd Ed.), (New York, USA: Dial Press, 
1969), p. 371 
57 S. M. Hersh, My Lai 4: A Report on the Massacre and its Aftermath, (USA: Cooper Square Publishers, 
2004) and D. L. Anderson (Ed.), Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre, (Kansas, USA: 
University Press of Kansas, 1998). 
58 Various forms of failure are discussed by R. S. McNamara and B. VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The 
Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, (New York, USA: Times Books, 1995), pp. 108, 185, 294, 322-323. 
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the conflict also deescalated. The Paris Peace Talks began in 1968.59 From November 1st 
of the same year, Operation Rolling Thunder ended, to stimulate these talks.60 In 1971, 
the defoliant programme, Operation Ranch Hand, ceased. Under the Nixon 
administration, a ceasefire was subsequently declared on January 27th 1973.61
This leads the case study on to acceptable and unacceptable change. It can be 
argued that there were no explicit conditions applied to the Vietnam Conflict, regarding 
the means permitted. That said however, negotiating with the VC/NVA was probably not 
considered acceptable in the internal mindset of the US cabinet before the conflict 
became hot. Thus it can be argued that some form of ‘unconscious’ internal change to the 
means conditions occurred, even though no means conditions were made explicit. 
However, the goal of the action is considered the focus here, when deciding if 
 The 
adoption of ‘negotiation’ in the Vietnam Conflict causes some difficulty in relation to 
EoC behaviour. On one hand, negotiation is an extra value aimed at a goal, thus it is 
intensifying the situation. Yet on the other hand, it has an indubitable ameliorative ‘feel’. 
In terms of traditional escalation, one would be hard pressed to argue that negotiation is 
concomitant with this behaviour. Thus what is the solution? The answer is subjective, 
based upon the type of escalation one is studying. Yet one interesting point is that 
negotiation is often totemic of goal modification (usually shrinkage). Thus, while 
acceptable if it is aimed at achieving the stated goal, negotiation may be symbolic of an 
imminent goal change or shift and thus a subsequent cessation of EoC behaviour. 
                                               
59 Exactly when negotiations between the US and North Vietnam began is uncertain. President Johnson 
sought negotiations with the North from 1965, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/coldwarfiles/index.cfm?thisunit=3&fuseaction=events.list, 02/09/08. His 
efforts were ultimately sabotaged by the Republican candidate Richard Nixon who encouraged the RoV 
Junta to walk out of negotiations talks on the eve of the US election in 1968, ensuring him victory, C. M. 
Clifford and R. C. Holbrooke, Counsel to the President: A Memoir, (New York, USA: Random House, 
1991), p. 582. The Paris Peace Talks resumed in 1969. However, secret Paris talks involving Henry 
Kissinger and, principally, Le Duc Tho occurred sporadically throughout the war; and from as early as 
1967 under the rubric of the ‘Pennsylvania Negotiations’ according to J. Hanhimaki, The Flawed 
Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, (New York, USA: OUP, 2004), p. 14. 
60 R. B. Frankum Jr., ‘Swatting Flies with a Sledgehammer: The Air War’, in A. Weist, Rolling Thunder in 
a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited, (New York, USA: Osprey Publishing, 2006), pp. 218-220 
61 Officially, the document declaring the ceasefire was called the Paris Peace Accords, P. Alexander, Man 
of the People: The Life of John McCain, (New Jersey, USA: John Wiley, 2003), pp. 73-74. It is 
acknowledged here that the accords only occurred after the ‘Linebacker’ operations, which resumed 
intensive bombing over North Vietnam to ‘encourage’ it government to return to the negotiating table, O. 
Schwab, A Clash of Cultures: Civil-Military Relations During the Vietnam War, (Connecticut, USA: 
Praeger, 2006), pp. 80-81 
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unacceptable change occurred or not. Although arguably a simplistic verdict, it is 
contended that the goal of keeping the south free did not change during the lifetime of the 
course of action. This belief can be argued to be the case as, ultimately, a ceasefire was 
reached with the NVA, with the proviso that democratic choice would decide the fate of 
the country.62 Furthermore, President Nixon declared that he had secured peace with 
honour, and success.63 However, the inclusion of a democratic vote could be seen as a 
compromise to the espoused goal of keeping the South anti-communist at all costs. Thus, 
the vote issue flanking Nixon’s trumpeting of ‘success’ could be interpreted as an internal 
goal shift on Nixon’s part. To reinforce an earlier point, this vote was brought about by 
negotiation. Regardless of this possible goal shift however, the verdict as to whether the 
war was a success or failure is, historically, a patent one. Vietnam is commonly accepted 
to be the archetype of military disaster.64
Let us now look briefly at the effect the type of measure selected to gauge 
continuance type can have upon the continuance verdict arrived at. From the discussion 
above, ‘absolute value per time period’, ‘absolute change from previous time period’ and 
 Thus, a conflict is apparent here. However, the 
concepts of success and failure have not yet been explored. As concepts, they are 
considered more complex than they may at first appear. Numerous, subjective, 
determinants are thought to be influential when deciding if a course of action has been a 
success or not. Although one may deem it unnecessary, it is felt prudent that the relative 
success or failure of the Vietnam Conflict be examined in the success/failure header 
below. Not only is this an end in itself, it will also enable real life illustration of some 
complex theoretical arguments related to success and failure. Moreover, the Vietnam War 
has some unique qualities that are considered to be particularly appropriate for the 
success/failure discussion. 
                                               
62 The two most notable sections of the Paris Peace Accords state that “[t]he South Vietnamese people shall 
decide themselves the political future of South Viet-Nam through genuinely free and democratic general 
elections under international supervision” and that reunification shall be “carried out step by step through 
peaceful means”, G. Katsiaficas (Ed.), Vietnam Documents: American and Vietnamese Views of the 
War, (New York, USA: M. E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 174-175. 
63 R. M. Nixon, Peace with Honor, (Radio, 23/01/73) 
64 D. M. Goldstein, The Vietnam War: The Story and Photographs, (New York, USA: Brassey’s, 1997), p. 
x. Goldstein argues that “the Vietnam War was arguably the most traumatic experience for the United 
States in the twentieth century. That is indeed a grim distinction in a span that included two world wars, 
the assassinations of two presidents and the resignation of another, the Great Depression, the Cold War, 
racial unrest and the drug and crime waves.” 
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‘percentage increase/decrease from previous time period’ were the preferred measures for 
gauging continuance type.65
As argued earlier, the behaviour of the enemy can be used as a ‘filter’; through 
which continuance type can be viewed. Data concerning NVA/VC numbers is difficult to 
locate,
 However using a meta-measure which represents the 
difference between the current and previous percentage value, the action can be argued to 
be deescalating if the rate of percentage increase is becoming less. Applied to Vietnam, 
the troop levels from 1959 to 1968, despite increasing absolutely, also deescalated 
relative to the rate of intensification, since some years involved a greater percentage 
increase in troops than the previous year. Owing to the self-analytical nature of the 
measures employed then, there is an infinite number of measures available, ad absurdum. 
This knowledge, coupled with the ad libitum nature of data analysis, gives credence to 
Disraeli’s lies, damn lies and statistics quote. 
66 and so little analysis can be performed. However, it can be argued hypothetically 
that if the NVA/VC rate of increase matched that of the US troop rates of increase, then 
the US was only maintaining its behaviour apropos troop investment. This analysis could 
be expanded to other values too, to portray overall continuance type. At the conclusion of 
chapter four, mention is made of a form of this phenomenon by Gelb and Betts who 
argue that the US intensified various investments simply to maintain its position in the 
conflict.67
                                               
65 New values would possess the first two measures on their first appearance, and would be given a token 
percentage for the third measure; possibly with weighting. Some new values (perhaps “invading a third 
party country”) would possess ‘versions’ of the first two measures, would be given a token third measure 
for their first appearance and then a legacy value (0%) until the actions were reversed or ceased. Again, 
weighting may have relevance here. 
66 P. B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975, (Novato, California: OUP, 1991), pp. 401-403 
67 L. H. Gelb and R. K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked, (Washington D.C., USA: 
Brookings Institute, 1979), pp. 192, 244 
 However, percentage increase can disguise the raw investment that is 
occurring. A low raw increase of a value for the NVA/VC for example, would appear as a 
large percentage increase owing to a low base level, yet a much larger investment would 
be needed for the US to create an equally high percentage value. This is a situation where 
weighting would be useful. Borrowing a previously discredited value from Kriesberg, the 
number of US troop deaths per year may give some indication of enemy activity, 
numbers and most importantly, rate of increase and decrease over a given time period. 
Figure 8.9 illustrates US troop deaths from 1962-1973. 
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From this data, one could estimate vaguely the investment patterns of NVA/VC 
troop numbers. However, factors such as US troop numbers, tactics, and what could be 
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termed as the kill rate68
The likelihood of the materialization of validly predictable direct 
and indirect consequences with potentially adverse values, 
arising from exogenous events, self-behavior, environmental 
constraints, or the reaction of an opponent or third party
 of the NVA/VC would need to be taken into account to obtain 
any sense of NVA/VC troop investment patterns. Overall, it is suggested that conclusions 
based upon this calculation would be prone to error. At this point, it is felt that the 
Vietnam case study should be concluded later in this chapter and that several more 
‘straightforward’ concepts be investigated now; to lay the necessary foundations for more 




Much of EoC behaviour research is based upon the actor’s attitude to risk. It is 
essential here thus to devise a working definition of risk that is suitable for EoC 
behaviour research. An appropriate definition of risk comes from outside of EoC 
behaviour literature. Vertzberger defines risk as: 
 
69




                                               
68 For more information on kill rates, see C. L. Barnhart, The Barnhart Dictionary of New English Since 
1963, (London, UK: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 243. 
69 Y. Y. I. Vertzberger, ‘Collective Risk Taking: The Decision-Making Group’, in P. ’t Hart et al. (Eds.), 
Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 
USA: University of Michigan Press, 1997), p. 276 
70 Ibid., p. 277 
 Real Risk, Perceived Risk and 
Acceptable Risk. Real Risk constitutes the actual risk level whether the decision maker is 
aware of the risk or not. Perceived Risk is the level of risk attributed to the action by the 
decision maker. Finally, Acceptable Risk constitutes the level of risk deemed acceptable 








There is no widely accepted view in EoC behaviour research regarding 
commitment71. Barton et al., in the EoC behaviour field, describe commitment as “an 
individual’s adoption of a stance in the appropriateness of a course of action.”72
Moreover, in this thesis commitment is actually considered to reflect more the 
investment of resources and a tying of hands, not just one’s belief. Thus another 
definition, from a pre-EoC behaviour author, is deemed more appropriate. Kiesler defines 
commitment as “the pledging or binding of the individual to behavioral acts.”
 This 
could be used as the definition of commitment for EoC behaviour, yet it is contended 
here that the actor may not always believe his actions are the most suitable later on in a 
project yet may continue with it because of outside pressures or simply to postpone 
failure. Using Barton et al.’s definition, escalating commitment would indicate that the 
actor is increasing his belief that his actions are appropriate. This is not necessarily 
correct. 
73
                                               
71 D. McElhinney and T. Proctor, ‘Concept of Entrapment and Decision-Making’, Management Decision, 
Vol. 43, No. 2, 2005, p. 190 and F. Luthans et al., ‘Organizational Commitment: Analysis of 
Antecedents’, Human Relations, Vol. 40, No. 4, 1987, p. 220 
72 S. L. Barton et al., ‘An Empirical Test of Staw and Ross’s Prescription for the Management of Escalation 
of Commitment Behavior in Organizations’, Decision Sciences, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1989, p. 532 
73 C. A. Kiesler, The Psychology of Commitment, (New York, USA: Academic Press, 1971), p. 30 
 Indeed, 
this definition implies the investment of resources. It also implies that the situation is 
predominantly a non-refundable condition, through the word “binding.” Finally, it does 
not explicitly refer to the actor’s state of mind, and this is preferable since an increase in 
the investment of resources is not always paired with a positive mindset. It also fits well 
with the three possible forms of escalation discussed above in that there can be a 
maintenance, intensification or deescalation of the pledging or binding of the individual 
to behavioural acts. One minor issue is that Kiesler discusses commitment in relation to 
the individual. EoC behaviour is argued to occur in more than just the individual DMU, 
thus the definition needs to be modified to make it more appropriate. Commitment then 




8.1.7 The Decision Making Unit 
 
It has been argued throughout this thesis that there is much uncertainty and lack of 
consistency in EoC behaviour research concerning the DMU. The fundamental issue here 
however is that although the term DMU has been used in previous chapters when 
referring to particular EoC behaviour authors’ works, very few authors actually use the 
term ‘Decision Making Unit’, even though they are referring to DMUs throughout their 
work. ‘DMU’ is instead used by the author of this thesis as a kind of ‘artifice’, to aid 
reader understanding when making points about certain pieces of research. The upshot of 
this is that there is no definition of what a DMU is and no explicit discussion concerning 
what types of DMU exist (applicable to EoC behaviour or not), anywhere in EoC 
behaviour research. There is a kind of intuitive treatment by EoC behaviour authors 
concerning what levels of analyses ‘are’ and what levels of analyses EoC behaviour can 
occur within. 
Regardless of DMU ‘types’, a definition of what a DMU is is needed immediately 
here. There are actually few definitions of ‘DMU’ available, and of those that do exist, 
many have nuances that are not applicable to EoC behaviour situations; particularly 
related to marketing. All definitions of a DMU however come from outside EoC 
behaviour research. The American Marketing Association, the Westburn Online 
Marketing Dictionary and Barron’s Dictionary all define the DMU.74
                                               
74 http://www.marketingpower.com/mg-dictionary-view747.php, 26/09/07, 
http://www.westburnpublishers.com/marketing-dictionary/d/decision-making-unit-(dmu).aspx, 26/09/07 
and http://www.answers.com/topic/decision-making-unit?cat=biz-fin, 26/09/07. 
 From these 
definitions, a DMU is, predictably, taken to mean a unit that makes a decision. Yet, 
although useful, these definitions cannot be used as working definitions for EoC 
behaviour, primarily because they all seem to be focussed upon buying decisions, when 
such decisions are not always the case in EoC behaviour situations. Something less 
specific is needed. A suitable, working definition of a DMU in relation to EoC behaviour 
comes from Abiola. Abiola states that a DMU is: 
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An individual or a group of individuals who are participants in a 
decision making process, who share a common goal or goals 
which the decision will hopefully help them to achieve75
Yet beyond a working definition of the function of a DMU, the types of DMU that 
exist also need to be settled. The predominant types mentioned by the authors above are 




In all existing EoC behaviour group literature, what constitutes a group is not fully 
defined. Rather, it appears to be assumed that the reader either has independent group 
dynamics knowledge, or that the intuitive understanding conveyed by the word group is 
enough. Such beliefs are fallacious, since the term group can convey several intuitive 
meanings. A working definition is necessary. A group according to Handy is “any 
 possibly considers the organisation to be a DMU 
type. This is deemed here to be a fundamentally false argument. The types of DMU that 
exist are argued here to be only the individual and the group. Moreover, it is argued that 
both types of DMU are applicable to EoC behaviour. The organisation is considered not 
to be a DMU because it does not actually make decisions; it is argued to be merely a 
context within which real DMUs may make decisions. However, a broad working 
definition of an organisation should be put forward (from the author): 
 
A organisation is a context within which a collection of 
interacting DMUs work towards a common goal or goals 
 
A possible third DMU may exist and this is the pair: two individuals working 
together. This suggestion however is too embryonic to be included any further in this 
thesis and requires further research. 
 
8.1.8 The Group 
 
                                               
75 R. O. Abiola, ‘Decision Making Unit (DMU) in Purchasing of Capital Equipment by Manufacturing 
Organisations in Nigeria’, Working Paper, (Federal University of Technology, General Studies 
Department, Akure, Nigeria: 2000), p. 2 
76 Two illustrative pieces of research are J. Ross and B. M. Staw, ‘Expo 86: An Escalation Prototype’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1986, pp. 274-297 and J. Ross and B. M. Staw, 
‘Organizational Escalation and Exit: Lessons from the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant’, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 36, No. 4, 1993, pp. 701-732. 
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collection of people who perceive themselves to be a group.”77 Perception is an 
important concept here then. An EoC behaviour author may believe that group research is 
being undertaken, when it may just be a random collection of individuals who are “happy 
to remain so.”78 Such research may be disregarded by others therefore who do not believe 
that the individuals perceive themselves to be a group. However, Handy’s definition 
alone is not detailed enough. A suitable definition for EoC behaviour research then is a 
summation of both Handy’s and M. and C. W. Sherif’s79
1. Common motives and goal(s);  
 definitions. A group is “a 
collection of people who perceive themselves to be a group” and have: 
2. An accepted division of labour, i.e. roles;  
3. Established status relationships;  
4. Accepted norms and values with reference to matters relevant to the group 
8.1.9 Resources, Non-Resources, Costs, Benefits and Outcomes 
 
The concept of the resource is treated ‘instinctively’ by EoC behaviour authors. 
There appears to be an assumption by these authors that the reader’s intuitive grasp of the 
term is enough. There is no definition of what a resource ‘is’, in EoC behaviour research, 
nor is there a definitive classification of resource ‘types’. From reading EoC behaviour 
research, resources are taken to mean things which can be used during a course of action. 
Moreover, authors’ portrayals of resource types differ; some authors recognise many 
resources, others only a small number. Even those authors who do recognise a number of 
resources often do not consider some of these resources in case studies in which said 
resources are actually being employed. Resource consideration also seems to be to be 
limited by whatever discipline the research is carried out in. 
Yet, crucially, it is posited that these limitations are merely symptomatic of the 
superficial treatment of a larger, more important process which concerns not only 
resources but non-resources, costs, sunk costs, rewards, the overall process of EoC 
                                               
77 C. Handy, Understanding Organizations (4th Ed.), (London, UK: Penguin, 1999), p. 151 
78 Ibid. 
79 M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology, (New York, USA: Harper and Brothers, 
1948), pp. 143-180 
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behaviour and, vitally, deciding success and failure. This important process must be 
treated in detail here, rather than in the ‘instinctive’ fashion it has been to date. Let us 
first characterise ‘the resource’. A resource here is deemed to be a feature of the physical 
environment that people value and use to meet a need. Now let us move on to the 
‘process’ under discussion. The process can be argued to begin with the investment of 
resources in a course of action. These investments could be termed ‘investment costs’ and 
are represented as values; used to attain a goal. The resources under discussion here 
consist of things like money, bombs, equipment and men and these are used in values 
such as ground assaults and bombing raids. Yet as noted above when looking at dollar 
investment in the Vietnam War, there are also what could be termed incidental costs. 
These are argued to be costs that, while sustained during the course of action, are not 
really costs sustained from values aimed at completing the goal; a subtle, yet important, 
difference. Moreover, incidental costs are considered to constitute resource costs and 
non-resource costs, rather than just the former. In terms of resources, incidental costs are 
considered to be things like money, dead troops and destroyed equipment. In terms of 
non-resources, incidental costs are things like general destruction, famine, instability of 
the economy, civilian deaths, mental damage, suffering and torture. However, this 
process is applicable to non-war situations too, yet war situations do provide greater 
clarity here. It is recognised that a number of observations need to be discussed in 
relation to the discussion so far. Yet, it is suggested that these concerns be put aside for 
the moment, to allow the discussion of the process to conclude. 
It is contended now that the constituents of both types of costs (investment and 
incidental) fall into the categories of either refundable or non-refundable (sunk). 
Refundable means here that the costs can be directly refunded ‘like for like’, even after 
they have been ‘used’; while non-refundable means that they cannot be directly refunded 
once they have been incurred. They are ‘sunk’ costs. It is contended that only resource 
costs are eligible to be classed as potentially refundable, not non-resource costs. 
Moreover, incidental resource costs are considered to be non-refundable (dead troops, for 
example). Thus, only investment costs are considered as potentially refundable. Even here 
however, only some resources can be counted as potentially refundable (living troop 
investment, for instance) and this depends upon the situation that is occurring. Moreover, 
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some resources are always non-refundable (time investment, for example). However, all 
costs (including investment and incidental and the subtypes) are considered to be 
potentially recoupable. ‘Recoupability’ is a theoretical concept invented in this thesis to 
aid understanding of the complete path of a project. ‘Recoupable’ is intended here to 
convey that costs can be potentially recouped in the form of outcomes; primarily80
                                               
80 It is recognised that rewards can occur during an action too, not just at the end, but these rewards are 
generally classed here as being received or ‘counted’ at the end, along with other rewards, to assist with 
the discussion. 
 at the 
end of a project (the ‘end’ occurs when investment costs cease totally). 
Fundamentally, outcomes can be in the form of (1) the goal itself, (2) a condition (if 
present), (3) resources and (4) non-resources (depending on the situation, it could be 
argued that an attained goal ‘includes’ or ‘is made up of’ some or all of the resources and 
non-resources delivered). This description however is considered to be an incomplete and 
potentially misleading picture regarding outcomes. Importantly, it should be understood 
that outcome costs may be sustained at the end of a project too, not just various benefits. 
This point conveys too that costs are not exclusively sustained during a course of action. 
The subject of ‘outcomes’ is indeed an important, multifaceted topic which needs 
expanding. 
At this time however several broad interconnected points are made. First, it is 
contended that outcomes can be arranged into a multitude of, subjectively created, 
‘types’; just as there are ‘types’ of cost preceding the outcome stage. Second, a number of 
these outcome types are thought to be ‘optional’ and do not occur in every situation. 
Third, and related to the former point, it is argued that the ‘forms’ (essentially, positive 
and negative) in which most of these ‘outcome types’ can occur are dependent upon the 
‘end state’ (most basically, the goal/condition attainment level) of the situation. Finally, 
most of these outcome types are considered to be unique to the end of a project; not 
occurring at any other point in the situation. A great deal more detail is necessary here for 
this discussion to be truly meaningful. However it is felt more prudent to provide such an 
expansion within the success/failure discussion below and, for now, leave the reader with 
an intuitive understanding of the process. Instead, in concluding this section, a series of 
brief observations are made concerning what has been discussed above. 
 242 
One issue that emerges from the discussion concerns the subjective nature of what 
one considers as ‘resources’ and ‘non-resources’. This issue influences, to some extent, 
the equally subjective issue of how ‘deep’ one goes when looking at what resources and 
non-resources are actually being used in a course of action. Both of these issues, it is 
contended, relate to a further, much broader issue of deciding how far one goes when 
deciding what costs are incurred in an action, as well as what beneficial outcomes are 
received from an action. Another point of friction is that, during a course of action, it is 
arguably difficult to decide if a recognised cost should be considered as an investment 
cost or as an incidental cost (a suicide bomber for example). More generally, there may 
also be difficulty in deciding if something is ‘non-resource’ or ‘resource’; clearly, this is 
related to what one considers as resources and non-resources. 
An additional observation is that some resources are present in every situation. One 
of these resources is ‘time’, another could be considered as ‘energy’. Some non-resources 
could also be considered to be present in every situation (such as pleasure and pain, or 
equivalent terms). Another comment is that, during a course of action, whether 
investment or incidental costs, some resources are ‘connected’, in that if one resource is 
used then another is used too. Similarly, some incidental non-resource costs are 
connected to incidental resource costs, and some non-resource costs are connected to 
other non-resource costs (wide scale generalised destruction and mental trauma, as an 
example of the latter). An important facet to emerge from this observation is that the 
dollar (representing here money in general) is often a ‘hidden’, complementary 
component of other costs (troops need to be paid, building destruction needs to be paid 
for and bombs cost money). One could further suggest that, where appropriate, similar 
relationships are also present when talking of ‘outcomes’. This entire consideration is 
important to the wider discussion above which argues that there is considerable 
subjectivity regarding what one considers as resources, non-resources, costs and benefits. 
This observation also has importance to a dispute regarding how refundable costs can 
also be considered as recoupable. 
If we travel to the end of the process momentarily, it has been argued that all costs 
expended during a course of action are potentially recoupable, in the form of beneficial 
outcomes. While it may seem odd that those costs that are classed as refundable costs 
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should still be considered as potentially recoupable (because they are generally ‘taken 
back’ by the DMU), the reasons they are is that, first, they still contribute to the potential 
rewards of the situation and, second, refundable costs may still incur sunk costs, owing to 
various ‘hidden relationships’, described above. It is correct however to argue that 
refundable costs should not be considered the same as other costs. In a hypothetical 
‘cost/benefit equation’ for example, they would not be counted as ‘costs sustained’ unless 
they were not refunded. And if they are refunded, these refunds would not be considered 
as ‘rewards’. This observation may have logical implications for one of the framework 
components: salvage costs. 
An interesting observation regarding refundable and sunk costs is that some 
refundable costs can change from refundable to non-refundable, and, sometimes 
simultaneously, from investment costs to incidental costs. Troops are refundable until 
they die. They are also considered as investment costs until they die; when they turn into 
incidental costs (a soldier being killed is not conducive to fulfilling a goal here; though 
this could be disputed; conversely a bomb is always non-refundable and is always an 
investment cost, since being destroyed is its ‘purpose’ – if a bomb is not used then it is 
not counted). If we stay with the end of the process, then a final observation is that most 
non-resource costs and some resource costs are not available in the ‘form’ of beneficial 
outcomes. If these costs are considered during a course of action, then to ‘balance’ the 
theoretical, input/output equation, it can be argued that such costs are ‘converted’ into 
other ‘permitted’ beneficial outcomes. Conversely, it could be argued that some 
beneficial outcomes are not available in the ‘form’ of costs. 
This concludes the main discussion relating to resources, non-resources, costs, 
benefits and outcomes. This discussion is based only upon the subjective opinions and 
observations of this thesis’ author and several conflicting opinions may exist regarding 
what has been set out. Furthermore, the discussion below concerning feedback, success 
and failure is felt to be ‘resources, non-resources, costs, benefits and outcomes: part two’, 





8.1.10 Success, Failure, Feedback and Goals 
 
Success and failure are contended here to be complex and highly subjective 
concepts. This assertion applies to non-EoC behaviour situations yet even more so to EoC 
behaviour situations. No EoC behaviour author fully explores success and failure; 
instead, the reader’s instinctive understanding of such terms is relied upon. Moreover, 
there is little general literature that examines critically the two concepts. The discussion 
below thus again represents the opinions and judgements of the author of this thesis. 
Furthermore, this discussion refers back to several arguments and discussion points raised 
within earlier headings. 
First, let us look again at one form of ‘failure’ that has already been discussed. 
When a situation undergoes what has been termed ‘unacceptable change’, failure can be 
argued to have occurred. It was argued above that if a goal and any possible ‘goal 
conditions’ (profit margins or amounts of particular costs to be incurred, for example) 
change either explicitly in the information statement or internally, then the action, as an 
EoC behaviour situation, has ‘ended’ and ‘failed’. Similarly, if any ‘means conditions’ 
are violated, either in the field, in the information statement or internally then, again, 
‘unacceptable change’ type failure has occurred. This entire form of failure however may 
actually now be better described not as real failure, but rather ‘quasi-failure’, given the 
discussion below. Let us now look at a second, more relevant, form of failure. 
It can be argued that in a given ‘end situation’, there has been no ‘unacceptable 
change’ – that is to say, there has been a definite end and no new ‘similar and connected’ 
situation has begun – but failure still occurs because the goal has not been met. Goal not 
met actually means either (1) neither the goal nor any conditions have been met or (2) the 
goal has been met but all or some accompanying conditions have not. The scenario in 
which (1) occurs involves the action ending (recall, this means investment costs cease) 
usually ‘voluntarily’ (the DMU could have continued the action but chose not to) or, less 
commonly, ‘by force’ (the project or the enemy, if present, dictates no option for 
continuance). The scenario in which (2) occurs is that the action ends, again, 
predominantly voluntarily, with the goal being met but all or some conditions that are 
present are not met. As an aside, in some situations, it is obvious that a condition has 
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been breached even though the action has not ended (e.g. time allowed for the project). 
Before discussing the arguments above, let us immediately move on to what success can 
be argued to mean. Success can be argued to be no unacceptable change and the goal 
and all conditions (if present) being met. So far, it seems a simple procedure for deciding 
success and failure. However, several subjective elements apply when deciding success 
and failure which are not tackled above and the description above is just one of a number 
of what could be termed perspectives on success and failure anyway. Both the subjective 
elements and the perspectives concern predominantly the topics of information, costs and 
benefits. It is felt that the reader needs to be made aware of both the subjective elements 
and the perspectives. To begin this discussion, let us recall and add some contextual flesh 
to the bones of the previous resource process discussion. One important way of looking 
at outcomes is to view them as either ‘positive’ (reward/benefit) or ‘negative’ (cost). The 
most obvious outcome from a situation is a goal and perhaps an adjoining condition, they 
are always positive outcomes, though are not guaranteed to appear. They are situationally 
dependent. Resources and non-resources are two further, and more complex, examples of 
outcomes, yet these could be classed as either positive or negative in nature, depending 
upon how they are delivered (as benefits or costs). It can be argued that resources and 
non-resources may occur as ‘semi-separate entities’ from the goal and possible condition 
(whether these are met or not) as miscellaneous ‘extra’ benefits and ‘extra’ costs; in 
addition to costs already incurred during the action. There is some intuitive likelihood 
however that if a goal is met then any ‘extra’ resources and non-resources will be in the 
form of positive benefits rather than negative costs. The contrary would also intuitively be 
true, where a failed goal would likely render ‘extra’ resource and non-resource costs. 
It would be more beneficial however for the reader to treat resources and non-
resources as the ‘raw materials’ or ‘building blocks’ of the various outcome ‘types’ to be 
discussed now, rather than as things that occur in isolation. For example, it is argued that 
there exist what could be termed ‘inevitable costs’ and, perhaps, ‘inevitable benefits’. 
These are outcomes delivered at the end of a project irrespective of the end situation. 
These are generally anticipated costs and benefits and relate to things like compensation 
costs for residents for noise pollution, which would occur whether a bridge construction 
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was completed or abandoned. Somewhat ironically, given their name, it is contended that 
inevitable outcomes do not always have to be present in a situation. 
Yet, as it has been argued, most outcomes are deemed reliant upon the end state of 
a situation. Consider now what are termed by Staw as ‘closing costs’. These are argued 
by Staw to be ‘objectively relevant’ costs that are incurred when a DMU quits an action, 
though closing costs here are expanded slightly to include costs that are incurred when a 
DMU fails to reach, principally, (1) a goal, but also (2) a condition and (3) not 
necessarily just by quitting the action. In short, here closing costs are the objective costs 
of failure. In a war, closing costs could include a loss of territory. In a building project, 
they may include redundancy packages and contractual fines. Every situation is different, 
but would likely contain some form of closing costs. It is suggested that these costs 
would likely be less severe if the goal was met but a condition was not, though this is 
situationally dependent. 
Importantly, another outcome type could be described very broadly as ‘cognitive 
outcomes’. Consider that some of the main motives Staw details as causing EoC 
behaviour are psychosocial in nature; it stands to reason thus that there are psychosocial 
benefits and costs that could emerge at the end of an action. Most simplistically, it can be 
argued that the DMU will likely experience non-specific or ‘unclassifiable’ pleasure and 
pain at the end of an action and, in turn, these feelings are largely dependent upon what 
‘state’ the situation ends in. Yet more specific and more complex cognitive benefits and 
costs can also be argued to emerge. 
Self-justification, internal binding (defined in the framework below), external 
justification, external binding, beating an enemy, punishing an enemy, being consistent 
and all going down together (known as the Towering Inferno Effect in the framework) 
are considered to be the most relevant elements of this discussion, though the reader may 
envisage more contributory elements. It is contended that these elements can all 
potentially contribute cognitive costs and benefits in a situation. One could argue that 
these elements are fairly predictable regarding what costs and benefits they create and 
under what circumstances they emerge. However, the situation regarding some of these 
elements is considered to be more complex than this argument portrays. 
 247 
Self-justification and internal binding are fairly predictable in that they will produce 
cognitive pleasure and pain depending upon how the situation ends. One could argue that 
benefits are produced if a goal (and potential condition) is met but costs are produced if a 
goal is not met or a goal is met but a condition is not. The same argument could be 
applied to the external facets. Here though, face would be the most logical reward or cost, 
not merely cognitive pleasure or pain. Face is an important concept here, although it is 
recognised to be not strictly cognitive in nature. Face relates to reputation or kudos, and 
is delivered in a positive or negative form. One could argue that face may also be 
received as a benefit even if the DMU quits an action; because outsiders recognise that 
the DMU has appreciated the situation. 
Beating an enemy arguably follows a different format from the previous elements. 
A goal could be met (which would likely be ‘beating the enemy’) and a condition may or 
may not be met, yet the DMU may still feel pleasure because the enemy was beaten. 
‘Extra’ cognitive costs would likely be received if an enemy was not beaten. The 
punishment of an enemy could also be argued to present counterintuitive results. A goal 
could be missed or met with an adjoining condition being missed or met too, but pleasure 
may still be received by the DMU as long as it felt that it had prolonged the situation in 
order to punish an enemy. The typical situation however would be of an action being 
forcefully halted by an enemy (it wins), when the DMU could have quit beforehand. The 
Towering Inferno Effect relates to the small group and the members’ wish to ‘stick 
together’ to the ‘bitter end’, despite overall goal failure being inevitable. Thus, if the goal 
fails through ‘force’, the group DMU may feel some cognitive pleasure associated with 
the failure. Consistency is also important when looking at cognitive costs and benefits. It 
can be argued that consistency benefits may be received, externally and internally, if a 
DMU finishes an action in any end state, except where it has voluntarily quit the action, 
since the DMU has remained consistent and steadfast. Even if the DMU quits however, 
consistency benefits may be received if a DMU spends a long time involved in the action 
before quitting. 
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A final outcome type is termed here as side bets. The concept of ‘side bets’ is a 
fluid one but, traditionally, according to Becker,81
It is hoped that this expansion of the resource process clarifies at least some of the 
points made under that heading. However it is recognised that a great deal more clarity is 
still needed. It is also recognised that the impact this discussion has on the success/failure 
debate is unclear. Let us move on therefore to discuss another element of the debate 
which will ultimately demonstrate the relevance of what has just been examined. It is 
contended now that there could exist a situation where the action ends and a goal is 
argued to have been met, yet another observer argues that, based upon the information 
given, he feels the goal has not been met and thus failure is claimed. A complicated 
addition to this example is cost related. First, an observer could argue in the same 
situation that the goal has indeed been met but because of the perceived level of overall 
costs sustained, the course of action is actually a failure. If goal conditions are added to 
 side bets are those facets of a situation 
which are usually built up over time and encourage commitment because if a situation 
was to ‘end’ these facets would cause costs. Staw includes side bets in his discussion of 
closing costs and this does have some utility. However, given that the closing cost 
definition was redefined to relate to the ‘objective costs of failure’, it is felt useful here to 
change too the definition of side bets to argue that while side bets can cause costs and are 
dependent upon the outcome of a situation, they now relate to those costs and benefits 
that are considered not directly intrinsic to a situation. It is contended that side bets in 
their new form – particularly regarding their potentially beneficial nature – cover the 
remaining outcome type that, it is argued, has not been previously covered: that of non-
situationally intrinsic, non-cognitive costs and benefits. Side bets here then are things like 
a promotion, a salary raise or set of new contracts, or conversely, demotion, getting fired 
or the loss of already held contracts. Side bets are not compulsory to every situation, but 
it is contended that they can exist in both forms simultaneously with only one form being 
realised; dependent upon the ‘end state’. It is contended that a goal and condition (if one 
is applicable) needs to be met for positive side bets to be realised, and a failure in any of 
these would result in negative side bets. 
                                               
81 H. S. Becker, ‘Notes on the Concept of Commitment’, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 66, No. 1, 
1960, pp. 32-40 
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this hypothetical situation, things become greatly more complex. Most simply, an 
observer could argue that (a) the goal and the condition (usually cost related, such as 
‘amount of cost type x to be incurred’) have been met and declare success. Yet, another 
observer could argue that (b) the goal and condition were not met; declaring failure. 
Another may argue that (c) the goal has been met but the condition has not, declaring 
failure. Finally, an observer could argue that (d) the goal has been met but the costs 
sustained are too high and either the condition is met or (e) not met; declaring failure in 
both cases. Although immediately difficult for the reader to isolate and recognise, 
opposing perspectives on the success/failure debate have been conveyed above, as well as 
a number of subjective facets that apply to all perspectives set out. The first conclusion is 
that sometimes a goal or condition being met or not met is subjective. Certainly, some 
situations will be more obvious than others, based upon the nature of the situation and the 
behaviour of the DMU. The DMU could ‘admit defeat’ publicly, for example, or a 
condition could be very obviously breached (e.g. time allowed). Interestingly, one may 
observe that side bets and/or face are delivered as either costs or benefits and so this 
would help to inform the observer as to whether the goal (and condition, if present) was 
deemed ‘not met’ or ‘met’ respectively. If a condition is present, then the presence of side 
bets and face costs may be less useful since it could be that only the condition was 
deemed ‘not met’ and not the goal. Consider however that these outcomes are not 
intrinsic to every situation. Several other points, discussed below, also question the utility 
of gauging success and failure by this ‘cost observation’. There is however an important 
reason that goal conditions are often the most subjective facets of a decision. 
Consider now the argument that the goal and any conditions being met, if present, 
are essential to declare success. Consider too however that that this is not the only aspect 
that must be considered. It is contended here that overall cost and benefit levels are 
essential too, when considering success or failure, including those sustained during the 
action. Namely, if the overall costs outweigh the gains, failure is the verdict, even if goals 
and any present conditions are deemed ‘met’. 
What is now crucial to take on board however is that costs and benefits are very 
subjective concepts in terms of what could loosely be termed breadth, depth and 
perspective. This is essentially why the condition of a goal was argued above to be often 
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the most subjective facet of a decision procedure, since goal conditions are 
predominantly cost/benefit related in origin (though goals themselves may also be, 
infrequently). The ways in which costs and benefits are subjective are considered to be 
too complex to discuss exhaustively here. However, important considerations involve the 
ideas raised in the resource process section. You will recall that the process header, on 
page 242 of this chapter discussed “the subjective nature...from an action.” The process 
section also discusses complementary or hidden costs and benefits that occur owing to 
relationships between certain resources and non-resources. Fundamentally, it is 
contended to be entirely subjective as to what one counts as costs and benefits and how 
deep one goes when looking at the amounts of costs and benefits received. This is crucial 
when judging success and failure and, more specifically, when judging whether a certain 
goal condition has been met or breached. Another important aspect includes subjectivity 
regarding what each type of cost and benefit is ‘worth’, since they are non-uniform or 
‘non-compatible’ in nature. How much in dollars, for example, is a dead soldier worth? 
And, if the goal is deemed ‘met’, just how much is goal x ‘worth’? How much is face or a 
particular side bet ‘worth’? Also, what dictates how much of some 
outcomes/costs/benefits are received on a given occasion? And what of projected costs 
and benefits? Just because a course of action ends, this does not mean that costs and 
benefits related to the course of action will not still occur, long into the future. Soldiers 
will still draw pensions and require rehabilitation and Germany and Austria-Hungary 
paid war guilt long after the end of The Great War. When does one stop? Another 
potential issue, regarding conditions in particular, is whether the observer counts gross 
costs or net costs apropos a particular facet. An equally subjective, condition related and 
more general, is whether one considers investment costs, incidental costs or both, during 
cost/benefit calculations. 
This investigation into subjectivity of costs and benefits could carry on. However, it 
is felt immediately that the discussion should move on, with regard to arriving at a 
conclusion. In summary of just one perspective then, a goal or a goal and condition must 
be deemed ‘met’ and overall benefits must be deemed to have exceeded overall costs for 
success to be declared. Conversely, failure occurs when (1) a goal is not met, (2) a goal 
(and by default, an accompanying condition) is not met or (3) a goal is met but not a 
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condition. Yet failure also occurs when (4) a goal or (5) goal with condition is met but 
overall costs exceed overall benefits. This is not the only way costs and benefits are 
important however. 
It is now contended that when success or failure has been declared as above, it is the 
cost/benefit final calculation which decides what could be termed the ‘hierarchy’ of 
situations in each discrete group (discrete group meaning ‘success’ or ‘failure’). Thus, a 
given goal and condition success situation is more of a success than another goal and 
condition success situation when the former has a greater amount of net benefits than the 
other. Somewhat counterintuitively, it is also contended that a goal ‘met’, failure situation 
(failure because of net costs) could be termed as a greater failure than a situation where 
the goal was not met. This could occur if the latter situation had a more favourable 
cost/benefit calculation than the former. 
In conclusion, it has been iterated throughout this section that success and failure 
are concepts that are prone to innumerable subjectivities and perspectives, and the author 
has attempted to represent just two of these perspectives (first, success and failure based 
on goal attainment and, second, success and failure based on the additional cost/benefit 
calculation) with additional mention of some of the relevant subjectivities. There are 
indeed limitless ways in which the success/failure debate can be manipulated. These 
manipulations rest primarily on two questions. First, ‘how are success and failure 
decided?’ and, second, ‘how, when and where are outcomes, costs and benefits 
awarded?’. In answering these multifaceted and interacting questions, the reader could 
create a ‘mix and match’ situation, where every element and step of the discussion can be 
tailored to personal preference. 
Consider for example the prevailing argument that the concepts of success and 
failure are based upon the overall costs and benefits of a situation and not solely the 
achievement of a goal. One could argue that only the achievement of the goal (and 
condition, if applicable) is necessary for success, regardless of costs and benefits. As an 
aside, this view is considered to be wrong, not least because Staw not only considers 
costs and benefits in his framework for continuing an action, but the framework is 
arguably ‘cost- and benefit-centric’ in that costs and benefits have primacy when 
deciding whether to continue an action, not merely the goal being still potentially 
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attainable; the goal is, in effect, ‘translated’ into a benefit value. Thus costs and benefits 
are important here. 
Yet in the discussion above, overall costs and benefits are used to declare success or 
failure, whereas Staw, in his framework, focuses upon the ‘situationally relevant’ and 
‘objective’ facets only; leaving aspects such as cognitive values outside of the ‘rational’ 
equation when deciding continuation of a course of action. Thus, the approach adopted 
by the author could be argued to be too broad and inclusive and, in turn, to be in conflict 
with Staw’s framework, in that it gives a ‘rational’ aspect to cognitive and other non-
situationally relevant elements of said framework. This is a sound argument yet 
paradoxically it is considered to be intuitively acceptable to adopt this approach when 
deciding success and failure but adopt only the rational cost/benefit approach when 
looking at the framework continuation mode. What the issue does create however is a 
suggestion that two additional outcome types are ‘situationally relevant’ and ‘non-
situationally relevant’, even here however there is likely to be a dispute as to what is 
relevant and what is not (it may be difficult to argue that some side bets are non-relevant, 
for example). This overall observation opens up another perspective however; where only 
objective costs and benefits are taken as pertinent when deciding success and failure, 
even if both types (objective and cognitive/other) are awarded as outcomes, for example. 
Another perspective is that only what are termed currently as non-relevant costs and 
benefits are taken as important. Mutually acceptable, diverging views of success or 
failure could be envisaged thus; depending upon what is the subject of the investigation: 
crudely, the situation, the DMU or a combination of both. An issue which should be made 
explicit here is that the above discussion also has relevance to costs incurred during an 
action. There is an innate link too between what is discussed above and what can be 
termed personal and professional interests during a course of action, which are in turn 
related to Agency Theory and the Tragedy of the Commons. Overall, it is considered that 
it would be more difficult to separate personal and professional interests and situation-
centric and DMU-centric costs and benefits in personalised, individual DMU situations, 
where the goal is ‘directly related’ to the individual than when the DMU is part of a large 
organisational project, for example. Another, complex, issue is that in a group DMU, 
group members could perhaps be viewed as ‘separate entities’ when considering and 
 253 
calculating success and failure and personal costs and benefits respectively. All these 
considerations could impact upon the structure of the framework itself; most plainly: 
‘what determinants are included and where’ not to mention undermining one of the 
foundations of EoC behaviour: predominantly irrational behaviour. 
Another issue that is just ‘assumed’ here is that non-situationally relevant outcomes 
are generally reliant upon the end state of the situation, as to their natures and presence. It 
may be that they are reliant upon some other aspects such as the situational costs and 
benefits (in that a negative balance results in negative non-situational outcomes) in 
isolation or in various combinations with the goal end state. Perhaps, both the goal state 
and the situational cost/benefit analysis need to be positive, for example, before positive 
cognitive/social benefits can be received. It is, however, difficult to see how some 
cognitive/social costs and benefits can be subject to anything other than the 
goal/condition end state of the situation. There may also be a subdivision between the 
goal and goal condition state as to what benefits and costs are received. How the situation 
ends is also important in that some costs and benefits are argued to be awarded only if the 
situation was ‘quit’ or only if the situation was ‘forced’. Deciding what is awarded in 
what circumstance could be subjective, as could deciding if a situation was actually quit 
or forced. More generally, there may also be dispute as to the outcome types success and 
failure actually produce (one could argue for example that a given outcome type emerges 
from failure rather than success, in a positive or negative form). A still further issue is 
that the cost/benefit situation may be all important when considering success and failure; 
more important than whether the goal/condition is met or not. 
Some final points of ‘clarification’ now. First, personal aspects like pleasure and 
pain are not always limited to non-situational considerations, since some EoC behaviour 
situations involve love and other emotional, non-material aspects as part of the goal and 
closing costs. Second, EoC behaviour literature talks of continuance primarily because 
the DMU ‘does not want to lose’ a particular ‘value’, whereas in reality the situation 
could be framed as the DMU continuing ‘in order to gain’ a particular value, since 
outcomes do tend to exist in positive and negative forms. Given that EoC behaviour 
situations do revolve around failure and a generally negative frame however, the negative 
connotation may indeed be the most suitable. 
 254 
Third, concerning unacceptable change and failure, there is possibly a theoretical 
conflict which, along with the proposed solution, needs to be repeated. It is argued earlier 
that if a situation ‘changes unacceptably’, then it has ended and failed as an instance of 
EoC behaviour. Yet, if failure occurs then one could argue that the resultant process of 
outcomes, as described in this section, should occur too. Although this is an attractive 
conclusion, when unacceptable change is argued to have occurred the outcome process is 
thought not to occur, though minor costs may occur as a result of this unacceptable 
change. The answer to this problem has already been implied: that the action is still 
continuing in a new but similar form, despite it having ended as an instance of EoC 
behaviour, hence the label: quasi-failure. This provides some satisfaction, yet another 
issue exists. The crucial issue here concerns deciding when an action has ended 
completely and another, totally new one has begun, regardless of the EoC behaviour 
context. This is a subjective, heap, concept. It does have some relevance to EoC 
behaviour in that an action may have changed and may or may not have changed 
unacceptably, according to the criteria set out earlier, but it may have changed to such an 
extent that observers view the action to have ended completely and a totally new one 
begun anyway; effectively instigating the success/failure outcome process. There is a 
dilemma then in deciding between change of a situation – incorporating acceptable and 
unacceptable change, in relation to EoC behaviour – and the real end of a situation, 
which could impact the validity of many of the arguments made throughout this thesis. 
This entire discussion requires further research, not least because logical conflicts may 
exist that have not been recognised by this thesis’ author, especially concerning the 
simultaneously existing types of ‘failure’ and ‘end of situations’ that are argued to occur. 
Fourth, the already subjective actions of counting costs and benefits as well as deciding 
what each is ‘worth’ could theoretically shift internally over time, revisiting the issue of 
unacceptable change. It should also be reiterated that the standard (goal and mean) 
internal shifts could indicate success when in fact failure has occurred. Fifth, a project or 
an enemy action could dictate that a particular amount of reinvestment is needed for 
continuance, yet this reinvestment will violate a goal condition. This would result in 
‘failure’ or ‘unattainability’ either way. Finally, more than one goal condition may exist 
in a situation. 
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The combinations of possibilities regarding success and failure and costs and 
benefits form a melting pot of perspectives and subjectivities and only a fraction of these 
have been discussed here, despite the arguably ‘tautological’ approach. Such 
‘tautological’ reasoning here however is important; more important than the arguments 
themselves, in that such reasoning expresses well the complexity of the situation. Such 
reasoning has particular relevance to three aspects of EoC behaviour: defining rational 
behaviour, the structure of the EoC behaviour framework and the raison d’être for EoC 
behaviour. 
Moving on now from the theoretical focus of this heading, a question posed earlier 
concerned whether the Vietnam War was a success or failure. Historians would deem this 
question to be an irrelevance; that the conflict was a dismal failure for the USA. 
McMaster, for example, introduces his book with the words “the disaster of the Vietnam 
War would dominate America’s memory of a decade that began with great promise.”82
It can be argued that the goal of the Vietnam War was, as a broad generalisation, to 
keep the South free from communist rule. Although not discussed explicitly above, 
history demonstrates that this goal ultimately failed.
 It 
may or may not be the case that the war was a disaster. However, as an aid for applying 
some of the complex points raised here, continuing the case study now is deemed useful. 
83 However, if we change history for 
a moment84 and argue that the war carried on until 1986 ending in a victory for the USA, 
could the course of action now be declared a success? It is suggested that given that costs 
are considered to be important to a course of action being declared a success or failure, 
the action would still have been a failure, owing to the net cost of the situation. Even if 
the war had been won in 1973, one could argue the same. Yet aside from this discussion, 
an interesting point raised earlier is that Nixon claimed he had secured success and peace 
with honour;85
                                               
82 McMaster is just one of many authors who take this view, H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon 
Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam, (New York, 
USA: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 1. 
83 Following the peace accords, conflict resumed between North and South Vietnam. Saigon fell to the 
North on April 30th 1975; see R. D. Shulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam 1941-
1975, (New York, USA: OUP, 1997), pp. 305-327. 
84 This is an accepted historiographical approach, called the counterfactual or “what if?” perspective. A 
typical example is R. Cowley (Ed.), What if: Military Historians Imagine What Might have been, 
(London, UK: Pan Books, 2001). 
85 Nixon, Peace with Honor... 
 a view in conflict with history’s view of the war. Why then does such a 
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conflict exist? The obvious explanation is that the peace with honour declaration 
occurred before the fall of Saigon. For the sake of making a theoretical point however, 
one could argue that Nixon felt that the course of action ended when the, ultimately 
violated,86 peace treaty was signed. Thus the goal was met. History paints a different 
picture. The Column of Tears,87 the White Christmas Evacuation88 and Operation 
Frequent Wind89 portrays failure of the US goal. However it is a matter of semantics, one 
could argue, as to whether the goal was met or not; based upon the perceived end point of 
the action. The end point is yet another subjective aspect of success and failure thus. 
However, even if one takes the theoretical view of the action ending at the treaty, the 
action could still be argued to be a failure owing to the costs sustained. The – broken – 
promise of military intervention if the North violated the treaty also figures in this debate, 
insofar as suggesting that the US action did not end at the treaty.90 Another facet of this 
discussion, perhaps more relevant to the first part of this case study, is that the renewed 
military action following the treaty – although not involving the US – was a form of 
intensification behaviour, following a period of deescalation; for the sake of 
differentiation, this could be termed reescalation. Further illustrating some of the 
theoretical points in the main discussion, it can be argued that the US suffered heavily 
from face and side bet costs. How the US lost face is self-explanatory.91 In terms of side 
bets, one can argue it lost the willingness of other countries to assist it in other campaigns 
against the USSR, since the US was seen to ‘cut and run’.92
                                               
86 R. T. Childress and S. J. Solarz, ‘Vietnam: Detours on the Road to Normalization’, in C. R. Nelson and 
K. Weisbrode, Reversing Relations with Former Adversaries: U.S. Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 
(Florida, USA: The University Press of Florida, 1998), p. 91 
87 J. Pimlott, Vietnam: The Decisive Battles, (Michigan, USA: Macmillan, 1990), p. 183 
88 J. E. Lee and T. Haynsworth (Eds.), White Christmas in April: The Collapse of South Vietnam 1975, 
(New York, USA: Peter Lang, 1999) 
89 L. H. Addington, America’s War in Vietnam: A Short Narrative History, (Indiana, USA: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), p. 157 
90 P. E. Haley, Congress and the Fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia, (New Jersey, USA: Associated 
University Presses, 1982) 
91 “Humiliation” is the predominant word here. For instance, P. R. Breggin, Beyond Conflict: From Self-
Help and Psychotherapy to Peacemaking, (New York, USA: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 213, S. Brown, 
The Crises of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years, 
(USA: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 49 and J. Meher, America’s Afghanistan War: The Success 
that Failed, (India: Kalpaz, 2004), pp. 83, 123. 
92 J. A. Fry, Debating Vietnam: Fulbright, Stennis, and their Senate Hearings, (Lanham, Maryland, USA: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), p. 160 
 The reader could reasonably 
apply several other points made in the main discussion to the Vietnam Conflict. However 
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it is deemed more prudent here to conclude the Vietnam case study now and move onto 
another subject related to success and failure: feedback. 
Feedback is information relating to the progress of a course of action; a ‘transitory 
report’ delivered to the DMU. Feedback can be in many ‘forms’, but it is delivered in two 
types: positive and negative. Feedback contains two important components. The first is 
whether the news is good or bad (positive or negative) and the second is related to the 
utility of continued future investment (glibly then, the nature of the feedback and the 
likelihood of ultimate success). Examples of feedback would be things like opinion polls, 
military victories/setbacks and cost under/overruns. Negative feedback is the main focus 
of an EoC behaviour situation, since negative feedback is where EoC behaviour starts. It 
is considered as beneficial to treat negative feedback as that which is unexpectedly 
negative (as opposed to everyday costs). Conversely, positive feedback is considered to 
be both what is expected and what is unexpectedly positive (above expectations). In 
competitive situations feedback delivered to a DMU is predominantly reliant upon and is 
the ‘opposite of’ the feedback delivered to the enemy DMU. Feedback is rarely clear cut; 
regarding its type and severity but particularly the forecasted outcome of reinvestment. 
Crucially, feedback interpretation is argued here to be subjective. It could be argued that 
a DMU could interpret a given feedback episode with ‘known’ facets as negative but 
with good, unknown, poor or no prospects or even adopt similar prospect predictions but 
with a positive feedback interpretation. Crucially there also exist information biasing 
factors. These can also have similar effects on DMU feedback interpretation. 
Theoretically then, this argument could mean that a DMU engages in EoC behaviour, 
from an ‘unbiased’ perspective, but, from its own perspective, it is not doing so, or, 
conversely, that it is committing EoC behaviour because of perceived negative feedback 
but the feedback is ‘actually’ positive. This issue, particularly the latter part – is complex 
and is a digression from this thesis’ aims; but it should be accepted that perception is an 
important facet when observing EoC behaviour. 
Finally, the previous chapters observe that some authors treat feedback in different 
ways; to the point where it may not even be necessary, in its most understood form, in 
considering EoC behaviour; recall Schoorman and Holahan93
                                               
93 Schoorman and Holahan, ‘Psychological Antecedents of Escalation Behavior…’ 
 for example. It is contended 
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that while Schoorman and Holahan’s work has merit, it should not be considered as 
standard EoC behaviour – or perhaps not even as an offshoot of EoC behaviour – since it 
is in essence basic cognitive dissonance reduction behaviour and it ignores Staw’s 
intentions when he envisaged the EoC behaviour hypothesis. EoC behaviour primarily 
deals with the real reactions of implementing a preferred choice – not just preferring one 
choice to another – and receiving genuine negative feedback; not pseudo-feedback as 
Schoorman and Holahan espouse. This thesis determines preference, implementation and 
real negative feedback to be essential components in virtually every EoC behaviour 
situation. As stated in earlier chapters, it is contended that Schoorman and Holahan’s 
overall premise is dubious anyway. A ‘course of action’ is ill defined here too. It is 
uncertain at points in their research if they are talking of different projects or the same 




One particularly relevant concept apropos EoC behaviour research concerns what it 
means to be rational. Rationality has a plethora of definitions but few exist in EoC 
behaviour research. Intuitively, the term evokes ideas of sensibility; things or actions 
making sense and actions being appropriate in accordance with some acknowledged goal 
such as “aiming at truth or aiming at the good.”94 Conversely, irrationality evokes 
images of passion, superstition, insanity and emotion overriding reason. Weber95 
provides a basis for much of the contemporary work on rationality; discussing multiple 
types of rational behaviour: Zweckrational (mathematical/logical/expectancy), 
Wertrational (belief systems/ethics/religion), affectual (emotional) and habitual (learned 
or systematic); where the final two types are subtypes of the first two. In contemporary 
research, Chase et al.96
                                               
94 S. Blackburn, ‘Rationality’, in S. Blackburn (Ed.), Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, (Oxford, UK: OUP, 
1996), p. 319 
95 H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (USA: OUP, 1958) 
96 V. M. Chase et al., ‘Visions of Rationality’, Trends in Cognitive Science, Vol. 2, No. 6, 1998, pp. 206-
214 
 argue that while the enlightenment era’s emphasis on 
mathematical probability remains important, other factors including bounded rationality, 
social norms, altruism and heuristics also play a part; behaviour cannot be judged as 
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rational or irrational in isolation from the human making the decision or the social 
environment in which the decision takes place. Sacrificing one’s life for another, for 
instance, is ecologically irrational but morally praiseworthy and eating the last dessert on 
the tray, while biologically rational for procuring energy, would be socially irrational. 
Smith too explores the addition of social norms in mathematical and economic models of 
rationality, ultimately asking “is it [still] rational to be rational?”97 It is no longer enough, 
Smith argues, to know that the actor is logical, we must also know what social pressures 
are playing upon the actor’s mind, and the workings of the actor’s mind itself, to 
determine true rationality. Other authors who explore rationality, still outside EoC 
behaviour but in the realms of IR, include Voss,98 Quattrone and Tversky99 and Streufert 
and Streufert.100
Maoz expresses several interpretations of rationality. Individual rationality (when a 
decision “maximizes the subjectively expected utility of the decision maker”),
 The latter argue for two distinct types of rationality, apropos leaders of 
nations: the rational view (the leader acts based upon logic and what is best for the 
nation) and psychological rationality (the leader incorporates what is best for himself in 
the decision making process). Agency Theory reemerges here then. 
Simply put, mathematical and Darwinian interpretations of rationality often clash 
with broader understandings of it. However, even if emotional and social inputs are 
included, no-one but the individual truly knows his own reasoning processes, nor the 
amount/composition of information he possesses or takes on board. Thus, from this 
perspective, one could argue that what the individual deems rational is rational. 
101
                                               
97 V. L. Smith, ‘Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology’, Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 99, No. 4, 1991, p. 888 
98 J. F. Voss, ‘Informal Reasoning and International Relations’, in J. F. Voss et al. (Eds.), Informal 
Reasoning and Education, (New Jersey, USA: Erlbaum, 1991), pp. 37-58 
99 G. Quattrone and A. Tversky, ‘Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice’, 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, 1988, pp. 719-736 
100 S. Streufert and S. C. Streufert, ‘The Development of Internation Conflict’, in W. G. Austin and S. 
Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, (Monterey, California, USA: 
Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 136-152 
101 Z. Maoz, ‘Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group 
Settings’, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1990, p. 82 
 group 
rationality (the extent to which a procedural, comprehensive and open analysis of all 
possible options results in a choice which reflects “a weighted aggregate of individual 
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preferences”)102 and outcome rationality (“a decision is judged in terms of its outcome, 
not on...how it was made”).103
The majority of EoC behaviour authors investigate EoC behaviour in terms of it 
being rational or irrational, with a focus upon examples which demonstrate the latter 
 Maoz’s final perspective relates to Janis’ argument that 
not all Groupthink decisions produce flawed results. Groupthink decisions are rational, 
using outcome reasoning; but only when a situation succeeds. 
An obvious question that remains however is: “is EoC behaviour rational or 
irrational?” There is apparent certainty among EoC behaviour authors regarding this 
question: the behaviour can be both, depending upon the situation and what is considered 
when continuing with an action. However, it is actually deemed impossible here to 
declare decisively if any single instance of EoC behaviour is rational or irrational. Indeed 
the problems of deciding rationality in EoC behaviour situations share much with the 
problems of defining escalation. Both terms are subjective as a function of the values, 
measures and perspectives adopted, by both the observer and the DMU itself. From the 
exploration of a number of the concepts above, it can be argued that the rationality of 
EoC behaviour is determined by many subjective, ‘optional’ indices; including 
mathematical/economic logic, social and ethical considerations, self-interest, 
costs/benefit accounting perspectives and depth, possible ‘autoepistemic type’ behaviour, 
coercion, feedback perception and attitude to risk. Ultimately, declarations of rationality 
or irrationality are considered here to be futile because such subjectivity abounds. This 
does not excuse EoC behaviour authors from not acknowledging this situation however. 
Yet, for the sake of an intuitive, working understanding, behaviour here is argued to be 
rational when it conforms to what can be termed loosely as ‘common sense’ and 
reasonable, long term profitable actions; where emotional security and personal 
considerations are acknowledged but take second place to more common goals and 
practices. 
 
8.1.12 The Utility of Escalation of Commitment Behaviour 
 




condition, using conventionally irrational determinants. Walton however, as described in 
chapters three and six, argues in detail that some instances of EoC behaviour are not 
merely rational but also optimal, when related to the concepts of autoepistemic reasoning, 
simulative reasoning and precommitment. Fearon also figures in this discussion. These 
concepts treat the DMU as rational when it deliberately meta-reasons about its own or 
another’s future reasoning for the greater good; and in this context, using a determinant 
of EoC behaviour that is generally considered to be conventionally irrational: sunk costs. 
Whether these precise forms of behaviour are relevant to EoC behaviour or not is 
uncertain. However, autoepistemic and simulative behaviour should be considered in 
EoC behaviour, though not as presented in Walton’s arguments. It is contended that EoC 
behaviour should only really count when unexpected negative feedback is encountered. 
Every PhD student and athlete alike knows before the regime begins that at points in their 
careers they will want to quit; the athlete in the cold winter months and the PhD student 
toward the end of the thesis. However, Walton’s arguments are certainly not redundant. 
Athletes should quit following a serious injury and students should quit when the project 
is falling apart. However, in cases where actors have initiated autoepistemic sunk cost 
reasoning before the unexpected setback, disaster may occur. They may continue with a 
genuinely failing/physically dangerous scenario, not just an anticipated difficulty, 
precisely because of their autoepistemic sunk cost behaviour. Therefore, autoepistemic 
reasoning should be considered as another EoC behaviour determinant, when a scenario 
arises were autoepistemic behaviour contributes to one continuing with a genuinely 
failing action. The athlete who continues to use a treadmill despite an injury because of 
autoepistemically invested sunk costs, not just standard sunk cost reasoning is a victim of 
the Autoepistemic Sunk Cost Effect (ASCE). Similarly, regarding the electronics firm 
example, when this simulative signalling manoeuvre fails, a Simulative Sunk Cost Effect 
could be suggested; where continuance occurs because of the sunk costs invested. In 
Fearon’s example too, the actor may continue because of the simulatively invested costs, 
even though the objective situation argues for withdrawal. Motive is an important facet in 
this situation, in that deciding why the DMU invested sunk costs in the first place (as a 
normal investment action or to purposely, psychologically, destabilise the enemy) may be 
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difficult. As an aside, autoepistemic reasoning could be hybridised to act in tandem with 
simulative reasoning, in competitive situations, as discussed in chapter six. 
So far however, only sunk costs have been included in this discussion. It is argued 
in chapter six that two other ‘conventionally irrational’ determinants of EoC behaviour 
could be included in the discussion of autoepistemic and simulative reasoning. These are 
external justification motives and the fluid concept of side bets. The framing schism of 
the DMU continuing so as ‘not to lose’ or simply ‘to gain’ does recur here though. 
Crucially, it is argued that both these facets do occur in the non-utilitarian form, not just 
the utilitarian form and thus should be included as EoC behaviour determinants under the 
umbrella subject of autoepistemic and simulative reasoning. The reader could conceive of 
more autoepistemic and simulative applications of determinants in future research. 
Something which has not yet been discussed is that autoepistemic and simulative 
precommitment behaviour may have an unconscious element attached to it. Not only 
could a DMU consciously consider its own or others’ weaknesses before undertaking an 
action, it could also act in what it believes is a ‘conventional’ manner while it is 
unconsciously acting autoepistemically or simulatively. This argument may be connected 
to the hybridised point raised above. 
 
8.1.13 Defining Escalation of Commitment Behaviour 
 
Although both escalation and commitment have been explored in this chapter, it is 
contended here that, put together, they still do not convey fully what it is to escalate 
commitment. It is considered impossible to create a definition that reconciles all the 
intricacies of the various interpretations of EoC behaviour. Thus, it is prudent to create a 
working definition of EoC behaviour, based upon the constituent concepts above, that is 
as attuned as possible without sacrificing the functionality and purpose of the research. 
Certainly, one can escalate commitment following positive feedback. However, EoC 
behaviour is based on the continuation of a project that is returning negative feedback, 
whether it is perceived or not. The likelihood of future success is fully considered in the 
definition because it has been demonstrated in chapters three and four that some authors 
only acknowledge EoC behaviour when continuance occurs despite there being no 
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chance of goal attainment following reinvestment while other authors only argue for EoC 
behaviour when there is at least the prospect of goal attainment. Yet it is contended here 
that all these conditions should apply simultaneously in the definition. It is considered 
here too that the DMU can be responsible or non-responsible for the initial action since 
most determinants apply to both situations. No mention is made of the DMU being ‘able’ 
to quit the action since it is thought here that in some cases the DMU simply cannot quit; 
either literally or because of the devastating consequences of doing so; yet chapters three 
and four demonstrate that many authors feel that the DMU must have an option to quit. 
The term unexpected is used in the definition to distinguish between a DMU continuing 
because it knows the negative feedback was to occur – as per autoepistemic reasoning, 
for example – and a DMU reacting to genuinely unexpected disappointment. The 
definition does not include the motives – or determinants – for the continuation as some 
definitions do. Nor does it comment upon the relative rationality or irrationality of the 
continuation. Ultimately then: 
 
Escalation of Commitment behaviour occurs when a responsible 
or non-responsible Decision Making Unit continues with a 
course of action that is delivering unexpected negative feedback 
and there is either some or no prospect of eventual goal 
attainment 
 
8.2 The Integrated Escalation of Commitment Behaviour Framework 
 
Now that the conceptual issues related to EoC behaviour have been explored and a 
suggested working understanding of each has been established, it is feasible now to 
implement the integrated EoC behaviour framework. To reiterate the historical context of 
this framework, there have been no other real attempts at an integrated framework 
following Staw’s 1997 effort. Some authors104
                                               
104 E. Biyalagorsky et al., ‘Stuck in the Past: Why Organizations Exhibit Escalation Bias’, Working Paper, 
(Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA: 2001), pp. 1-59, J. Morrison, ‘Against Better 
Judgment’ Masters Thesis, (Royal Roads University, B. C., Canada: 2002), Sabherwal et al., ‘Escalating 
Commitment…’, R. M. S. Wilson and Z. Qing, ‘Entrapment and Escalating Commitment in Investment 
Decision Making: A Review’, The British Accounting Review, Vol. 29, No. 3, 1997, pp. 277-305 and S. 
J. Hartman and B. H. Nelson, ‘Group Decision Making in the Negative Domain’, Group & Organization 
Management, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1996, pp. 146-162 
 have tried to include multiple 
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determinants of EoC behaviour in a summary, like Staw, but suffer many similar 
problems as him (discussed in chapters three, six and seven). 
The integrated framework of this thesis, then, possesses several important 
characteristics and serves a number of vital purposes, discussed already in chapter seven. 
Let us revisit one issue however, related to the structure of the framework. Recall that the 
framework is based upon Staw’s 1997 framework but with some notable differences. One 
difference is that the 1997 framework headings are modified here. One reason for this is 
that some headings are considered to be simply not necessary, because determinants 
contained with them can be ‘expanded’ to ‘less specific’ situations. This is the case with 
the ‘Contextual’ header. This argument ultimately reveals that each heading has a ‘level 
of specificity’; where some headings are applicable to every situation but other headings, 
while complementary to the more common ones, are only applicable in more specific 
situations. For example, the ‘Physiological Determinants’ header is applicable to every 
situation, but the ‘Organisational Determinants’ header is only applicable when the 
DMU is part of an organisation. Moreover, the ‘Group Determinants’ header is only 
applicable when the DMU is a group, whether part of an organisation or not. The 
proposed headings also reflect the exploration of the DMU issue, above. The modified 
headings allow all recognised forms of DMU to be represented evenly. The modified 
headings of the integrated framework then are as follows, with a visual guide regarding 
how ‘specific’ each heading is: 
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An important issue needs to be discussed now; before the framework is set out. The 
framework is designed to function best in what is deemed the ‘most common’ form of 
EoC behaviour situation: a goal-centric scenario where ultimate goal attainment is still 
potentially possible. Nevertheless, a situation can arise where there is no chance of a goal 
being attained, yet some form of investment is still possible. This is a multifaceted and 
complex situation, with implications for the structure of the framework. Importantly it is 
argued that EoC behaviour situations can include a hypothetical construct known as ‘goal 
conditions’. It is not the place here to delve into the meaning of these conditions again, 
except to say that goal conditions are considered to be relatively uncommon in EoC 
behaviour situations and include ‘conditions’ like ‘dollar profit margins’ and ‘time 
limits’. What does need to be understood however is exactly how the EoC behaviour 
definition and, most importantly, the framework treats goal conditions, particularly in 
relation to a feasible situation where the core goal itself remains potentially attainable 
(e.g. the completion of a bridge), following a feedback episode, but a goal condition (e.g. 
the estimated time limit) is not, (and thus the ‘overall goal’, in its broadest sense, is 
unattainable).105
First, the use of the word ‘goal’ in both the framework and the EoC behaviour 
definition is generally commensurate with the term ‘goal and goal conditions present’. 
So, the definition’s meaning, when the probability of ultimate goal attainment is argued 
to be zero, applies to situations where (a) the goal itself is unattainable (irrespective of 




                                               
105 One could argue that a further situation – where goal attainability is perceived to be certain following 
reinvestment – is relevant to the framework. This may be the case. However, it is deemed prudent to 
focus upon combining already posited situations for now and reserve exploring the utility of the 
‘guaranteed success’ condition for future research. It is argued that this inclusion would make more 
complex, among other things, the issue of goal conditions; since a further axis of behaviour would be 
present in a situation on top of being ‘potentially attainable’ or ‘not attainable’. 
106 It could be argued that goal conditions can be ‘met’ even in circumstances of main goal failure, (e.g. a 
main goal failed and ended in less than the time specified in a goal condition, or goal conditions are still 
potentially attainable in an ongoing situation where the main goal is deemed unattainable) but this is not 
argued to be the case here. Goal conditions are deemed to be irrelevant when the main goal is considered 
to be unattainable. 
) or (b) where it is possible that the goal itself can still be met but an 
adjoining goal condition cannot be met. Crucially however, it should be understood that 
in the framework below, only the main goal itself nuance (statement a) is implied when 
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the goal is discussed in terms of being unattainable, unless otherwise stated. To justify 
these apparently asymmetrical applications of the word ‘goal’, consider again how one 
could integrate clearly, into a framework, said situation where the main goal is potentially 
attainable but not a goal condition; and thus the overall goal is unattainable. 
It is contended that a number of determinants in the framework have what could be 
termed ‘manifold levels of discussion’: variable meanings dependent upon the EoC 
behaviour situation type being applied to the framework. In other words, it is considered 
that most determinants in the framework potentially apply only when there is a prospect 
of entire goal attainment. However, other determinants potentially apply (a) when the 
entire goal is potentially still attainable or when the entire goal is unattainable because the 
main goal itself is not attainable (recall that any conditions are considered irrelevant in 
this circumstance), (b) when the main goal is not attainable or when the main goal is 
potentially attainable but a condition is not, (c) when the entire goal is potentially 
attainable or when the entire goal is not attainable because the main goal itself is 
potentially attainable but a condition is not and (d) when the entire goal is potentially 
attainable or when the main goal is unattainable or when the main goal is potentially 
attainable but a condition is not. 
Most determinants in the framework are self-explanatory as to which circumstance 
they apply to. However, where it is not thought to be clear, explanation is given. Some 
important qualifications are need here though. The first is that some readers may consider 
differently, in terms of ‘situation applicability’, some of the determinants. They may also 
consider new ‘combinations’ of applicability than those outlined above. Future 
framework determinants may also be subject to the same effects. The second and more 
relevant qualification revisits the reason for the exploration of the possible applications in 
the first place: in the framework below, only the main goal itself is implied when the goal 
is discussed in terms of being unattainable. While goal conditions are deemed a valid 
addition to EoC behaviour from this thesis, they are not included in the relevant 
determinants in the framework itself, under conditions of an unattainable goal, for several 
reasons. 
As stated earlier, the framework is best suited for situations where there is at least 
the prospect of complete goal attainment. Yet, while it is deemed acceptable to allow into 
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the framework the ‘less compatible’ situation of goal attainment potential being zero 
owing to the main goal being unattainable, including the situation where goal attainment 
potential is zero owing to the goal conditions being unattainable would make the 
framework too unwieldy and repetitive, relative to the limited positive impact that would 
be felt. Overall, the relative rarity of goal conditions in a situation, not to mention the 
circumstance where a condition is both present and unattainable, does not justify the 
added complexity that would be created if goal conditions were to be included in the 
framework under conditions of ‘goal unattainability’. 
One situation which is also feasible is where the main goal is unattainable because 
there are what could be termed ‘absolute limits’ on the goal conditions of a particular 
situation. To expand, above it is suggested that goal conditions can always be violated. 
However the point here is that it is possible that a situation could exist where the goal 
conditions simply cannot be violated. Examples would be absolute timetables (Expo ’86 
or the 2012 London Olympics) or inviolable budgets (organisational/governmental 
coffers). One could therefore envisage a situation where the goal is considered 
unattainable because the goal conditions cannot be modified, though it is acknowledged 
that the goal could also be unattainable anyway (whether the violation was allowed or 
not). Importantly however, by expansion this situation would also imply that not only is 
the goal unattainable, but that failure is effectively inevitable because the margins of the 
conditions cannot be fudged. Enemy behaviour could also present a type of inevitability 
of failure too (in a war for example). Although it is stated above that goal conditions are 
not included in the framework as part of the goal being unattainable, this ‘non-violation 
and failure inevitability’ situation is included in the framework because it is viewed as 
part of the main goal being unattainable rather than being ‘condition-centric’. 
To return to the main discussion, the determinants deemed applicable, when the 
goal is unattainable owing to goal conditions, are outlined now. However, this discussion 
is not definitive; rather it is the author’s opinion and so represents a further research 
opportunity for the reader, not only regarding the addition of more determinants to this 
discussion but in terms of including ‘unattainability owing to goal conditions’ in the 
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framework in a way that reduces the unjustifiable complexity that would occur.107
Clarity of feedback also is an important determinant here, as is the availability of 
alternatives, an inability to quit, whether investment is passive or active and the amount 
of time available to make the escalation decision. Aside from the more ‘rational’ 
economic motives, other determinants include: psychological determinants (self-
inference, internal binding, cognitive scripting, information biasing, Illusion of No 
 The 
number of applicable determinants where goal attainability potential is zero owing to goal 
conditions is sizeable. For greater understanding, the reader is advised to identify the 
nature of each of these determinants from the framework first and then return to the ‘no 
condition’ specific points made here. 
To begin, one could argue that a DMU would continue with a course of action 
despite the goal being unattainable, owing to goal conditions, because, most basically, the 
marginal gains of goal achievement – even with a condition not being met – exceed the 
marginal costs of the same course of action. However, even when the marginal costs of 
goal achievement without the condition exceed the marginal gains of the same, the 
additional costs of quitting the main goal may exceed the net marginal costs of achieving 
the goal without the condition, thus encouraging continuation. Overall, this is a greatly 
more complex equation than the equation which deals solely with the entire goal being 
potentially attainable. Closing costs are a crucial factor to consider here, as perhaps are 
some types of side bet, especially concerning the division of any closing penalties related 
to the main goal and the goal condition. Comments made in the main framework 
concerning marginal gains and costs may also relate to this goal condition discussion. 
                                               
107 A still further yet important complexity which applies to both the main framework and to the goal 
condition situation involves a less likely but still possible situation where (a) the goal has already been 
attained and a goal condition is still potentially attainable, thus the situation as a whole is still potentially 
attainable and (b) where the goal has already been attained but the goal condition is not thought to be 
attainable, yet investment continues (in other words, in both cases investment does not necessarily need 
to cease after main goal attainment as is perhaps implied in this introduction to the framework). This is a 
subtle complexity, and although not included explicitly in this discussion, (some minor conflicts with 
what has been stated above do exist, especially related to statements a and b concerning what an 
unattainable situation is, statements a-d concerning determinant applicability arrangements, and the 
condition related determinant list above), it is believed that without great difficulty, situation (a) of this 
footnote can generally be applied to the framework situation already and, with a little more alteration, 
situation (b) can generally be applied to the conditions introduction presented here. More study is 
required however, to include these situations intrinsically in this discussion. The reasons why these 
situations  have not been included to the level of other considerations is that it is thought that yet more 
added complexity would damage the discussion greater than any added utility. 
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Choice, consistency and learning motives, postponement of failure, PCH effects and some 
elements of Prospect Theory), social determinants (external binding, social information 
biasing, some elements of manipulation, competition and conflict, pressure and 
resistance, inertia, the Saboteur Effect and cultural norms), group determinants (intra-
group manipulation, group conflict, group pressure and resistance, group norms, group 
inertia, group conformity pressures, Towering Inferno Effect, Newgroup Syndrome, 
communication structure, social loafing, group size and leadership style) and 
organisational determinants, (some limitation techniques, Agency Theory, and 
institutionalisation). Finally, it is contended that the moderators/intensifiers (e.g. age) 
described throughout the framework, also apply in ‘goal conditions unattainability’ 
situations. One final point before examining the framework regards the likelihood of 
some determinants being related to other determinants in various ways. This is not 
discussed in depth in the framework and thus is yet another research opportunity. The 
kind of relationships between determinants may include those such as moderating and 
intensifying effects, synergistic effects, the need for one determinant being present in 
order for another to be present and the presence of one determinant excluding another. 
Let us now move immediately on to the integrated framework itself. 
 
8.2.1 Physiological Determinants 
 
The physiological category refers to the physical and biological characteristics of 
the DMU or constituent parts of the DMU in the case of a group. These determinants are 
present in every situation. These ‘determinants’ however could perhaps be better 
considered as intensifiers or moderators of several other determinants in the framework, 
in multiple ‘situations’ (regarding possibility of ultimate success), rather than as 
‘standalone’ EoC behaviour determinants. 
 
Age of the DMU 
 
It is suggested here that the age of the DMU, or the aggregate age for a group, is a 
key but unresearched EoC behaviour determinant. It is contended that as the age of the 
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DMU increases, certain forms of ‘irrational’, psychologically motivated, EoC behaviour 
will decrease; for several reasons. First, it is suggested that age tends to be concomitant 
with work experience, deemed here to be a positive psychological determinant too. It is 
suggested that greater age also reduces the felt need for the DMU to prove itself, as a 
younger DMU might feel expected to do. However, in a group scenario, it is argued that 
although aggregate age is important, the age of the leader and the dominant members 
matter too, since they will have a disproportionate effect on proceedings. Conversely, it 
could be argued that older DMUs, especially if they are experienced, may feel as if they 
are expected to ‘be a success’ and thus feel obligated to escalate commitment more than 
younger, inexperienced DMUs. 
 
Gender of the DMU 
 
Brockner and Rubin108
Although there are several different cultural determinants of EoC behaviour, such 
as the small group culture and the culture of the organisation, there is also an overriding 
cultural effect that is related to the DMU’s nationality. Chapter four discusses authors
 argue that the individual DMU is more likely to escalate 
based on ‘irrational’ motives when he is male, owing to predominant behavioural 
differences between the sexes regarding risk treatment and justification motives. 
However, in a group scenario, Brockner and Rubin argue that it is females who 
‘irrationally’ escalate more than males owing to a reversal of sexual identity. In a group 
therefore, it is suggested that the effect of gender on EoC behaviour is a combination of 
the numbers of males and females and what genders hold the most dominant positions 
within the group. 
 
National Culture of the DMU 
 
109
                                               
108 J. Brockner and J. Z. Rubin, Entrapment in Escalating Conflicts: A Social Psychological Analysis, (New 
York, USA: Springer-Perlag, 1985), p. 96 
 
109 C. W. Chow et al., ‘Escalating Commitment to Unprofitable Projects: Replication and Cross-Cultural 
Extension’, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1997, pp. 347-361, S. B. Salter and D. J. 
Sharp, ‘Agency Effects and Escalation of Commitment: Do Small National Culture Differences Matter?’, 
The International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2001, pp. 33-45, D. J. Sharp and S. B. Salter, 
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who argue that national culture affects one’s propensity for EoC behaviour. In a group 
context, it is suggested that the national culture effect is an aggregate effect of the 
members’ nationalities, the nationalities of the more dominant or powerful members and 
the country in which the group is operating. The final condition would arguably also 
apply to the individual DMU. Overall, different nationalities are likely to encourage EoC 
behaviour to various degrees. 
 
8.2.2 Project Determinants 
 
Of all the categories, the project determinants could be considered to be the most 
‘objective’ and ‘rational’ factors in causing EoC behaviour. 
 
Clarity of Feedback, Exogenous or Endogenous Reasoning and the Efficacy of Further 
Investment 
 
Finlay et al. argue that “decisions based on less than perfect knowledge are 
unavoidable.”110 While arguably not true for every situation, it is agreed here that the 
clarity of any feedback is indeed a crucial EoC behaviour determinant. Feedback (in a 
negative sense) has two dimensions: how bad the setback is and what the chances are of 
ultimate goal attainment following reinvestment. Staw’s research argues that the clearer 
the negative feedback is that reinvestment will or will not succeed, the more likely it is 
that the DMU will act for maximum utility, or at least be less subject to justification 
motives. However, more ambiguous information will cause the opposite effect. As part of 
this calculation, Staw further argues that111
                                                                                                                                            
‘Project Escalation and Sunk Costs: A Test of the International Generalizability of Agency and Prospect 
Theories’, Journal of International Business Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1997, pp. 101-121 and C. R. Greer 
and G. K. Stephens, ‘Escalation of Commitment: A Comparison of Differences between Mexican and U. 
S. Decision Makers’, Journal of Management, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2001, pp. 51-78 
110 D. J. Finlay et al., Enemies in Politics, (Chicago, USA: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 96 
111 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update and Appraisal’, in Z. Shapira (Ed.), 
Organizational Decision Making, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 197 
 whether the setback is deemed exogenous or 
endogenous will help determine whether the project is continued or not. If further 
investment is deemed by the DMU to be efficacious then EoC behaviour will be more 
likely to occur than if it is deemed wasteful. This reasoning is certainly prospective in 
 272 
nature. However, feedback interpretation is considered to be subjective and it may further 
be skewed by information biasing processes; reiterating the argument that perception is a 
crucial consideration here. Bowen believes that reinvestment in potentially attainable 
situations is rationally founded112 and only reinvestment in non-attainable situations 
should be classed as EoC behaviour; in opposition to Staw in several ways.113
This determinant, from Staw,
 Other 
authors argue that EoC behaviour can apply in both potentially attainable and non-
attainable circumstances and this thesis prefers this view. Expectancy Theory investigates 
these issues further. 
 
The Future Expenditure Required to Reach the Payoff 
 
114
                                               
112 ‘Potentially attainable’ means that the situation is also equivocal. The DMU ‘rationally’ reinvests to 
obtain more information about the situation, according to Bowen. 
113 Staw clearly conveys in his research that EoC behaviour situations predominantly involve equivocal 
information (they are rarely definitive as to predicted outcome) and that they are certainly not always 
rationally extended. 
114 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update…’, p. 197 
 is linked to Expectancy Theory. If predicted 
marginal benefits (those benefits that are yet to appear) exceed predicted marginal costs 
(those costs that are expected to be incurred) regarding a potentially attainable project, 
then it can be argued to be entirely ‘rational’ to continue a course of action. This 
determinant can be contrasted with the continuance of a project despite predicted 
marginal costs exceeding predicted marginal benefits because the costs of quitting the 
project are higher than the net costs of carrying on. It can be argued, using this reasoning, 
that in some cases goal failure may be preferable to success because some rewards have 
already been received and the DMU has a positive cost/benefit ratio, and if the DMU 
continues, even though it is predicted to complete the goal with a positive balance, the 
cost/benefit balance may not be as great as if it quit the project now. However, most 
situations have the gains at the end and any other situations would likely contain heavy 
closing costs as a deterrent against such behaviour. This facet is discussed when sunk 




Closing Costs and Salvage Value 
 
These closely connected determinants concern cases where it is recognised that the 
costs of continuing to a potentially attainable goal (or perhaps even that the project is 
unattainable or even failure-inevitable) are likely to be greater than the perceived 
potential gains, but it is judged too that the overall closing costs, received from 
terminating the project (redundancy payments, clauses, decommissioning a partially built 
nuclear plant, lost territory in a war) will be greater than those of continuing (or perhaps 
continuing for a very long time in the case of an unattainable or failure-inevitable course 
of action). Similarly, projects that have large intangible costs such as salaries and 
insurance payments will have a lower salvage value than projects where costs are 
invested in machinery, where at least some refund can be made. Thus, low salvage value 
and high closing costs, according to Staw,115
                                               
115 Ibid. 
 encourage EoC behaviour. The 
consideration of salvage value however is deemed here to be a potentially irrational 
determinant of EoC behaviour rather than a rational one. There is a sunk cost ‘feel’ to 
considering the salvage value of a situation when deciding whether to continue or not, 
since the DMU is looking back at what it has invested. Perhaps what should also be 
considered here is the modified interpretation of side bets (in the success/failure 
discussion). Although argued to be a DMU-centric determinant of EoC behaviour, side 
bets could be argued to have some situational relevance in some circumstances, such as 
the award of new contracts upon success, or loss of existing contracts after failure. 
However for uniformity, side bets should be considered, for now, as a psychological 
determinant. Another consideration is the issue of costs sustained during an action that 
are not situationally relevant or objective. Finding a place to put these costs is difficult in 
the current framework. They are not thought to be considered when calculating marginal 
costs and gains, but they are arguably more than mere psychological considerations. 
Moreover, there is a perhaps a case for the consideration of a further, hypothetical set of 
equations labelled here as ‘closing gains’: the benefits of a DMU quitting and/or failing 
an action; if only to complete the ‘set’ of equations presented. Furthermore, there may be 
some very subtle cost/gain differences in equations depending upon whether a DMU 
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considers failing or quitting an action, but this is an embryonic argument. In truth 
however, closing gains would likely be only psychosocial in nature. Indeed, as argued 
earlier, some psychosocial elements such as external justification, punishment and 
consistency are potentially positively awarded after failure and/or quitting. 
 
Timing of Rewards and Costs and the Project Structure 
 
Many projects involve irregular concentrations of rewards and costs during their 
lifetime. It is argued116
Running parallel to this situation is the project structure. If the project is structured 
as an investment situation (a situation where one’s inputs are directly linked to the 
likelihood of the project succeeding), then negative outcomes are considered less 
alarming than if inputs are considered as expenses. Furthermore, if the DMU does 
reexamine the project, then future success is more likely to be expected than if the project 
is set in a non-investment frame.
 that a DMU will be more likely to continue a project when costs 
are expected first anyway, followed by benefits at some future date. A likely reason for 
this is this structure would more likely present a positive cost/benefit ratio upon 
reconsideration, regarding a potentially attainable goal. Perhaps EoC behaviour, more 
generally, is more likely too because there is very little to distinguish between a 
genuinely failing project and expected upfront costs. This situation is less likely in 
situations where benefits closely follow cost expenditures, since if this project type failed 
to deliver benefits soon after starting, the manager would be more likely to perceive a 
problem. 
117
                                               
116 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents, Prototypes and Solutions’, 
Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol. 9, 1987, p. 47 
117 Ibid., p. 46 
 This discussion raises the issue that there are several 
subtle types of investment. The first is investment which is aimed at achieving the goal 
but may not definitely do so, and the second is investment which is not only aimed at 
achieving the goal but is directly linked to the goal being achieved in a mathematical way 
(increasing investment directly increases the completion ‘level’ of the project). Both of 
these types are separate from the investment context; the basis of an EoC behaviour 
situation. Another issue regarding costs, benefits and project structure regards a situation 
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where there is a possibility of goal completion following a setback but the marginal costs 
of continuing to the goal exceed the marginal gains and the costs of quitting immediately 
are less than the net costs of the DMU carrying on to goal completion. However the 
project may be ‘staged’ in such a way where the DMU may be able to continue to a 
certain point in the project, (but before the end of the project) where gains exceed costs 
up to this stage. This particular issue could perhaps be applied too to situations where 
there is no chance of goal completion or where the goal conditions cannot be met. 
 
Availability of Alternatives 
 
Staw suggests118
                                               
118 Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment: An Update…’, p. 197 
 that if there is a choice of alternative courses of action to pursue 
following negative feedback in a still potentially attainable action then EoC behaviour is 
less likely to occur. However, if there is a lack of viable alternatives or there have been 
too many costs incurred already for others to be afforded, then EoC behaviour is more 
likely to occur. 
 
Inability to Quit 
 
It can be argued that the DMU escalates commitment to a course of action 
following negative feedback because it is physically, legally or bureaucratically unable to 
quit. This inability can be related to many aspects of life from drug addition and 
blackmail to contractual obligations. In reality however it is suggested that a DMU, 
unless being held hostage, can practically always quit an action and that it is the 
consequences of quitting that makes the DMU believe it cannot quit. This distinction 
however is ambiguous. Although the DMU may be physically able to quit an action, it 
can be argued that disastrous consequences may make the action effectively inexorable. 
The Illusion of No Choice explores this distinction more. It is argued that an inability to 




Passive or Active Reinvestment 
 
Brockner et al.119
                                               
119 J. Brockner et al., ‘Factors Affecting Withdrawal from an Escalating Conflict: Quitting Before it’s too 
Late’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 5, 1979, p. 494 
 argue that if the method of reinvestment following a setback is 
passive rather than active, then EoC behaviour is more likely to occur since DMUs tend 
to avoid changing the status quo of a situation; either consciously or through neglect. It 





It is suggested here that the length of time available to make an EoC behaviour 
decision can affect behaviour. If there is little time to decide, information may be 
processed/viewed incorrectly, encouraging EoC behaviour. More simply, it is suggested 
that if time is short, EoC behaviour will be the choice since the DMU does not want to 
quit without considering all the options and so will continue in order to obtain more time 
to consider these options. This situation may become cyclical where there will never be a 
situation where the DMU has enough time to properly consider its choices. This 
determinant could arguably apply to all attainability situations. 
 
8.2.3 Psychological Determinants 
 
These are determinants that move beyond the objective nature of the project and are 
reliant upon the nature of the DMU itself. These factors tend to be predominantly less 
‘rational’ and more egocentric in nature. As has already been mentioned, generalised 
cognitive pleasure and pain can inform a decision whether to escalate or not, yet more 







Following a setback, Staw120
This is deemed a highly prospective and thus potentially rational tool for deciding 
whether to escalate commitment or not following a setback. Expectancy Theory is 
represented using the formula MF=EIV, detailed on page 35 of this thesis. Thus, using 
Expectancy Theory correctly, according to Staw and Ross,
 argues that self-justification motives may occur, when 
the goal is still potentially attainable. These motives originate if the DMU made the 
original decision (or perhaps just continued with an adopted action) because the DMU 
does not wish to admit that it has made a mistake and that the action is failing. Thus the 
‘solution’ is to invest more and carry on with the failing project and to hopefully prevail, 





Although a moderator of ‘irrational’ EoC behaviour, this theory is related to 
Expectancy Theory in that it is also a prospective reasoning technique. The theory argues 
that following a setback, the DMU will strive to improve its degree of rational, 
prospective reasoning. This process can involve the more prudent selection of 
 it is likely that EoC 
behaviour in a badly failing project will cease. The problem with Expectancy Theory 
however is that it can be skewed by other psychological factors, such as information 
biasing. This is because the measures used in the theory are highly subjective and based 




                                               
120 B. M. Staw, ‘Knee Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen Course of 
Action’, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1976, p. 29 
121 B. M. Staw and J. Ross, ‘Commitment to a Policy Decision: A Multi-Theoretical Perspective’, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1978, pp. 43-45 
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The Gambler’s fallacy occurs when the gambler (DMU) believes that previous 
negative feedback in an action means that the action is more likely to succeed in the 
 argue that various reinforcement traps can encourage EoC 
behaviour following a setback in a still potentially attainable situation. If the history of 
the project has been mostly positive, then the DMU may continue owing to a belief that 
the current setback is an anomaly; which may indeed be true. If the history has been 
highly positive, then the DMU may fall victim to an Illusion of Invulnerability, where the 
setback is ignored altogether. If negative feedback is predominant in the history, then the 
DMU may fall victim to Learned Helplessness, where the DMU believes its actions have 
no bearing upon the results produced. Finally, if the history of setback and success is 




Self-inference dictates that DMUs may escalate commitment following negative 
feedback because they cognitively view their own prior investment actions and then infer 
beliefs and values from them. If a DMU invests in a situation, then it infers from this 
action that it believes the action is sound and so must invest further in it. Self-inference 
applies to potentially attainable situations, but it could be argued that it applies to 
unattainable situations too. 
 
The Gambler’s Fallacy 
 
                                               
122 Ibid., p. 45 
123 Ibid., pp. 41-45  
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future, because the DMU is due a win.124
The broad definition of the SCE dictates that the DMU will reinvest in a potentially 
attainable situation in order to justify and prevent the wastage of previously incurred, 
sunk, costs. Garland
 However, unless the sunk costs are also the 
‘direct relation’ form of investments, this belief is fallacious. This factor, then, is linked 
to both the project structure and the SCE. 
 
The Sunk Cost Effect  
 
125
It is argued here that autoepistemic reasoning – an act argued by Walton
 argues that it is the relative quantity of sunk costs that determines 
the severity of the SCE rather than the absolute level of costs. 
 




 to be a 
positive decision making tool for unpleasant decisions – may backfire when combined 
with sunk costs to create what could be termed the ASCE. This effect occurs when a 
DMU deliberately invests a large amount of sunk costs into an unpleasant project, 
predicting that in times of weakness it will knowingly and willingly fall victim to the 
SCE and so carry on; not wanting to waste its very large investments. However when an 
unexpected negative feedback episode occurs, the DMU continues with a potentially 
attainable situation precisely because of these autoepistemic sunk costs. Thus, a useful 
psychological tool may backfire to encourage EoC behaviour in what could be an 
‘irrational to reinvest’ project. The ASCE is more complex than this, however the 
complexity that requires mention here is that other factors may also be ‘utilised’ in an 
autoepistemic manner and thus fall victim to the Autoepistemic Effect (AE). 
 
 
                                               
124 Staw, ‘Knee Deep…’, p. 30 
125 H. Garland, ‘Throwing Good Money after Bad: The Effect of Sunk Costs on the Decision to Escalate 
Commitment to an Ongoing Project’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 75, No. 6, 1990, p. 728 
126 D. Walton, ‘The Sunk Costs Fallacy or Argument from Waste’, Argumentation, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2002, 
pp. 473-503 
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Postponement of Failure 
 
Based on work by Karlsson et al.,127 it is suggested here that even when feedback 
dictates that further investment will not attain the goal, or that, arguably, other indices 
dictate that quitting a potentially attainable goal is ‘rational’, EoC behaviour may still be 
the DMU’s preferred option in order to postpone the dissonance associated with goal 
failure. Politicians may utilise this technique in order to choose the least damaging time 
to admit failure – far from elections – perhaps even choosing to end the project as they 
leave office. It is suggested here however that such postponement techniques may lead to 
the right time to quit never actually appearing; thus the action, where possible, may drag 
on indefinitely. An indefinite situation, where applicable, may actually be preferred; 
where losses are absorbed by other activities of the DMU and no dissonance is felt. 
Overall then, depending on the situation, it can be argued that a DMU may continue an 
unattainable or perhaps even an ‘irrational but attainable’ situation indefinitely, until it 
voluntarily stops, until the situation dictates it (reinvestment is no longer acceptable 
because of an absolute limit of some kind or an approaching enemy army) or, 
paradoxically, it actually completes the goal, all in order to postpone failure. Although 
not strictly a postponement of failure, consider the case of the Vietnam War; where 





Levels of Self-Esteem 
 
129
                                               
127 N. Karlsson et al., ‘Escalation of Commitment with Transparent Future Outcomes’, Experimental 
Psychology, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2005, pp. 67-73 
128 J. Hanhimaki, ‘Selling the ‘Decent Interval’: Kissinger, Triangular Diplomacy and the End of the 
Vietnam War, 1971-73’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2003, pp. 159-194 
129 D. B. McFarlin et al., ‘On Knowing when to Quit: Task Failure, Self-Esteem, Advice and Non-
Productive Persistence’, Journal of Personality, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1984, pp. 138-156 
 argue that if the DMU possesses high self-esteem, then it is more 
likely to escalate commitment to a goal that is potentially attainable following a setback 
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than if it is less confident in its own abilities. Whyte et al.130
Fox et al.
 suggest the same 
relationship using the term self-efficacy. 
 




 suggest that if the DMU’s academic background is linked to the course 
of action then it will be more likely to escalate a potentially attainable situation following 
a setback. There is argued to be an exaggerated belief within the minds of specialist 
DMUs; where in-depth knowledge causes the DMU to believe that it is greatly more able 
to reverse the situation than a non-specialist DMU. This situation may be linked to the 
social binding determinant, discussed below; where the DMU believes that the state of 
the action reflects its own overall prowess. However, it is suggested that the academic 
background determinant is lessened by two other factors: age and work experience. Thus, 
a learned DMU which is starting out in the field of its chosen discipline is more likely to 
escalate commitment than an older, more experienced DMU. 
 
The Need to Appear Consistent at all Costs, Learning about Escalation of Commitment 
Behaviour, Long Term Utility and Self-Punishment 
 
132 suggest that a DMU escalates commitment following a setback 
for several psychological reasons that rest upon its desire for long term utility. It can be 
argued that as well as wanting to appear consistent to others at any cost, the DMU 
escalates a situation in which there is either no chance of goal attainment or where the 
goal can potentially be attained but more ‘rational’ reasoning recommends quitting, in 
order to punish itself for a bad decision and to learn a lesson for the future. What is more 
unusual is that Wilson and Qing133
                                               
130 G. Whyte et al., ‘When Success Breeds Failure: The Role of Self-Efficacy in Escalating Commitment to 
a Losing Course of Action’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, Vol. 18, No. 5, 1997, pp. 415-432 
131 S. Fox et al., ‘Escalation Behavior in Domains Related and Unrelated to Decision Makers’ Academic 
Background’, Journal of Psychology and Business, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1995, pp. 245-259 
132 B. H. Bornstein et al., ‘Rationality in Medical Treatment Decisions: Is there a Sunk-Cost Effect?’, 
Social Science & Medicine, Vol. 49, No. 2, 1999, pp. 215-222 
133 Wilson and Qing, ‘Entrapment and Escalating Commitment…’ 
 argue that the DMU escalates in order to learn more 
about the phenomenon it is a victim of: namely EoC behaviour. It is suggested here that 
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Bornstein et al.’s and Wilson and Qing’s arguments are paradoxical in that the only DMU 
that would escalate for the reasons these authors prescribe is the DMU that is not 
primarily concerned about the action’s outcome; which is not concomitant with an EoC 
behaviour situation. 
 
The Illusion of No Choice 
 
Janis134
It is suggested in this thesis that experience is an important EoC behaviour 
determinant. It is contended that experience (which is different from academic study) in 
the area of the project will reduce ‘conventional irrationally motivated’ EoC behaviour 
following a setback, because the DMU is more able to deal with many psychological 
 suggests that a DMU may continue a course of action because it is under 
the erroneous impression that it cannot do anything else, even quit the action. To advance 
this effect further, the DMU may escalate because it deems itself to be physically, legally 
or bureaucratically unable to quit but also because it knows it is able to quit but is 
unwilling to do so because of an assumption of the disastrous consequences that await. 
What is distinctive about the Illusion of No Choice however is that the DMU is either 
physically able to quit the action but doesn’t know it or that it knows it can quit but 
believes, erroneously, that quitting the action will cause disastrous consequences. This 
effect is linked to the Eichmann Effect; denoting a DMU’s apparent inability, or 
unwillingness, to disobey orders. Although obeying instructions and legalities are 
considered to be important facets of this effect, it is suggested here that in some cases the 
effect may be unconsciously self-induced in order to stave off cognitive dissonance. If a 
DMU believes that it has no means to quit or disobey an action – that it is escalating 
under duress – it can justify more easily it escalating an action. This determinant could 




                                               
134 I. L. Janis, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment, (New 
York, USA: The Free Press, 1977), p. 268 
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effects that may arise. However, it may be the case that a more experienced DMU may 
actually feel obligated to succeed more than less experienced DMUs. Experience is often 
concomitant with age. Like age, gender and nationality then, experience could be looked 
on as an intensifier/moderator of many ‘irrational’, psychological determinants of EoC 
behaviour, in several ‘attainability’ situations. 
 
One Giant Project 
 
It is suggested here that a DMU undertaking more than one course of action 
simultaneously may be unable to separate them completely. Several possible 
relationships can emerge from this inability to separate, it is argued. For example, if two 
projects have received negative feedback, the DMU may press the justification needs of 
one project onto the other, especially if only one is still potentially attainable. The DMU 
may also treat the marginal cost/benefit equation of both attainable projects as ‘one’. 
Thus a project that would be unprofitable to continue on its own would be continued 
because the other would absorb some of the losses and make an, albeit less, profitable 
result in total. Another possible relationship is that in two failing situations, the DMU 
may decide to escalate one project just because it is more likely to succeed than the other 
even though both should be independently studied. Here, the DMU is weighing up the 
merits and costs of each project, not on the future utility, but on their merits relative to 
each other. One could anticipate a large number of potential applications of this 
determinant that deserve further research. 
 
The Project Completion Hypothesis 
 
Some authors suggest that EoC behaviour is caused by how close a, still potentially 
attainable, project is to completion when the setback is encountered. Boehne and 
Paese,135 Conlon and Garland136 and Garland and Conlon137
                                               
135 D. M. Boehne and P. W. Paese, ‘Deciding Whether to Complete or Terminate an Unfinished Project: A 
Strong Test of the Project Completion Hypothesis’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, Vol. 81, No. 2, 2000, pp. 178-194 
 argue that the closer the 
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project is to completion, the more likely the DMU is to escalate commitment. It is 
suggested too that the amount of costs already incurred can trick the DMU into thinking 
the project is near completion, when in fact these may have no bearing on the completion 
level. Boehne and Paese, Conlon and Garland and Garland and Conlon also state that in 
some cases where the SCE has been blamed for EoC behaviour, it is the level of project 
completion that is responsible. Moon138 argues however that sunk cost and project 
completion factors are both valid determinants of EoC behaviour and are not mutually 
exclusive causes. He contends further that the SCE and PCH can together influence a 
DMU to escalate commitment, both simultaneously and synergistically. Related to the 
PCH, Fox and Hoffman139
                                                                                                                                            
136 D. E. Conlon and H. Garland, ‘The Role of Project Completion Information in Resource Allocation 
Decisions’, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1993, pp. 402-413 
 argue that EoC behaviour can be caused by the need for 
proximal closure, where completing the project is an end in itself, no matter what the 
cost/benefit or other considerations. Although vanity motives can be a driver for this 
argument, completing the project irrespective of costs and benefits implies that moral 
obligations and fulfillment of promises may too be important determinants of both EoC 
behaviour and so-called rational behaviour, beyond a cold cost/benefit analysis. Clarity 
of completion is also deemed an important determinant of EoC behaviour according to 
Fox and Hoffman; where the more clear the steps, or path, to completing the goal are, the 
more effort the DMU invests. This determinant is related to information, thus any 
feedback, even negative, may be argued to encourage continuance, since it provides 






137 H. Garland and D. E. Conlon, ‘Too Close to Quit: The Role of Project Completion in Maintaining 
Commitment’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 28, No. 22, 1998, pp. 2025-2049 
138 H. Moon, ‘Looking Forward and Looking Back: Integrating Completion and Sunk-Cost Effects within 
an Escalation-of-Commitment Progress Decision’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 86, No. 1, 2001, 
pp. 104-113 
139 S. Fox and M. Hoffman, ‘Escalation Behavior as a Specific Case of Goal-Directed Activity: A 
Persistence Paradigm’, Basic and Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2002, pp. 273-285 
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Prospect Theory and Framing Effects 
 
According to Kahneman and Tversky,140 Prospect Theory dictates that a DMU is 
more sensitive to losses than gains. Thus, in the domain of losses the DMU is more likely 
to engage in risky behaviour to avoid accepting a certain loss (where gain is possible but 
so is greater loss) than if it was in the domain of a certain gain (and greater gain is 
possible but so is loss). DMUs in EoC behaviour situations are practically always in the 
loss domain (owing to costs sustained and few rewards) and so prone to risky EoC 
behaviour, where the situation is still potentially attainable. Moreover, Prospect Theory is 
intensified by how the information the DMU receives is framed, despite the objective 
information being the same. Staw and Ross141
Staw and Ross
 argue that if a situation is portrayed in 
terms of losses, the DMU will be even more willing to risk further investment in the 
project. However if it is termed as a proportion of gains, the DMU is more likely to avoid 
risking further investment. However, it is suggested here that if the information is 
phrased in an overly positive manner then the DMU may feel as if the project is going 
better than the facts reveal, causing EoC behaviour anyway. Prospect Theory and 




142 argue that DMUs tend to bias information so that it fits with their 
beliefs. Thus if a DMU believes that the project will be lucrative, feedback information 
will be interpreted to reinforce this belief.143
                                               
140 D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, ‘Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk’, Econometrica, 
Vol. 47, No. 2, 1979, pp. 263-291 
141 Staw and Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents…’, p. 54 
142 Ibid., pp. 53-54 
143 D. Bar-Tal and N. Geva, ‘A Cognitive Basis of International Conflicts’, in S. Worchel and W. G. Austin 
(Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (2nd Ed.), (Chicago, USA: Nelson-Hall, 1986), p. 124. Bar-
Tal and Geva call this behaviour “freezing,” where belief is treated as fact and other information is thus 
discredited or ignored. 
 DMUs bias information by: the invention of 
exogenous failures and the ignorance of endogenous ones; the interpretation of 
ambiguous data as positive data; the narrowing of their information searches to only find 
reinforcing data; and the selection of only positive data from a report with mixed 
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feedback. It is suggested here that justification motives may exacerbate the level of 
information biasing by the DMU. Information biasing is also expressed in social ways, 
discussed under the ‘Social Determinants’ header. It is considered that information 
biasing could apply to a number of objective ‘attainability’ scenarios. Moreover, it is 
contended that information biasing can effectively dictate what the perceived situation 




Staw and Ross argue that so well learned is the societal turnaround script144
In many circumstances, the DMU does not perform an action in isolation. Rather, 
the project is a multiparty event, with assistants, colleagues, managers and spectators 
observing the DMU’s actions and even opponent DMUs seeking to achieve goals that are 
in opposition to the DMU’s own. 
 that the 
DMU believes that no matter what appears to be happening with the project, it will 
succeed in the end, owing to fate. The DMU therefore escalates commitment. This factor 
is linked to both Learned Helplessness and the Illusion of Invulnerability effect. It is 





As well as external binding, discussed below, it is suggested here that binding can 
also occur internally; where the DMU itself believes that its performance on a given 
project is reflective of its entire competence and so continues with a potentially attainable 
project, to demonstrate its overall competence. 
 
8.2.4 Social Determinants 
 
                                               
144 Staw and Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents…’, p. 54. The turnaround script has a 
number of meanings but it means here the innate belief prevalent in society that everything will be okay 




According to Staw and Ross, following a setback, and if the DMU is made aware of 
another situation similar to its own, then it may copy the actions of the comparison DMU 
as a function of “the desirability and similarity of the comparison other.”145
Clarity of feedback is an important EoC behaviour determinant. If the feedback is 
terrible and is predictive of no chance of ultimate success then EoC behaviour is unlikely 
to occur. It is argued here that information may be socially distorted when other actors, 
such as messengers, deliver information to the DMU. This may be accidental, such as the 
use of an inappropriate frame on the data or the inclusion of semantic errors as the 
information travels through departments, which creates the wrong impression. 
Information may also be deliberately spun as it travels up the chain of command for two 
very similar reasons based upon fear. First, a messenger is afraid to be the bearer of bad 
news to his immediate superior simply because he may be blamed or victimised for 
delivering such information, thus he distorts the information. Second, the DMU at the top 
of the chain of command may discredit the source of the information in order to discredit 
the negative information itself and this source may not be the immediate messenger. 
 However, if 
the comparison DMU withdraws then the original DMU may also withdraw. Staw and 
Ross do not comment as to whether the DMU can copy a similar situation that has 
already been completed, but it seems reasonable to suggest that if the DMU can locate the 
stage it is at within the history of the other event then it will model its own behaviour 
upon it. It is suggested that in this historical sense, modelling would only encourage EoC 
behaviour if the historical action turned out to be a success. Questions remain however as 
to whether the means used would need to be similar for modelling to occur. It can be 
argued too that even if the action is doomed to unattainability (or perhaps even if there is 
goal condition responsible unattainability), modelling may still encourage EoC 
behaviour, through a form of what could be termed blind mimicry. 
 
Social Information Biasing 
 
                                               
145 Ibid., p. 58 
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Information is again distorted in anticipation of the reaction of the DMU. Social 
information biasing is also discussed under the manipulation heading. Again, it is deemed 
that this determinant has utility to a number of attainability scenarios and that it can 
effectively dictate what the perceived situation (feedback type/severity/attainability) is 




Here, a DMU may continue a potentially attainable action following a setback to 
prove to others, such as spectators, rivals or critics, that it did not make a mistake in 
initiating (or, perhaps, continuing) the action This, Staw and Ross argue,146
Staw and Ross
 is a form of 
face saving. They argue further that external justification motives are intensified when 






 argue that in a social setting the perceived competence of a DMU 
can become tied to the fate of one action. Thus, the DMU may continue a potentially 
attainable action to demonstrate its overall competence as a DMU rather than to simply 





                                               
146 Ibid., p. 55 
147 Ibid., p. 56 
148 L. Thompson et al., ‘Cohesion and Respect: An Examination of Group Decision Making in Social and 
Escalation Dilemmas’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1998, pp. 289-311. 
Although applied to groups by Thompson et al., this determinant can be expanded to more general 
DMUs. 
 argue that DMUs which are highly respected will be less likely 
to ‘irrationally’ escalate towards a potentially attainable goal than less respected DMUs 
following negative feedback. The highly respected DMU may feel less of a need to 
impress and will realise that, even after overseeing an isolated failure, it will still be 
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respected by others. Less respected DMUs however may escalate to earn respect, because 
they have little respect to lose or because they feel indifferent to the needs of others. This 
factor is linked to external justification, but deals more closely with how much face the 
DMU has at the start of a project, which in turn determines the DMU’s need to externally 
justify its behaviour. Alternatively, it is possible that a DMU that is highly respected but 




Linked to the national culture of the DMU are the cultural norms of the society in 
which the DMU operates. The society here is taken to be the spectators, investors and 
advisors that surround the DMU and, if applicable, the organisation in which the DMU 
operates. Recall in chapter three that Staw talks of the norm for consistency as an 
example of a cultural norm.149
The DMU’s goal often relies upon defeating an opposing DMU (DMU2) which is 
striving for equal and opposite goals. Certainly, ‘competition’ can exist in many forms 
but the ‘duopolistic/versus’ situation is thought to be the most common. Competition 
provides a number of complex motives for EoC behaviour. Brockner
 Cultural norms could conceivably be applied to situations 
where the goal is unattainable (and perhaps even where failure is inevitable). Cultural 
norms are also linked to the turnaround script. 
 
Competition with an Enemy DMU 
 
150 and Teger151
                                               
149 B. M. Staw, ‘The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action’, Academy of Management Review, 
Vol. 6, No. 4, 1981, p. 579. See also: D. T. Campbell, ‘Reforms as Experiments’, American 
Psychologist, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1969, pp. 409-429 
150 J. Brockner, ‘The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward Theoretical 
Progress’, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1992, pp. 39-61 
151 A. I. Teger, Too Much Invested to Quit, (New York, USA: Pergamon, 1980), p. 96 
 both 
suggest that an opposing DMU2 is likely to encourage the DMU (DMU1) to want to 
‘beat’ the enemy, regardless of more ‘rational’ indicators (and assuming the goal is 
potentially attainable). Punishment and revenge motives in DMU1 are also likely. It is 
suggested here that these latter motives can occur whether the goal is unattainable, 
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(including failure being inevitable) or perhaps even when the goal is still potentially 
attainable. Thus, depending upon the situation, DMU1 may continue (either indefinitely, 
until it voluntarily stops, it is victorious or it is ‘forced’ to stop through limitations or 
defeat) in order make the opposition pay an overly high price for its victory or merely its 
persistence, but at DMU1’s own expense too. 
However, it is suggested here that several other determinants of EoC behaviour 
emerge when a DMU is in competition with another. One possible determinant is related 
to precommitment. The DMU may invest to make the other DMU believe that any 
opposing investment will be wasted (simulative reasoning). Yet a simulative fallacy can 
emerge if the opponent calls the original DMU’s bluff and invests in the situation 
anyway. Such investment therefore may trigger EoC behaviour because of the 
simulatively invested sunk costs. 
Emotions certainly appear to play a large part in EoC behaviour in duopolistic 
situations, yet it is suggested here that lack of emotion, which would seem to be a 
beneficial state, may be equally dangerous. If the enemy is dehumanised in the eyes of 
the DMU, then although this perception may encourage EoC behaviour to cease at the 
point at which the project is deemed ‘irrational’, it may too encourage an action to 
continue up to this point, where it would otherwise have been ended on ethical grounds. 
Humanitarian and emotional considerations then are important and may actually present 
a reason for quitting, not just escalation. 
Although not strictly a social determinant, it is suggested here too that just because 
an opponent does not exist does not mean beating/revenge motives will not be present in 
an EoC behaviour situation. It is suggested that a DMU may still anthropomorphise 
inanimate objects, concepts, beliefs or situations and continue in order to win or seek 
revenge (e.g. a roulette wheel). 
Finally, it is suggested that EoC behaviour of the DMU is also dictated by the 
nature and behaviour of the enemy DMU; most notably how prone the enemy DMU itself 
is to escalating commitment. Being a DMU, it is suggested that the enemy’s behaviour is 
determined by all the determinants detailed in this framework, paradoxically including 
the nature of the enemy DMU determinant (DMU1). Because the enemy DMU’s 
behaviour is suggested to be a determinant of the other DMU’s EoC behaviour, an 
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autopoietic or, rather, a cyclical determinant is also suggested to be present; where the 
DMU that acted or is perceived to have acted first dictates the future intensity of the EoC 





Information too may be deliberately biased or filtered before it reaches the DMU in 
order to encourage EoC behaviour. This information may also be framed in an overly 
positive or negative way which, it is suggested, also encourages EoC behaviour. The 
manipulator can use Low-Balling too when delivering information, discussed in chapter 
 suggests that DMUs should be warned of possible negative feedback before 
they begin an action, to avoid panicking the DMU and to prevent premature quitting. 
However, it is suggested here that such an action is potentially damaging to the DMU. 
Vague, unspecified warnings of negative feedback may make the DMU more relaxed and 
willing to escalate commitment following a heavy setback. The solution would be to 





Often, genuine attempts to aid a DMU during a project or to limit its EoC behaviour 
may backfire and cause EoC behaviour. However, it is suggested in this thesis that EoC 
behaviour can be caused by deliberate manipulation of these and other factors; including 
determinants of EoC behaviour. Related to the Illusion of No Choice for example, a DMU 
may be deliberately swayed by another agent into believing that it has no choice but to 
continue an action. The manipulator may also utilise Emotional Inoculation by implying 
that a very high level of negative feedback is normal and to be expected. Some limitation 
strategies involve setting a limit for expenditure, where the project is halted after this 
limit is reached. If the manipulator sets this limit, it may set it extremely high to keep the 
project going and to give a false sense of success. 
                                               
152 Janis, Decision Making…, pp. 155, 388 
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three. The manipulator may also use the Salami tactic against the DMU. Here the DMU, 
whilst rejecting a very large escalation, may agree to a smaller one. Thus, the manipulator 
simply breaks his demands up into very small slices and gets the DMU to escalate the 
whole way anyway, just over a longer time period. The Salami tactic is linked to the Foot 
in the Door technique, discussed in chapter three. 
The final form of manipulation is set under the broad heading of rigging. Rigging153
When the DMU relies upon other actors to receive information, perform tasks or 
enact its decisions, inertia may occur. If negative feedback is received by said actors it 
may not actually reach the DMU for a long time, because of the bureaucratic channels the 
information has to pass through. Thus the action may persist. Even when the negative 
information is delivered, and an order is issued by the DMU to quit the action, 
bureaucratic procedures may again make difficult the demobilisation of long standing 
procedures such as funding allocations and employee assignment. Therefore, the failing 
action may be continued long after the order to quit is issued. Inertia is, according to Staw 
 
involves the manipulation of the settings in which decisions are made. The manipulator 
may choose meetings where the location or times of the meetings are awkward for 
advisors who disagree with the manipulator, but convenient for advisors who agree with 
him. The manipulator may also only notify the enemy of meetings at the last minute, 
reducing preparation time. Less subtle rigging would include giving less time for enemies 
to talk during meetings than for allies and providing more resources for the latter than the 
former. Manipulation is linked to Agency Theory, though here, the DMU could be 
described as the principal and the manipulator as the agent and manipulation can 
arguably occur for many reasons. Manipulation is also possible within the Group DMU. 





                                               
153 I. L. Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policy Making and Crisis Management, (New York, USA: 
The Free Press, 1989), pp. 55-56 
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and Ross,154
Pressure and policy resistance are two similar determinants of EoC behaviour. 
Following negative feedback, the DMU may come under pressure to continue a task, 
from inside an organisation, (if applicable), and/or from outsiders. If part of an 
organisation, pressure is likely to come from superiors. External pressure may come from 
local businesses that stand to gain from the action or government departments, keen to 
promote a symbolic event. A group DMU may experience pressure from members within 
the group too. Although situationally specific, some generalised arguments can be 
expressed here concerning pressure. Pressure can be in the form of verbal appeals; 
lacking in any tangible value. However, pressure could feasibly also take the forms of 
threats, immediate benefits and promises. Threats could take the form of proposed legal 
action, withdrawal of other unrelated contracts, cuts in government funding or political 
support for future projects, demotion and even just the loss of friendship; all if the action 
is ended. Conversely, ‘extra’ benefits could also be promised to the DMU if it continues 
with the action; delivered when the course of action ‘ends’, but not if it is quit. These 
benefits could feasibly be promised regardless of the eventual outcome and thus be 
offered even if the goal is considered unattainable, though a successful outcome, and thus 
potential attainability, would be a most likely condition for the extra benefits to be 
delivered. Benefits could also be delivered immediately to the DMU if it continues with 
the course of action. Some of these considerations, then, could be considered loosely as 
ad. hoc side bets and closing costs. This discussion has relevance to: the marginal costs 
 predominantly an organisational EoC behaviour determinant, but it is 
suggested here that it may also occur when the DMU is not part of an organisation but 
uses outsiders (outsourcing) to fulfil a task. Inertia can also doubly occur when the DMU 
is also considered to be part of an organisation and also uses outsiders. Inertia could 
feasibly be applied to a number of attainability scenarios. It may also be considered as a 
form of information biasing. 
 
Pressure and Policy Resistance 
 
                                               
154 Staw and Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents…’, p. 61 
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and gains discussion; the input/output discussion; the success and failure debate and the 
question regarding professional versus personal interests. 
Policy resistance may occur when the DMU decides to quit the action. Both 
outsiders and those within an organisation, if applicable, may resist the order because the 
action ending will adversely affect them. Such resistance may appear in the form of 
deliberate generation of ambiguous or false positive feedback, strikes, ‘accidentally’ 
ignoring demobilisation orders or encouraging others to express their displeasure. In the 
case of a group DMU, policy resistance may occur from group members too. It is 
suggested that resistance could be applied to both potentially attainable and unattainable 
scenarios; although more likely the former. 
 
The Saboteur Effect 
 
This hypothetical effect is related to policy resistance, yet is deemed here to be 
more destructive, focussed, secretive and sudden in nature. Even if a policy change by a 
DMU following negative feedback is accepted and resistance declines, a powerful 
individual either within (in the case of a group) or external to the DMU (potentially an 
organisation member or an outsider) may object. Though overruled, this individual 
proceeds to force the situation to continue or escalate by using powers and methods that 
are beyond his mandate (ultra vires). The individual, though officially on the side of the 
individual or group that is aiming to tackle the problem is generally considered to be a 
loose cannon who is effectively outside of the DMU’s control and circle of trust and who 
is constantly at odds with the DMU. Yet, the sabotage action still comes as a surprise and 
is overt yet surgical in nature. One recent example occurs in warfare and, though 
thwarted, demonstrates the potential danger of the saboteur. During the Korean conflict, 
General Douglas MacArthur of the UN taskforce disagreed with President Truman 
concerning the limited strategy of defence of the South and often greeted his superior’s 
orders with open defiance.155
                                               
155 MacArthur’s most widely recognised act of defiance occurred on October 15th 1950 when ‘Brass Hat 
MacArthur’ greeted his commander in chief, the president, with a handshake rather than a salute. 
 MacArthur had advocated the use of nuclear weapons 
against the Chinese in North Korea, supported the use of Taiwanese nationalists in 
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combat and issued briefings to the press that were hostile to Truman. More seriously, 
MacArthur also issued an aggressive ultimatum to the Chinese Government to subvert 
Truman’s own embryonic attempts to call for a ceasefire. It was an open secret that 
Truman did not trust MacArthur to obey presidential policy and it was felt to be a 
possibility that MacArthur could have attempted to destabilise peace on the battlefield.156
It is felt prudent here to specify that feedback interpretation – encompassing the 
subjectivity and information biasing factors already discussed – also applies to individual 
members of a group DMU – not just to the group DMU taken as a ‘unit’ – and that such 
interpretation can vary between members. It is also argued here that acceptable risk 
levels (as discussed by Vertzberger
 
MacArthur was removed by the Joint Chiefs before his actions could destabilise 
Truman’s plans still further. It is suggested that the Saboteur Effect could apply to both 
attainable and unattainable situations. 
 
8.2.5 When the Decision Making Unit is a Group 
 
It is contended here that when the DMU is considered to be a group, additional EoC 
behaviour determinants come into play. For example, it has already been seen that the 
role of gender is reversed in a group situation. As well as including existing group EoC 
behaviour determinants however, this header includes entirely new, hypothetical group 
ideas from the author, based upon EoC and non-EoC behaviour reading. It also includes 
some existing group determinants from non-EoC behaviour literature. 
 




                                               
156 The Truman/MacArthur affair is documented well in R. Lowitt, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy, 
(Chicago, USA: Rand McNally, 1967). 
157 Vertzberger, ‘Collective Risk Taking…’ 
) may also vary between group members. Logically 
then, acceptable risk levels may also apply, as an EoC behaviour determinant, to 
individual DMUs and when viewing group DMUs as whole ‘units’. It can be inferred that 
acceptable risk levels relate to already discussed factors like culture, age, experience and 
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gender but also simply to ‘individual personality’. What is crucial to understand however 
is that group members may differ in their wishes to continue or quit an action (based 
somewhat on said feedback interpretation and acceptable risk levels) and that the motives 
to continue an action (again related to feedback interpretation and acceptable risk levels) 
can vary too. This means that a group DMU unit could continue an action because of a 
vast amount of different motives – expressed throughout this framework – felt by 
particular group members. Perception then is, again, an important factor of EoC 
behaviour. All of these factors should be considered when looking at the determinants 
below, especially in relation to leader and dominant member focussed determinants, 
decision making procedures and group conflict. 
 
Polarisation, Conformity Pressures and Groupthink 
 
Whyte158 argues that groups are subject to polarisation; where the initially dominant 
viewpoint in a group is intensified following discussion. Thus, he argues, a group DMU 
will be more likely to intensify their efforts following a setback (risky shift) if the 
majority want to continue (this argument could perhaps also relate to the most dominant 
members). The cautious shift may also occur however if the dominant view is to 
deescalate behaviour (leading to cessation).159 Whyte160
                                               
158 G. Whyte, ‘Entrapment: Are Groups Less Susceptible?’, Working Paper, (Toronto University, Faculty 
of Management, Toronto, Canada: 1990), pp. 231-235 
159 For more information on polarisation, see J. A. Zuber et al., ‘Choice Shift and Group Polarization: An 
Analysis of the Status of Arguments and Social Decision Schemes’, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1992, pp. 50-61. 
160 Whyte, ‘Entrapment: Are Groups…’ 
 also discusses conformity 
pressures within the group that can force members to adopt the opinions of the dominant 
view (or, again, the most dominant members). Although Whyte talks of these 
determinants in the sphere of equivocal, Prospect Theory situations (implying a pre-
existing tendency to continue), it can be argued that in unattainable situations too, EoC 
behaviour may intensify and occur respectively because of these determinants. A much 
more subtle, voluntary and ‘group encompassing’ form of coercion however is 





It has already been demonstrated that Street and Anthony,161 Kameda and 
Sugimori162 and ’t Hart163
                                               
161 M. D. Street and W. P. Anthony, ‘A Conceptual Framework Establishing the Relationship between 
Groupthink and Escalating Commitment Behavior’, Small Group Research, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1997, pp. 
267-293 
162 T. Kameda and S. Sugimori, ‘Psychological Entrapment in Group Decision Making: An Assigned 
Decision Rule and a Groupthink Phenomenon’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol.  65, 
No. 2, 1993, pp. 282-292 
163 P. ’t Hart, Groupthink in Government: A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure, (Baltimore, 
Maryland, USA: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 94 
 all argue that there is a relationship between EoC behaviour 
and Groupthink. What exactly this relationship is however is unclear. Based upon the 
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available research, it is suggested in this thesis that many facets of Groupthink, at 
different stages of the Groupthink cycle can independently and cumulatively cause EoC 
behaviour in groups. It is deemed premature to exclude any Groupthink categories from 
comparison with EoC behaviour in future research. With this in mind, figure 8.11 could 




It is contended here too that some Groupthink determinants could be applied to 
individual EoC behaviour, not specifically to group DMUs. It is argued further that a 
number of Groupthink facets that are suggested to cause EoC behaviour could be 
elaborated upon. Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures for example is a 
complex subject which deserves further investigation. Some suggested subheadings for 
this category are outlined below as separate EoC behaviour determinants. Several authors 
suggest further Groupthink determinants than those which are included in the most 
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accepted model.164 McCauley165 argues that the size of the affected group is important. 
He contends that a very small group would be less likely to suffer from Groupthink 
tendencies. It is contended here that a very large group would also be less likely to suffer 
from Groupthink, owing to a lower probability of homogeneity of its members. 
Moorhead et al.166
The dynamics of a group are not fixed. One factor which can change the group 
dynamics is the stage at which the group is at. Tuckman and Tuckman & Jensen argue 
that groups travel through five stages, each with their own specific dynamics: Forming, 
Storming, Norming, Performing
 argue that time pressures also accentuate the concurrence seeking 
tendency in the group. These determinants too may have an effect on EoC behaviour. It 
has already been argued that time pressures can cause EoC behaviour, and it is suggested 
below that the size of the group can also affect the escalation tendency. Conversely, some 
suggested group determinants of EoC behaviour may deserve inclusion in a Groupthink 
framework. Again, Street and Anthony’s arbitrary exclusion of some EoC behaviour 
determinants as potential determinants of Groupthink is deemed premature apropos the 




167 and Adjourning.168 Stern169
                                               
164 C. A. Kiesler, ‘Attraction to the Group and Conformity to Group Norms’, Journal of Personality, Vol. 
31, No. 4, 1963, pp. 559-569. One pre-Groupthink contribution of voluntary group conformity is how 
attractive the group is to individual members. 
165 C. McCauley, ‘Group Dynamics in Janis’s Theory of Groupthink: Backward and Forward’, 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes Vol. 73, No. 2/3, 1998, pp. 142-162 
166 G. Moorhead et al., ‘Group Decision Fiascos Continue: Space Shuttle Challenger and a Revised 
Groupthink Framework’, Human Relations, Vol. 44, No. 6, 1991, pp. 539-550 
167 B. W. Tuckman, ‘Developmental Sequence in Small Groups’, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 63, No. 6, 
1965, pp. 384-399 
168 B. W. Tuckman and M. A. C. Jensen, ‘Stages of Group Development Revisited’, Group and 
Organization Studies, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1977, pp. 417-427 
169 E. K. Stern, ‘Probing the Plausibility of Newgroup Syndrome: Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs’, in P. ’t 
Hart et al. (Eds.), Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making, (Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, USA: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 153-190 
 argues that newly formed 
groups may have ambiguous norms and procedures, which may encourage various group 
pathologies. It is suggested here that both the ambiguous norms and procedures and their 
symptoms may lead to both EoC behaviour, following a setback, and to Groupthink 
behaviour. Figure 8.13 shows a suggested pathology of Newgroup Syndrome. 
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This thesis suggests that the group is also likely to fall into an EoC behaviour 
pattern if it is too established and set in its ways, even if procedures are more established 
(this could be termed as an Oldgroup Syndrome). Members may be so familiar with each 
other that they avoid discussion of relevant information or doubts over a course of action 
in order to avoid any harm to their friendships. Moreover, a suggestion to escalate may 
go unchallenged. This is also suggested to be a Groupthink determinant. 
Related to both the Newgroup and ‘Oldgroup’ syndromes, Stern170
The same forms of manipulation that occur in the social setting against group and 
individual DMUs can also be argued to occur within a group setting. The main difference 
however is that the DMU is turning on itself; the manipulator is a group member, not an 
outsider. Like the social form of manipulation, many reasons can be responsible for a 
 argues that the 
predicted duration of the group may affect group performance from the start. If the 
Shadow of the Future is short, members will be more likely to disagree and speak their 
minds. If the shadow is long, members may be more concerned about long term comfort 
and good relations and so will be unwilling to engage in discussion that may lead to bad 
blood. It is suggested here that the latter condition is conducive to both Groupthink and 
group EoC behaviour. It is contended that many of these group facets could cause EoC 




                                               
170 Ibid., p. 164 
 301 
group member causing manipulation. Hoyt and Garrison171
Kaarbo and Gruenfeld
 categorise group 
manipulation under three headings: Structural (membership manipulation, inclusion of 
members and exclusion of members), Procedural (framing, agenda setting manipulation, 
favourable or unfavourable meeting times and locations) and Interpersonal (lies, threats, 
use of political whips, leaks, threats of leaks, bluffing, bribery, blackmail, coalition 
building and use of expertise as leverage). Manipulation within a group is also a form of 
intra-group conflict, discussed below. It is argued that elements of group manipulation 
may apply in multiple attainability situations. 
 
Intergroup and Intra-Group Rivalry and Conflict 
 
172 argue that rivalry and conflict between groups173 and also 
rivalry and conflict within groups are important group interactions. It has already been 
argued that rivalry between the group or individual DMU and spectators or critics can 
cause EoC behaviour. Similarly, duopolistic conflict has also been argued to cause EoC 
behaviour in DMUs, including groups. It is suggested here however that intra-group 
rivalry and conflict could also cause EoC behaviour in a group DMU. Intra-group rivalry 
and conflict may promote EoC behaviour in that information processing may be skewed 
or ineffective and manipulation may be rife. Types of intra-group rivalry and conflict 
range from faction formation and information withholding to manipulation and nay 
saying.174
More complexly, Kaarbo and Gruenfeld suggest that intergroup rivalry and conflict 
decrease intra-group rivalry and conflict, because members feel as though they should 
 
                                               
171 P. D. Hoyt and J. A. Garrison, ‘Political Manipulation within the Small Group: Foreign Policy Advisers 
in the Carter Administration’, in P. ’t Hart et al. (Eds.), Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics 
and Foreign Policy-Making, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 249-
274 
172 J. Kaarbo and D. Gruenfeld, ‘The Social Psychology of Inter- and Intra-Group Conflict in Governmental 
Politics’, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1998, pp. 226-233 
173 Realistically, this discussion could be applied if just one DMU in the interconflict condition is a group, 
not necessarily all. Other DMUs could be individuals, but only the group DMU would be subject to the 
specific rivalry/conflict effects discussed, it is contended. 
174 E. K. Stern and B. Sundelius, ‘Understanding Small Group Decisions in Foreign Policy: Process 
Diagnosis and Research Procedure’, in P. ’t Hart et al. (Eds.), Beyond Groupthink: Political Group 
Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA: University of Michigan Press, 
1997), p. 129 
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stick together. While this may seem beneficial, Kaarbo and Gruenfeld also argue that 
“intra- and inter-group dynamics do not function completely independently. Not only can 
inter-group rivalry create in-group solidarity, but consensus within groups on strategies 
and goals can generate hostility towards out-groups.”175 Brewer argues the same.176
Conscious attempts to limit conflict and rivalry within a group may make EoC 
behaviour more likely too. Blake and Moulton
 If 
this information is looked at in the context of Groupthink, it could be argued that such 
cohesion would promote Groupthink, as it is a very similar facet to the external threat 
determinant already in the model. The examination of friendly rivalry would appear to be 
a useful consideration in this entire discussion, both in relation to Groupthink and EoC 
behaviour. 
177
                                               
175 Kaarbo and Gruenfeld, ‘The Social Psychology…’, p. 231 
176 M. B. Brewer, ‘The Role of Ethnocentrism in Inter-Group Conflict’, in S. Worchel and W. G. Austin 
(Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (2nd Ed.), (Chicago, USA: Nelson-Hall, 1986), p. 88 
177 R. R. Blake and J. S. Moulton, ‘From Theory to Practice in Interface Problem Solving’, in S. Worchel 
and W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (2nd Ed.), (Chicago, USA: Nelson-Hall, 
1986), pp. 67-87 
 suggest that there are five ways to 
diffuse such conflict: smoothing, confrontation, splitting the difference, withdrawal and 
suppression. Figure 8.14 shows the various methods through which rivalry and conflict 
can be resolved. In this thesis, only confrontation is deemed beneficial since the others 






Stern and Sundelius summarise the main group interaction patterns described above 







It is suggested here that group based conflict and rivalry effects may cause EoC 
behaviour in both potentially attainable and unattainable courses of action, directly and 
indirectly. It is suggested that numerous autopoietic and cyclical relationships involving 
the EoC behaviour determinants discussed here could be envisaged, with important 
implications for EoC behaviour. 
 
Diffusion of Responsibility 
 
Whyte argues178
                                               
178 G. Whyte, ‘Diffusion of Responsibility: Effects on the Escalation Tendency’, Journal of Applied 
Psychology, Vol. 76, No. 3, 1991, pp. 408-415 
 that a group may be less likely than an individual to escalate its 
commitment following a setback, regarding a potentially attainable goal, because its 
feelings of responsibility for initiating the action, or continuing it after ‘taking over’, are 
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diffused among the group members. The ‘irrational’ need to justify therefore is lessened. 
However, Bazerman et al.179
Most groups have an obvious, designated leader. If not, then they have an elected 
supervisor or chairman who controls proceedings and records votes. It is suggested here 
that the nature of the leader has relevance to many other group determinants in this 
framework and thus also to the EoC behaviour tendency in groups. Preston describes how 
the leader’s nature influences the group as the “leader-group nexus.”
 state that the absence of individual responsibility triggers 
risky behaviour because there is less accountability for each group member. EoC 
behaviour thus is argued to be more likely and, arguably, more severe and in unattainable 
situations too. Being ‘not initially responsible’ is also important here, in that the 




It is suggested here that a sufficiently large group can also suffer from internal 
inertia for the same reasons as when inertia is external. Internal inertia could cause EoC 
behaviour in potentially attainable and unattainable situations. 
 
Group Pressure and Group Policy Resistance 
 
Pressure to escalate can be placed onto a DMU from outsiders. Yet feasibly, such 
pressures could occur from members of a group onto other members of the same group. 
Furthermore, members of a group may also resist the order or consensus to end a project. 
Overall then, a course of action, even an unattainable one, may stumble on for a long 
time owing to these factors. 
 
Leadership Style, Dominant Personalities and the Decision Process 
 
180
                                               
179 M. H. Bazerman et al., ‘Escalation in Individual and Group Decision Making’, Organizational Behavior 
and Human Performance, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1984, pp. 141-152 
 Although there is 
180 T. Preston, ‘Following the Leader: The Impact of U. S. Presidential Style upon Advisory Group 
Dynamics, Structure and Decision’, in P. ’t Hart et al. (Eds.), Beyond Groupthink: Political Group 
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a plethora of leadership factors, the most obvious leader characteristic is how 
authoritative his style is. In figure 8.16 Handy summarises several studies which together 




It is suggested here that polarised leadership strategies (highly authoritative or 
overly democratic) may encourage EoC behaviour. An overly authoritative leader will 
engage in selective membership of his allies and yes men, penalise criticism, be open to 
manipulation and choose which information to take note of (biasing). Yet an overly 
democratic leader may lead the group into impasses and trigger intra-group conflict. A 
middle ground is therefore required, where the leader is willing to take criticism but is 
also able to take control in the event of a group dispute. 
                                                                                                                                            
Dynamics and Foreign Policy-Making, (Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA: University of Michigan Press, 
1997), p. 192 
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A crucial determinant, related to leadership, is how a decision is arrived at. 
Handy181
How well the leader gets on with his members may also influence EoC behaviour. 
A well respected leader will generally trigger more effort from his subordinates than if he 
is not respected.
 argues that there are five possibilities: decision by authority, majority, 
consensus, minority and no response. It is suggested in this framework that all options 
have the capacity to encourage EoC behaviour following a setback, but authority and no 
response are the most likely, owing to the preferences of the leader being enacted without 
adequate questioning. 
182
The qualities of the group members are also important. Members of the group who 
are passive for example may be coerced into following the opinions of the more dominant 
members, and these opinions may include EoC behaviour. Too many dominant members 
however and intra-group conflict may ensue, again triggering EoC behaviour. Passivity 
and dominance aside however, Belbin
 More effort generally equates to more information being turned up 
following a setback and greater attempts by members to solve the problem. Less 
respected leaders may cause members to shirk their duties and not engage fully in group 
information discussion, arguably making EoC behaviour more likely. 
183
                                               
181 Handy, Understanding Organizations…, p. 173 
182 Ibid., p. 169 
183 R. M. Belbin, Team Roles at Work, (Oxford, UK: Biddles, 1999), p. 87 
 argues that a group should consist of particular 
member types in order to operate efficiently. It could be argued that without a balance of 
roles in a team, or in the absence of a particular role, then EoC behaviour may be more 
likely to occur. In summary, Preston discusses many leadership and group member 
qualities – in the context of the president and his relationship to an advisory group – that, 






It is argued that several facets discussed in this header, particularly leadership 




Cultural pressures that are argued above to affect the DMU may also be at work 
within a group DMU to a greater or lesser extent. The group may also have its own local 
culture that is different from the wider social environment. Thus even if the turnaround 
script is not prevalent in the wider social situation, for example, it may be prevalent 
within the group. Moreover, a group that is made up of a particular ethnic group may 
have a vastly different cultural outlook on the situation than the society in which it is 
operating. This may encourage or moderate EoC behaviour depending upon the cultural 
makeup of the group; in a number of ‘attainability’ situations. 
 
Group Communication Structure 
 
Handy184 argues that the communication layout of a group affects its decision 
making quality. It is suggested in this thesis that EoC behaviour too, in a number of 
attainability situations, is accentuated or moderated dependent upon the communication 
structure of the group. Handy states that there are three main communication structures 
(figure 8.20). Each structure has advantages and disadvantages. Preliminary research is 
needed to determine how group communication structure affects EoC behaviour. 
 
                                               




It is suggested here that in a group setting it is easier for members to avoid work. 
Group dynamics allows for a greater amount of anonymity than for an individual DMU. 
Such loafing could encourage EoC behaviour, in a number of attainability situations, if, 
for example, members of the group or the authoritative leader argued for escalation, as 




It is suggested here that large group size encourages EoC behaviour. An overly 
large group may suffer from a form of group inertia and may also encourage social 
loafing. A large group may suffer too an overly large drop in feelings of responsibility. It 
is uncertain however whether such a large drop would encourage or limit EoC behaviour. 
The ‘group size’ facet could arguably apply to several attainability situations. 
 
Towering Inferno Effect 
 
Moller argues185 that, in war, combatants may continue with a conflict because they 
have grown accustomed to living on the edge and all the bonding this involves. The 
soldiers would find it difficult to live a normal life186
                                               
185 B. Moller, ‘Ethnic Conflict and Postmodern Warfare: What is the Problem? What Could be Done?’, 
Paper Presented at the Anthropological Perspectives on the Roots of Conflict in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Conference, Malta University, Valetta, Malta, 4-5th October 1996, p. 14 
186 For comparison, consider the psychological readjustment of Vietnam veterans following the war, C. R. 
Figley (Ed.), Stress Disorders Among Vietnam Veterans, (New York, USA: Brunner-Routledge, 1978). 
 after such excitement and thus 
continue their, often fruitless, battles. In this thesis, it is suggested that small groups may 
suffer from the same problem, to varying degrees of similarity. For example, the group 
may enjoy the emotions attached to all going down together (if goal failure is inevitable, 
not simply the goal being unattainable) and so stick it out until the end. To a lesser 
degree, the group may simply not want to end prematurely a situation in which members 
feel comfortable, even if costs, benefits, probability and other factors argue that it should 
be ceased. Some groups are task oriented and thus will dissolve when the task is 
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completed or written off. Members may continue with a course of action therefore in 
order to maintain friendships that would otherwise come to an end. Again, it can be 
argued that the group may continue indefinitely, until it voluntarily stops, until it is forced 
to stop or until it is ‘successful’. The Adjournment stage of group formation therefore 
could be as problematic as the Forming stage. 
 
Suggestions for Future Group EoC Behaviour Research 
 
Although many new possible determinants of EoC behaviour in groups have been 
discussed in this framework, owing to the complexity of group dynamics, many more 
factors are likely to exist. The best way to discover these new determinants is to explore 
literature that deals with the determinants of effective group performance and, preferably, 
represents these determinants in causal frameworks. One example of literature dealing 
with effective groups comes from Fuller and Aldag who graphically represent their 





However, what also needs to be done is to test the determinants discussed in this 
heading which remain hypothetical at the moment, as well as establish whether or not the 
less specific, partially untested and untested determinants, discussed in the other headings 
of this framework, actually apply to the group DMU, and/or the individual DMU or 
neither (the latter, if entirely untested). 
 
8.2.6 When the Decision Making Unit is Part of an Organisation 
 
Inversion of Limitation Strategies 
 
Much EoC behaviour literature explores ways to limit EoC behaviour. Main and 
Rambo,187 Kroll,188 Nathanson et al.,189 Barton et al.190 and Simonson and Staw191
Setting an arbitrary limit has no rational merit in decision making since escalation 
decisions should be based upon future gains, costs and the likelihood of success, not how 
much is left to spend. It would be irrational to quit a failing project just because of an 
arbitrary limit set before the project began. Moreover, limit setting may encourage the 
DMU to spend to the limit even when it is apparent long before this point that the project 
 all 
discuss such ‘limitation strategies’. These strategies include: limit setting: where a limit is 
put on the amount of costs the DMU will incur from the project before it quits; removing 
the initial decision maker(s) immediately after the decision is made, so as to lessen 
justification motives; reducing the price of goal failure for the DMU as long as the 
decision-making procedures were prudent; changing the frame in which information is 
reported; and improved procedures for both the reporting of negative feedback and 
predicting the likelihood of future success. While improving procedures is likely to be 
beneficial for EoC behaviour situations, some of the recommendations may make the 
situation worse. 
                                               
187 D. Main and R. G. Rambo, ‘Avoiding Entrapment’, CPA Journal, Vol. 68, No. 3, 1998, pp. 24-28 
188 K. M. Kroll, ‘Rising Above Sunk Costs’, Industry Week, Vol. 249, No. 14, 2000, p. 19 
189 S. Nathanson et al., ‘Toward the Reduction of Entrapment’, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, Vol. 
12, No. 3, 1982, pp. 193-208 
190 Barton et al., ‘An Empirical Test of Staw and Ross’s Prescription…’ 
191 I. Simonson and B. M. Staw, ‘De-Escalation Strategies: A Comparison of Techniques for Reducing 
Commitment to Losing Courses of Action’, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 77, No. 4, 1992, pp. 
419-426 
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should be ceased; because the DMU feels it is allowed to. Removing the DMU from the 
decision context after it has made the initial decision may also increase the likelihood of 
EoC behaviour in that because the new DMU feels less responsible for the initial 
decision, and thus less accountable for its result, it may become more reckless in its 
decision making choices than the original DMU would behave in justifying the original 
decision. However, a group DMU may react differently in this situation. What is more 
interesting to consider is that if the new DMU chooses to escalate commitment, rationally 
or recklessly at least once, it would now inherit some of the responsibility for the action 
continuing. This would engender genuine justification motives in the new DMU and may 
defeat the goal of changing the DMU initially. One solution may be to change the DMU 
after each choice to escalate commitment. This could cause a loss of connection with the 
project, its employees and stakeholders as well as a potential loss of information during 
each transition. Reducing the price paid for unavoidable failures that occurred despite a 
DMU following procedures would likely reduce more ‘irrational’ EoC behaviour. 
Removing too much punishment however, and putting the emphasis strictly on obeying 
procedures, may make the DMU uninventive in the face of a setback and too willing to 
quit. Framing that is skewed too positively or negatively may make the DMU escalate. 
Attempting to present feedback neutrally is to be praised. However, converting overly 
positive or negative framed information too far the other way in an attempt to reduce EoC 
behaviour may be as bad as if the information was left alone. 
Although limitation strategies are predominantly applicable to this heading, some 
limitation techniques like limit setting and framing may occur even when the DMU is not 
part of an organisation. Moreover, at least some limitation strategies could encourage 
EoC behaviour in unattainable situations as well as potentially attainable ones. Limitation 
strategies form an important building block of EoC behaviour research. Although the 
strategies have been used here to illustrate only how they may backfire to actually 
encourage EoC behaviour, they do deserve further study and research in their own right. 
Although beyond the scope of this research, these strategies may be subject to several of 
the issues discussed in chapters six and seven, including the probability that further, 
undiscovered, limitation strategies may exist. It is hoped that this thesis will encourage 
discovery of new strategies as well as sparking dialogue regarding how well the existing 
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strategies actually work. It is also contended that these actions will then proceed to 




Agency Theory dictates that the DMU (the agent) may commit an action when it 
serves its own goals despite harming the larger organisation. It is suggested here then, 
that the DMU may escalate commitment when such escalation serves the DMU’s goals, 
despite it damaging the organisation (the principal). This could occur in several 





Like external binding, according to Staw and Ross,192
Two prescriptive arguments have been explored here in response to the issues 
outlined in chapters six and seven: an investigation of the interpretations of concepts 
important to EoC behaviour, with input from this thesis’ author, culminating in a working 
definition of each, and a ‘summative’ determinant framework, again with input from the 
author. It is contended that these two approaches will assist in improving the state of EoC 
behaviour research in a number of ways. Aside from the obvious benefits of a working 
definition of important concepts and a complete summary of all EoC behaviour research, 
 organisations too can become 
bound to a particular project, believing that the project represents the organisation to the 
outside world. The loss of such a project, the DMU feels, would damage the 
organisation’s reputation and influence. Thus, the DMU may feel internally pressured, or 
come under pressure, to continue with a failing, possibly even terminal, project because it 




                                               
192 Staw and Ross, ‘Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents…’, p. 62 
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one of the most obvious ways is by promoting and assisting future research and future 
research direction. (1) Personal opinions and multiple understandings of concepts and 
framework determinants, (2) new facets, (3) the existence and effectiveness of limitation 
techniques, (4) the possible relationships between some determinants, (5) goal 
conditions, (6) the proposed ‘situational applicability’ of each determinant, (7) the 
numerous potential ‘likelihood of success’ conditions under which EoC behaviour can be 
applied,193
                                               
193 An aspect of this situation which has not been explicitly examined in this chapter is how resource 
investment levels correspond to the ‘attainability status’ of a situation. That is to say, it should be inferred 
in this chapter that the attainability status of a situation is the ‘best case scenario’ and applicable only if 
reinvestment is at or above the level needed for said attainability status. However, one could envisage a 
situation where, depending upon differing reinvestment levels, the attainability of a situation could shift 
gradually. This would be especially true if ‘time’ was a goal condition and low reinvestment levels meant 
that an action could not be completed in the given time condition. Thus the goal would not be attainable 
in the sense of the goal condition of time not being met. This is a complex situation, and not explained 
easily in a footnote, and deserves the future scrutiny of EoC behaviour researchers. 
 and (8) the framework structure for example, will all hopefully promote future 
research. More usefully however, they will also hopefully promote research direction; 
that is EoC behaviour authors all researching similar aspects of EoC behaviour. It is 
hoped thus that a research nexus will be created so that academics will all be researching 
similar elements of EoC behaviour. This is felt to be important for the future prosperity of 
EoC behaviour research. The following chapter investigates further the utility of these 




This chapter discusses the core findings of the hypotheses, objectives and research 
question and through this process evaluates their ‘validity’. The effectiveness of the 
research approach is also reflected upon here, leading to an examination of aspects of the 
approach which, with hindsight, would have been changed. Finally, the priorities for 
future Escalation of Commitment (EoC) behaviour research are addressed. 
 
9.1 The Findings of Hypothesis One, Objectives One and Two and Hypothesis Two 
 
The preceding study has demonstrated that EoC behaviour research does indeed 
suffer from a number of ‘issues’. For the sake of presenting these issues in a fresh light 
here; it could be argued that each issue, according to its nature, belongs in a particular 
‘category’. This is an especially useful viewpoint to take when addressing the issues’ 
causes and effects. Chapter seven uses the ‘category perspective’ by labelling each issue 
as immediate, intermediate or overriding. However, given that these labels are discussed 
there in terms of what could be termed their ‘causative strength’, ‘tier’ would be a better 
term here, to demonstrate the hierarchical purpose of the labelling, where – expressed 
simplistically here – the overriding issues at the top trickle down their consequences, 
causing the intermediate and immediate issues. Yet, these issues are not only classified in 
plain hierarchical terms; a strong chronological aspect is argued to exist regarding issue 
cause and effect in the history of EoC behaviour research too, in chapter seven. Thus, the 
issues can not only be viewed in terms of their atemporal hierarchical position, but also 
their chronological hierarchical position. 
But what of the nature of the issues beyond their ‘causative strength’? Again, for 
the purpose of presenting the issues in a fresh light, the underlying nature of all the issue 
types can be understood by looking at the overriding issues. Chapter seven describes the 
scope and complexity of EoC behaviour theory and the quantity of EoC behaviour 
research as overriding issues. Yet perhaps the most serious and controversial overriding 
issue is ‘poor quality research technique’. This issue gives this thesis a somewhat 
reproachful tone; where other EoC behaviour authors are argued to be responsible for the 
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theory’s problems. Yet, this is simply the conclusion the evidence lends itself to: the 
issues recognised in the thesis include, and are the products of, scope, complexity, 
quantity and poor author research technique. Yet, what of authors’ efforts to recognise 
the current situation and prescribe for it? Again – and representing another form of poor 
research technique – it is argued that a lack of recognition and prescription – or faulty 
versions of both, where they do occur – have allowed the current severe situation to 
emerge and perpetuate. Given what is argued above, it is the – possibly unnecessary – 
conclusion of this thesis that the state of EoC behaviour research and the theory itself is 
indeed ‘extremely poor’. 
 
9.2 Addressing the Research Question 
 
Given the stark conclusions of this thesis’ critical analysis section, a powerful 
prescriptive response was deemed necessary. The response could be divided into four 
core facets. The first element is a ‘passive’ one, insofar as it is suggests that the thesis 
will significantly assist EoC behaviour authors, simply by being acknowledged by them, 
in that it will generate recognition – meaning entirely new awareness, confirmation or a 
combination of both of these – of the issues raised here. Consequently, it is suggested that 
this passive element may also guide authors as to the prevention of the perpetuation of 
the current situation, through making them aware of the hazards of current research 
patterns, as well as encouraging them to research the issues further, to discover new 
origins for these issues and to discover new issues entirely. An essential component of 
this passive measure is the requirement of EoC behaviour researchers to perpetuate this 
thesis’ recognition of the issues of EoC behaviour research in their work, through in-text 
warnings and/or actual studies on the issues themselves. Clearly, this requirement 
exploits and manipulates the current EoC behaviour author trend of issue perpetuation. 
This component is ‘essential’ because this thesis’ findings will not reach their target 
audience directly and so must be disseminated virally by research that directly references 
the thesis and acknowledges the valuable effect of such recognition and perpetuation. Yet 
this passive response was deemed inadequate in isolation; recovery of EoC behaviour 
research would not be ‘automatic’ in reply to merely presenting the facts and waiting. 
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Indeed it was determined that EoC behaviour research stood the best chance of recovery 
through a further ‘three edged’ response, represented by the terms prescription, 
integration and direction. These three approaches are tiered insofar as they work from the 
ground up. 
The core conceptual difficulties discovered in the study were tackled first, by 
discussing each concept and its various interpretations; ultimately arriving at a 
prescribed, summative, mutually acceptable definition. Regarding some concepts 
however, no exploration has occurred previously and thus only the author’s perspectives, 
opinions and definition were explored. The next approach – integration – involved 
creating a summative EoC behaviour framework nucleus which gathered together all 
determinants from all EoC behaviour research to date and presented the multiple 
understandings of some determinants, where they existed. Yet crucially, ‘new facets’ 
were also introduced in this framework; basically, ideas by the author for new 
determinants or ‘differently applied’ existing ones. The framework also restructured 
Staw’s framework, upon which it is based, to accommodate, among other things, the new 
facets and the new understanding of the Decision Making Unit (DMU) types at work in 
EoC behaviour situations. These two approaches taken together will, it is argued, produce 
benefits typical to those provided by working definitions and complete frameworks and 
research histories and, specifically, will improve the state of EoC behaviour research. 
Crucially however it is contended that the two approaches will also ‘produce’ the final 
restorative approach: direction; insofar as encouraging and assisting future research and 
future research direction; the latter meaning EoC behaviour authors all researching 
similar aspects of EoC behaviour contemporarily; something which is felt to be key for 
the future prosperity of EoC behaviour research. 
 
9.3 Reflecting on the Research Approach 
 
Both the lex parsimoniae methodology and the structure adopted to fulfil the aims 
of the thesis worked well. In particular, the logical structure of the thesis permitted a 
complex analysis to be suitably set out and expressed. Certainly, both elements would be 
used again. However, the author is not without regrets, and it is deemed a requirement 
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here – given the criticism of other authors in this thesis – to discuss these. Aside from the 
limitations of the thesis, there is one element that would be changed if the study was to be 
repeated: the level of analysis that was undertaken in some areas of the thesis. It was 
always the intention of this thesis to balance information with clarity. Chapter seven, for 
example excluded the examination of the complex hypothetical connections between the 
issues – which was ‘doable’ and was actually performed in earlier thesis drafts – to 
concentrate on presenting more clearly the importance of the overriding issues. However, 
in chapter eight, for example, although the analysis is deemed useful, it is thought that 
some aspects should have been left at a more superficial level in order to aid overall 
understanding. As a mea culpa, the reasons this did not occur are related to vanity and the 
desire not to leave unwritten, arguments that could be made by other authors in the 
future. As an aside, the limiting of the entire hypothetical relationship examination – 
which created a framework of the relationship types (including cyclical, direct, indirect 
and single and multiple cause/effect issues) – generated a large amount of cognitive 
dissonance, given the significant amount of sunk costs that were invested in the research 
(approximately six weeks of work). However, it is hoped that this, and other excluded 




The overall conclusion of this thesis is that both hypotheses have been proven, both 
objectives have been explored effectively and the research question has been adequately 
addressed. Clearly, numerous issues remain to be investigated, including many 
concerning the framework and the concepts exploration but also the actual validity of the 
solutions – in terms of their overall approach – that ultimately emerged, as well as 
numerous investigative avenues regarding the proposed issues which precipitated such 
solutions in the first place. However, this ‘concentrated’ thesis has reached its 
investigative limit; owing not only to time, space and methodological practicality 
(especially relevant to the ‘historiographical’ elements) but also to significant ‘consensus 
gaps’ and ‘success measurement factors’ that can only be bridged by future research 
(especially relevant to elements of the solutions proposed and to validating the very 
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solution approach adopted). Thus, it is the responsibility of practitioners of future EoC 
behaviour research, including this author, to ‘carry the torch’. 
With particular regard to future EoC behaviour historiographical research; authors 
should, as a priority, examine further and attempt to establish empirically the 
hypothesised relationships between the proposed immediate, intermediate and overriding 
issues. This process would, however, be lengthy, laborious and arguably subjective. In 
tandem with this approach, future research should also measure if and by how much EoC 
behaviour research has improved; specifically in relation to the uptake of this thesis 
among EoC behaviour authors in their future works. If both theoretical improvement and 
recognition of this thesis are observed then this would suggest that the prescriptive 
techniques put forward here are on the right track; although this lemma would depend 
strongly upon the context of how this thesis was used in this future research. Uptake is a 
subjective term here, given that this thesis argues for other authors to spread the message 
spelt out in this study, not just to adopt this thesis in isolation as the ‘bible’ of how to fix 
EoC behaviour research. Furthermore, such improvement – coupled with said uptake – 
could be agued to support, or ‘indirectly validate’, a number of other arguments made in 
this thesis, including those which shaped the ‘format’ of the solutions. 
Overall, this thesis has both built significantly upon existing empirical EoC 
behaviour research and provided a solid base upon which both future historiographical 
and empirical EoC behaviour research can be located. EoC behaviour research has 
moved on appreciably since it was first envisaged1
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